Archive for the ‘Ukraine’ Category

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The re-militarisation of Artsyz airfield (Odessa)

June 24, 2017

1998 saw the military finally leave the former Soviet airbase of Artsyz, western Odessa.

The 840 hectare site, once known as the 206th Airbase was home to the 737 Fighter Wing, and in Soviet times was also the airbase for a military transport squadron.  It was also a reserve space shuttle site.   Popular folklore would also have it that it was a Soviet chemical weapons storage site.

Naturally since the military left the airbase it has been thorough pillaged and ransacked by “local recyclers” and otherwise thrown beyond disrepair and convincingly into ruin.

The last remotely military action at Artsyz was in 2014 when concrete blocks were laid across the runways to prevent the Russians landing if they had a mind to try.

The Artsyz 840 hectare site is now home to 6 AN-2 crop spraying aircraft operated by the company Albatross.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Stepan Poltorak when visiting Odessa has now announced that 380 hectares of the site will return to military service and be restored (hopefully beyond former “glory” and to something befitting a modern military site for the Air Force).

The designs are apparently almost complete and work will begin in 2018.

“Design will be complete and next year we will start practical measures for restoration.  Now we need this airport” – S Poltorak

So be it.

Artsyz is about as far from Russia as is possible within Ukrainian territory if discounting the ever increasingly militarised illegally annexed Crimea – except it is not possible to discount the ever increasingly militarised illegally annexed Crimea, which in contemporary military terms is but a catapult distance away when it comes to lobbing missiles at a target or flying in those very polite little green men and/or overt Russian military.

Quite what Ukrainian Air Force units and/or equipment will be based at Artsyz has not yet been disclosed, nor has the reason why this abandoned military ruin is now needed (rather than desired).

Thus without knowing what Air Force units will be stationed at the refurbished airbase, it is difficult to understand why it has become a priority for the Defence Ministry vis a vis those already used in the region.

Is it a case of being able to transfer military personnel and equipment to the Ukrainian southwest swiftly – primarily a matter of internal military logistics?

As such is it connected to the recent deployment of the National Guard to Belgorod (under the guise of “community policing”.) – or not?

Is it to provide a deterrent to any future adventurism from the expanding illegal Russian forces in Crimea?  If so, what form will that deterrent take?

Will it include a counterterrorism and/or organised crime capability monitoring the smuggling to and from Transnistria and/or along the Odessa coastline?

It is perhaps reasonable to expect complaints (that will rightfully be ignored) from Tiraspol and/or Moscow regarding Transneistra, as Artsyz is probably the closest (former military) airbase to Transneistra, Moldova and Romania that Ukraine possesses.  (Literally minutes from Moldavian and Romanian airspace.)

Is there a broader, even bilateral/multilateral dimension?  A preparatory act relating to future joint operational capacity with Romania (and/or others) perhaps?  Will it become part of a larger A2AD bubble?

Cynically, which will have a runway worthy of the name first?  Odessa International Airport or Artsyz?

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StranaUA searched – Editor Igor Guzhva arrested

June 22, 2017

Many readers aware of the media outlet StranaUA will have perhaps wondered why the search of its premises by the National Investigative Police (not SBU) has taken so long in coming.

StranaUA is hardly what can be called a publication that promotes a western traveling Ukraine.

Igor Guzhva is long reputed to be a creature of Vladislav Surkov, and others close to the publication include Russian journalist Iskander Khisamov who was, and perhaps still is, within the orbit of Gleb Pavlovsky a Kremlin spin doctor.

However, a media outlet is a media outlet and freedom of speech is the shield that protects, even if propaganda and disinformation is espoused, promulgated and disseminated under the cover of freedom of speech yes?

Well actually no – albeit each case must necessarily be assessed on its individual merits.

As Dmitry Kiselev, Russia’s most (in)famous rabid “journalist” recently discovered in a European Court of Human Rights ruling when challenging his sanctions and travel ban as curtailing his journalistic right to free speech, the court stated propaganda is not covered by a journalistic masking of freedom of speech.

So Ukraine has taken action against StranaUA in light of this recent ECfHR ruling and decided to put an end to StranaUA flapdoodle?  Or Kremlin influence?  Perhaps dodgy funding?

