Archive for November, 2015

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Shokin appoints Nazar Holodnitskogo as Anti-Corruption Prosecutor

November 30, 2015

On 30th November, the untrusted (unless you are President Poroshenko), Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin finally appointed the long awaited Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, the appointment coming the day before President Poroshenko stated the office must finally begin work.  (Thus Mr Shokin could delay matters no longer.

The successful applicant, following a long, public and reasonably transparent process is Nazar Holodnitskogo.

shokinMr Holodonitskogo has a lot to do – but then he has a lot to go at.  He and his team are certainly not lacking work.

This appointment will naturally get all the headlines – and perhaps rightly so.  It will certainly bring about headlines in the weeks and months ahead.

However, perhaps just as importantly, Mr Shokin also gave approval to some much needed structural changes within the PGO too.

The General Inspectorate of Internal Investigations (the office now responsible for prosecuting prosecutors and investigators) has been born, with an action plan, and the appointment of  Maxim Melnichenko was also made.  Mr Melnichenko will report to the very good Deputy Prosecutor General David Sakvarelidze (which he actually does already in a different role).

All in all, two very promising occurrences within an otherwise discouraging Prosecutor General’s Office.

Yet one question remains regarding these events.  Mr Shokin’s appointment of Mr Holodonitskogo was from a choice of the two final candidates from a lengthy process to insure individual moral courage and fortitude both past and present.  The other finalist was Maxim Grischuk (who would have been your author’s choice).

It simply cannot be that Mr Grischuk does not take a senior position within the PGO having passed the public “corruption smell test” with flying colours, and the professional qualifications/ability test of a large panel of experts.  An honest prosecutor simply cannot be wasted.

What now for a good man called Maxim Grischuk?

It is perhaps only right to acknowledge the tremendous external (international) political and diplomatic energy expended that has forced these changes upon President Poroshenko, and thus within the Prosecutor General’s Office.  That energy will need to be maintained of course – not only in insuring these new appointments and their departments can work freely of political (and Mr Shokin’s nefarious) interference, but also in seeing through the complete reconstruction of the institution and the changing of the guard within.

Nevertheless, rapid sweeping reforms and some headlining prosecutions in 2016 are required – and perhaps they will come too!

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Klimkin to attend DCFTA trilateral talks 1 December

November 30, 2015

It’s been a month since the last entry was made regarding the trilateral talks between Ukraine, the EU and Russia surrounding the bilateral Association Agreement and DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU.

On 1st December another round of talks occurs some 30 days prior to the full implementation of the agreement between the EU and Ukraine – this time Ukrainian Foreign Minister Klimkin will be attending – for reasons as yet unknown (as the lest few rounds of talks have been at “expert/technical level).

Klimkin

Perhaps he is expecting one last Kremlin onslaught, one last high-stakes attempt at blackmail (of either bilateral party), or maybe some details of where The Kremlin sanctions against Ukraine will manifest – or it is probably better stated, what will actually be exempted The Kremlin sanctions so Ukraine can prepare the reciprocal actions.  Ukraine is after all, far beyond caring about the sensitivities of the Kremlin.

(It should be anticipated that if and when Ukraine gets Visa-Free short term visitor status for its citizenry, The Kremlin will cancel that status for Ukrainians in the “spirit” of reciprocity.)

As the above linked entry stated – “A large scale trade embargo toward Ukraine is all but assured by a Kremlin that perhaps still believes it can beat, threaten and coerce the current Ukrainian direction out of it – when instead with every such act, it simply beats that choice further in.

The question therefore, is how long will any such Kremlin instigated embargo upon Ukrainian goods last? The answer will be in years – but how many?

A glance at the 1990’s would suggest that as a petulant and truculent Kremlin embargoed almost all trade with the eastern European and Baltic States as they swiftly stepped out from under The Kremlin shadow, they rapidly redirected their trade flows. Naturally a free trade agreement with the EU, let alone the deep and comprehensive one that comes into force, means that Ukraine will have little option but to make the most of that opportunity (and other opportunities outside of Europe). Those certain Ukrainian businessmen that pre-war in The Donbas who would have tried to slow such a process due to their trade interests with Russia, having seen them dramatically effected by Kremlin sponsored events in the east, will also be forced to look to other markets during the (likely) forthcoming embargo years.

During the early 2000’s, similar Kremlin embargoes on Moldova and Georgia forced trade reorientation with Europe (and others) too.

The end result being that when The Kremlin relaxed and/or removed its imposed embargoes, pre-embargo trade levels never returned – with any of the nations involved.”

