Posts Tagged ‘business’

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Ukraine begins to lobby DC – professionally

January 7, 2017

Many times it has been written that Ukraine would be wise to lobby Washington DC beyond the abilities of its own diplomatic mission and occasional delegations.

So it comes to pass, and probably due to a Trump presidency almost being upon Ukraine, the national leadership has decided to engage professional lobbyists to champion Ukraine inside “The Beltway”.

That said, whilst Ukraine as a State has taken its time to arrive at this decision, many of the Ukrainian elite have long since lobbied their own causes/interests within DC.

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Ms Tymoshenko outspends all others (despite her meager income according to her e-declaration.)

The Ukrainian State has chosen to spend a seemingly meager sum of $50,000 per month having BGR Group strengthen ties between the USA and Ukraine, and further encourage US investment and/or US investors to look at Ukraine.

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Not before time, and perhaps only because of who the next US president will be, has Ukraine as a State started to spend money where many of its nefarious elites have done so for years.

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The contract would seem to last for the duration of 2017.

Although this is definitely the right policy for the Ukrainian State to engage in – indeed to belatedly engage in – a reader may ponder just what returns can be expected for $600,000 per annum when considering that Ms Tymoshenko spent more than that amount in 2014, that same amount in 2015, and would appear to have very little to show for it – unless her lobbying was intended to insure very little was publicly shown regarding her.

So, what do you get for $600,000 of lobbying inside “The Beltway” (even if leveraged with a cooperative Ukrainian Ambassador and embassy)?  BGR Group and 2017 will provide the answers!

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Moldavian meetings

January 5, 2017

For the first time since 2008, a President of Moldova, Igor Dodon met with a “President of Transnistria” Vadim Krasnoselsky.

Whether it proves to be anything more than a symbolic gesture by pro-Kremlin Moldavian President Dodon remains to be seen, for his powers as president are extremely limited (which is perhaps a good thing being a robust supporter of federalising Moldova).

Moldova is a parliamentary democracy with the President having very little sway over policy or legislation.  (As such the Moldavian parliamentary elections of 2018 matter far more than the recent election of Mr Dodon as President of Moldova.)

What was known to be discussed appears to have been all rather sensible – and occurred outside of the longstanding 5+2 format which may or may not further frustrate an already frustrated process.  Nevertheless issues such as agriculture in the Dubasari district, education and diplomas, and the movement of citizens across the Dniester river were discussed.

It is said they will meet again soon with proposal to solving the issues discussed and to set timelines to implement agreed solutions.

Time, as it always does, will tell when it comes to results, particularly as President Dodon would have to have the Moldavian parliament “on side” to actually deliver much (if anything).

With regards to meetings, and perhaps worthy of note for those in Kyiv, on 26th December, 3 days after Mr Dodon’s election as president, the odious and criminal Mykola Skoryk MP (Oppo Block) quietly visited Moldova attending a Party of Socialists event to celebrate Mr Dodon’s success.

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President Dodon had been a long serving Chairman of the Party of Socialists after leaving the Communist Party.  Needless to say the Party of Socialists is a robustly Russophile political entity.

That the obnoxious Mykola Skoryk would surround himself with russophiles is in keeping with his personal views (as inferred in the above link).  As regular readers will note however, it is not his russophile views that make Mykola Skoryk obnoxious.  Quite simply there is nothing about his political history, business activities, or egocentric personality that make him likable – russophile or not.

Time will tell whether Prosecutor General Lutsenko will actually get around to trying to strip Mykola Skoryk of his parliamentary immunity and prosecute him as he stated he would in September – but as yet hasn’t.  Perhaps he has forgotten, perhaps he opened his mouth before gathering sufficient evidence, or perhaps a grubby deal has been struck that he won’t now go after Mr Skoryk.  Neither Messrs Lutsenko or Skoryk have been adverse to grubby (and criminal) little deals throughout their political careers.

The question however is what was Mykola Skoryk doing at a Party of Socialists gathering for, and with, the newly invested President Dodon?  A shared russophilia is unlikely to be the answer in and of itself.  There will be more to it.

Perhaps it is a matter of insuring any cross-border “business” is not interrupted under a new presidency.  Perhaps there are now opportunities to expand “business”.  Maybe an arrangement made for an immediate “bolt hole” from Odessa should Prosecutor General Lutsenko actually put action where his rhetoric already exists.  Per chance some plotting and scheming regarding stirring up matters in “Bessarabia” occurred – as one domestic result of a Trump victory in the USA will probably be an emboldened pro-Russian political voice within Ukraine from those that have generally kept a low profile over the past 2 years – those like Mykola Skoryk.

