Pre-judging the Ukrainian elections – The Tymoshenko lens
October 26, 2012It is no secret to those who read this blog that I have on several occasions during this parliamentary election period, been asked to speak with LTOs (long term observers) from several international monitoring organisations with people in Odessa.
Whilst large sections of recent blog posts cover much of what has been said, lack of political ideology, lack of policy, poor strategy on behalf of certain parties, who is doing what in contravention of election laws etc., not all of what I have discussed for hours with these observes has appeared here – and neither will it – ever.
This is the second set of elections such organisations have sought me out for comment for official reports, and certain “off the record” comments made must remain “off the record” if they are to seek me out again in elections yet to come.
However, the object of this post is to view the Ukrainian elections through a different lens. An EU lens to be exact.
That EU lens may or may not be tainted by what the election observers report in their final assessments. As we all know, “political will” has a habit of being blind to reality when it suits.
Here is the latest OSCE interim report and here is the latest, second_interim_report_2012 from CSEOM. Neither are exactly damning, although both raise the same electioneering issues some of which may very well have serious repercussions on election day itself.
Like so many matters of importance, election observers can only include in their reports what they personally observe. Hearsay evidence is not evidence – and quite rightly – even if by excluding second hand/hearsay evidence a very ugly picture is sanitised in the process.
Thus, on the basis of what the international observers do observe personally, the results should influence the lens through which those their reports reach actually peer through. That is indeed the theory.
Now much can change between now and election day on Sunday. The PECs and DECs may very well get some severe criticism that will radically change the final reports, condemning the elections to a farce. However if the PECs and DECs manage to do a fairly competent job, the question arises will the elections be seen as free and fair via what is included, rather than excluded, from the international observer reports?
A long time prior to the electioneering, there were serious noises coming from the EU that if Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Lutsenko did not take part due to their jailing, via below par international judicial systems, the elections would not be deemed free and fair – regardless of whether they were technically free and fair or not.
Despite that threat, both have remained in jail.
The last opinion polls prior to the legal purdah over opinion polls being published so close to the election had Ms Tymoshenko’s party polling behind both Party of Regions and UDAR.
Undoubtedly, the EU takes note of the polls.
If only 15% of the nation will actually vote for her party, then naturally 85% of the nation have no desire to see her or her party in power as a result of their votes. Thus, is viewing the Ukrainian elections via the “Tymoshenko lens” a viable thing for the EU to do?
Should some very robust positions by those looking via the “Tymoshenko lens” change within the EU given the polling figures?
Going by the last released polls, more Ukrainians would want to see Party of Regions continue to run the country than any other political party. No party has the majority of the nation behind them, but that is not in itself either unusual or peculiar to Ukraine when governments are formed after elections. Whether the polls are accurate or not, and what gravity to give polls – I have written about before.
If Yulia Tymoshenko and her party are as unpopular as the polls would suggest, does keeping the “Tymoshenko lens” firmly to the EU eye when viewing these elections therefore ignore Ukrainian public opinion?
Some recent statements from a meeting of EU leaders past and present that took place in Berlin on 24th October are as follows:
Guenter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 1999 – 2004 – “We should not allow the Tymoshenko case to decide our future relations.” He also made a very long-winded case that some EU nations are using the Tymoshenko case as a “political instrument” to slow down Ukrainian EU integration.
Former Polish President and current co-leader of the European Parliament’s monitoring mission in Ukraine, Alexander Kwasneiwski: “While the Tymoshenko case is front and centre, there have been real legal reforms, including a new criminal code”. He went on to say “Ukraine needs Europe and Europe needs Ukraine”.
Mr Kwasneiwski has a point about reforms. This year Ukraine has moved up 9 places to 73rd (of 144 evaluated economies) according to the influential World Economic Forum 2012 Report, and according to the World Bank’s 2012 Ease of Doing Business Report, Ukraine moved up 15 places to 137 (of 185 assessed nations). Not brilliant, but upwardly mobile in no small part due to the reforms taken over the past year.
President of the European Commission 1999 – 2004, Romano Prodi said “Open the door, export democracy and encourage more trade”, going on to say “The Tymoshenko case cannot hinder the future of the country and deeper ties between Europe and Ukraine. You cannot stop history. A free and fair election must presage this change.”
