Archive for the ‘Russia’ Category

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New Media Rules – ATO (Donbas) wef 01/01/17

December 29, 2016

For those few journalists that still attempt to cover the war in eastern Ukraine and the continuing almost daily death toll, be advised that with effect from 1st January 2017, new rules apply:

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“Since January 1, 2017, a new procedure of work for media representatives covering the ATO in the east of Ukraine will be implemented.

According to this procedure, media accredited to the Security Service of Ukraine will receive two types of press cards such as first and second level accreditation.

Second level accreditation press card (blue) allows working within the ATO area, except for forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The procedure of reception of this press card is the same.

Meanwhile, the first level accreditation press card (pink, with number 1) allows working within the ATO area and allows working directly at the conflict line (at forward platoon strongpoints, company defence positions).

Media must undergo three day training at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (National Defence Ivan Chernyakhovskyi University — two days of theory, as well as at the 169th Training Centre of Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Desna, Chernihiv oblast (one-day practical training) to receive the press card of first level accreditation.

Foreign media accredited to the Security Service of Ukraine will receive first level accreditation press card only after obligatory one-day briefing!

More than 250 persons are undergoing training and will receive first level accreditation press cards this December. Considering the popularity of the training, three-day training will be conducted in January 2017, please, follow our updates.

Please note, a new procedure of visiting the ATO area is implemented as required by the Order of the First Deputy Director of the Anti-Terrorism Centre at the Security Service of Ukraine (Director of the Anti-Terrorism Operation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) of 19.01.2016 No. 45 ‘On procedure of media admission to military facilities in the Anti-Terrorism Operation area in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’ (Annex 4, Order of First Deputy Director of the Anti-Terrorism Centre at the Security Service of Ukraine (Director of the Anti-Terrorism Operation) of 27.10.2016 No. 555).

If you have questions don’t hesitate to contact us +38 (067) 223 16 43; (044) 245 44 01″

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SBU claims Ukrainian State IT systems received 247 cyber attacks in 2016

December 23, 2016

According to the SBU, Ukrainian State information systems were subjected to 247 cyber attacks during 2016 (which is 2 weeks from ending at the time of writing – so there will be more before the year is through).  As a result 64 criminal proceedings are apparently under way – “proceedings” however is not defined as being arrests, or charged, or convicted.

As it appears only 64 instances have resulted in criminal proceedings with 5 convictions and 4 “wanted” circulations, it may be “proceedings” amounts to little more than “under investigation”.

Thus according to the SBU, if allocating 1 attack per day, 2 of every 3 days witnessed Ukrainian State IT systems under cyber attack throughout the entirety of 2016.  Naturally that is not how matters occurred on such an evenly spaced timeline – neither does it account for the cyber ops that are and have been on-going undetected daily for months, or perhaps years, against the Ukrainian State.

Were there peaks and troughs in cyber attacks?  Did those peaks and troughs align to peaks and troughs of Ukrainian allies?  If there is any correlation does that provide some form of guide to the capabilities of hostile cyber foes?

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Nevertheless 247 is the number of cyber attacks the SBU states the Ukraine State IT system has been subjected to.

It is however unclear what classification of cyber attacks have occurred and in what number under any sub-classifications of cyber attack.  Such attacks may vary from DDoS, to data hacks, to actually taking control of the systems themselves.

Further the SBU is not the only Ukrainian institution charged with looking after and monitoring cyber naughtiness to which Ukraine is subjected.   The Ministry of Interior also has a very similar statutory  obligation.  There is then the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection, notwithstanding the Ukrainian Computer Emergency Response Team.

Quite whether each would measure and/or count the cyber attacks to which the Ukrainian State IT systems have been subjected to in the same way as the SBU is unknown.  Are the definitions the same?  Is the ability to monitor (and prevent/mitigate) such attacks the same?  Which is the lead agency?  Is there a lead agency?

Of the 247 attacks, which have been attributed and to whom?  Specifically what was the attack?  State (and/or State infrastructure)?  Business (State Owned Enterprises)?  Banking (State owned banks and/or the NBU)?  Others?

What damage was done?  What losses were incurred?  What was stolen?  Has the “how” been shared with allies and/or applicable regional/international treaty bound institutions?

