Archive for July, 2018


SBU (not NABU) investigates Odessa City Hall

July 30, 2018

In late October 2017 an entry appeared relating to an apparent raid and attempted theft of Ukrainian military land by the cast of usual suspects (Trukhanov, Lampochka Galanternik, Alexander Zhukov etc) in Odessa appeared.

To be fair to Mayor Trukhanov, clearly he was not leading this particular criminal incident – his historical and longstanding partners in organised criminality were – while on his mayoral watch and undoubtedly with either his tacit or inferred approval (at a minimum).

To continue to be fair to Mayor Trukhanov, it would perhaps be unfair to state that he is friends with Lampochka Galanternik and Alexander Zhukov, but rather that he is a longstanding partner.  Mayor Trukhanov always seemed to display a slightly deeper and unquestioning loyalty toward Leonid Minin and Alexander Angert than he has toward Sasha Zhukov and Lampochka Galanternik.

(It is no doubt partly for this reason that Mr Galanternik has his own people in City Hall to keep a watchful eye upon Mayor Trukhanov.)

Nevertheless Mayor Trukhanov is expected to make life easier for Messrs Galanternik and Zhukov with regard to their interests, acquisitions and questionable activities, even if they do not always include him as a major beneficiary – a shared and thoroughly nefarious history provides for plenty of “kompromat” all round – if there be a need to remind each other of what is expected from partners.  It is an expectation from his partners in crime that Mayor Trukhanov has consistently met.

NABU has raided Odessa City Hall numerous times under the leadership of Mayor Trukhanov.  Indeed a reader might suppose they will soon be renting office space in City Hall.  There are at least 4 significant investigations on-going and Mayor Trukhanov, having been served with official papers, will be appearing in court as the accused in at least two cases so far.

On 30th July 2018, two documents appeared within the social media circles of Odessa proclaiming another investigation surrounding Odessa City Hall – this time by the SBU.

The documents were uploaded by Artem Kartashov and appear to suggest the SBU will be investigate the issues raised in the above link relating to the incident in October 2017 and the military airbase land subject to an apparent attempted raiding/seizure.

It is claimed that the Shevchenko District Court, Kyiv has directed the SBU to investigated the matter.

At the time of writing the blog found nothing in the on-line court records – but there is often a lag of several days before records appear on line.

A reader may question the jurisdiction of the Kyiv court in Odessa, however would any reader expect an Odessa court to rule the SBU investigate this matter (which to be blunt, it already has) against this cast of local, powerful, organised crime characters?

A reader will also question why it has taken 10 months for a court mandated investigation to be ordered.

But why the SBU and not NABU (again)?

Will not those in the City Hall cesspit (and the Odessa courts) who facilitated this incident fall within the NABU remit (again)?

Is there not the stench of corruption and dirty deeds about this affair?

Surely it is NABU that is mandated to cut off the heads of the snakes in City Hall who were undoubtedly involved?

The answer, if these documents are genuine, is clear.

The investigation is ordered under Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – which falls far outside the remit of NABU and squarely within the remit of the SBU (and national security).

Article 111.  High treason

1. High treason, that is an act willfully committed by a citizen of Ukraine in the detriment of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defense capability, and state, economic or information security of Ukraine: joining the enemy at the time of martial law or armed conflict, espionage, assistance in subversive activities against Ukraine provided to a foreign state, a foreign organization or their representatives,-

shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.

2. A citizen of Ukraine shall be discharged from criminal liability where, he has not committed any acts requested by a foreign state, a foreign organization or their representatives and voluntarily reported his ties with them and the task given to government authorities.”


A SBU investigation into, and possible charges of High Treason is probably not what those who seemingly conspired to commit this local land grab will have anticipated in a “worst case scenario” when assessing any risks.  A local issue dealt with by local “ways’, “means” and “ends” was probably the expectation if anything went wrong (as it did).

Clearly this is not a stick created to beat Mayor Trukhanov with, for there are sufficient NABU sticks to do that with insofar as The Bankova is concerned.  It is however a stick that may well be waved at Messrs Galanternik and Zhukov who actively backed their longstanding partner in crime for the role of Mayor in 2014/15 – not that either have been resident in Odessa (or Ukraine) for years.