Is Mr Klimkin attending just in case Foreign Minister Lavrov turns up?  Thus far there is nothing in the Russian public realm that states he is attending – he probably has his hands full dealing with the latest self-inflicted Kremlin trade wounds with Turkey.  (To be sure Ukraine (and no doubt others) will do its very best to step into the Turkish trade vacuum the Kremlin sanctions and/or embargo opportunities present.)

Is Mr Klimkin’s attendance simply a symbolic statement to how seriously Ukraine takes the DCFTA issue, and with a mere 30 days prior to full implementation the Foreign Minister will attend the talks – despite there being no possible changes to the fully ratified agreements between Ukraine, the EU, and all governments of the Member States?

He is hardly attending because he happened to be in the neighbourhood (even if he did happen to be in the neighbourhood, for that’s not how these things work).

Thus it is a rather interesting announcement.

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Holodomor – A street with a million (+) names?

November 28, 2015

The problem with history, certainly when it comes to numbers, is often visualising the horrific loss of human life certain events cause – particularly those events that are “man-made”.

Most people can visualise a dead person, perhaps several.  Some can, and have seen, dozens at a time, occasionally hundreds.  Very few may have witnessed thousands of dead bodies in one place, but beyond that?

Be it any large war, the Holocaust, or the Holodomor, visualising millions and millions of dead is simply beyond comprehension.  The monuments we erect to commemorate such hideous outcomes are often simple and understated, and deliberately so out of somberness, respect and humility – but are therefore mostly forgotten until specific State appointed days of remembrance fall upon the societal calendar.

For how can there be a a monument of suitable scale that is commensurate to the sacrifices, or sacrificed?  How also to bring about remembrance in a more continuous subconsciousness within today’s society outside of the alloted day or hour?

There are museums of course, and libraries and the Internet – all accessible to many, but generally they too fail to adequately impress the sheer number of deaths involved in a manner that makes it digestible and comprehensible with any sense of lasting mental impression.

holodomor

As these events travel further back in time with each and every passing hour, clearly justice becomes more and more symbolic – as perpetrators and survivors alike reach the natural ending of their days without their day in court.  Justice it seems, is that those who died and/or survived be not forgotten – at least for one day in the year.

It is of course possible to begin belated investigations and perhaps even reach judicial outcomes to cover the events of the past to some degree, and thus to provide some sense of finding of guilt.  If with regard to the Holodomor, Ukraine was to follow the lead of Germany in its ruling against Demjanjuk, a guard at Sobibor, who was found guilty not of any specific act himself, but being part of the “extermination machinery“, then it follows perhaps that there be room to find guilt of Joseph Stalin, the leadership of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the time etc. The question that arises is how far throughout that murderous and repressive apparatus does one go, and/or what parts of the institutions are targeted (apart from the obvious like the political leadership and the NKVD)?

Thus far, with regard to the Holodomor about 800,000 victims have been positively identified amongst figures that range from 3 to 7 million.  No doubt yet more will eventually be identified, and eventually there will be a far more accurate, although never precise, figure reached regarding the actual death toll.

If the names of these known Holodomor victims were individually placed on the average sized cobble stone that makes up Deribasovskaya, the main pedestrian street in central Odessa, it would more than re-cobble the entire street – which thus returns the reader back to the issue of visualising the horrendous and horrific loss of life.

Initially in Germany, and then latterly across Europe, there is something called the Stolpersteine.  It is a project where commemorative stones are laid outside the last known addresses of Jewish victims prior to their deportation (and in most cases extermination).  There are tens of thousands of such stones laid across Europe, outside tens of thousands of addresses throughout Europe.  They are a daily reminder to those now living at the address and/or walking along that street of the dark past it once witnessed – rather than a statue in a pleasantly manicured public space seldom visited.

Imagine, however, all those Stolpersteine laid together along a single public street.

If it is not the graphic images of WWI and WWII in museums or on TV that seem to leave the greatest impact, but when visiting, it is the sight of miles upon miles of headstones in cemeteries across Flanders, Artois and beyond that do, what societal impact would a major Ukrainian street cobbled/paved with individual names of those victims of the Holodomor have on an every day, rather than annual, basis?

Perhaps one day Ukraine will embark upon its own Stolpersteine project and place individual stones outside the addresses of all those known victims of the Holodomor as a daily reminder for those that walk there – or perhaps it will make a bold statement of remembrance where the name of each victim literally stretches from one end of the street to the other.  With 800,000 identified victims from millions, it will have to be a very long street, and rather than being a street with no name, it would be a street of a million names (and more).  Perhaps the boldest act is more appropriate for the victims who will never see justice?  A matter for the authorities (if they ever think of it).

