Archive for August, 2013

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The release of Tymoshenko imminent? Who will it hurt the most?

August 31, 2013

President Yanukovych stated – quite unambiguously two days ago – “I see no obstacles to signing this accord. The conditions set forth by the EU Commission will be met.

For many EU member states, not to mention the European People’s Party within the European Parliament, the most publicised issue of them all is the end to “selective justice” – namely the release of Yulia Tymoshenko.

That is not to say she alone sits in a Ukrainian prison due to “selective justice” – many do, albeit they are obviously lesser mortals – many such incarcerated when she was Prime Minister.  Likewise, many who should be sat in a Ukrainian jail are not – selected not to face justice, as much today as when Yulia Tymoshenko was Prime Minister.

She is nothing more than a high profile symptom of a much larger and long lasting problem – a problem in which, to the cold and impartial observer, she cannot be absolved just because she became a victim herself.

Anyway, how to interpret Yanukovych’s words when he is acutely aware that the Tymoshenko issue is perceived as the biggest single obstacle to any signing?  In stating “The conditions set forth by the EU Commission will be met” there seems to be a robust inference that Tymoshenko will indeed be freed imminently.

If that is so, then it will surely occur in September, prior to a final preparatory EU meeting in October relating to Ukraine, ahead of the Vilnius Summit in November.  Ergo, it follows that prior to that October EU meeting all the Ukrainian ducks need to be lined up in a row both legislatively and in relation to Tymoshenko.

A while ago, prior to the recent quoted statement by President Yanukovych, I was told by a fairly trusted and reliable source that Tymoshenko would be released on or around 15th September.  (Chatham House Rule applies to the source.)  Whether that date proves to be correct or not, now seems rather irrelevant taking into consideration what President Yanukovych said publicly.

The questions that follow therefore, relate to whether Ms Tymoshenko will still be headed for Germany, how long before she miraculously recovers within a time frame that would shock the medical profession for somebody with her condition, and most importantly post Vilnius, how long before she strains an already fractious opposition pact to the point of breaking?

The question has to be asked just who her early release will hurt the most?  The current President, or the grubby little deals struck within the all boys club that is the current opposition leadership trinity – most if not all of these deals are likely to be thrown out of the window at her earliest opportunity?

Whilst there maybe light at the end of the tunnel for Ms Tymoshenko – does that same tunnel now contain an on-coming train for the current opposition agreement?  Who most needs to derail her comeback?

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Ukraine to lose “Strategic Partner” status if it signs with the EU – Glazyev

August 30, 2013

Yesterday I wrote this relating to the obvious deterioration in Russian Ukrainian relations and the fact the EU, majority and opposition were at least on the same page for once.

There I raised the issued of Mykola Tomenko’s rather hopeful outlook relating to Russian relations being based on anything more than absolute “needs”.

“Unfortunately, “reasonable” works only when both parties are prepared to sacrifice “positions” but seek more than “needs” – effectively working by way of the middle road of “interests”. Mr Tomenko seems to have a rather hopeful outlook when it comes to Russia being “reasonable” any time soon.

It is also rather a stretch to say the current government have suggested an association with both Customs Union and EU to society. What it has suggested publicly and often – swiftly pooh-poohed by Russia – was a Customs Union +1 (Ukraine) arrangement whereby Ukraine was not a full member of the Customs Union. The current government is fully aware – having negotiated and agreed the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU themselves – that the two are not compatible (because the CU does not allow Ukraine to set unilaterally its trade parameters – a requirement of the EU).

However he is quite right. The current government should face the reality that the current status quo is an impossibility should any agreement be signed. Russia will sulk and will make Ukraine suffer given every opportunity. The recent warning shots have been fired and leave no room for doubt.

Nevertheless, until signatures dry on any agreements – and there is no guarantee there will be any signatures at all – perhaps stretching that status quo as long as possible is not such a bad option over the next few months. What is Mr Tomenko’s contingency plan should there be no signing with the EU and also having ruled out any kind of 3 +1 styled Customs Union arrangement having completely poisoned the Russian well in advance?”

Now if my skepticism relating to Russian attitudes towards Ukraine – and Mr Tomenko’s more up-beat hopes for a Russian/Ukrainian relationship based upon a “pragmatic and mutually beneficial basis” needed any further confirmation – presidential advisor to Mr Putin, Sergei Glazyev underlined the fact that Russia is quite prepared to cut off its nose to spite its face yesterday.

