Unilateral Ceasefire

Even prior to his inauguration, President Poroshenko repeatedly made clear that there would be no negotiation with armed groups active in eastern Ukraine.

Like almost every national leader and leadership, he has taken the time-honoured position that irregular armed groups fighting on its territory are not to be negotiated with – despite Kremlin insistence that Ukraine do so.

If he did it would be very likely to create something of a frozen conflict similar to that of Transnistria.  That in turn having the effect of preventing Ukraine heading toward full European integration, effectively anchoring it where it is.

Perhaps that Transnistrian outcome will happen anyway with a little Kremlin planning and assistance.  Whether that plan will ultimately come to fruition or not remains an open question.

Regardless, President Poroshenko’s plan began at 10 pm last night.

A unilateral ceasefire – with the exception of self-defence – came into force for the Ukrainian military, expiring at 10 am on Friday 27th June.

The military time table clearly being set by the political time table as President Poroshenko will be signing the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement on 27th June too.  Ergo he meets with many national leaders at the conclusion of this unilateral ceasefire,  having given those armed and actively engaged against the Ukrainian army 7 days to disarm and/or leave Ukrainian territory should they wish to do so.  Amnesty offered to those who have not been responsible for serious incidents or crimes should they decide to stay.

Thereafter, it seems very clear that should there be those who do not lay down their weapons and continue their fighting with the Ukrainian army, will be killed or captured and jailed.

Only once fighting has ended will the vast majority of the presidential plan then unfold.

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office calls on all sides to support Ukraine ceasefire to pave the way to implement peace plan http://t.co/cbNYdiRM5P

— OSCE (@OSCE) June 20, 2014

As it has been abundantly clear that this plan was not and is not a plan that is intended to engage the Ukrainian leadership in any form of direct dialogue with those irregular groups armed and fighting against it – as is standard globally – one can only presume that The Kremlin is deliberately misreading the plan put forward by President Poroshenko when it stated yesterday:

“This is not an invitation to peace and negotiations but an ultimatum to militias in the southeast of Ukraine to lay down their arms.”

To be blunt, The Kremlin would never negotiate with armed and active  irregular militias on Russian soil – and nor would anybody expect it to either.

No such negotiations were or are likely to take place with armed and active irregular militias.

It therefore follows that yes, that prerequisite is an ultimatum to some – or it is an opportunity for those who will take it – before the rest of the plan, which can be reasonably interpreted as an invitation to peace and negotiation, can effectively begin.  Firstly however that ultimatum/opportunity need be resolved – one way or the other.

Whilst it is very unlikely that many amongst the irregular forces will take up the offer, the offer has been made.  The consequences of taking it up – or not – are fairly clear, both militarily and politically, domestically and regionally.

Few will be expecting much to come of it, and perhaps nothing will come of it.  But that the offer has been made matters for what comes next.

Preparing for the Kremlin cacophony

In exactly 7 days from now, Ukraine will have signed the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement with the EU – short of anything incapacitating happening to President Poroshenko over the next 168 hours or so.

As such there can be no doubt that the cacophony currently bellowing from The Kremlin will intensify in orders of magnitude, however that noise and posturing manifests itself.  Earplugs and calming deep breathing exercises required from Ukraine over what will be a deliberately intense psychologically challenging week.

It is not a question of what to expect – it is a question of expecting everything and anything and meeting it with a determined calm.

Another Russian military build up (of lesser size) on Ukrainian borders?  Probably.  Threats of entering Ukraine under the guise of an ill-fitting R2P or “unilateral peacekeeping”?  Possibly.  Brinkmanship on the border by regular Russian troops – pushing matters to the very brink?  Expected.

Desperate attempts to get a UN Resolution passed critical of Ukraine in some way, shape or form?  Undoubtedly.

Creating the impression of officially considering recognising the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics?  Maybe.

A massive increase in propaganda?  Of course – and something that unfortunately tends to mask some genuine failings by Ukrainian leadership within a sea mostly of spurious nonsense.  In a sense somewhat self-defeating, but now with no holds barred considering EU-Ukrainian signatures are all-but guaranteed to occur.