How many can be publicly attributed to Russia and/or the known Russian proxies?  If they could be attributed, were they?  (Just because they can be, for either political and/or operational reasons they may not be.)

How many can be publicly attributed to organised crime – both that interconnected with Russia, that of domestic origin, and also others?

How many can be publicly attributed to those that are neither State actors (or known State associated actors), or organised (criminal) groups, but that are simply lone actors with either criminal intent or a curiosity that defies legal boundaries?

What is behind the SBU numbers?  Are the numbers of the other statutory monitoring agencies similar to those of the SBU?  If not, what are the discrepancies and where and why do they exist?

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The EU Summit (15th December) & Ukraine

December 14, 2016

The 15th December is the date of the last EU Summit (of European leaders) in 2016.

The agenda is going to be full and no doubt the meeting will be prickly affair.

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The agenda sees Ukraine as the lunchtime topic for discussion – and perhaps that is because Ukraine is probably the agenda item least likely to cause indigestion compared to all other items up for discussion.

The day covers (in no particular order) Syria, Russia, sanctions, Brexit, Ukraine, Mr Trump and refugees/migration (and by extension Turkey).  Greek issues apparently do not appear this time – there are only so many hours in a day.

With regard to Ukraine the obvious agenda issues relate to 27 of 28 Member States and the European Parliament ratifying the Association Agreement (and DCFTA) with only The Netherlands outstanding, that and the issue to be finally put to bed sometime in February/March 2017 relating to Visa-free tourism for Ukrainians (on the assumption the European Parliament votes appropriately regarding the “Visa-free suspension mechanism” issue also on 15th December).

The issue with the Dutch Association Agreement is one of optics for the domestic Dutch constituency.  In order for the Dutch to ratify the agreement and finally close the bureaucratic process they insist upon official recognition that in ratifying the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, it is not a pathway toward EU accession for Ukraine.  Further, they require official recognition that it in no way affords EU guarantees regarding collective security guarantees or obligations to military aid.  Lastly that it does not provide an entitlement (obligation) to financially support Ukraine.

It may appear politically ugly considering that only The Netherlands remains to ratify the agreement and now seeks such official understanding to pacify its domestic electorate, but to be quite clear the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (and DCFTA) offers none of these entitlements/EU obligations toward Ukraine anyway.

Nowhere does the Association Agreement infer, let alone state, that the Association Agreement is a stepping stone toward EU accession.  The clauses regarding defence and security offer no expectations of collective security or obligation to military assistance.  It has always been abundantly clear that any and all financial aid to Ukraine comes with conditionality relating to reform.

There is only one way for Ukraine to formally accede to the EU, and that is to first formally apply, and then go through the Acquis Communautaire 31 (minimum) – 35 (the maximum thus far) chapters therein.

There is no denying that if Ukraine complies with the Association Agreement fully and in its entirety (at best a 10 year process, probably longer at the speed Ukraine is proceeding) that for almost all Acquis chapters it will have traveled perhaps 80% – 85% of that journey in each and every chapter.  However there will be few, if any, where it will have traveled the full distance whereby that Aquis chapter will be then closed.  Ergo there would be a few more years thereafter to complete that process if embarked upon at all.

Indeed perhaps there is a need to better conceptualise the legality and spirit of both the Association Agreement and the Acquis Communautaire in fundamental terms.

The Association Agreement exists for Ukraine (at its own speed – despite some timelines in specific spheres within) to bring European values/governance/processes/standards to Ukraine from “Europe”.  Thus the Association Agreement brings a notional/perceived “Europe” to Ukraine – it does not take Ukraine to the EU.

The Acquis Communautaire is a trial undertaken by nations seeking to accede to the EU.  It is the (only) process that would therefore take Ukraine to the EU.

Thus the AA (and DCFTA) brings “Europe” to Ukraine.  The Acquis takes Ukraine to the EU.

Therefore, as politically ugly and difficult to digest for some the Dutch requirements may be, they actually make no difference to the legalities of the Association Agreement, nor the spirit in which it was negotiated and offered.

Ergo, it can be expected, despite the ugly optics, that the Dutch will get the official recognition that they seek even though some Member States will cringe whilst agreeing.  To get the Association Agreement over the finish line by officially acknowledging what is not contained in the Association Agreement will ultimately be a price paid.