“Ukraine will stop being our strategic partner and it will disappear as a subject of international law because it will have to coordinate all its action in the trade sphere with the EU.  Ukraine will not be able to make a step towards us if the EU does not allow it to do. We do not understand why Ukraine is giving up its sovereignty voluntarily to Brussels, rejecting cooperation with us on preferential terms.

This is a catastrophe for Ukraine and a big blow for us.”

Ukraine will stop being Russia’s strategic partner was a statement waiting to be made by somebody – how could it be otherwise?

What Mr Tomenko wants to see by way of relations based upon a “pragmatic and mutually beneficial basis” in relation to trade is unlikely in the short term.  Somebody in the Kremlin at this very moment is working on the scenario of replacing the goods that Russian businesses rely on from Ukraine to determine how long it would take – whether that strategy be implemented or not.

But once again, Russia and Mr Glazyev (and Mr Tomenko) are choosing to concentrate only upon the DCFTA and economic issues and seem to be deliberately ignoring to Association Agreement which is of possibly much more serious domestic consequence to the Kremlin in the years ahead as I have written about recently.

“Despite the Customs Union (read Russia) framing the Ukrainian future choice in purely economic terms whenever and wherever it can, Russian concern relates to its desire to keep a nation with a perceived shared history, culture and language looking toward it favourably. The perception of Ukraine turning its back on Russia for the EU will present difficult questions for those in the Kremlin when ordinary Russians in huge numbers begin to ask whether the chosen Ukrainian direction is in fact the right direction – and shouldn’t Russia be following that route too?”

Mr Tomenko seems to expect a relationship based upon a “pragmatic and mutually beneficial basis”, when both the EU Association Agreement and Mr Putin’s Custom Union/Eurasian Union are ideological concepts first and foremost – and pragmatism often plays a poor second fiddle to ideology if it is perceived to undermine it.

The more Russia publicly  and deliberately ignores acknowledging the political, democratic and social parameters set by the Association Agreement upon Ukraine, the more I become convinced of what I wrote above relating to serious domestic concerns in the longer term within the Kremlin.

Should Ukraine and the EU manage to make a half-decent show of things with regards to both the Association Agreement and DCFTA – that may further stoke the discontent amongst an already unhappy Russian middle class.

If ever there was a reason to choose the EU deal over the offer by Russia, for those who care about the chances of not only consolidation, but the eventual invincibility of democracy in Ukraine over any other style of leadership, then the economics of the DCFTA vis a vis Customs Union are, whilst important, secondary – which is undoubtedly why Russia is keen to frame the entirety of the Association Agreement in singularly economic terms, remaining mute over the political, democratic and social  frameworks within the Association Agreement.

A fear of the Churchill hypothesis seeping across the Russian border from its perceived close Ukrainian kin?

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A day when everybody made sense? EU, Ukraine & Russia

August 29, 2013

It doesn’t happen very often, but 27th August was a day when it appeared everybody – with the exception of Russia – was singing from the same song-sheet and actually sounding in tune with the realities of the current EU/Russia/Ukraine situation.

Firstly, Stephan Fule and Andriy Kluyev on message and striking the right tone – although once again Stephan Fule states the European Commission is ready to – and is engaging with – the current Ukrainian government, opposition and civil society without seeming to grasp the need for direct engagement with the biggest constituency of them all, the Ukrainian people.

As neither the Ukrainian government, opposition or civil society manage to effectively engage with Ukrainian society, perhaps the EU should try do so before Russia whips up ethnic Russia sentiment across Ukraine?  Surely it is better to preempt what is inevitable.

Secondly there was Mykola Tomenko (in my opinion the best leader the Batkivschyna Party will never have) setting out a reasonable foreign policy toward Russia.

“Ukraine and Russia have quite a substantial political and economic crisis in their bilateral relations. Unfortunately, the crisis will worsen before November.

Such remarks should prompt our leadership to look for new forms of relations with Russia, or, to be more precise, to build mutually beneficial and pragmatic economic relations.