Former President of PACE/Council of Europe, Mevlut Cavusoglu stated “The Tymoshenko case overshadows virtually everything, but it should not – the whole country should not be excluded from Europe merely because of Tymoshenko.” He also went to great lengths to underline that fact that the current election laws under which the elections are taking place were supported by more than 80% of the RADA, including Tymoshenko’s own party.
Probably the most notable comments came from the former Austrian Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbaur who said “If the elections are free and fair, we have to make sure the Association Agreement is signed and ratified successfully. Europe is dealing with itself at the moment rather than its neighbours. I say Ukraine should become part of the EU, although this won’t happen overnight. We should not give up on Ukraine and leave it to Russia.
We used to say Ukraine has to make a choice, but this is not true. Ukraine has made its choice. It is us, the EU, who have to make a choice, We should clearly say that we want Ukraine to become a member of the EU as soon as it meets all necessary standards.”
Thus it appears there are a larger and larger number influential voices within the EU and PACE structures suggesting quite strongly that the issue of Ms Tymoshenko should be seen as exactly that – the issue of Ms Tymoshenko – not the issue with Ukraine.
On many levels they are probably right. By the time Ukraine ever fully meets the Copenhagen or Maastricht criteria for EU membership, both Ms Tymoshenko and President Yanukovych are likely to be exceptionally elderly, if not pushing up the daisies.
And if the elections are not deemed fair? The EU still has to deal with the government that will be formed no matter how faulty or manipulated the system was that puts it there. After all, the EU still deals with China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba etc – none of which can be said to have free and fair elections or governing bodies legitimised by free and fair public mandate. Admittedly the Association Agreement probably would not get signed – but it isn’t signed now either. You would expect the most useful bits of the DCFTA to the EU to somehow splinter off and get signed independently such is political expediency though.
There are issues between the EU and Ukraine that would require on-going cooperation regardless. Pulling down the iron curtain is not a viable option on so many business, security and policy fronts it would become rather pointless to even try. The “exceptions” could very well out number the “rule” if that were to be attempted.
It would probably suit both the EU and Ukraine to have these elections deemed free and fair (with necessary critical comment where appropriate) rather than have an additional obstacle put in the way of relations, and through the necessarily strict protocols involved in election monitoring and thus what is included (or not) in reports, if the “Tymoshenko lens” is removed from the EU eye, maybe, just maybe, that may very well just be what happens.
Odessablog's Blog 
I think the premise of your post is inaccurate.
I have yet to see ANY statement from the EU’s direction that assessment of the elections in Zookraine depends on releasing Tymoshenko.
Rather, some of the statements are that in ADDITION to free and fair elections, Tymoshenko and Lutsenko and the others must be released.
Why? Contrary to what the sovok mafia in the Party of Regions has tried to portray, it’s not about one person.
It is about the lack of a legal system in Zookraine, in which stalinist show trials were used to “convict” and purge political opponents. But it’s not limited to just purging political opponents.
The Regionnaires – and your post – points to “procedural reforms” in the area of criminal procedures.
That, of course, is meant to excuse, somehow, the stalniist show trials against Lutsenko, Tymoshenko, and the others.
It’s like outlawing murder after the fact – ‘yes, we murdered Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, etc., but now we have outlawed murder.”
Typical bass ackwards upside down Zookrainian sovok mafia “logic.”
And what’s even worse is the sentiment that says: “well, if the people want a sovok mafia system of government the EU should turn a blind eye towards it.” Gag.
“Reform of criminal procedures” —
Big whoop – those are being roundly ignored, and the prosecutors have the status of an “untouchable super-agency” complete with super-expensive $100,000 cars registered privately to the “prosecutors.”
Just check the Foreign Notes blog.
Simple to check my premise – look for yourself at the historical statements of the EEAS and EP relating to Tymoshenko and Lutsenko……before they realised that their statements would not change the situations of those two people.
I would suggest looking at their statements between Novemeber 2011 and March 2012 as an approximate time-frame.
You will find plenty of official press releases stating that if those two did not take part then there would be serious doubts the elections would be deemed free and fair.