Whatever the case, Mykola Skoryk did not become the first Ukrainian MP to personally congratulate Mr Dodon on his election simply because of a shared russophilia and as Odessa shares a border with Moldova he thought he’d “drop by”.  He is hardly otherwise a regular face at the Party of Socialists gatherings.

That Mr Skoryk has said very little about his trip probably means that more questions should be asked.

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Good business, bad politics. Tigipko

January 2, 2017

Having written about Viktor Pinchuk in the previous entry, this post concentrates on another Dnipro Clan oligarch and long time acquaintance, Sergei Tigipko, who has been spending money recently.

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Mr Tigipko it has to be said is an interesting soul whose business activities are somewhat difficult to keep an all-seeing eye upon.

Perhaps he is fated to be that way, for ever since birth Mr Tigipko has not been what he appears to be.  Mr Tigipko was actually born on 13th February 1960 – officially, but in fact he was born in the early hours of 14th February.  Due to a bureaucratic mix up between medical night shift and morning shift workers the wrong date was officially recorded.  It is claimed, similar to Queen Elizabeth II, he therefore has two birthdays, an official one and a real one.

Fair enough – surely all oligarchs can afford to have two birthdays.

In the late 1970’s the family moved from Moldova to Odessa and Mr Tigipko then headed to Dnepropetrovsk and the Metallurgy Institute where (perhaps with the help of a well placed step-father) he became a member of the Komsomol Committee.  In true Marxist-Leninist adherence he busied himself with organising discos and supplying the evils of western decadence – Pepsi.  It appears that a disco-loving Ihor Kolomoisky was a regular and that they became good friends.

(As an aside Mr Tigipko, or more precisely Mrs Tigipko, retain their interest in Odessa in an act philanthropy annually organising and sponsoring the Odessa International Film Festival – which is actually a very good event.)

Indeed Mr Tigipko has had good fortune in meeting business acquaintances, whilst suffering an equally poor fortune in the world of politics.

A few years of questionable military service and teaching intervene before Mr Tigipko lands the role of chief of psyops/reflexive control when he became the Second Secretary of the (Communist) party and Komsomol committees in Dnipro.  Propaganda and agitation commonly being the role of the Second Secretary – a role he was destined to fail at with the date being 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet system only 2 years away.

Nevertheless, having already forged a friendship with Ihor Kolomoisky, it is within the regional Komsomol committee he also meets Olexandr Turchynov (the current head of the Ukrainian national security apparatus and once upon a time, an ardent Tymoshenko ally).

When the Soviet nonsense all eventually crashed, Mr Tigipko had become First Secretary and in charge of the regional Komsomol cash box.  He was also by then known to Gennady Tymoshenko who was head of ideological manipulation for the Kirov District.  Gennady is the father of Alexander Tymoshenko – the unfortunate husband of Yulia.  Indeed it is rumoured that Mr Tigipko played a role in funding Ms Tymoshenko’s video empire back in the day – presumably with Komsomol cash.  Controlling that cash, he also came to the attention of Dnepro Regional Council Chairman, the infamous Pavel Lazerenko.  He had also made direct acquaintance with (soon to be President) Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Pinchuk.

A reader can now literally see the Dnipro Clan forming.

As the Komsomol system was collapsing Mr Tigipko was swiftly given a senior position within Dnipro Bank – no doubt moving to the position along with the Komsomol regional cash.  (There is no reason to believe that events in Dnipro would be any different than those elsewhere in Ukraine at the time when it comes to moving regional Komsomol cash).

Within a year the bank owners were far from getting along well and Mr Tigipko set up PrivatBank with Ihor Kolomoisky, Gennady Bogolyubov, the late Leonid Miloslavsky and Alexie Martynov.  From 1992 – 97 Mr Tigipko was Chairman of the Board of PrivatBank – although what share holding he had will probably never been known.  What is known is that the initial shareholding was not equal.  How much Komsomol/Dnipro Bank cash was used in the creation of Privat is somewhat unclear – and will undoubtedly remain that way.

Meanwhile Mr Kuchma became President Kuchma and Pavel Lazarenko became Prime Minister – leading to a split within the Dnipro Clan and President Kuchma using Mr Tigipko to keep an eye on the out-sized and out of control criminal appetites of Pavel Lazarenko.  He becomes Vice Prime Minister for Economic Reforms in order to carry out that task.