Clearly from the agenda items, the Ukrainian issue is the least likely to put a Member State leader off their luncheon.  For good measure the Brexit issues are to be discussed at evening dinner – after UK Prime Minister Ms May has left the Summit and the building.

In fact Ukraine for once (in the context of AA ratification and the possible mention of Visa-free), may prove to be one of the easiest agenda items.

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Savchenko in Minsk

December 12, 2016

As much as this blog was going to avoid comment upon Nadya Savhcenko’s meeting in Minsk with the leaders of the “DNR” Alexandr Zaharchenko, “LNR” Igor Plotnitsky, and Russian interlocutors on 7th December, too many emails, private messages and direct messages have arrived asking for comment that careful and limited comment there will be.

Firstly it has to be recognised that daily Ukrainian soldiers still die on the front lines in eastern Ukraine.  It may well be the case that those on the opposite side also suffer daily fatalities, though no figures are announced daily like those of the Ukrainian military.  Also Minsk, a framework document that has failed to deliver anything approaching a ceasefire (where the fire actually ceases) since its agreement more than 2 years ago and thus remains diplomatically alive only in the absence of any alternative – and indeed that alternative may actually be worse than continuing with the sham of Minsk.

However, at the very least, those freed following negotiations under Minsk will not consider the process a complete failure when their very freedom comes as a result.

Nevertheless it cannot be claimed that the process has been anything other than a failure in the eyes of many.

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Having met Nadya Savchenko a few times (the last time in June), with regard to her character of the many insights gleaned, and for the purposes of this entry, it is sufficient to note her strong willed personality – so strong that being an “institutional and/or team player” would clearly be secondary.  These character traits alone, as an entry from May made very clear, are not those particularly welcome within the Batkivshchyna Party.

Those personality traits and the fact that as a parliamentarian she has absolute immunity (and impunity) with regard the law, has the potential for some to be somewhat wary of unpredictable and or predictable but unstoppable acts.  (She can, as all other parliamentarians, do what she likes, when she likes, and without (immediate) legal repercussions until such time as parliamentary immunity is lifted by the Verkhovna Rada or her mandate expires.)

Ergo how and who could stop Nadya Savchenko from going to Minsk (other than Belarus)?

Nevertheless, there is such a thing as party discipline and Yulia Tymoshenko cannot afford to be seen as a weak leader of what is in effect nothing more than a Batkivshchyna Party that is political vehicle solely for promoting Yulia Tymoshenko.

Indeed, of Nadya Savchenko’s Minsk adventure, Batkivshchyna have stated they “consider unacceptable any negotiations with the leaders of “DNR” and “LC” and MP N.Savchenko did not coordinate her actions with the factions and parties, and has recently announced her participation in the new political project.”

That said, she is a member of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party, and has unquestionably gone against the party line that is repeatedly and unambiguously on record.  The “distancing” in the above Batkivshchyna statement is not the same thing as party discipline, nor instigating disciplinary measures within the party for such a blatant departure from the party line.

However, to remove her from the party having been elected upon the party list (as No1 before Yulia Tymoshenko due to populist electioneering when Ms Savchenko was still incarcerated in Russia) opens the way for Ms Savchenko to lose her parliamentary status (as happened to former parliamentarians Mykola Tomenko and Igor Firsov per Article 81 of the Constitution).

The expected and inevitable dilemma for Ms Tymoshenko (foreseen in the May entry linked above) as to just how much she will allow herself (and Batkivshchyna) to be tarred with the undisciplined Ms Savchenko brush once again presents itself.

Dilemma!  What political cost to dealing with Ms Savchenko’s disregard for the party line by disciplinary measures, vis a vis looking weak for not doing so?

Further the SBU is now playing catch up – Yuri Tandit of the SBU making clear that they are now collecting and collating information regarding the Minsk meetings of Nadya Savchenko after the fact.

Nevertheless what’s done is done – and may well happen again (and again).

Ms Savchenko justifies her trip by stating “We must do our best, each of us, to take our heroes home even if we will have to pay those who shoot at us”, saying of President Poroshenko “He, like all of us, wants to pick up our children from captivity and the political prisoners from of Russia.  I am confident that the president on his level of doing everything possible to make this happen as quickly as possible.”