T’will be interesting to see just who the SBU name as formal suspects – for it seems almost impossible that Lampochka Galanternik can be a name omitted – and his inclusion will equate to Kyiv taking on the old guard of organised crime in Odessa.


SAP Nazar Kholodnitsky to be disciplined – Is that enough?

July 26, 2018

Nazar Kholodnitsky the head of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office appears likely to be disciplined/reprimanded for issues that seem to revolve around certain decisions, comments and actions (or lack of) he has made.

Fair enough.  Institutions have rules, processes, procedures and structures that are to be adhered to – otherwise why have them?

That the current rules do not allow for dismissal relating to the incidents that occurred is also fair enough.  They are what they (currently) are.

The blog has no issue with the rules, processes or procedures that are in place insofar as this specific disciplinary decision is concerned.

A reader may very well question the methods employed to gather the evidence that brought about the disciplinary processes (the bugging of his office with NABU equipment) – or not.

At the end of the day, somebody must police the police, somebody must prosecute the prosecutors, and somebody must keep the anti-corruption agencies from becoming corrupt.

However, no differently to public prosecutions, how evidence is obtained and/or used within internal disciplinary proceedings matters.  A lawful (and hopefully ethical) evidence chain uncompromised and unbroken remains the backbone of any process if it is to withstand any future legal challenges.

Internal investigative/complaints and discipline departments aside, invariably “policing the police” occurs via external horizontal agencies if any degree of transparency and objectivity is meant to be projected.  For example, Lviv investigates Odessa, Sumy investigates Kyiv, Kherson investigates Kharkiv and so on.  Or an entirely different investigative agency is tasked to investigate a totally unrelated agency, for example the SBI investigates the SBU, the SBU investigates the Customs Service, Customs investigates NABU and so on.

The point being trained investigators investigate investigators with whom they have no attachment and have no conflicting interest.

However the processes and structures are designed, the end result is a mechanism whereby the police are policed, the prosecutors are held to account and the anti-corruption agencies kept on the straight and narrow – whether these investigations lead to internal discipline or public prosecution at the time of any investigation beginning matters not – it is the investigative outcome that determine what route is appropriate.

It also has to be recognised, perhaps mostly by those actually holding high position, that no individual is bigger than the institution of which they are a part.  Everybody can (and ultimately will) be replaced – and the institution will continue without them.

(It is for this reason one of the current problems within Ukrainian politics that will probably only improve is when the parties become bigger than the leaders, rather than the leaders being bigger than the parties as is currently the case.  Issues of predictable, recognised and overarching ideology and control etc).

The issue of institutions being bigger than the individuals within (whatever their pay grade/business card title) is perhaps now where Nazar Kholodnitsky should concentrate his thoughts.

He will be disciplined.

He is the first public face and leader of a new institution that at its core is supposed to represent unblemished integrity.  It is an institution that will and already has set precedents.

He too has set precedents.

The question for him is whether he should set another precedent and resign in an effort to maintain the perception of an unblemished and integrity driven new institution specifically born to tackle those without personal integrity or moral compass.

In short, does he value the long term future and public perception of an institution he has headed and helped create more than his own personal short term future?

What legacy does he intend to leave behind when he (ultimately/eventually) leaves?

What precedent will he set for those that follow him into his current role with regard to personal standards/integrity of the office held?

Whatever the actions and whatever the outcomes that have led to his disciplinary issues, he still has the opportunity to act with personal integrity and for the benefit of an institution he helped create.

Will he take it?


Ukraine signs up to the OECD tax initiative – but will it ratify it?

July 23, 2018

Of the many questions/thoughts this blog asks when an entry appears, more often than not at least one of the following is among them on every entry:

  1.   Follow the money!
  2.   Who benefits?
  3.   Who decides, and who decides who decides?

Of course (almost) nothing in life is free, there are always beneficiaries to any decision, and who decides, and who decides who decides are all common features of daily life – a cynical and skeptical bias is sometimes necessary when asking these questions and objectivity should perhaps take priority over subjectivity when drawing conclusions when reaching answers.  Some outcomes are clearly nefarious and others less so, if at all.