Failed – if any – attempts to resolve the gas issue over the next week?  A given.  No immediate rush.

Yet more fighters and weaponry crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine?  Absolutely – probably in their droves and ever increasingly technical and devastating equipment.

A pronounced increase of the most intense fighting in eastern Ukraine? – Yes, and by extension with chance of the President’s 14 point peace plan getting past point 1 next week.

The list of possible/probable socio-economic issues is endless – import issues, introduction of Visas, quality problems etc – to be expected.

There is no need to go on – the picture painted should be clear enough.

Throughout all of this, there is little Ukraine can do except stay calm, grin and bear it, dealing with these issues as well as possible over this short time frame.

No matter how bad it gets during the next week, the Europeans and US will probably think long and hard regarding the next level of sanctions prior to any signing.  Presenting The Kremlin with a fete accompli prior to any signing poses significant risks.

The appearance of a very bleak week (and immediate future) will manifest itself – for that is the appearance some vested interests need to project.

Howeer, once this time has passed and agreements are signed, Ukraine then has options over some very significant issues to The Kremlin that can have almost immediate effects – but the time for such negotiations is after the signing of EU agreements.

As an example, it can immediately chop up the behemoth that is Naftogaz, splitting it into several distinct and legally isolated parts.  A key to that will be to entirely separate the GTS from the other dismembered pieces.

Thereafter it can begin a process to integrate within the European Energy Community as a priority – 2 years(ish) to accomplish as a guesstimate.  In doing so, it not only begins to clean up the Ukrainian energy sector – probably the most corrupt of all sectors – but also hinders/deprives The Kremlin clique of their corrupt earnings from energy supply to Ukraine too.

With South Stream currently stalled and that will eventually run through some of the EU’s most corrupt Member States, a drop in corrupt revenue will not be particularly appreciated amongst the elite within the Russian energy sector.

There is then the Ukrainian defence, space, R&D, aviation sectors etc., that Russia currently relies upon Ukraine within.

The next week is very likely to test the patience and nerves of many, as The Kremlin cacophony and posturing reaches a crescendo.

What comes after the 27th June and the signing of agreements with the EU by Ukraine (and Moldova and Georgia) will be the real question.

Certainly The Kremlin will not see losing this battle as losing the war – but how to turn the tide back in their favour?  Thus far every aggressive and/or punitive action – be it direct or indirect, overt or covert – has done nothing but further alienate those to whom they have been applied.

Whatever The Kremlin thought it could beat out of Ukraine with assorted policy and tactical sticks, it has succeeded only in beating it further in.  Certainly with the illegal annexation of Crimea there is no trust and little appetite for any Kremlin carrots anymore either.

7 days from now, in all probability at the time of writing, the question of Ukrainian direction will be signed and sealed – but it raises further unanswered questions as to the Kremlin response over the short and medium term – and how that response will manifest itself.

Nevertheless, between now and then, earplugs and Valium for the faint of heart may not be a bad idea, for the Kremlin cacophony and posturing will become incredibly intense.

 

Voluntary dissolution? – The RADA

One month ago the constitutional issues relating to early RADA dissolution and elections were outlined in this fairly long entry – illuminating the fact it was not a simple matter for President Poroshenko to accomplish without some “engineering”.

“Thus any such early termination would therefore have to be “engineered” to fit – somehow. Not the ideal way to start a presidency, either in practice or by way of external perceptions any such “engineering” will generate.

If that were not enough, some resistance to early RADA elections from currently sitting RADA MPs is assured from almost all quarters except Klitschko’s UDAR and Poroshenko’s Solidarity….”

That being the case, what “engineering” has occurred?

Today, a Bill has been submitted to the RADA to vote for its own voluntarily dissolution.  That Bill submitted by UDAR – which should come as no surprise given the above quote.

Will enough MP’s back the Bill – or will there need to be further “engineering” behind the scenes before another attempt?

If such a vote for dissolution can be accomplished fairly swiftly, new RADA elections could be timed to coincide with the local elections on 26th October, saving no small amount of public funds.