Well fair enough – or is it?

Why shouldn’t she do what she thinks she can?

Putting aside the issue of ugly optics and being seen to be negotiating with the public faces and “leaders” of the “Republics” directly (rather than indirectly and through “channels” as is standard fare, and for good reason of “legitimising” the other parties) there are issues of both her legitimacy and also wider coordination.  (That she has done this at the very least may now make her a “useful idiot” in a wider Kremlin secret service operation.)

And it is perhaps coordination that matters the most.

Ms Savchenko states that she traveled to Minsk on her personal Ukrainian passport and not her diplomatic passport.  Whether or not this is meant to infer a personal and not “official Nadya Savchenko MP” dialogue with the “leaders” of the “Republics” is a matter of perception.  As such, when it comes to framing, were any “negotiations” unofficially official (though they appear unsanctioned officially or tacitly), or were they officially unofficial to which any “negotiation” (whether it may or may not reap results) raises the question of what was “given” and “taken” in that negotiation and the ability, particularly by Ms Savchenko, to deliver thereafter.

Perhaps yet more problematic is that it may well be that this becomes a channel or negotiating format of choice for one side but not the other – thus undermining the negotiating formats that are already accepted and working.  Differences between official and unofficial channels may very well complicate matters further and also be deliberately used to frustrate progress by any party concerned in negotiations when those differences are exploited.  The potential nightmare scenario may arise where with insufficient care and coordination there is a real possibility that due to deliberate, or unintentional, mishandling of negotiations, those detained could be held for far longer than would otherwise have been the case.

If this was indeed a personal pilgrimage (well meaning as it may have been) there are real risks as well as potential rewards as a result.

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Whatever was negotiated and/or agreed may actually be counterproductive to any (or all recent progress) by the officially nominated trilateral groups.  Indeed it may be that an individual uncoordinated effort with such a focus on a specific issue distorts or blinds to the wider negotiating policy repercussions both in the immediate and longer term.

Further, even if Ms Savchenko’s personal and seemingly unofficial interjection delivers any much welcomed prisoner releases, that does not necessarily mean political gains for Ms Savchenko in the long term.  Many of her actions and statements have already raised red flags in some quarters in Ukraine – for her to succeed swiftly where 2 years of negotiations where heavyweights the like the OSCE, Messrs Kuchma and Gryzlov et al have delivered little, may raise as many (if not more) red flags as it would potential voters.

Time will tell how this plays out for Ms Savchenko, how Batkicshchyna (Ms Tymoshenko) deal with this, how much the SBU and the official negotiators will learn of the “negotiations” (and as importantly the resulting interpretations of all those present), and perhaps most critically for those already working so hard to release, whether there will be results within the parameters they have been asked to remain within.

Perhaps, considering the high profile Ms Savchenko has, what a reader may ponder most is that if Ukraine felt she was the most suitable of people to be directly involved in such negotiations then she most certainly would be – and that she isn’t may well say all that needs to be said.

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Drama (of the political sort) at the Russian Theatre Odessa

December 6, 2016

The Russki Theatre (Russian Drama Theatre) in Odessa is a longstanding and well known historical venue.

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Since 2002 it has been managed by Alyaksandr Kopaygora.

Mr Kopaygora is nothing short of a controversial figure.

To be diplomatic, his management of the Ruski Theatre is far more in keeping with his ideology than managing a premises called Ukrainian Theatre.  To be less diplomatic and somewhat more blunt and also accurate, Mr Kopaygora was a leading ideologue in Igor Markov’s “Rodina Party” in Odessa.

Mr Markov’s party was (it is now officially defunct) robustly pro-Russia.  Indeed Mr Markov is currently living in Russia and actively playing to the Russian propaganda narrative (as a reader would expect).   Mr Markov has stated he will not return to Ukraine for as long as it pursues its “European” trajectory.  (He is also wanted.)  Among that same ideological crowd is Anatoly Wasserman (a man considered by many to be far more odious than Igor Markov).  Messrs Wasserman, Markov and Kopaygora were all leading lights in Party Rodina.