23rd July witnessed Oksana Markarova, the Acting Finance Minister of Ukraine, sign the nation up to the Multilateral Convention on the Implementation of Measures Relating to Tax Agreements – hurrah!

While a reader is encouraged to explore the above link, of the 15 point OECD initiative, there are perhaps four significant points that will benefit Ukraine insofar as the national budget is concerned.

– Step 5: “Improving measures to combat tax abuses”
– Step 6: “Prevent Abuse of Privileges Under the Bilateral Agreements”
– Step 13: “Recommendations on transfer pricing documentation and disclosure of information by country”
– Step 14: Improvement of the Mutual Coordination Procedure through Dispute Resolution.

The entire point of any tax or AML legislation is to reduce the wiggle room these schemes have to operate in easily.  Actually throwing people in jail is secondary to reduction through prevention in the first place – though it is of course absolutely necessary to prosecute those that transgress.  What point legislation if it is not effectively implemented?

The question is now whether the Verkhovna Rada will actually ratify the signing of this instrument so that it can be deposited with the OECD.

There are many international instruments where numerous nations are signatories (with or without reservations) that have not ratified or deposited these legal instruments (with or without reservations).

(A “reservation” is a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State – so long as any reservation(s) do not make the treaty more or less worthless in its application to that State of course.)

How long between the signing and ratification of this international instrument is a matter for the Verkhovna Rada.  It is unclear whether any reservations were made, or will be made by Ukraine if it ratifies and deposits this instrument.

To be blunt it is probably not a matter of “if” Ukraine will ratify this instrument, but rather a question of “when”.  A question of timeliness from signature to ratification.

Even if/when Ukraine ratifies and deposits this instrument there will of course be “work a-rounds” for those determined to find a way – but as stated at the start of this entry, the legislative goal is to consistently reduce the space for nefarious scams and schemes to operate in with ease, and therefore this is another small but positive step in that direction.


An SBI update (keep your expectations low)

July 18, 2018

Throughout the autumn of 2017, the blog plotted the predictable and deliberately slow progress relating to the creation of the creation of the State Bureau of Investigations – a process timed to insure that it would not be fully functional and productive before the elections of 2019.

18th July 2018 witnessed that latest progress (as glacial as it may be) toward establishing the leadership of the SBI under the guidance of the Director, Roman Tryb.  For all intent and purpose, Mr Tryb since his appointment has been an Emperor without Empire or legion.

A list of 27 potential SBI leaders/senior managers was announced, of which, to employ a system of traffic lights, has some fairly wholesome “green light” names, a few “amber” questionable/dubious names, and naturally several unquestionably “red” entirely unsuitable and unsavory names.

Something expected of course as any independent appointment process in Ukraine remains subject to a degree of manipulation and disfiguring via vested interests.

Obviously public interest and ire will be vented toward even the possibility of the “red light” names – such as Messrs Dmitry Rudenko and Yehven Ablov, regardless of the number of “green light” names.

As far as Odessa related nominees is concerned, it is fair to say the light is perhaps “Amber”, for Oleh Denga who has made the cut.  Mr Denga is widely perceived to be uncomfortably close to (read a creature of) Olexandr Granovsky, President Poroshenko’s curator and puppeteer of judges, prosecutors and “outcomes”.

That said, when it comes to Odessa and those related, some who were on the selection committee were perhaps of equally questionable integrity – or worse (Eugene Dade).

What matters of course is whether there is (perhaps even the slightest) confidence of the Ukrainian constituency in the SBI going forward.

The Ukrainian constituency is by nurture (if not nature) exceptionally cynical and skeptical.  This skepticism and cynicism naturally increased when the political timetable was clearly setting the speed at which the SBI would become fully functional and effective.  (More or less impotent until elections are over).

Further magnification of that skepticism and cynicism will occur when looking at the “amber” and “red light” names that have managed to defy supposed checks and disqualification thresholds.

That distrust will still further intensify should those names be appointed.