There after the EU tone began to change to what you state. Previously though it was much more robust!
To save you some time, a few official statements stating Tymoshenko had to be allowed to take part in these parliamentary elections from the EU:
Click to access 20111013_882_verdict_in_case_of_ms_julia_tymoshenko_en.pdf
“The right of appeal should not be compromised by imposing limitations on the defendants’ ability to stand in future elections in Ukraine, including the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.”
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/2011_10_28_01_en.htm
“insists that Yulia Tymoshenko should be allowed to exercise her right to participate fully in the political process both as of now and in the forthcoming elections in Ukraine;”
There are literally tens of such statements “insisting” Tymoshenko take part in these elections of official EU websites, official EU press statements – and just as many if not more quotes from EU officials in places like the EU Observer making no bones that if she didn’t then the elections could not be seen free and fair.
I appreciate the links, but you have selected quotations which are taken out of context. For example, insisting that Tymoshenko be allowed to participate in the process was in the context of noting quite a few concerns about the sovok mafia in Zookraine, not just Tymoshenko’s ability to participate in elections.:
———————————————————————
G. whereas the EU continues to emphasise the need to respect the rule of law, including by establishing fair, impartial and independent legal processes, thereby avoiding any danger of creating the perception that judicial measures are being used selectively; whereas the EU regards these principles as especially important in a country which aspires to enter into deeper contractual relationships and build on its political association with the Union;
1. Takes the view that a deepening of relations between the EU and Ukraine and the fact of offering Ukraine a European perspective are of great significance and in the interests of both parties; recognises Ukraine’s aspirations pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, provided that all criteria, including respect for the principles of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, are met;
2. Deplores the sentencing of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko as a violation of human rights and an abuse of the judiciary for the purpose of the political suppression of Ukraine’s leading opposition politician; emphasises that the law selectively applied against Tymoshenko dates back to Soviet times and makes provision for criminal prosecution for political decisions; whereas Articles 364 and 365 of that law, which are currently under review by the Verhovna Rada, do not conform to European and UN standards;
3. Urges the Ukrainian authorities to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial legal process should Yulia Tymoshenko appeal against her conviction, and in the other trials against members of the former government; insists that Yulia Tymoshenko should be allowed to exercise her right to participate fully in the political process both as of now and in the forthcoming elections in Ukraine;
4. Is concerned that the Tymoshenko trial is at odds with the Ukraine Government’s proclaimed commitment to democracy and European values;
5. Expresses genuine concern at the continued detention of the former Minister of the Interior, Yuri Lutsenko, against whom no sentence has yet been pronounced in his trial, and at other similar cases;
6. Insists that all judicial proceedings against former and current senior government officials should be conducted in accordance with European standards of fairness, impartiality, transparency and independence;
7. Takes the view that a failure to review Yulia Tymoshenko’s conviction will jeopardise the conclusion of the Association Agreement and its ratification, while pushing the country further away from the realisation of its European perspective; expresses concern at some signs of decline in democratic freedoms and at the possible instrumentalisation of state institutions for partisan purposes and to exact political revenge;
8. Stresses that the strengthening of the rule of law and internal reform, including a credible fight against corruption, are essential not only for the conclusion and ratification of the Association Agreement and the deepening of EU-Ukraine relations, but also for the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine;
9. Welcomes the agreement that has been reached on the conclusion of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement; regards this agreement as a solid basis for the possible finalisation of the negotiations on an Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine;
10. Expresses alarm at reports concerning the deterioration of media freedom and pluralism in Ukraine; calls on the authorities to take all necessary measures to protect these essential aspects of a democratic society and to refrain from any attempt to control, directly or indirectly, the content of national media reporting;
11. Strongly supports the recommendations put forward in the joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR on the draft parliamentary election law; considers it essential that these recommendations should be adopted and implemented in an expedient, inclusive and comprehensive fashion, involving both the opposition and civil society;
12. Urges all political forces in Ukraine to conduct a fair and transparent debate about the political decision-making process; insists that investigations into possible failures in that process should be carried out by a parliamentary committee of inquiry;
13. Considers that the recently postponed meeting with President Yanukovych would have offered an excellent opportunity to tackle serious concerns which have been addressed to the Ukraine Government and re-establish a constructive dialogue that could lead to the initialling of the Association Agreement, provided that significant progress is made on the remaining technical and key political obstacles; calls on the Council and Commission to reschedule the meeting with President Yanukovych so that it takes place ahead of the planned EU-Ukraine Summit in December 2011;
14. Calls on the Commission to support judicial reform in Ukraine by making better use of the EU’s capacity-building programme and to consider setting up a High-Level EU Advisory Group to assist Ukraine in its efforts to fall into line with EU legislation, including in the judicial sphere;
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of Ukraine and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.