The loyalty to Ukraine is therefore more than questionably thin as far as Mr Kopaygora is concerned for far too many local constituents, and perhaps nominally exists due only to the meager (official) salary he receives from the Ukrainian taxpayer via the State.

(Indeed his anti-Ukrainian activities were reported to the Ministry of Culture in 2015.  As usual when it comes to the Ministry of Culture there was no response – which is why historical architectural buildings in Odessa continue to be bastardised and/or destroyed under the management of a Luddite/Philistine Mayor of no vision, despite the Culture Ministry’s statutory obligations toward protecting many such buildings.)

The Regional State Administration (RSA) of Odessa announced a competition for Mr Kopaygora’s role as his term drew to an end.  Competition (and “competition”) for public roles is now very much en vogue – and for many public positions a matter of law.

Odessa is renowned  for many things, among which are its “intellectual set” and “arty crowd”.  As such there are numerous individuals of suitable calibre capable of managing the Russki Theatre – albeit another was lost to abysmal Ukrainian driving and/or roads only yesterday.  (RIP Dr. Yulia Gomel, composer of symphonies, ballet, chamber and choral music – undoubtedly a loss to the city and Odessa National Music Academy.)

The day the competition winner was due to be announced, 6th December, the Regional State Administration cancelled the contest for the position.

The reason being, it finally succumbed to public pressure.  The public pressure was not aimed at Mr Kopaygora directly – but at the “competition panel”, the composition of which was stuffed with associates of Mr Kopaygora and therefore clearly compromised as far as neutrality is concerned.

Whether a well placed rumour, or a genuine leak, it also became known that law enforcement agencies were quietly taking an interest in the process.  A reader may conclude that if being busted for corruption is a likely outcome, then being busted over a trifling matter of fixing the competition result for the Russki Theatre is probably not worthwhile.  The risk/reward simply isn’t there.

Ergo, 6th December instead of announcing the “competition” result (and probable continuance in the role of Mr Kopaygora), it was announced that the competition had in fact been cancelled.

In sum, a wise decision by those within the RSA.

Clearly efforts will be made to insure the next competition panel is perceived to be far less biased (at least prima facie) and if that be so then it may come to pass that the official relationship between Mr Kopaygora and the Russki Theatre that began in 2002 will ultimately faceits final curtain.

In the meantime as the festive season approaches, the show must go on.

 

 

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A tangled web – The Ukrainian MIC

November 28, 2016

There are many (in)famous Ukrainian politicians, “businessmen” and recognised organised criminals historically associated with gun running and the defence industry/MIC of Ukraine.

In entries past, the names of Semyon Mogilevich, Leonid Minin, Sergei Mikhailov, Leonid Wulf, Alexander Zhukov, Vadim Rabinovych, Leonid Lebedev, Mark Garber, Kuzma Medanich, Andrey Vazhnik, and Anatoliy Fedorenko, are to name but a few “headliners”.

Since those gun running 1990s/2000 decades have passed, in recent years the Ukrainian military and MIC have been forced to undergo radical changes and retooling – nothing spurs such action as a confined yet nevertheless hot war with Russia in the eastern regions.  Also, no longer do trains loaded with armaments sat on rail sidings at Odessa Port go without more than a few photographs and a questions by both public and media alike.

That is not to say that whilst the hollowed out military is by no means hollow anymore, that the endemic corruption that enabled the gun running of the 1990s/00s has been systemically and comprehensively addressed.  Indeed now large lumps of GDP are heading to the military and MIC, and will continue to do so for years to come,  the eyes of the “rent seekers” so attuned to guzzling from the teat of State subsidies and embezzlement of State funds will naturally seek opportunities therein.

So too, it has to be said, will the Kremlin seek to infiltrate further such MIC structures.

Putting the military to one side, the Ukrainian MIC which is still predominantly State rather than private in its composition, will at some point surely be subjected to some form of scrutiny when it comes to the abilities and loyalties of those working within.  With more than 100 State MIC subsidiaries operating under the State Ukrboronprom umbrella there are a lot of managers with access to information that “others” may find “useful” and some skill sets that are clearly not optimal for their roles.