The appointment of Mr Tryb as head of the SBI agency (whether spurious or otherwise) when it was announced was widely perceived to be a compromise, and thus compromised, appointment.  That certain names remain in the running now, is not likely to do anything but harm to the SBI before it even goes in to bat by way of societal perception.

It would appear that an uphill struggle with public perception (as (almost) all Ukrainian institutions have) could very well be a mountain that will not be overcome in the short or perhaps medium term.  The SBI will be a “results judged” institution – meaning successful convictions rather than arrests, investigations or charges raised.

In the immediate future however, all eyes will be on the appointments soon to be made and who gets what – or not (and why not).

Ultimately however, it will be down to the SBI to display an integrity that will confound public expectations and actually deliver a step forward – albeit that already appears to be about as realistic as the farce that became known as “judicial reform” meant to deliver an “independent judiciary”.

As always, a wise reader will keep their expectations low – and hope to be surprised.


Not such a Turkish Delight in Odessa

July 17, 2018

It is no secret that foreign agencies work in Odessa Oblast.

The most obvious that would come to mind is that of the Russian Federation, but as a reader moves closer to Europe then the Romanian SIE is active, as is Mossad, and of course Turkey across the Black Sea also has a great interest in Odessa too.

To be fair there are numerous agencies active in Odessa as a reader would expect from a city that is a transport hub on internationally recognised trading routes (as well as internationally recognised smuggling routes – be it people, guns, drugs and counterfeit).

Odessa is a destination, it is a hub and it is a source of legitimate and criminal trade.  It is cosmopolitan and it is mercantile.

What self-respecting foreign agency with particular regional interests wouldn’t be active in Odessa?

Most go about their work quietly – albeit perhaps not as invisibly as they might think.

However, it appears that Turkey recently made some rather obvious and perhaps illicit renditions of two of its citizens.

If true this would not be the first time Turkey (or other agencies – Mossad allegedly spirited away a Turk with Islamic links from Odessa train station some years ago) has tried and/or succeeded in renditioning their citizens from Odessa back to Turkey.

In 2008 several Kurds were either successfully renditioned or attempts were made by Turkey to “reclaim them” against their will.

The latest incidents allegedly occurred on 12th and 15th July 2018 – the first in Odessa and the second in Mykolaiv.

It is claimed that both individuals were FETO supporters (Gullist).   That may or may not be the case, for rumours are rumours and who starts them and for what reason requires some thought.

Either way extrajudicial renditions are just that regardless.

On 12th July it is claimed that the Turkish Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT) abducted Turkish businessman Salikh Zeki Yigit from his restaurant in Odessa city centre, held him at the Turkish Consulate in Odessa overnight, and the following day spirited him back to Turkey (by plane to Istanbul and then on to Mersin).

The second individual was a Turkish blogger (married to, and father of Ukrainians) Yusuf Inan in Mykolaiv.   Mr Inan was apparently subject to extradition proceedings, but it appears that the MIT could not wait.

Both men had residency status in Ukraine.  Both were renditioned to Turkey during the last week if some very solid rumour be believed.

Whether a tacit blind eye was turned or whether the matter will be raised privately having drawn Ukrainian ire is speculative – particularly in light of recent Turkish statements thanking Ukraine for its “cooperation” regarding the return of “refugees”.

What is not speculative at the time of writing is that there has thus far been no public statement from any Ukrainian institution or ministry – either to confirm or deny either incident.

Would a reader therefore draw inference that if these illegal renditions took place (and it appears that they have), in the absence of any official comment whatsoever, that Kyiv was aware?

The answer has to be – probably.

If so, and of course there is plausible deniability, it will be something of a human rights image problem at the very least in numerous private diplomatic conversations – albeit insufficient to cause any significant policy changes toward Ukraine (or Turkey).  No doubt the Human Rights NGOs that read the blog (and there are certainly some in Brussels that do) will take note.

Whether there are any more Turks in Ukraine on the MIT rendition list – time will perhaps tell, and perhaps fairly soon.