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It’s not the hours you put in – It’s what you put into the hours

November 28, 2015

Of the best bosses your author has every worked for, both have been women – and fearsome, professionally demanding, but quite brilliant women they were too – as is perhaps to be expected for those that reached lofty institutional heights within late 1970’s Britain.

One in particular was fond of stating “It’s not the hours you put in – It’s what you put into the hours” – and then continued to work all the hours God sent with incredible and unfailing insight, intuition and accuracy, setting an incredibly high standard for the mere cogs that made up the machinery of the department (such as you author).

That expression however, has remained within the consciousness of your author – albeit today with regard to the blog, it is more a case of “It’s not the minutes that are put in – It’s what is put into the minutes” when producing the daily dirge relating to Ukraine.

white rabbit

All of which brings about this latest statistical barrage relating to the first year’s activities of the Verkhovna Rada.

This convocation worked 89 days, as opposed to its predecessor’s 78.  Over 4780 draft laws or resolutions were submitted – 34% more than the previous convocation.  Of the draft laws and resolutions submitted, 1344 (28%) were actually considered, of which 765 were ultimately successful.

85% of the President’s submissions for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada were successful.  Only 33% of that submitted by the government got an affirmative nod, and a mere 14% made the grade from the MPs of the Verkhovna Rada.

Though the statistics go further and paint an interesting picture, for the purposes of this entry there is no need to go on.

The numbers are mind-boggling.  4780 draft laws and/or resolutions submitted – meaning MPs spent the time (or their boiler room staff and/or “sponsors” spent their time) crafting legal text just over 70% of which was clearly nonsense and not even worthy of serious committee consideration – and duly wasn’t.

Of the 1344 (or 28%) that was given committee time, 579 submissions were also dismissed by the relevant Verkhovna Rada Committees, or failed to garner sufficient votes amongst the parliamentarians to be successful.

What of the exceptionally large number of successful new laws (61%) or adopted resolutions (39%) – all 765 of them over the past 12 months?

Can the printers of legal tomes that adorn the libraries of advocates and notaries even attempt to keep up?  Can the legal system and those that work within it keep up?  What of the institutions of State or the regulators?  By way of example, and without listing all policy areas, there were 65 new successful Tax and Customs Bills, 63 relating to law enforcement, and 51 national security and defence – with another 586 across all other areas of governance, it seems pointless to list them all when the point has been made.

Have any of these newly adopted legal norms been effectively implemented?  If so, is anybody monitoring the effects?  In short, is the newly adopted legal prose working as intended – or is it ineffective, or worse proving to be counterproductive?

If most of the 765 adopted legalese has gone unimplemented, would repealing 765 existing laws have been more beneficial to the Ukrainian constituency instead?  Lord knows the Ukrainian statute book is replete with Soviet legacy legislative (and by extension bureaucratic) hangovers.

(On the subject of Soviet legacy nonsense, why is it still required to show an internal passport to buy a rail ticket from Odessa to Kyiv or Lviv, when it’s possible to drive there or get the bus to these cities without showing any ID?  That such flapdoodle and codswallop persists, and for what purpose other than to continue a Soviet hangover, who knows?)

Now there will be literally thousands and thousands (and thousands) of legislative changes required to facilitate the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU over the next decade – there is no denying this – but it is structured (for if the EU knows how to do anything, it knows how to do bureaucracy).  There are time scales for different areas of legislative integration.

Therefore, within such a framework with specific time lines there are obviously priorities, and it may be that the feckless Ukrainian parliamentarians (that are so incapable of crafting decent legislation that only 14% submitted gets past the Verkhovna Rada committees and their peers in the chamber), will stumble and fumble in the face of legislation that is upon the immediate horizon (despite having 28 existing EU acceptable choices for almost all proposed laws to choose from already in existence amongst the Member States).

It will also be the case that there are domestic legislative acts that are not tied to the Association Agreement that are also deemed priorities (and again the 28 “European examples” will be ignored) that will garner the same entirely feckless response by way of speedily crafted and inept legal prose submissions – but other legislative requirements provide a little more time for consideration and can thus propose to amend entire legal chapters and/or frameworks in a single draft submission, freeing up countless wasted parliamentary hours both of the parliamentarians drafting poor text, and of the Verkhovna Rada Committees refusing – before even getting to a vote.