Cold War or Cold Peace?

Ukraine faces a choice in its future relations with Russia.  The bloody shenanigans in eastern Ukraine will not go on forever in the form they currently manifest themselves – though shenanigans will continue in differing forms.

Oplot, The Russian Orthodox Army and the Vostok Battalion – the three major anti-government paramilitary groups active in eastern Ukraine have varying degrees of allegiance to self proclaimed leaders such as Denys Pushylin of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”.  Those allegiances ranging from tepid to almost non-existent currently.

Whether Pushylin’s on-going visit to Moscow will change that remains to be seen.  Will his meetings with Babakov, Matviyenko, Glazyev and Zhirinovsky change the minds of the paramilitary commanders of these units?  It seems doubtful, as he is missing one or two paymasters whose political interests will ultimately require Mr Pushylin to get out of the way.

In fact, some would question the loyalty of some paramilitaries to the very concept of the Donetsk or Luhansk People’s Republics.  Those with a preferred ideologically based geopolitical outcome look toward a Novorussia or Russian annexation.  Thus some on-lookers question whether the specific individual DPR and LPR entities exist outside of the minds of a very small circle of people, such as Denys Pushylin.  The “buy in” even amongst the paramilitaries for these two distinct entities is very small.

With Russian annexation unlikely to come any time soon – if ever, and in-fighting between self-appointed leaders frequent, the creation of Novorussia seems some way off.  Internal battles for power must be first settled.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian military is gradually making in-roads.  The priority now being the recapture and control of the national border with Russia – which it is doing, albeit rather slowly.  It is to be hoped that the Russian and Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsmen are successful in setting up humanitarian corridors as recently discussed.

Once that is completed, after yesterday’s RADA vote with 261 votes in favour, Ukraine will unilaterally demarcate its border with both Russia and Transnistria.

Belarus, it would seem, is deemed to present far less of a threat – quite probably rightly.  Would President Lukashenko willingly and knowingly allow his territory to be used as a transitory route for weaponry and paramilitary fighters to pass through en route Ukraine in large numbers?

Naturally, Crimea does not need demarcation when Kyiv considers it remains Ukraine.

Thus, this RADA law having passed yesterday evening, now provides that within the month, Ukrainian unilateral border demarcation occurs.  The expectation of many checkpoints being closed is a reasonable one.

As President Poroshenko has stated “‘Ukraine is in a state of war. This is a new type of warfare–with use of professional subversive groups, mercenaries'” – we can expect requests to the EU and UN for border control assistance to be forthcoming and frequent.  Whether any such assistance comes – and in what form – remains to be seen.

It seems, in the absence of any truly unexpected event (over and above the continued large number of fighters and weaponry crossing into eastern Ukraine) that President Poroshenko will sign the AA/DCFTA on 27th June together with his Georgian and Moldavian counterparts, come what may.

On the presumption that this will be ratified by all parties fairly swiftly to the angst of The Kremlin, combined with some success as stemming the flow of weaponry and fighters into eastern Ukraine, the question then arises as to the true nature of any future political Russia-Ukraine relations for decades into the future.

Will some form of Cold Peace be reached?  If so it will require Ukraine to declare military neutrality (no to NATO) and acceptance of the Crimean situation/annexation at the very least.  If Ukraine is not prepared to robustly and permanently rule out joining such an alliance in the future, or accept the annexation of Crimea, then a Cold Peace is not workable, and a Cold War of sorts between the two nations looks to be the only option on the horizon (short of full scale conventional war).

The Cold War of sorts would appear to be the most likely at present.

Viewed through that lens, how likely is it that the much talked about “wall” – two meters (six-feet) high, 25-30 cm (10-12 inches) thick wall of reinforced steel, complete with electronic alarms, trenches and minefields – will actually be constructed along the Ukrainian-Russian border?  A fantasy or a reality about to manifest?

It wouldn’t be the first such wall in human history – but it would certainly bring about a very physical reminder to all of what will be a Cold War of sorts that seems likely to exist between the two nations very, very shortly and for some time to come.