Well no.  Prima facie the issue appears to be purely criminal.  Igor Guzhva has been arrested for demanding and recieving a $10,000 bribe to withhold from publication kompromat (incriminating material) of a Ukrainian parliamentarian.  Thus a matter of blackmail it appears.

According to Prosecutor General Lutsenko, the incident is on tape and the bribe has been recovered during the search.

Mr Guzhva will no doubt claim he has been framed, and whether or not he is taken out of circulation it is unlikely that StranaUA will simply disappear as a result – nor change its style of media content  It will claim State institutional pressure on dissenting media.  The muffling of freedom of speech.

Time will tell whether it is indeed a State an engineered incident, or simply a criminal getting caught for a criminal act – or both.

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n end to ATO and a start of “temporary occupation” (legislatively speaking)?

June 21, 2017

The misnomer that was and remains the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine, sealed in Ukrainian statute in April 2014, may very soon be about to end.  Ukraine after all is not fighting against terrorists.   It was, is and will continue to fight against an assortment of pro-Kremlin (or Soviet nostalgic) locals, mercenaries, PMCs and the Russian military – along with more Russian armour in that small occupied enclave than many European nations possess.

However April 2014 was what it was – a structural mess with a political class struggling on many fronts, a military, it was suddenly discovered, that was entirely hollowed out, infiltrated, and poorly equipped.  So too the SBU, the police, and every other institution of State holding responsibilities toward national security and rule of law.   Then, as is always the case, Ukrainians and Ukrainian civil society rallied and filled the void where governance, military, and command and control was effectively neutered.

The choice in 2014 was to either impose Martial Law which would have prevented much needed presidential, Verhovna Rada and local elections following the fleeing of the former regime, or to come up with something statutory that would allow both State and ad hoc volunteer mobilisation to temporarily fill the gaps.

Thus the ATO legislation was created at a time when the Russian military presence was far more covert than it later became after the legislation came into legal effect, and Ukrainian structures, processes and command and control were ramshackle.  What consideration was given regarding an alternative word to “terrorist”, and why other words were eventually rejected matters not – suffice to say that international and domestic legal definitions will have played a part, as will the perceptions such words will have projected among the Ukrainian constituency.

During the ensuing 3 years Ukraine with the assistance of external and internal actors has managed to improve it military capabilities and understanding of those capabilities.  It is also abundantly clear to all that the kinetic war it fights in eastern Ukraine is not one with terrorists.

Having now held the line, it is perhaps time to revisit the ATO legislation, the provisions within that provide for certain actions but not for others, and craft a legislative platform suitable for where the conflict is now, and also to provide for the likely (and less likely) scenarios in the future.

Lo, the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) is set to address this very issue.

The term “ATO” and “ATO zone” may soon be historical and no longer statutory.  Instead a reader may see wording similar to “temporarily occupied territories”.  Such wording will possibly have legal repercussions  both within and without Ukraine – though it is unlikely to change the attitudes of those that support Ukraine.

Quite how, for example, it would affect the Minsk understandings, or veteran statuses,  or more mundane issues such as press passes, or other existing decrees, statute, resolutions and orders, that may mention ATO is unclear.

With regard to the goals of the new legislation, the current draft states – “The goals of the state policy on the restoration of state sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces are: liberating the occupied territories and restoring the constitutional system in all of Ukraine’s territories; protecting the rights, freedoms and legal interests of Ukrainian citizens who are suffering as a result of Russian aggression; reinforcing the independence, state sovereignty and integrity of the independent, sovereign, democratic, legal and social Ukrainian state.”

It is also apparent that this proposed legislation aims to set up an operational headquarters for personnel (as appointed by the President) directly involved in supervising national security.  Thus Olexandr Turchynov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, may get his own Bat Cave or mini-Pentagon – or perhaps considering financial constraints, a dank and musty bunker from which to run his national security empire (or “the Ukrainian Deep State” for the conspiratorially minded).

If finally recognising in legal statute that the areas beyond government control are indeed “temporarily occupied territories” then it makes sense to prohibit all activities that are subject to State regulation or the use of State resources within the territories.  Whilst it is fair to say that those within the management of the occupied territories are not going to pay any adherence to Ukrainian legislation, the legislation prohibiting such matters must still exist or order that it can be broken.  (The principle that everything that is not forbidden is allowed.)