Less, as they say, is more (on many occasions anyway) – and clearly far less grotesquely substandard drafting, and far more consideration and thoughtfulness would provide for not putting in the extra hours, but increase the quality of what goes into the hours put in.

It’s not as though the additional 11 days this Verkhovna Rada convocation has sat, nor the vast majority of the successfully passed 765 Bills and Resolutions, have come anywhere near meeting even the lowest of expectations of society – and most of those laws and resolutions that come close to having a potentially positive effect have been pushed through by “friends of Ukraine” with carrot or stick, or by the IMF.

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Buying an extra gift this Christmas – Odessa

November 27, 2015

It had been mulled as to write a few words about the “decommunisation laws” and the change of street names in Odessa – or not – as none have yet changed as of today.

But something has caught the eye of the blog that seems worthy of a little promotion (and yes there are always charitable and humanitarian causes worthy of raising) in a timely manner.

In Odessa, a scheme has been launched All-Ukrainian Action Group to buy an extra gift this year and/or to act as Santa Claus and/or the Snow Maiden, for children suffering from the effects of the war, economic, and family difficulties – or in some cases a combination therefore.  We are thus talking of orphans, IDPs, children of ATO families with absent parents, low-income families etc.

According to organizers, the most coveted gifts for children are:

  • crayons, paints, markers,
  • colouring, books, games,
  • soaps, toothpaste, shampoos,
  • soft toys, jewelry and accessories, casket,
  • clothes (warm clothes, hats, scarves, mittens, sweaters)

Volunteers of the charity fund “Good Samaritans” will repack all gifts brought into colorful and bright packaging.   During the evening of the Orthodox Christmas 6 and 7 January 2016, all gifts will be handed to children.   The last date for donations being 25th December 2015 to allow for sorting, wrapping and distribution across the oblast.

Last year the people of Odessa gathered 2,500 gifts across the 27 points collection points. This year, there appears to be more collections points than in 2014.

Gift collection points, addresses, telephone numbers and a website are displayed above.

Worthy of a mention as almost 25% of the readers of this blog have Ukrainian IPs and have a month to search their soul – So take the hint!

Back to policy, politics, fecklessness and the usual subject matter tomorrow.

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And so begins an internal political Maidan? Maybe

November 26, 2015

Many times this blog has opined over the past year that the next “Maidan” would probably fall within and not without the walls of the Verkhovna Rada.

The last 48 hours has seen some interesting announcements and developments from those within the two largest coalition parties – President Poroshenko’s Solidarity Party and Prime Minister Yatseniuk’s People’s Front.

Firstly the People’s Front announced an impending “coup” designed to unseat Prime Minister Yatseniuk.  If there be such a “coup” then it is perhaps not without political justification.  The Prime Minister is mired in corruption and cronyism allegations ranging from delaying signing off on appointments to important positions within SOEs, defending and stymieing investigations of his friends – most prominently Martynenko who is under investigation in several European nations for possible criminality etc.  There is no need to list everything, the issue is raised.  This notwithstanding the People’s Front deciding not to take part in the local elections of October 2015 due to the fact it was almost inevitable they would fail to pass the 5% threshold – in any Oblast.

The point of the party stating it would support no other Prime Minister than Mr Yatseniuk is perhaps to call the bluff of the coalition partners, as a complete lack of support from all People’s Front deputies would make the Verkhovna Rada more or less unworkable – if all People’s Front MPs acted in unison.

The question is how many are truly loyal to the Prime Minister, and how many are “for rent”, happy to move across to Solidarity (or others)?  There is no ideological boundary as there is no ideology, so how many are immovable from the party ranks?  As an educated guess, less than 30, which is perhaps not enough to hold the coalition to ransom.  The question for the Prime Minister is to how many he would say “Et tu Brute?”  Too many?

But would not an early Verkhovna Rada election have the same dire electoral results for the party as the local elections which they decided to forgo?  Quite probably – certainly if they passed the 5% threshold nationally their numbers would dramatically reduce within the Verkovna Rada.  A dangerous game perhaps.

Could the People’s Front party put forward an alternative candidate for Prime Minister?  Naturally so, but volunteers at this moment may be few with so much prickly legislation still requiring to be passed, and there are potential schisms appearing within the Solidarity Party that if gather momentum could force an early Verkhovna Rada election anyway – thus endangering the People’s Front regardless of its own posturing and deterrence strategy.