 The post-Soviet rhetoric about the two brotherly nations should remain in history textbooks. We should talk about two states building their relations on a pragmatic and mutually beneficial basis.

Unfortunately, we can say that this is not the end but in fact only the beginning of such a confrontation on Russia’s part. This calls for a more appropriate response from the Ukrainian leadership: saying that nothing happened and everything is okay is an attempt to bury one’s head in the sand. 

The Ukrainian authorities should substantively reconsider their approaches toward relations with Russia. The Ukrainian leadership has spent several years explaining to Ukrainian society the possibility of building a coordinated system of equitable relations within the format of an association with the Customs Union and the European Union. However, the opposition has always pointed out that it is impossible to work simultaneously in two distinct systems.”

Unfortunately, “reasonable” works only when both parties are prepared to sacrifice “positions” but seek more than “needs” – effectively working by way of the middle road of “interests”.  Mr Tomenko seems to have a rather hopeful outlook when it comes to Russia being “reasonable” any time soon.

It is also rather a stretch to say the current government have suggested an association with both Customs Union and EU to society.  What it has suggested publicly and often – swiftly pooh-poohed by Russia – was a Customs Union +1 (Ukraine) arrangement whereby Ukraine was not a full member of the Customs Union.  The current government is fully aware – having negotiated and agreed the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU themselves – that the two are not compatible (because the CU does not allow Ukraine to set unilaterally its trade parameters – a requirement of the EU).

However he is quite right.  The current government should face the reality that the current status quo is an impossibility should any agreement be signed.  Russia will sulk and will make Ukraine suffer given every opportunity.  The recent warning shots have been fired and leave no room for doubt.

Nevertheless, until signatures dry on any agreements – and there is no guarantee there will be any signatures at all –  perhaps stretching that status quo as long as possible is not such a bad option over the next few months.  What is Mr Tomenko’s contingency plan should there be no signing with the EU and also having ruled out any kind of 3 +1 styled Customs Union arrangement having completely poisoned the Russian well in advance?

Lastly, pro-EU Party of Regions MP Volodymyr Oliynyk made some very valid points – particularly in respect of Ukrainian society.

As we all know from personal experience, there is a societal lag when it comes to changes in policy from the top – in any nation.

“We can change clothes, but we must change ourselves, to become Europeans by ourselves: in behavior, in attitudes to each other, to the law. In this sense our task isn’t simple, but these amendments are necessary, primarily for Ukraine.”

Mr Oliynyk is absolutely right in what he says above.  It is easy to change legislation or policy.  It is not easy to change the attitudes of society – they do indeed lag a long way behind on the occasions society is not driving the change.

Again we return to the fact nobody has made any direct impact through dialogue with the biggest constituency of them all – the Ukrainian people.

He went on to say, “If Russia imposes sanctions, God forbid, of not an economic, but political character… undoubtedly we’ll find new market outlets, but Russia will also lose…We don’t want such development of events. We need mutually beneficial partner relations, but, as Shevchenko wrote once: everyone has his truth, his will in his house.

Within these words are the critical element of self-determination and sovereignty as Shevchenko no doubt understood very well.

Ultimately Ukraine must take control of the situation both East and West when it comes to its own destiny.  It cannot allow others to dictate its destiny any longer – and the days of fence-sitting are over.

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“We can’t lose Ukraine” – Baroness Ashton

August 28, 2013

Hmmm.

I think I have read almost every press release, seen almost every video/YouTube clip, watched almost every live EU EEAS podcast made by Baroness Ashton – not because I am a stalker, but a policy wonk, and therefore EU foreign policy matters to me, particularly when it involves the EaP nations.

The statement attributed to her by the Estonian Government’s website at a recent meeting in Estonia that “We can’t lose Ukraine” seems therefore very unlike something Baroness Ashton would say – on the record at least.

Off the record she may very well state such thoughts so bluntly.  Having never had an off the record conversation with her, I wouldn’t know just how great a difference there is between her public statements and private conversations.

What I can say, after hundreds of conversations with diplomats and politicians both on and off the record over the years, is that what is said publicly is often far more careful and polished than what is said privately – as we would expect.  The whole point of an off the record conversation is that it allows those having it to be blunt – without public repercussions.