Bastille Day – Ukraine buys 55 Airbus (French) helicopters

July 14, 2018

As the citizens of France celebrate lopping off the heads of their aristocracy, with no doubt Bastille Day celebrations continuing into Sunday for the World Cup final, the 14th July also witnessed Ukraine sign a contract with France to purchase 55 helicopters for the Ministry of Interior.

The deal was witnessed by Prime Minister Groisman, Interior Minister Avakov and French Ambassador to Ukraine Isabel Dumont, with the contract being signed by Gennady Balla, the Director of Horev Avia (a State owned enterprise) and Bruno Even, the General Manager of Airbus Helicopters.

We sign the agreement on the Day of the National Holiday of France and I am convinced that our relations will have even brighter prospects, and today we are finalizing the enormous work that the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, first of all Minister Arsen Avakov and French partners, conducted. This contract makes it possible to use 55 helicopters to ensure the safety of our citizens, an unprecedented volume, and it opens up new opportunities for cooperation.” stated Prime Minister Groisman – with a quip (that was intended to be anything but) that perhaps Airbus Helicopters should consider opening a regional maintenance hub in Ukraine, and that Ukraine should be considered for the French aviation supply chain more broadly

While the exact contractual details wherein lies the devil are not yet fully in the public realm, the cost of the contract is Euro 555 million.  The helicopters to be supplied are 21 x H225a, 10 x H145s and 24 x H125s.  The purchase price includes the helicopters, pilot training, maintenance training, and tech support.  Further the deal would appear to be financed to a large degree by a combination of French banks and French State medium term loans.

The first 4 H225s are expected to be delivered before year end 2018.

What is not clear is what on-board tech will also be transferred as part of the price – and the helicopters will have different uses dependent upon their role within the MIA – Borders, civil defence missions, policing etc – all may have slightly different tech fit-out requirements.

Nevertheless the deal is done.  Presumably thereafter, everybody went off to the French embassy to celebrate Bastille Day – although perhaps not to eat cake all things considered.


More haste, less speed – Draft Law 6688 update

July 10, 2018

A few days ago an entry appeared expressing concern regarding some very woolly draft legislative text relating to the ability of the SBU,prosecutors or investigators to block/shut down/ban websites for 48 hours without any judicial involvement, and that therefore appeared prime for abuse – “aimed at infringing public safety; intimidating the population;  provoking military conflict, international difficulties; influencing decision-making, the carrying out of actions or inaction of public authorities or local self-government bodies by officials of those bodies, civic associations, legal entities to attract public attention to the specific political, religious or other views of the perpetrator

As the entry linked above stated, not only might this draft prose rub uncomfortably against the fundamental right to freedom of expression granted by the Constitution of Ukraine, it could also very easily have a fractious relationship with Ukraine’s international obligations per Article 10 of the European Human Rights Act.

Potential problems in giving SBU officers, prosecutors and investigators the ability to ban websites for 48 hours without a judicial input are surely more easily resolved by having a 24/7 “on call” system for judges whereby there is always one on call and available if the closing/banning/blocking of a website is so desperately urgent.

No doubt Vice Prime Minister for European Integration Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze is tired of reiterating to Ukrainian legislators, that new legislation should consider European norms when they are written.  The blog knows for a fact it is a drum she repeatedly beats – and it is a drum that often goes unheard.

One of the major questions posed in the previous related entry was why all of a suddenly a draft law submitted a year ago has suddenly found great momentum – particularly when there are such obvious areas that require some attention.

Whatever the haste, there now appears to be less speed – and rightly so.

One of the authors of Draft Law 6688 has stated that the text relating to the ability to ban websites for 48 hours without any judicial input will be removed.

Further, and no doubt Ms Klympush-Tsintsadze will be pleased, the authors have decided to seek and involve experts in matters cyber from the OSCE, EU and NATO – for clearly a number of cyber matters are a national security issue.  It must be hoped that some very woolly prose with a clear ability to be misued will also be revisited.

It still remains unclear as to the mens rea behind forcing this draft law to the top of the Verkhovna Rada agenda after a year sat gathering dust since it was submitted.  Nevertheless, this move toward more haste and less speed is a wiser course of action.