(This move obviously ruffled feathers and PrivatBank came under scrutiny for laundering money via its Riga branch.  Some things don’t change.)

Whilst in post, Mr Tigipko acted as “roof” for the French cement company Lafarge who then had a few issues with assets in Ukraine.  As Bernadette Chirac (wife of Jacques) then sat on the Lafarge board it is perhaps no surprise that Mr Tigipko was awarded French honours personally by Mrs Chirac in 1997.

By 2000 Mr Tigipko wisely quit as the conflict of interests of those around him in the Kuchma government were in all probability intractable at best and very bad for the health at worst.

By 2001 whatever shares in Privat he had were sold for a figure unknown, and he set up on his own with the TAS brand containing banking, insurance, and numerous other interests held under the usual Cypriot holding company  – which today is a beast of many tentacles – and is in fact the reason for this entry.  (Indeed Mr Tigipko sold one of his banks to Swedbank pre 2008 crisis for $735 million via TAS Overseas Investments (Cyprus)).

If business has been good, politics has not been.

Politically Mr Tigipko did not fare well under Viktor Yushenko and Yulia Tymoshenko.  Having chosen the Kuchma side of the Dnipro Clan split, thus backing Yanukovych in 2004/5 elections, that clearly did not sit well with the new “Orange” president, nor a Prime Minister that chose the Lazarenko side of the Dnipro Clan split.

Further when Yanukovych eventually became president in 2010, despite initially welcoming him into the fold, he very clearly and publicly shafted by Mr Tigipko politically.

Lo, tax avoidance aside, it clearly pays in a business sense to hold your assets offshore and in a different legal jurisdiction in a predatory political environment like Ukraine.  It is simply far easier to defend and retain your assets.

Under the current president Mr Tigipko has kept his head down making no discernible political moves and very few business moves.

However, in the past few months Mr Tigipko appears to be going on a spending spree domestically.  Having recently bought another insurance company and rolled it into his TAS insurance entities, it appears he is now entering the hotel business too.

Not only is he entering the hotel business his seems to be doing getting good deals.  For a mere $10 million Mr Tigipko has bought the Radisson Hotel in Kyiv from the Russian owners who for a long time have desperate to sell.

Now a reader may think that the hotel business in Ukraine is not one where returns will be swift – and they’d be right too.  There are no swift returns with anything to do with hotels in Ukraine.  That said, the price paid for this asset being so low, it is possible he will see a 7 year ROI.

However, it may also be that Mr Tigipko has some insider knowledge regarding the return of licensed gambling in Ukraine and any amended parameters regarding what premises can host casinos – and which can’t.   It may well be that the absolute nonsense proposed a year ago for the return of gambling has now had a more sensible eye cast upon it – or is about to have a more sensible eye take a look.

If so, then the Radisson in Kyiv would have additional potential – and a far swifter ROI.  As Mr Tigipko has a knack for good business and poor politics, then who would be surprised if that will ultimately prove to be the case?

More generally, does Mr Tigipko now think that the bottom has now been reached and that the small economic bounce is likely to continue in an upward trend, so now is the time to buy?

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Treading on the toes of Angels – Odessa machinations

December 26, 2016

The name Alexander Angert also know as Angel to use his mafia name, has appeared in this blog numerous times (a reader may use the search facility if particularly interested).  How could it not?  His links with Mayor Trukhanov and Alexander Zhukov (father of Daria, the current Mrs Roman Abramovich) among others of notoriety and the numerous joint and associated business enterprises that do well out of City Hall and Ukraine more broadly, demand that every now and again his name is mentioned.

Indeed Mr Angert was mentioned so often by Yuri Lutsenko when he was Minister of Interior in the Tymoshenko government it would be difficult to have seen him as anything other than a personal nemesis.  (A reader may ponder why he no longer mentions it now he is Prosecutor General).  Misha Saakashvili as Governor was also not adverse to throwing Mr Angert’s name about when it came to the organised criminality in Odessa.

Mr Angert no longer lives in Odessa – but he does visit when the situation is serious enough to demand he personal participation in a “negotiation”.  His last know place of abode (for many years) is London.  Indeed if asking the personal assistant of Mr Zhukov who also lives in London, messages can apparently reach Mr Angert through that channel.  (It seems that via this route Leonid Minin can be reached in Rome too).