I am therefore left to wonder whether this statement was made in the expectation of privacy – later to be unexpectedly be made public – or whether it is paraphrasing to a sound-byte by an Estonian press officer, or whether recent Russian actions toward Ukraine have finally focused the minds of those at the very top of the EEAS and European Commission respectively, to the point where more robust and definitive language and thinking now prevails.

The chances of a governmental press officer inaccurately reporting such a statement are slim given the gravity of the statement.

Ergo, I am left with the options of a comment made in the expectation of privacy, and/or a distinct (deliberately public) – albeit indirectly attributed – hardening of attitude towards Russia.

If the EaP project is to survive – and it won’t without Ukraine as the most significant nation by far – then whatever happens to Ukraine at the hands of Russia is a clear signal to the other capitals of the EaP nations.  It follows therefore, that any EU response with regard to pressure placed upon Ukraine will be watched carefully by those much smaller EaP nations.

In this regard, “We can’t lose Ukraine”, whether actually said by Baroness Ashton or not, is quite true.

A proportionate but robust EU response will be expected in order to provide what may well be much needed fortitude in some EaP capitals as they attempt to stand their ground when various Russian sticks are used to soundly rap the knuckles of those who would dare to pick up a pen and sign agreements taking them into the EU orbit and out of that of Russia.

Ukraine therefore sets the precedent not only for what, where , when and how Russian coercion takes place – but also,  and perhaps more importantly, the response and support EaP capitals can expect from the EU when such actions undoubtedly occur.

That is not to say Russia will exactly mirror the coercion model used on Ukraine on the other EaP nations, as there nuanced differences to the sticks that can be used for each EaP nation – additional levers of Transnestria in Moldova, or Ossetia in Georgia etc, to add to the Russian armoury for example – But economic, social and political “sanctions” and “agitation” are equally available to be employed in any EaP nation as they are – and will be – in Ukraine, before, during and after any Association Agreement progression.

As such, any form of success between Ukraine and the EU will harden attitudes in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Chisinau to follow the EaP path.

Naturally, there will be those in numerous Scandinavian, Baltic and ex-Warsaw Pact nations – particularly in Warsaw I strongly suspect – who will be prodding the European Commission and EEAS, stating, “We told you this would happen so you had better be prepared to make a show of things and openly show your displeasure with Russia – for a change – for if you fail to do so, not only will you lose Ukraine, but the entire EaP project with it.”

Unfortunately, I am not sure whether the statement attributed to Baroness Ashton – if accurate – was meant to be made public or not.  I cannot find an EU or EEAS statement confirming the Estonian governmental website account.  Knowing the accuracy and whether it was meant to be a public or private comment would take us past the “what was said” to “what was really said” by way of EU intent and robustness toward Russian meddling now and in the future.

 

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Lutsenko – How temporary should temporary allies be?

August 27, 2013

A few days ago, when commenting upon the apparent distancing of the opposition leaders, I wrote this – “……..Or perhaps the political expediency has now turned to the beginning of disorder as the very wise Lau Tzu orated?

If so we can hardly be surprised. Once the signing – or not – of the EU Association Agreement passes at the end of November, opposition leaders will have their eyes on the presidential campaign of early 2015 – and very little else.”

Depending upon just how much credibility we may consider Yuri Lutsenko to retain amongst the opposition ranks – and that is very subjective indeed – then as soon as necessary legislation has been passed to allow for the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU – zero sum politics returns immediately, with all opposition eyes on the presidential campaign of 2015 as I suggested just a few days before.

“President Yanukovych is the opposition’s temporary ally.  Until the ink on his signature dries up, he is our ally.  The following day the ink dries up, he is again our adversary whom we have to defeat in the 2015 presidential elections.”

Yes indeed there is a presidential election to compete within – but such statements tend to suggest a weary return to the zero sum politics we are so accustomed to in Ukraine by the feckless political class.

Depending upon what inference we draw from Lutsenko’s statement, it is a very sad indicator for the immediate fate of Association Agreement should it be signed.

Is this the declaration of a moratorium between November 2013 and March 2015 by the opposition parties when it comes to the required cooperation to turn what is effectively no more than a signing of a statement of direction into actual and tangible European integration by way of ratification?

Unless he is expecting by some miracle that by simply signing the Association Agreement it transforms Ukraine overnight and is indeed an all-powerful panacea that will work its magic unaided – which it certainly isn’t – there will be a lot of hard work to do between any signing of any agreement and its ratification.