A disagreeable entry – Ukraine and the Trump-Putin tete a tete

July 9, 2018

Having had a few emails asking about thoughts and outcomes of the Trump-Putin meeting and the implications for Ukraine, the blog despite better judgment will surrender and write a few lines – as disagreeable as writing those few lines actually is.

Disagreeable why?  Because there is no foreseeing what oratory will spew forth post-meeting other than an expectancy of headline grabbing no matter how hollow or ill-judged that oratory (and accompanying tweets) will be.

Further there is no foretelling what will be said between the two men privately.

What can be foretold is that President Putin will be far more prepared, far more disciplined and far more devious/manipulative than his US counterpart.

It therefore follows that the question will be what outcomes The Kremlin desires and how it will go about getting them from President Trump.

In among all of that, what of Ukraine?

It is very difficult to see many deliverables from the meeting for either president – but it is unlikely President Putin is expecting any meaningful deliverables to be announced.  Such things are usually thrashed out and prepared in advance – and that is probably quite difficult with two president’s that think in zero sum, winner and losers, terms.

Perhaps a publicly shared concern (that may or may not come to fruition) over arms races, nuclear proliferation, a commitment to beginning negotiations on missile treaties, international terrorism etc.  Rhetorical froth that can be lost as time passes and new headlines are created.

There are unlikely to be any genuine expectations among the wiser heads within The Kremlin that immediate sanctions relief, the recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation or similar will be forthcoming, as those wiser heads within The Kremlin would ponder whether it could be delivered by President Trump when there is Congress and The Senate to contend with.  Are there any gains to be had in putting President Trump, or allowing President Trump to put himself, in a position where he is seen not to be able to deliver?

How would it make President Putin appear to be seen to have put trust in somebody that could not deliver?  Is it worth going there, and even if it is, is the right time to do so now?

Therefore on balance, President Putin is probably unlikely to manipulate President Trump into committing to things he knows he can’t deliver.  That time is probably not yet ripe when other opportunities can be engineered to do so with more tempting “dangles”.

Although there are always deals to be done within diplomacy (if they can be identified), President Trump’s tete a tetes with less than democratic leaders have thus far been little more than theatre.  Unfortunately it is the sort of theatre that seems to result in a loss of trust every time the curtain comes down and the actors prepare for the next headline-grabbing Act.

However, there may be something to be gained by The Kremlin in offering up some small symbolic, and generally meaningless concession with a view to continuing a public dialog with the US at the highest levels.  A political “dangle” of the sort that whatever the outcome of the symbolic sacrifice offered by The Kremlin, the aim of that high level political process would be to further the Kremlin designs in aggravating the increasingly obvious schisms between the US President and his European political peers.

In short, a well prepared President Putin will probably use this meeting not to realistically try and gain major concessions to the benefit of Russia, for there is little hope of that from this meeting, but rather to insure that President Trump is manipulated into saying and acting in ways will continue to severely irk the Europeans.  After all he only needs encouragement to follow his existing path and if a few new irritating topics can be added where possible, so much the better from a Kremlin perspective.

Quite what the US, or perhaps simply President Trump expects to gain from this meeting with President Putin remains somewhat unclear – beyond headlines and a twitter storm.  Realistically however, all things considered, the wiser heads in The Kremlin will not be seeking significant relief for Russia, but rather increased pain for Europe.

On that layer of the game, Ukraine is becomes a “means”/Kremlin tool rather than a Kremlin “end”/goal, whereby whatever agency Ukraine has (and Ukraine certainly has agency) when it is used and a “means” and not seen as an “end”, that agency becomes far more constrained.

Make no mistake, Ukraine remains a Kremlin goal – perhaps the most important of goals – but it is also a means (one of several to be fair) of generating further strife between President Trump and his European peers – if President Putin gets it right a few days from today.

A most disagreeable entry to write – as it is almost entirely pure speculation.  In fact it may prove to be the biggest serving of flapdoodle ever served up in the decade this blog has been in existence.  Or it may not.

Whatever the case, the sky will not fall in due to this meeting – but the storm clouds many very well darken considerably.

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