The full extent of Mr Angert’s (business) interests is very difficult to gauge.  In some cases his control is “unofficial”.  Others there are clearly cut outs who are known associates.  There are overtly known long term business partners like Igor Uchitel.  There are even one or two business where Mr Angert’s name actually appears.  Thus quite where all the metaphorical and literal bodies are buried is unknown – but there are definitely both metaphorical and literal bodies buried.

Perhaps the best way to identify the assets controlled by Mr Angert are those in Odessa that were left alone by Viktor Yanukovych and “The Family” from 2010 to 2014.  Former President Yanukovych did indeed meet with Mr Angert in Odessa and whatever was said between them seemingly saved Mr Angert’s interests from the attentions of “The Family” – or perhaps saved “The Family” from a slighted and vengeful “Angel”.

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Of the businesses that are transparently associated with Mr Angert, one is Odessagaz.  It is co-owned by Messrs Angert and Uchitel and has been for decades.  Neither oligarchs such as Firtash or Kolomoisky and not former President Yanukovych have ever made an attempt upon Odessagaz, nor interfered as they have with other regional and national gas companies.

Clearly tangling with those behind Odessagaz was not worth the blood and treasure – even for such odious, nefarious and powerful men.

Any regular reader is well aware of the frequent mention of the business appetites (by hook but mostly crook) of Igor Kononenko, President Poroshenko’s long term friend, occasional business partner and parliamentary “leg breaker”.  He is, to be blunt, as bad as they come when it comes to scams, schemes, and coercion.  His current appetites and methodology as to feeding them have hardly gone unnoticed – neither has the completely absent desire of President Poroshenko to rein them in.

It would appear however that Mr Kononenko is about to go not only where angels and oligarchs fear to tread, but indeed is about to stand on Angel’s toes.

Mr Angert, or more precisely Odessagaz, for many, many years has been trying to bring about the insolvency of Odessa CHP (thermal power plant).  Bankruptcy petitions have been made and various internal nefarious financial acts have been “encouraged” of the employees within Odessa CHP by Odessagaz (Mr Angert).  The net result was to engineer the bankruptcy of Odessa CHP beholding of large debts to Odessagaz who would then take Odessa CHP as debt settlement.

Recently however, that plan has quickly been undone via the purchasing of a significant quantity of Odessa CHP debts by Energomerezha.  This company is controlled by the brothers Surkis who are in turn puppets of Igor Kononenko.  In buying up those debts Energomerezha has therefore taken control of Odessa CHP financials that can either prevent Odessa CHP bankruptcy or assume the role of leading creditor thus undoing the plans of Odessagaz (Mr Angert).

In short when Energomerezha decides to allow Odessa CHP to go bankrupt at a time of its chosing it would be the largest creditor with a claim to taking control of the asset as settlement.  Thus that can be expected when all the ducks are lined up to insure the loser would be Odessagaz – and by extension Mr Angert.

(In the meantime as usual there is a scam whereby an agreement has been reached between Odessa CHP and Energomerezha that enables Energomerezha (read the brothers Surkis and Igor Kononenko) to clear UAH 1000 in profit for every thousand cubic meters of gas).

Quite how this situation will play out remains to be seen when even the appetites of Yanukovych, Kolomoisky and Firtash left the machinations of Angel well alone in Odessa.

Perhaps Messrs Kononenko and Angert will come to an agreement amicably.

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Or perhaps there will be made an offer than cannot be refused.

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Odessa investment projects – Berezyne – Besarabyazka rail reconstruction

December 25, 2016

Immediately prior to the festive season getting under way, the blog was invited to the Odessa Regional Administration by a friend who is head of the Investment and Tourism Department, Roman Kozlovskyi.

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He and his team can be found on the 6th (top) floor within the rabbit warren that is the Odessa Regional Administration building.  (Thus any investor that enters this labyrinth is effectively at his mercy when it comes to actually finding their way out again.)

The result was a commitment by the blog to highlight some of the best opportunities for investment from a particularly long list.  It will also bring to the attention of certain project initiators some of the worst project offerings.  Some projects should be pushed as they are good projects for all concerned.  Others should be pushed into the rubbish bin of wishful but financially retarded thinking.

As such, ad hoc, entries will appear over the coming weeks relating to the good, the bad (and some ugly) investment projects within the Odessa Oblast

This entry highlights an investment project that seems viable.

In 1999 the rail connection between Berezyne and Besarabyazka was dismantled for reasons that would seem politically rather unclear, if criminally somewhat more understandable.