The draft statute also makes clear that Ukrainians have the right to free and unobstructed entry into the occupied territory, and to exit the territory through entry-exit control points provided they present proper identity documents which confirm their Ukrainian citizenship.

However, also muted is the granting of the operational headquarters the right to determine the list of goods which are prohibited and permitted to pass between the territories of Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories.  (Currently the movement of such goods is prohibited by the NSDC’s decision from 15th March 2017.)  As the proposed draft law looks toward the years ahead that will almost certainly witness parts of Luhansk and Donetsk remain “temporarily occupied territories” – and without a ceasefire where the fire ceases – it is perhaps reasonable to ponder this proposal further (although not to the point where rightfully updating the ATO statute grinds to a halt).

Is this a matter that should remain the competence of the NSDC, or one that can be returned to the competence of parliament?  What, other than the existing restrictions, would require the nimbleness of further swift, yet autocratic NSDC Directives vis a vis codifying them in statute via a democratically elected, albeit glacial and feckless, parliament?  Is it indeed the feckless nature of parliament that makes the NSDC the better choice?

Regardless, the days of Anti-Terrorism Operations, ATO,  and ATO zones may soon be drawing to a close.  The days of “temporarily occupied territories” may soon begin (more than 3 years after they were “temporarily occupied”).

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PrivatBank (and others) assets head to auction

June 20, 2017

There are a number of electronic platforms used for auctioning off seized, arrested or defaulted assets in Ukraine.

Among them is the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) creatively titled “Electronic Trading System of Arrested Property” headed by Victor Vishnev.

Despite the very bland and clunky appearance  of the website and some lots that would equate to little more than junk, it is obviously functional.  The SOE has a track record with Oschadbank and Ukrgazbank having auctioned off assets worth UAH  130 million and UAH 150 million respectively.

Of the 3762 lots of Q1 2017 it has auctioned, it has raised UAH 386 million.  (According to the Ministry of Justice)

Mr Vishnev has let it be known that his SOE has won a competition to auction the now nationalised PrivatBank assets – about 2000 lots in total.

They include the Bukovel ski resort, Dnipr FC’s training ground, numerous shopping malls and business centers (mostly but not entirely located in and around Dnipr).  This is surely the biggest account there is and will be for some time.  It will equate to UAH billions.  There will be some solid assets to buy among the lots, but the full listing of the lots will paint an interesting picture of what pies PrivatBank (read Messrs Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov) has had its fingers in.  (Naturally not all of their interests are associated with actions via the bank.)

Interestingly, Mr Vishnev stated that  SOE Electronic Trading System of Arrested Property also expected to conclude an agreement with Russian VTB to auction 900 lots.  Quite what those lots consist of remain to be seen.  Perhaps the majority are High Street branches as the bank exits Ukraine.  Then again, perhaps it won’t be overflowing with High Street branches and some interesting assets will come to light – as well as some interesting history surrounding them.

A website, no matter how basic it looks, to keep an eye upon as PrivatBank and VTB assets for auction get uploaded over the coming months.

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Poroshenko heads to the White House

June 19, 2017

President Poroshenko heads to Washington DC, The White House, and a meeting with President Trump – perhaps.  If President Trump does not see President Poroshenko while he is there, then inferences will certainly be drawn in Ukraine and The Kremlin.

On the presumption (as risky as that may prove to be) a meeting occurs, then the two men have significant differences.  President Poroshenko is a micromanager.  He is very careful in how he frames matters and reasonably particular about what he says or that is attributed to him.  He also clearly goes beyond his constitutional powers and infringes upon and/or subverts the constitutional powers of the parliament.

President Trump appears incoherent when he speaks.  His framing is terrible even on policy issues that are sensible.  He is not a micromanager, but expects his will to be done with others sorting out the details and clearing up the mess.

They have things in common of course.  Both are very rich men.  Both are businessmen.  Both have their share of dodgy deals in their business résumé.  Both value loyalty over ability.  Both understand the value of personal relationships.  Both speak English.  Both know how to negotiate and strike a deal (even if bordering upon the absolute extremes of legality – or occasionally crossing them).

But what deals can be struck?

The world has become accustomed to State leaders publicly announcing deals – or no deals – when they meet (with the hard preparatory work done by those that receive no public recognition).