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Ukrboronprom is currently headed by Roman Romanov (a former car dealer who led the presidential election campaign for Petro Poroshenko in Kharkiv).  Beneath him spreads a large organagram of managers across the one hundred plus SOE subsidiaries.  Whether Mr Romanov has been either tasked or is even able to assess the professional competency and patriotic leanings of the management of those companies which collectively form the Ukrainian MIC is unknown.  A “single sweep” would be far from effective if that is all that results anyway.

Among the management of such subsidiaries certain names catch the eye being from Odessa – for example, Alexander Volkov.

Mr Volkov is currently acting head of Promoboroneksport – a subsidiary that has been busy with BMPs in Jordan and MiG 24V helicopters to Uganda throughout 2016.  All appears to have contractually gone well, and thus it seems very likely that Mr Volkov will become the substantive head of Promoborneksport.

Mr Volkov is best known is Odessa as being the long standing regional party chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) – or SDPU(u) – and his work at the ports and roads industry.

The SDPU(u) is a party long and closely associated with the nationally loathed Viktor Medvedchuk (Godfather to one of President Putin’s children).

Promoboroneksport is a subsidiary of Ukrspetsexport, which is in turn a subsidiary of Ukrboronprom.

Ukrspetsexport is also headed by a native of Odessa, Pavel Barbul.

Mr Barbul is better understood by his father’s associations.

Alexie Barbul has long been associated with roadworks.  He once headed the roads department at Odessa City Hall, thus not only making him a close acquaintance of Mayor Turkhanov (who is well acquainted with several names listed at the beginning of this entry) but he is also with the company “Growth” (winner of many Odessa tenders) associated with Mayor Trukhanov, the aforementioned Alexander Zhukov, and Odessa’s most (in)famous mafia Don, Alexander (Angel) Angert.  The involvement in road infrastructure also meant that Alexie Barbul was well acquainted with Mr Volkov, who now heads a subsidiary subservient to that Pavel Barbul now controls.

Thus looking at recent, current and future appointments within a clearly tangles web, a reader may come to one of two conclusions – though neither are in fact mutually exclusive.

The first, with names such as Medvedchuk, Trukhanov, Zhukov, Angert nestling behind Messrs Volkov and Barbul, is that the Ukrainian MIC is subtly (or not so subtly) “zoned” – with the Odessa controlled “zone” being that of export, whether or not that export actually leaves from Odessa is irrelevant – this is to do with regional structures of power/influence, and probable sources of hierarchy in rent seeking and embezzlement arrangements.  (A look at the “Kharkiv names” would suggest that the “Kharkiv zone” will be far more production orientated – the same rules applying).

The second conclusion a reader may reach, considering the curriculum vitaes of many of the old names and their associations with organised crime, gun running historically, and with many a very questionable definition of “patriotism”, is that more of the same old schemes may well blight the international headlines in the years hence to the detriment of Ukraine.

A reader may also decide to keep a watchful eye upon the centres of R&D that fall within current university specialised departments.  Would any be surprised to see such centers, boffin brains and facilities included, somehow removed from the university and entirely (yet quietly) privatised, or subjected to a PPP arrangement where the private, rather than the public, in any partnership would seize control and almost all profit – with the Ukrainian taxpayer assuming all investment costs and/or loses?

How clear the horizon for such State-Private initiatives such as UaRpa at the forefront of military tech R&D?  Whose “zone” will it fall into, and when?

A reader may ponder given the direct involvement of several sovereign nations, notwithstanding NATO, in the development of the Ukrainian military and MIC whether they too are viewing managerial appointments within the MIC with the same cynicism as displayed within this entry – or not.  And if not, why not?  They have been active in Ukraine now long enough to spot a bad seed germinating, and currently still have the leverage to nip such dubious, yet increasingly obvious internal structuring in the bud.

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The Firtash star falls yet further – Ukraine

November 27, 2016

Whilst all eyes will be upon Mikhail Saakashvili and the inaugural gathering of his newly minted “Rukh New Forces” in Kyiv on 27th November, and its possible political rise – not to be confused with the old “Rukh” political party which may well see a revival simply and deliberately to insure confusion on any ballot paper – the political/influential decline of Dmitry Firtash continues apace.

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As previously mentioned in historical entries, Mr Firtash once powerful within the Party of Regions machinery has seen his influence significantly reduced since its collapse.  More so than any of the other oligarchs associated with PoR, such as Rinat Akhmetov or Sergei Liovochkin etc.