As you wish.
I am yet to come across an official communique that has numerically listed actions points that were not deemed as expected to be carried out in and of themselves per each numbered item.
Each and every point on that list can stand alone and has no need to be taken as the “whole”. As a receiving diplomat I would be looking at what on that numbered list would and could be actioned, and what, for whatever reason, would or could not be. I would also be looking at what was missing from the list that had been anticipated. What are the red lines the government will not cross and what ground can be given – in a nutshell.
However, maybe you have far more experience in such matters than me.
Suffice to say, based on my own experience, what I have read in and out of the public domain, I stand by my premise for the article based on the rhetoric from the EU in 2011/early 2012. Words such as “Insist” are not words diplomats or bureaucrats, speech writers and PR people use lightly in my experience, as the drafting of such documents are very carefully scrutinised word for word, meaning for meaning, possible ambiguity (wiggle room) for possible ambiguity (wiggle room) etc., before publishing – again in my experience.
There are, as I have already written, many more examples on MEP twitter feeds, in newspaper articles etc. shortly after her jailing where the initial rhetoric was, to paraphrase, no Tymoshenko in the parliamentary elections equals unfree and unfair elections. Quotes such as these:
“If the opposition can’t run with their leading figures, then these are not free elections.” German MEP Elmar Brok.
Deputy head of Germany’s Social Democrats, Wolfgang Thierse “In as far as political opponents are excluded from this election, the fairness of the poll is in doubt.”
There are a huge number of such quotes out there.
There is indeed much rhetoric surrounding the situation in Zookraine.
The resolutions are not, and are not intended to be, diplomatic documents.
In addition, the sovok mafiosi in Zookraine have no subtlety or anything else. They have some cunnnig, but no brains.
One has to beat them over the head on their Neanderthal skulls severely in order to get a piont across – and even then, one would likely have better luck with a brick wall.
The bass ackwards and inance logic is amply demonstrated by the video clip of Symonenko on the Big Politics show last night.
He has no problem with trying to portray himself as a “Christani commie”!!!!!!
And he rails against the IMF “imposing” and “dictating” terms to Zookraine, which is also a mantra repeated by the Regionnaires.
Strange “logic” – they want to borrow money from the IMF ot the typically cheap rates of interest, but they don’t want to meet the conditions of the lender.
http://lb.ua/news/2012/10/27/176177_tv_poslednie_predvibornie_batalii.html
Same thing with the EU – the sovok mafia idiots proclaim that they want to join the EU – but they don’t want to meet membership conditions.
And yanusvoloch the illiterate idiot lard-ass continues to try “triangulation” in the typically stupid “Ukrainian third way.”
There is no “Tymoshenko lens” needed to see that Zookraine is an abysmal sewer when it comes to government.
“If men were angels there would be no need of government’ – that was written a long time ago.
In Zookraine, the system is set up for all the criminals to be in government – and the people tolerate it, and have tolerated it for 20 years.
[…] In the run-up to the Oct. 28 general election in Ukraine, here's a selection of relevant texts published on OpenDemocracy.net: by Ukrainska Pravda's Serhiy Leshchenko – here and here; Roman Kabachiy's profiles of the “young hopefuls” running for parliament this year; Igor Torbakov's comparison of today's Ukraine and Russia; and Yegor Vasylyev's comparison of Ukraine and Belarus. Foreign Notes summarizes a report on the “dependencies existing between the political and business elites” in Ukraine. Odessablog looks at the upcoming vote through “an EU lens.” […]