What new opportunities (as opposed to existing and well known to the US) are in Ukraine that can be offered as new deals to be done for which President Trump can claim credit?  Do there need to be new opportunities or simply a US administration less risk adverse than the previous?  What is US foreign policy when it comes to Ukraine?  To be blunt, it appears that currently the US Embassy Kyiv is pretty much left to do its own thing without much instruction or policy input from Washington.  As such a continuation of the previous administration’s policies in the absence of one from the current administration.

What are the Ukrainian priorities?  Clearly a good personable relationship between both presidents is a priority – and one from which President Trump should feel more drawn toward than any that will be struck with Russian President Putin later in the month when they meet for the first time.

A reader may question whether it is a diplomatic win for Ukraine that President Poroshenko meets with President Trump before meeting President Putin.  Perhaps given the circumstances surrounding the on-going issues of aggressive Russian meddling in US internal affairs, notwithstanding allegations of any personal Russian issues for the US President and his immediate circle, support for Ukraine, and a good personal relationship with Presdient Poroshenko, may well be employed as a defence against such accusations.  A cosy personal relationship may suit both US and Ukrainian presidents in current circumstance.

Perhaps therefore warm presidential handshakes, smiles, and a deal or two are required to reinforce the perception that by remaining firmly with Ukraine it somehow equates to President Trump (and by extension the US) being hard on The Kremlin (and by extension Russia) – which of course is not necessarily the case..

What therefore, are the Ukrainian priorities?  What, aside from creating a good personal relationship could Ukraine reasonably expect from President Trump that falls within his authority and that also promotes a perception that being supportive of Ukraine somehow equates to being tough on Russia?

The arming of Ukraine perhaps?  Ukraine, after all, is nowhere near ready economically, politically or militarily to conduct a Croatia-esque Operation STORM.  Arming it will not result in any such military action to retake occupied territory by force.  Also, whilst it is clear that President Putin is quite prepared to allow the war of exhaustion to continue for years to come, there is no indication that within The Kremlin any territorial advances are deemed worthwhile either.

The formal entrance of the US into the Minsk negotiation process?  It would be entirely naive to think the US has not been informally involved in the process from the start, but given that Minsk has failed to deliver anything like a ceasefire where the fire actually ceases, would the US want to enter as an official participant?  Further would the other parties officially involved want the US to become an official negotiator?

The creation of an alternative official negotiation body is fraught with the usual dangers, insomuch as if one party prefers one format and another the other format, matters may actually get worse rather than better.  Hence the Surkov-Nuland channel was viewed negatively.  Assuredly it presents the ability to play one format off against another by any and all negotiators for particular participants.

President Trump may make assurances that he will sign the legislation that was recently passed in the US Senate and which now requires Houseconsideration, should it reach him – legislation that codifies current sanctions that exist by Executive Order only.  (Legislation that irks Germany as it allows US interference with Nord Stream II.)  However promising to sign something that may or may not reach President Trump, (and if it does may not withstand amendments in the House prior) is hardly a major outcome for the meeting of two Heads of State.

A statement of US support for a NATO MAP for Ukraine?  The US has backed such a MAP before only to see no consensus among other NATO members – and it requires 100% agreement.  It would be words that cannot be met by deeds which both sides would be aware of.  The question then would be whether those words are said in the absolute knowledge that they will not translate into anything of substance, unless used as a platform to “upgrade” Ukraine with regard to its partner status with NATO.

The announcement of a bilateral alternative to the Budapest Memorandum?  In the current circumstances?

Support for a Marshall Plan for Ukraine?  As long as the Europeans are paying – and that proposal will not be tabled until November in Europe.

So what’s left that can be announced by way of deals?  Something in agriculture?  IT?  Space?  MIC cooperation?  Free golf lessons and membership of Mar a Lago for President Poroshenko?  Trump Tower in Kyiv?

We shall soon see.

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UK goes after Nasirov? (It might and it should)

June 16, 2017

When Roman Nasirov, then Head of the State Fiscal Service was arrested in March 2017 by NABU on suspicion of nefarious acts, it has to be said it came as a surprise to almost all.

President Poroshenko claimed no prior knowledge – which may well be true, for if he had it is quite possible Mr Nasirov would still be in his job.

As part of the investigation NABU claimed Mr Nasirov holds both Hungarian and UK citizenship as well as Ukrainian – something that would statutorily bar him from holding any political or civil service position.