The issue with any deterrence strategy is that it only works if it deters.  If it doesn’t deter then there are consequences that must be faced.

rada

Of the possible schism within Solidarity, there is the appearance of a formal “Anti-corruption platform”, comprising thus far of  Sergiy Leshchenko Svitlana Zalіschuk, Igor Fіrsov, Vladislav Golub, Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Olexiy Mushak, Pavlo Rіzanenko, Yuriy Solovey Olga Chervakova, Oleksandr Chernenko and Oksana Yurinets – under the stewardship of Viktor Chumak and Mustafa Nayem.

Whether others will join, and whether this will remain a purely internal affair within Solidarity, or whether the former activists, civil society members, journalists and cultural icons so desperately placed on otherwise odious party lists by all parties will begin to make this a cross-party affair remains to be seen – however, should it occur, or should early Verkhovna Rada elections prove to be necessary, there is a real possibility that this internal schism could become a political party in its own right – or at least threaten to do so and force the cleansing of the Solidarity Party lists.  The former seems more likely and would undoubtedly bring across the disillusioned reformers swept into the Verkhovna Rada across all party lines when the parties were trying to provide the public with a thin veneer of change to their respective structures.

This formal creation and announcement was naturally swiftly met with a shot across the bows from the party leadership, and confidant of the President – Igor Kononenko.

Mr Kononenko described the situation as absolutely normal – however he went on to say that if the group conduct work on splitting fractions, then “we will draw conclusions”.  Mr Kononenko stated further that there would be no pressure put upon the MPs that formally announced their participation in the “Anti-corruption platform” but then warned the newly established group of MPs to “stay away from demagoguery, to respect facts and constructively work primarily within the faction.”

A statement that perhaps contradicts himself and certainly may conflict with the aims of the “Anti-corruption platform” within the Solidarity Party.  Viktor Chumak has clearly stated its aims are to fight against corruption “inside the Parliament, both within the parliamentary faction Bloc Petro Poroshenko, and outside.”

Clearly a political head to head within Solidarity is potentially on the horizon, and also more broadly within the Verkhovna Rada itself when these MPs are necessarily noisily washing dirty linen publicly, refusing to back down, and feel forced to take actions that will effect the smooth running of the Solidarity Party and the coalition when the numerous corruption issues they will raise are simply ignored.

There is then the quiet opening of a “satellite office” of “Team Saakashvili” in Kyiv – under the auspices of promoting the “Odessa Package” of desired reforms cooked up within the Governor’s advisory team in Odessa.  It is, nonetheless, the opening of “Team Saakashvili’s” physical presence in Kyiv, and it is a team that has openly called for Prime Minister Yatseniuk to resign numerous times.   It is a team that regularly openly names the corrupt at the highest levels and has traction in the psyche of quite a large part of the national Ukrainian constituency.

“Team Saakashvili”, should early Verkhovna Rada elections occur, will become a political party – for few within are fond of Solidarity or any other existing political entity – and “Team Saakashvili” has a very long list of previously vetted, western education Ukrainian citizens free of corrupt deeds following its recruitment appeal in Odessa that drew applicants from all over.  There are several hundred pre-vetted “clean” Ukrainians to put on a party list that will easily garner far more than the required 5% threshold to enter the Verkhovna Rada.

The biggest political losers if this were to happen would be Solidarity and the People’s Front for their is the voter base most susceptible  – albeit “Team Saakashvili” would be loyal the President Poroshenko, it would not be President Poroshenko’s party as Solidarity is.

Thus there are several storms brewing not only within the People’s Front and Solidarty Party rank and file in and of themselves, but also between the People’s Front and Solidarity – neither of which will benefit from early Verkhovna Rada elections with “Team Saakshvili” awaiting its chance in the national legislature.

Likewise none would want to see Prime Minister Yatseniuk removed until the most prickly issues are passed through the Verkhovna Rada, allowing any replacement a more gentle public reception – yet keeping him when enveloped by a deep fog of corruption and cronyism will become much more difficult with a very public and noisy Solidarity Anti-Corruption platform, many well known to the public and many who have the support of external “supporters of Ukraine” that will, to some degree, have their backs.  As long as the “Anti-Corruption platform” shoot straight and hit big targets, it is rather difficult for the external “supporters of Ukraine” not to back these MPs having proclaimed innumerable times corruption is the main enemy of Ukraine.

To hold it all together will take careful management – failure to manage this well will result in either the next “Maidan” occurring within the Verkhovna Rada (rather than outside it) where the reformers simply go head to head very publicly with the old corrupt faces and schemes, or early Verkhovna Rada elections – or perhaps one will lead to the other.