Ukraine (finally) stops military contracts with Russia

Much has been written in the media and cyberspace regarding the uninterrupted sale of two Mistral class amphibious assault ships by France to Russia, given on-going events in Ukraine.

Perhaps somewhat unfair on the French, considering the Ukrainian military contracts with Russia have continued.  Only yesterday, did Ukraine itself – with immediate effect – suspend its military contracts with Russia.

Somewhat duplicitous to expect EU nations to cancel contracts with The Kremlin in support of Ukraine, whilst Ukraine continued to fulfill their contracts with those acting aggressively toward it.

An expensive decision for Ukraine undoubtedly – but it is a nation that if it is to even partially fulfill its preferred course, will have to make more and more similar decisions where purported values and existing economic interests will often be forced to disagreeably converge over the next few years.

 

Events, trends, norms and containing corruption

Away from all the tragic and bloody headlines dominating the domestic and international media regarding Ukraine, other unreported interesting events are occurring in Ukraine.

To begin this entry, there is a  need to place a few jigsaw pieces together, and then describe an incident that occurred a few days ago, that will in turn then lead to the core of this entry.

Firstly, to deal with the jigsaw pieces.

A gentleman called Georgie Yaroshenko who stood – unsuccessfully – as an UDAR candidate for the Dnepropetrovsk City Council has a very close and visible business relationship with Valery Ishchenko.

Valery Ishchenko is the man behind Pivdenny Bank, one of the larger banks in Ukraine.  He also owns shopping centers, retail chains etc.  Mr Ishchenko is also an UDAR Deputy in the RADA.  More than that he was/is also a fairly major financier of the UDAR party.

It follows therefore, that he has a  fairly close relationship with Vitaly Klitshchko, leader of UDAR and now Mayor of Kyiv.

All of these men are well acquainted with Valentin Nalyvaychenko, the current head of the SBU.

By extension, all of the aforementioned are therefore firmly behind President Poroshenko.  Any nefarious smell that arises within this jigsaw puzzle has the potential to affect all concerned in some way, shape, or form.  The public presumption of guilty by association remains alive and well.

On 13th June I tweeted:

A bad smell is about to engulf Georgie Yaroshenko & Valery Ishchenko – which with then drift around Klitschko & UDAR if they aren’t careful.

— Nikolai Holmov (@OdessaBlogger) June 13, 2014

Explaining no more at the time, it was therefore left somewhat cryptic.  It is necessary to expand on the tweet a little now, without going into excruciating detail – there is no need, as interesting as the detail actually is.

Mr Yaroshencko called a meeting of all brokerage and import/export companies in southern and eastern Ukraine at a hotel called Bartolomeo in Dnepropetrovsk.  He then proceeded to inform all concerned that he will be the node that issues all necessary documentation for all such business – be it white, grey or black in nature.  He had been to Crimea during late April – early May, and struck the necessary agreements with those now in charge there (how patriotic?)  Any questions? – You all know who I am connected to, etc., etc.

Only one gentleman from Odessa spoke up – naturally – he had little choice.  One of Odessa’s most high profile organised criminals is now the Mayor, and he has long standing interests in the nefarious goings-on at Odessa ports.  That is unsurprisingly when you consider his connection to one of Ukraine’s most infamous mafia men “Angel” that goes back to the early 1990s.  Any new such scheme would clearly go head to head with the long standing interests of both of these “aggressive Odessa businessmen”.

That no others present raised any issues, presumably all were accepting of the new corrupt scheme to be installed.

What transpired next by way of telephone calls is very interesting – but not for repeating.  Suffice to say a smelly issue for Mr Yaroshchenko and under whose patronage he was peddling his corrupt scheme, was now wafting through the air with numerous witnesses having breathed it in.

Hence the somewhat cryptic tweet a few days ago, inferring UDAR, Mr Klitshcko etc., would need to act – 140 characters is simply not enough for the tale above.

Anyway, those around Messrs Yaroshchenko and Ishchenko did indeed act – the very next day.

Not only has the SBU been tasked with investigating the matter personally by both President Poroshenko and SBU chief, Vitaly Klitshcko has made it clear to Mr Ishchenko that if there is a case, he is expected to resign his RADA seat – and has received such an assurance that a resignation will be forthcoming.