Mr Nasirov flatly denied any dual citizenship.

NABU requested the UK confirm or deny that Mr Nasirov was a UK citizen.  Promptly, officially and publicly the UK confirmed that Mr Nasirov had indeed been granted UK Citizenship a few years ago.

An entry then appeared relating to UK citizen Roman Nasirov and possible offences under The UK Bribery Act 2010.

As stated months ago, unfortunately for Mr Nasirov – “The UK Bribery Act is one of those rare British laws that extends beyond the territory of the UK but travels with the citizen.  Thus any acts of bribery, giving or receiving, be the reward financial or in another form, in which Mr Nasirov is complicit in Ukraine (or elsewhere), is also criminal offence in the UK for which he can be dealt with there.

The entry also made clear that a reader should expect that hurdles and sabotage of the case should be expected at every opportunity – “Naturally Ukraine should be given first bite at the Nasirov cherry – yet few expect Ukraine to actually manage to get the case (at least with Mr Nasirov in attendance) to a verdict and sentencing.  His disappearance if released and a trial in absentia (if the case got that far) is more probable when considering that nobody of senior position goes to jail under President Poroshenko.”

It has thus proved to be, as expected, that at every opportunity to slow the case has indeed occurred.  Yet more hurdles await to be thrown into the due process system.

The entry also went on to ponder, in the full expectation of a Ukrainian justice failure, whether the UK should therefore act – “The question therefore is whether the UK should begin its own investigation of crimes committed under its own legislation in support of the Ukrainian people?

One wonders after numerous hours spent with UK diplomats over the years, notwithstanding a sprinkling of UK politicians and an occasional Lord, all ruminating upon what can be done to aid Ukraine in its fight against corruption, if this option will be pursued.  It’s not often they will get the chance to look at one of Ukraine’s most powerful office holders under due process of UK legislation.

The question is will they do it, or will the UK consider it a possible politically expedient exit for some very unwilling Ukrainian elites in this case?”

Good questions, perhaps only answerable as and when the case against Mr Nasirov is sabotaged rather than continuously hindered.

But what of the anticipated sabotage of the case?

It is unclear exactly what evidence the UK was asked to provide by NABU.  Was it simply that he was a UK citizen, or was there more to it?  That Mr Nasirov has assets in the UK is known.  How were they were paid for?  What is their value?  How did Mr Nasirov gain UK citizenship – for it is not cheap in the absence of “Grandfather rights”.

It appears that whatever evidence the UK was asked to provide and subsequently did is irrelevant.  Solomiansky Court, Kyiv has now ruled that the UK evidence is inadmissible and is thus disregarded.

This has clearly irked the UK and/or UK Embassy Kyiv – and rightly so, for to be sure any evidence provided by the UK will have strictly adhered to protocol and bilateral agreement.

Indeed it now appears that, officially, consideration is being given to whether criminal offences have been committed by a UK citizen that can be tried in a UK court – as pondered in the March entry.

“British Embassy statement on the criminal case against Roman Nasirov:

We are deeply concerned about the recent decision in Kyiv’s Solomiansky Court, where evidence provided by the UK in relation to the case against Roman Nasirov was ruled inadmissible and disregarded. The UK authorities will now review the facts and consider if criminal offences have been committed by a British citizen which may be tried in the UK.

This case underscores the urgent need for progress towards a reformed, independent and transparent judicial system and the swift introduction of specialised Anti-Corruption Courts with strictly vetted judges capable of properly trying high profile corruption cases.

The UK is a strong supporter of reform in Ukraine, which is why we are hosting the Ukraine Reform Conference in London on 6 July. Reform of the Ukrainian judicial system is a crucial part of the Ukrainian Government’s programme. The Ukraine Reform Conference will offer a further opportunity for the Government of Ukraine to demonstrate commitment to real progress in reforming the judicial system and further tackling corruption.”

So, should the UK go after its citizen Roman Nasirov for nefarious acts that fall foul of the UK Bribery Act 2010?  It could and it should!

It rightly gave the Ukrainian authorities the chance to have the first bite at the Nasirov cherry, but clearly there is little appetite – to the point of dismissing the evidence provided by the UK upon Ukrainian request.