Quite simply, with so great a legislative and implementation challenge to meet between signing and ratification – including changes to the Constitution of Ukraine that necessarily require the votes of 300 MPs, and thus the absence of zero sum politics because neither side can muster that number alone – that time becomes very valuable indeed – A time of cooperation and inclusion if what needs to be done is to get done expeditiously.

What of the undoubted Russian shenanigans during the period between any signing and ratification  that will occur?

It will require a united and robust rebuttal by the entire Ukrainian political class.  It will require a united political dialogue with the nation to explain just why taking any such Russian inflicted pain is worthwhile in denying efforts to scupper the Association Agreement that will be both slow to be ratified and bring any tangible benefits.

If Lutsenko believes Yanukovych to be a necessary and temporary ally now, regardless of who wins or loses any elections, how can that situation change during what will certainly be a very difficult period prior to ratification of something so absolutely fundamental to the future of the nation?

When does Lutsenko believe the threats, both internal and external, have diminished enough to jettison Yanukovych and Party of Regions as temporary allies over this particular matter?

Just how temporary is temporary?  Should it be based upon the drying of Yanukovych’s signature on Ukrainian laws to meet EU expectations, the signature on the Association Agreement itself, or upon any final ratification document in due course?

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A twitter chat with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

August 26, 2013

I have written a few entries lately that have been republished by the nice people at EastBook.EU both in the original English, but also translated into Polish and Russian too.  Once again, many thanks.

Much to my surprise, yesterday evening having imbibed slightly too much red wine than is good for me owing to celebration of Ukrainian independence, I saw some of my entries being tweeted by none other than Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (@JSaryuszWolski) who happens to be the Vice President of the European People’s Party within the European Parliament – Blimey!

To be precise, this one and this one – tweeting both English and Polish versions.

Needless to say, I made a mental note that I should perhaps actually read through what I write prior pressing “Publish” without even a cursory attempt to edit my ruminations – although they don’t read too badly on reflection.

Anyway, a small twitter exchange occurred between us and it seems that what caught his eye in the second entry he was so kindly disseminating to his twitter following, was this paragraph – “Despite the Customs Union (read Russia) framing the Ukrainian future choice in purely economic terms whenever and wherever it can, Russian concern relates to its desire to keep a nation with a perceived shared history, culture and language looking toward it favourably.  The perception of Ukraine turning its back on Russia for the EU will present difficult questions for those in the Kremlin when ordinary Russians in huge numbers begin to ask whether the chosen Ukrainian direction is in fact the right direction – and shouldn’t Russia be following that route too?”

Well, all very clever and possibly quite insightful of me – but is it realistic to think that could actually turn out to be the case?

Why not? – Now matter how far back in history we want to go, events are normally regional (if not global).  Be it the Mongol Hordes, Napoleon, the Tzars, Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, the 1917 Revolution or Axis sweeping across the European Continent in full or in part, in the rare instances where national borders became robust borders as far as direct consequences may be concerned, the indirect ripples, many of which were and remain long lasting relating to such regional occurrences, were not prevented by national borders.

During most of those events I list – and many others – the actions of neighbours are not insulated by national borders.  Direct or indirect but often profound repercussions are the reality.

As such either directly or indirectly over the centuries, what has happened to Ukraine has happen to Russia and vice versa.  Culture, religion, history and language all have considerable similarities over large periods of time that simply cannot be undone – despite any differences, the similarities and consistencies loom large and frame the Russian perception of Ukraine today, just as it has historically.

Therefore, should Ukraine and the EU manage to make even a half-decent show of the Association Agreement in its implementation and resulting outcomes – and let us not delude ourselves that even after signing a fully compliant Ukraine will emerge – but should this occur, then questions within an already grumbling Russian middle class will begin to manifest themselves into a more robust and complex political animal that may well challenge those currently sat in the Kremlin.

What would be the result on Russian middle class psyche if Ukraine and the EU not only manage to make a notable (if not perfect) go of things and Ukrainians were granted Visa-free throughout Schengen whilst those in Russia still had to go through the often degrading, very intrusive and simply annoying bureaucracy of getting Visas?