He finds himself marooned in Austria following a thus far unsuccessful US attempt to extradite him over corruption accusations.

Though extradition from Austria may have failed, he remains wanted by the US.  Indeed in June, inquiries were made following a request by one close to him, via back channels, regarding any possibility of a change of US policy toward him.  The answer a definitive – No.  Those close to him again last week requested that inquiries be made via the same back channels regarding the possibility of an out-going Obama Presidential Pardon, resulting in another definitive – No.  (A reader would infer that any “pardon” must also relate to an admission of guilt – for how otherwise to pardon somebody who claims to have done no wrong?)

Matters will not improve for Mr Firtash – they will actually deteriorate further.

Mr Firtash has come to light in a German bribery case.

There is a matter of €500,000 cash being provided to ex-Stasi officer Nina Vilkening to facilitate desired outcomes via the Chief Commissioner of the Criminal Police Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, who received €300,000.

No doubt inquiries will continue and as none of the defendants are particularly youthful, it is not beyond the realms of probability that a deal can and/or will be cut with defendants in order to bring to light the full extent of Mr Firtash’s active involvement in bribery among the German institutions.

Thus it may yet prove only to be a matter of time before Mr Firtash is wanted by Germany – an extradition request that will not be denied by Austria.

Whilst this may now be appearing upon the horizon, the Spanish are far ahead of the Germans.

Spain has admirably been pursuing “Slavic” organsied crime for several years.  Russia has publicly decried Spanish investigations, reports and arrest requests for several years.  Ukraine is not exempt.  Only recently a number of Ukrainians, including the son (Stepan Chernovetsky), of the former Mayor of Kyiv, have been arrested for organised criminality and money laundering in Spain.

Bravo Spain – an example for Austrian and UK (in particular) banking and organsied crime investigative bodies to follow.

Mr Firtash, and two other as yet unidentified Ukrainian businessmen, have now fallen foul of Spanish investigations.  Judge Ignacio Sánchez García-Porrero leading the Spanish inquiry seeks Mr Firtash and the two as yet unidentified Ukrainian businessmen’s delivery to a courtroom in Spain.  The are suspected of leading a major money laundering racket in and via Spain (centered in Barcelona and Marbella).

(With the allegations specifically relating to money laundering presumably it is either the UCO within the Guard Civil and/or the UDEF doing investigative the leg-work rather than the broader Spanish organised crime institutions.)

Whether all the dirty money belongs to Mr Firtash, or whether some is from associates will perhaps become apparent as and when he is brought before a Spanish court.

With known associates ranging from Semyon Mogilevych the Russian “Don of Dons”, through the entire former Cabinet of Viktor Yanukovych’s ousted government, a debt and thus beholding to Russia’s Gazprombank of between $4 and $5 billion, and by extension a beholding to Yuri Kovalchuk (who is very close to President Putin) who personally arranged such loans, just whose dirty money Mr Firtash is suspected of laundering is unclear at this stage.

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There will be layer upon layer of shell companies, nominal directors, fictitious entities and front men to wade through to find and identify the eventual beneficiaries (ultimately based in the usual offshore havens undoubtedly).

Nevertheless, the Spanish have been diligently working upon the misuse of their territory and legislation for several years when it comes to Slavic organised naughtiness.  Clearly Judge Ignacio Sánchez García-Porrero believes all is now sufficiently clear to officially go after Dmitry Firtash (and the two other as yet unidentified Ukrainian businessmen).

Extradition to Spain, no differently than the possibly forthcoming extradition request to Germany, when received by Austria will be a far smoother, almost seamlessly slick affair compared to the request from the US – as all such matters within the EU Member States are.  That is the entire point of the EU Arrest Warrant and the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

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Therefore, whilst a reader may be caught up with the hype surrounding a possibly rising political party headed by Mikhail Saakashvili, the continued fall of the Firtash star may well become a very messy, public and revealing fall indeed.

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Once within Spanish jurisdiction, even if the Spanish case ultimately fails, by that time there will be the existing US request and a probable German case that the Spanish can extradite him to.

The outlook for Mr Firtash currently looks rather bleak – a lesson for Ukrainian kings and pawns alike.

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