How feasible it will be to manage the ambitions of the “Anti-corruption platform”, or the brinkmanship of the People’s Front, or the unpredictability of Samopomich, or the ego of Yulia Tymoshenko, or the inevitable momentum and national seepage of “Team Saakashvili” now it has opened an office in Kyiv?

Or perhaps the questions should be just how feasible the ambitions of the “Anti-corruption platform”, brinkmanship of the People’s Front, how unpredictable is Samopomich, and how great the patience of “Team Saakashvili” actually are, will probably all be answered by Easter 2016.  (There’s nothing that can be done with Yulia’s ego or populist nonsense.)

Are the seeds of a new “Maidan” within the Verkhovna Rada now sown for germination in 2016,  or will the dark lords and grey cardinals ride to the aid of a corrupt Mordor (and de facto save Prime Minister Yatseniuk in the process)?

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Saakashvili on Odessa Customs & Clearance

November 25, 2015

In his usual and characteristic way of stating the issues in a somewhat unpolished manner, Governor Saakashvili gave an interview to “The Day” (День) media outlet regarding the new Odessa Customs set up, e-clearance going on-line with effect from 1st March 2016, and who is and is not seemingly welcome to use Odessa as a customs clearance hub.

He noted, probably rightly, a significant decrease in corruption within customs in Odessa – whilst simultaneously acknowledging that smuggling continues.

He stated clearly that the majority of corruption schemes now operate from Kyiv customs and no longer from Odessa.   “Currently, these flows have switched to other customs, mainly in Kyiv, where the custom clearing goods occur at lower prices.  We want to customs clearance only the loads from the EU, US, Japan, Canada and Australia, because of their origin and the price specified in the declaration of the goods are confirmed at 100%.  But the Chinese and Turkish goods clearance we will refuse because it is impossible to find a real return for them. Let them visit other customs, because it is a potential source of corruption.  When from March 1st, 2016 electronic customs begins, then all will use the cargo customs clearance.”

Now there is little to argue about in what is said factually regarding the transfer of customs clearance flows to a more “understanding” Kyiv customs clearance regime.

To have an e-clearance system in place by 1st March 2016 may be a little ambitious, but it is at least a recognition that his May 2015 statements of e-clearance by 1st November were a technological fantasy as the blog pointed out at the time.  A 9 month install and testing is more realistic from the date he announced e-clearance for Odessa, and it will certainly make Odessa far more attractive to those that regularly use e-clearance globally.

However, with regard to Chinese and Turkish goods, it is surely not “impossible” to find origin and pricing that can be 100% confirmed for a reasonable percentage of what comes through Odessa normally.  Even if only 5% – 10% can only be 100% verified then it would seem perhaps a somewhat undiplomatic choice of words to utter “impossible” – and that percentage of 100% verifiable goods from China and Turkey is probably higher.

customs

Indeed, with all EU, US, Australian, Canadian and Japanese good entering getting an almost immediate pass and almost no inspections, does that not allow more time to inspect Chinese and Turkish goods and test the apparent newly acquired moral fortitude and group ethic of the customs officials in Odessa Port – or is that confidence somewhat limited and therefore politically problematic?

Instead of pushing the corruption from Odessa customs clearance to Kyiv customs clearance, could the corruption not have actually been tackled, rather than simply redirected?  Is it not a somewhat flawed policy to simply move the problem?

If Odessa customs has seen a rapid reduction in corruption, which is probably has, then is it a genuine policy win if Kyiv customs has seen a rapid increase in corruption as a result?  Admittedly Governor Saakashvili is the governor of Odessa, and therefore results in Odessa have primacy amongst the constituents he is responsible for and to – indeed such local results may well be fawned over by many of the Ukrainian constituency seeking a genuine battle with corruption – but in taking Ukrainian citizenship and as a national public political figure (with future national ambitions no doubt), is a shifting of the problem perhaps not the answer they would expect?

That said, is it perhaps easier to deal with such issues in an oblast by oblast manner – for each oblast has its own peculiarities and prominent corruption practices.  A piecemeal approach to those peculiarities may be easier to effectively implement under a broad national umbrella that is otherwise less than effective – particularly when the centre is clearly unwilling to deal with its own corruption.

Governor Saakashvili also has limitations upon the power he wields both within and without the Odessa Oblast.

The question then is perhaps not whether shifting the corruption from Odessa customs clearance to Kyiv customs clearance is a good policy (or not) when it comes to tackling corruption – but whether it was the only strategy available to the authorities of Odessa?

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