The 1999 dismantling of this section of railway thus pushed goods moving between Moldova to and from the ports of Odessa via rail to go through the Kremlin sponsored enclave and smuggling haven of Transnistria, an area that falls beyond the direct control of Government Moldova.

As such the reconstruction of the Berezyne – Besarabyazka rail link would provide a goods rail link avoiding Transnistria entirely.

Accordingly any investor could be assured both Governments of Ukraine and Moldova would be very much in favour of using this reconstructed route for commodities such as coal, fertilizers, oil, black metals and iron ore.  Indeed, reading between the lines, it is almost assuredly the case that such commodities would be immediately rerouted once the new track is in place.

Such assurances would naturally bring about numerous obvious methods for generating a return on capital employed for any investor – whichever method is ultimately agreed with the Odessa Regional Administration (there is certainly a degree of flexibility to accommodate any investor within the ORA).

It is hardly a difficult task to monitor the track usage and tonnage transported when only Ukrzaliznytsia and Calea Feratadin Moldova (both State owned rail entities) will use the track.

As is often the case, investors see most risk in the construction phase of any project.  Indeed for really large investments such as PFI schemes it is common practice to refinance a project after the construction phase is completed and that risk is thus removed.

Thus to some basic numbers – for that is what counts for any investor.  (For a full and detailed numbers breakdown a reader/investor is invited to contact Roman Kozlovskyi via the following email:  rkozlovskyi@odessa.gov.ua or the blog can provide his mobile number more privately.)

Clearly there will not be much environmental impact in the reconstruction of a preexisting rail line.  Most of what is required is already there by way of ground works and utilities.  Thus the laying of 21.5 kilometers (20 in Ukraine and 1.5 in Moldova) of track and whatever ground work is required is not an infrastructure project haunted by unknown and unseen technical issues.  The Odessa Regional Administration figures suggest 9 months to complete the project with a team of 30.

The investment sought is UAH 398256930, or about $15.4 million (exchange rate depending).  Hardly a large sum, and in fact perhaps far too small for some investors to consider.  Nevertheless, such is the low risk nature of this infrastructure project and the obvious methodologies provide that return on investment will be fairly swift and attractive, it therefore falls into the category of a good project for consideration.

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Germany’s KfW and Oschadbank Ukraine look to SME financing in 2017

December 24, 2016

State owned KfW Bank of Germany together with State owned Oschadbank Ukraine will apparently target the ever under financed SME market in Ukraine following the signing of a memorandum to do just that via a vehicle called the “German-Ukrainian Fund”.

The “German-Ukraine Fund” is not exactly new.  It has been around since 1998 when it was created by Presidential Decree 574/98.  It’s creation was with the very same intent as the memorandum signed on 24th December 2016, and its structure 31.3% National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance Ukraine 31.3% and KfW 37.4% appears to be unchanged.

Needless to say that since its creation in 1998, judging by the woeful state of financing for the Ukrainian SME market, the results have been less than spectacular over the past 18 years.

Traditionally Oschadbank is not a bank that has ever had anything to do with the financing of SMEs.  It certainly has experience of financing large scale projects (all plundered naturally), but would not be on any list associated with the financing of SMEs.

Indeed it would be fair to state that Oschadbank has absolutely no experience of SME financing – a banking sector that undoubtedly has its own very specific competencies requiring sector expertise.

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KfW Bank, aside from being able to borrow cheaply due to being 100% owned by the German State, is split into 3 major banking subsidiaries.  Of most relevance to Ukraine is KfW Entwicklungsbank which lends to governments, commercial banks and public enterprises that engage in the microfinancing of SMEs.

It would appear that whatever the EBRD has done behind the scenes to the internal workings of Oschadbank, part of any result is to open up the banking horizons of Oschadbank and attempt to focus them upon what is an SME economic engine historically ignored.  If nothing else it would diversify the loan portfolio of Oschadbank if a significant number of loans actually take place.

(A reader may suspect that both the EBRD and KfW  will have to lend a good deal of experience regarding microfinancing to Oschadbank for the foreseeable future – though that too may be no bad thing in the short-medium term as the internal Oschadbank management develops.)

All in all, some reasonably positive news to (almost) close the year 2016 – particularly for Ukrainian SMEs or SMEs coming to Ukraine.  If 2016 has been a difficult year for Ukraine, 2017 unfortunately does not seem likely to get any better – that the environment Ukraine finds itself within will get worse is more probable.