As I have written before, relying on the Ukrainian political class or civil society to get the EU message across to Ukrainian society is wasted energy.  It is necessary to go direct.  The same is certainly true of Russia.  There is nothing more individual by way of direct diplomacy than freedom of movement across borders where once intrusive and expensive bureaucracy once stood.

How long would it be before Russians started asking  “shouldn’t Russia be following that route too?” when their perceived Ukrainian kin seem to be enjoying benefits denied them?

Can Ukrainian direction affect the direction of Russia? – Given the perceived kinship felt by Russia towards Ukraine, given time I think so – if there are benefits to be seen denied to our northern neighbour that would be coveted.

As Jack Saryusz-Wolski closed our twitter chat with “Polityka jest sztuką robienia maksimum,w granicach tego co możliwe” – or in English, “Politics is the art of making maximum, within the limits of what is possible.” – I closed with “And diplomacy is the art of letting others have it your way.

Let’s see whether those two statements not only have a profound effect on Ukraine in the immediate term (on the assumption that the association agreement be signed and delivers tangible results – which is by no means assured), but also by extension over time on Russian direction too as demanded by society.

Perhaps not – but hope is a peculiarly human trait.

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Expediency is the shadow of right and truth, it is the beginning of disorder

August 25, 2013

When virtue is lost, benevolence appears, when benevolence is lost right conduct appears, when right conduct is lost, expediency appears.  Expediency is the mere shadow of right and truth; it is the beginning of disorder – Lau Tzu

Perhaps an apt description of the current state of affairs within the opposition parties of Ukraine?

Having seen, day in and day out, for months upon end, during the ill-fated and exceptionally pointless “Rise Ukraine” campaign by the opposition parties – during which hardly anybody did “rise” and nobody really knows why they were asked to “rise” even now – I became accustomed to seeing Arseniy Yatseniuk, Oleh Tyahnybok and Vitali Klitschko joined at the hip.  They were almost inseparable.

Quite which we want to identify with virtue, which with benevolence, and the latter with right conduct, I will leave to the readers – however the result of such an unholy and ideologically fractious alliance was clear to all from the start – with Klitschko repeatedly making statements about the differing ideology within this trinity – resulting in a glaringly obvious case of political expediency, an alter at which individual right and truth (not to mention individual party ideology) was to be sacrificed.

However, over the past month – with the exception of the 10th Ukrainian World Congress in Lviv last week, during which I did not see Klitschko speak to either Yatseniuk or Tyahnybok either on or off stage – they have hardly been seen in each others company.

Yatseniuk now regularly appears on television alone, where once there were always three.  (As an aside, he also  appears to be trying to lose his natural “intelligentsia look” – swapping it unconvincingly for a tanned and permanently unshaven look, to match his ever less intelligent but increasing bold comments one supposes.  I much preferred the intelligent Yatseniuk to be frank.)

Today, yet another lackluster opposition rally occurred in Kyiv where almost every opposition leader (significant or otherwise) was present – less Tyahnybok and Klitschko.

Next week, Stefan Fule, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy meets with Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, Andriy Kliuyev, and Vitali Klitschko. – No mention of Yatseniuk or Tyahnybok.

In short, the past 12 months of being unable to separate these three leaders when appearing in public, has radically reversed over the past few months.

Perhaps it is the holiday season.  Perhaps I am perceiving this all wrong – Or perhaps the political expediency has now turned to the beginning of disorder as the very wise Lau Tzu orated?

If so we can hardly be surprised.  Once the signing – or not – of the EU Association Agreement passes at the end of November, opposition leaders will have their eyes on the presidential campaign of early 2015 – and very little else.

Unless they are going to present themselves as a photocopy of each other relating to policy, ideology and vision, divisions will necessarily become apparent on the assumption they do not nominate a single candidate amongst themselves for the first round – which they simply won’t do, as Klitschko is the most popular opposition leader, but Tymoshenko will not allow a presidential race without her horse in it.

Perhaps I am reading too much into the current lack of joint appearances by the opposition leaders, or perhaps I am being somewhat insightful in suggesting that – coordinated EU action between now and November aside – the faction leaders have already tentatively begun to try and distance themselves from each other in both word and deed, conscious of not wanting to be tarred with each others brushes.

Wise chap that Lau Tzu.

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