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UN Office of Counterterrorism (undefined)

June 15, 2017

In 2006, then UN General Secretary Kofi Anan attempted to gain consensus over a definition of terrorism – “The deliberate killings of civilians and non-combatants for political purposes.”  Necessarily short and to the point using as few words as possible to minimise objections to words used.

The morality behind that prose thus being such acts are unacceptable and unjustifiable under all conditions.

He failed.

There was insufficient support for the text from Member States.  The reason for that failure being rather obvious if you live in a particularly fractious neighbourhood, or have allies that do, where borders are, or are likely to be redrawn by force and/or occupation.  The invaded and wronged sovereign State (and their allies) would wish to reserve the right for partisans to act and avoid being automatically labeled terrorists by the invaders and/or occupiers.

Thus there remains no UN definition of terrorism.

The 15th June 2017 witnessed the UN General Assembly vote unanimously for the creation of a UN Office of Counterterrorism.

The UN horsetrading done several months ago, this new office will almost certainly be headed by Sergei Kislyak, the current Russian Ambassador to the USA who features in the on-going issues within the Trump White House, or Vladimir Voronkov.

There will of course be squawking and screeching that Russia, considering its current actions in Ukraine, Syria, Libya and elsewhere, has no moral right to have their man head the newly created office.  Further some will argue, Russia has since the 1880s promoted and sponsored terrorism and continues to do so.

Be that as it may, the inaugural head of this new UN Office will not only have the usual administrative and bureaucratic teething troubles, but also faces fundamental challenges that may very well seriously effect its potency from the outset.

As there is no UN definition of terrorism, yet having created a UN Office for Counterterrorism, it would now be rather useful for the UN to define what it, as an organisation, deems terrorism.  How else will it act to support nations in anti-terrorism pursuits, mobilise resources, and insure its own transparency, if there is no UN definition of terrorism around which to hang a UN generated and/or implemented counterterrorism response?

If Kofi Anan’s very simply constructed 10 word definition gathered no traction, a far more complex definition would certainly fail to garner approval from Member States.

Anyway, what are the ingredients of any definition of terrorism and who decides?

Is it a practice or doctrine of violent action?  If so should that be expanded to include that it is either meant to instill fear, or only that it does instill fear?  Should that be clarified that it is predominantly political?

What about context?  Should there be reference to terrorism as a tactic?  A direct mention of victims?  What of mens rea (intent) – should that not be in a definition?  Is terrorism, in the modern age, limited to physical violence, or does the threat of violence qualify?  What of cyber terrorism?

Should a definition codify that the victims (civilian or otherwise) are not a target, or that they are?

Should it identify motivations for engaging in terrorism?  Should it mention the perpetrators, or that terrorist acts must form part of a campaign of violence?   Should it be part of international, regional and domestic criminalisation processes?

In a broad brushstroke cycle of – “Attention -> Respect -> Legitimacy -> Power” – inherent to much terrorism dynamics, how should that fit into any definition – if at all?

Is there a need to expressly codify guerrilla warfare as distinctly separate from terrorists?   Is it enough to generalise that guerrilla warfare is normally conducted against military targets avoiding civilians whereas terrorists don’t?

If, even arriving at a UN definition of terrorism (if only for its own counterterrorism use), will there then be drawn out discussions over categorising sub-divisions of terrorism for recording and/or accounting purposes?  What labels to proscribe?  Religiously inspired?  Ethno-nationalist and separatist?  Left wing/anarchist?  Right wing?  Single Issue?

How easy will it be to get real and traction-able international cooperation without a UN definition of what it proposes to counter?  On the other side of that coin, without such a definition how to prevent the abuse of the term terrorism for the use of suppression?

Will “State sponsor of terrorism” get a UN definition when considering the reasons for refusal of the 2006 terrorism definition offered by Kofi Anan?

There is then judicial issues.  Where there exists jus cogens/peremptory norms upon all sovereign nations (such as war crimes and genocide etc), would a UN definition provide for UN jurisdiction?

Without a definition to work from, just how effective will the UN Counterrorism Office be?

It would take several other, somewhat lengthy entries to offer thoughts on the “how”, “why”, “where”, “when”, and of any assistance and/or guidelines and/or recommendations the new office might consider.

But of immediate importance is the “what” with regard to an absent UN definition of terrorism, for that must surely be fundamental to a UN counterterrorism office.

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