So it is with this sliver of hope for Ukrainian SMEs and SMEs entering Ukraine in 2017, that the blog wishes all those who celebrate Christmas on 25th December a thoroughly enjoyable day.

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Privat nationalisation and political weight loss

December 19, 2016

Ukraine has eventually taken the decision to nationalise Ihor Kolomoisky’s (and others) Privat Bank.

In some ways it is a surprise that the will to do so was actually found, despite that for more than 2 years everybody and anybody with any knowledge of Privat Bank has hardly been shy in opining that it presented serious risk to the Ukrainian economy and had it not been systemically vital to the Ukrainian banking system it would otherwise have been closed.

To a man/woman, of those spoken to one to one by the blog, be they politicians, economists, diplomats or international bankers, all recognised that the Privat problem had to be addressed and that nationalising it was the better of the options available – if the will could be found to do so.

Lo it has come to pass that 100% of Privat shares are now owned by the State.

How grubby the deal struck between Ihor Kolomoisky and The State is, remains unknown.  For a man like Ihor Kolomoisky to “voluntarily”  “sell” his shares to the State in what has been a significant political and financial lever over the State for him for many years with no gains to him pushes the boundaries of belief.  With the ability to simply put the Ukrainian banking sector into melt down, there is presumably a quid pro quo no matter how small yet favourable that may be in return for the “voluntary” handing over of all shares.

So be it.

Questions will undoubtedly be asked regarding the large amount of PrivatBank loans to its owners (Mr Kolomoisky and friends), other companies with the same owners, and to those associated with the owners, that have consistently been taken out with no intention of repaying them.

What is the exact cash figure these nefarious loans amount to?  What are the chances of those loans now being serviced and eventually repaid by those that took them and who are extremely skilled at historically saddling the State with their debts?

On balance, should a reader accept that those loans will probably not be repaid, thus in assuming these non-performing loans (debts) in however many $ billion they amount to, is that still a price worth paying to insure that PrivatBank can no longer collapse the entire Ukrainian banking system?

Even if agreements have been reached to now begin to repay these loans, the question is then over what period of time (in the unlikely event they will be repaid in full and in the spirit of any agreements made)?

The question presented is therefore one of short term (debt assumption leading probable loses when loans are not repaid) verses the medium/longer term view of what price is put upon insuring the entire national banking system will not collapse due to Prvat?

Financial issues aside, there is of course politics to consider.

The last time the nationalisation of Privat was mentioned by the blog in September, the politics were “Tymoshenko orientated”.  Mrs Tymoshenko is not in favour of the nationalisation of Privat as it doesn’t really work to her advantage.

Ms Tymoshenko aside, broader questions need now be asked about how the nationalisation of Privat changes the political and/or oligarch power dynamics with a major Kolomoisky lever now surrendered.

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Mr Kolomoisky can no longer use Privat as a personal piggy bank.  How does it change his ability to buy parliamentary votes for hire and/or buy entire political parties?  Will it effect any future voting outcomes?  To mitigate, will key voting personnel previously simply bought, now start to appear in Kolomoisky business structures instead for the purpose of leverage over their vote?

In short, just how much political weight loss has been incurred by Mr Kolomoisky – if any?

Without the “ace up the sleeve” of a persistent ability to cause national banking melt down, how does that effect the Kolomoisky position when negotiating how next to screw the State?

How will the rest of the oligarchy class react?  Will they make peace with the State or solidify around a common cause yet further in screwing it over?

How will this effect a poor presidential poll rating if he is perceived to have engineered the right thing for the country, or alternatively is perceived as having used his position to weaken yet another oligarch to his own advantage?  The two are not mutually exclusive, but that is how it will be presented.

Can Mr Kolomoisky now be certain that in what appears prima facie to be a weakened position, he will now not be called to account for innumerable scams and schemes over the years?  Was a de facto arrangement made that in effect grants amnesty via a promise of non-prosecution as part of the deal?  Are there other “compensatory” arrangements reached that will filter into the system over time that will be beneficial to Mr Kolomoisky’s other interests?

The repercussions of this nationalisation financially are on balance likely to be beneficial for Ukraine and the least worst option that could have been taken.  As long as Privat is managed prudently henceforth over the medium term this act is the most sensible option available.  In the long term, it would be wise to eventually return Privat to the private sector – once its systemic and internal risks have been mitigated against.

What is far less clear are the political and oligarchy/power behind the curtain repercussions.  It may be some time before those become fully evident.

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