It appears in this particular case, being a very close business associate of the man who finances UDAR, Mr Klitschko and stands behind the President and SBU Chief, will not save Mr Yaroshchenko from criminal proceedings – nor will it save Mr Ishchenko from losing his UDAR Deputy’s seat, a party financier or not.

The powers that currently be have been swift to go after two of their own.

How this event will effect the internal workings of UDAR – for Mr Ishchenko will obviously have many friends amongst UDAR – remains to be seen.

It is rather depressing that there are those actively seeking to create new nefarious schemes from within the ranks of a fairly unsullied political party – fairly unsullied because it has not had the time to fully sully itself thus far.

More broadly though, the leadership response also raises the issue for many amongst the corrupted, that if this is how those behind the president are dealt with, how much faith can those who are not behind him have when manipulating the system to create corrupt mechanisms and get away with it?

Another question therefore, if those engaged in new or on-going corrupt acts are to be rightly dealt with this way – what do you do with those who have engaged in corruption historically?  How far back do you go?  What level of corruption do you tackle and what do you leave alone?

Probably the most sensible answer is to go after the most serious national corruption and (also some) high profile cases – if the two are not naturally combined.   Add to that instructions to regional PGOs to go after half a dozen notable cases in each Oblast, and one hundred or so cases that will get the attention of the public across every part of the nation appear.

A case load the regional courts can cope with and that can also be observed by international observers, media and civil society for reasons of transparency and diligence to due process presents itself.  Perhaps wishful thinking – or perhaps a similar suggestion will emerge from the Presidential Administration over the coming months.

However the issue will be dealt with in the future, the response to this particular event, in comparison to how matters would have been handled under all previous administrations, is something of a bright spark in an otherwise historically very dark place.

But it remains a single event.

It may be the first event in what becomes a trend – or it may not.  Such a trend may become the norm – or it may not.

That a single event garnering such a response can momentarily be seen as a spark so bright, sadly illustrates what a dark place certain parts of Ukrainian life are – but everything has to start somewhere.

The question is whether this is indeed a start of something notable, or whether it is a single spark that will soon be smothered and forgotten.

Martial Law – Yes or No?

It seems highly likely that MP Sergei Sobolev – Batkivshchyna Party – is going to submit a Bill to the RADA relating to the creation and implementation of Martial Law in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts this coming week.

Thus far, prior to, and since his inauguration, President Poroshenko has resisted such a move – making no mention of it in his address to the nation yesterday.

However, that does not mean unfolding events have not changed his position despite him not orating any such shift  thus far.  As previously written, currently his peace plan faces some obstacles.

Will Martial Law be declared in the east?

Any forthcoming appeals from officials to local residents to leave the area will probably provide the best clue over the next few days. If so then it is hoped that plans are in place to deal with the displaced – as well as those prevented from leaving who would have done so if they could.

This, together with an already known Ukrainian drive to retake control of its borders with Russia will be the two major military issues to keep an eye on next week.

Expect a visible Kremlin response.

 

An unhappy week for Gazprom

Yesterday was not the best of days for Gazprom.

It was first hit by a Lithuanian record fine of $48.2 million, then announcing it would leave the Lithuanian market – an announcement met with glee by the Lithuanian authorities who swiftly bought out Gazprom via two State owned entities for $191.7 million.

Secondly, Ukraine announced that with effect from Monday 16th June it was going to stop buying Russian gas, whilst taking the on-going disagreements between parties to the Stockholm court of Arbitration.

Then came US State Department statements via Marie Harf that Russia had not only allowed tanks through its territory enabling them to enter the territory of Ukraine – but the tanks were indeed Russian Federation tanks supplied to those adverse to Kyiv.

All of this against the backdrop of Bulgaria – and by extension Serbia – ceasing work on the South Stream 2 days before yesterday’s events.

Whether or not broader sector (rather than personal) sanctions follow from the US or not – the combination of these instances seems unlikely to have a positive effect on Gazprom when trading starts again on Monday.