The next big scandal of Odessa City Hall waiting to happen?

Such is the scale and breadth of corruption within Odessa City Hall under Mayor Gennady Trukhanov, it takes circumstances quite special for the next major scam and criminal activity to stand out as either brazen or of significance by way of future implications.

When such particular circumstances form, the blog usually tries to identify them before (or at the very least as) they happen so a reader can watch events unfold.  Unfortunately there are simply too many such incidents commented upon by the blog to link to them all.  A reader is therefore left to employ the search engine within the blog.

The planets are currently aligning for the next big criminal scandal to occur within Mayor Turkhanov’s Odessa City Hall – and despite 4 or 5 large NABU investigations into City Hall, a reader will be all too aware that this is unlikely to be a deterrent to those involved.

At the centre of the events currently unfolding is the Odessa CHP, responsible for providing the city heating.

It has long been an asset subject to criminal intention and activity.  An asset of attraction to the most serious of criminal and political players (when such individuals can be separated).

“Don” Angel Angert long targeted the CHP plant, drowning it in manipulated debt to his heating and power providers with a view to taking control of the asset via the courts and seizing it as payment for those outstanding debts.  Close friend of President Poroshenko and parliamentary leg-breaker Ihor Kononenko also had an interest in the plant and via two proxies (the Surkov borthers) prevented this “Angert seizure” happening by taking control of the debts.

Unsurprisingly, Mr Kononenko swiftly suffered mercury poisoning and “Don Angel” is also rumoured to have now left this mortal world via natural causes.

Nevertheless, the business partners of “Angel” remain – including long-time associates Mayor Gennady Trukhanov, Alexander Zhukov, Vladimir (Lampochka) Galanternik and in particular with regard to gas (and now banking) Igor Uchitel.

During the winter of 2017/18, Odessa City Hall was forced/stepped in to insure the continued functioning of Odessa CHP as Naftogaz Ukraine and other creditors sought to recover their debts.  It was critical that the plant continued to operate throughout the winter in Odessa.  Such a preventable societal disaster as scandals continued to seep out from City Hall was simply not an attractive prospect for Mayor Trukhanov’s City Hall.

Wednesday 19th September 2018 is likely to witness the adoption of Odessa CHP into the city’s communal property – albeit City Hall will not want to keep the CHP given the massive debts of the CHP to the likes of Naftogaz and others.  (The debts far exceed UAH 0.5 billion plus almost the same in late payment charges – approximately UAH 1 billion or more in total).

Thus taking the CHP plant into communal property under City Hall when City Hall has no desire to keep the asset, a reader can therefore interpret it as the first move toward the privatisation of the asset.

That being so, the question will be how transparent and/or legitimate the disposal of this asset will be when it occurs.  Is there a plan of how to dispose of the CHP once it becomes part of communal property?

Will the entire plant be privatised or part of it?

Will any partial or full privatisation come with the contract to supply (the monopolised) heating for the city?

Will Odessa City Hall “insure” that the debts of the CHP are written off by the Odessa courts prior to assuming the plant as communal property?  If so that would certainly make its subsequent privatisation (and monopoly) very attractive – despite the need for significant investment in the exiting plant and city infrastructure.

However, this is a Trukhanov City Hall.  Who would be interested and who will be entrusted to deal with the disposal of the asset into private hands (perhaps insuring the correct private hands) considering on-going NABU and SBU interest in Odessa City Hall?

The most obvious candidate with regard purchase has issues.  VS Group, controlled by Russian Alexander Babakov, sits behind Odessaoblenergo.  Odessaoblenergo is the most obvious (domestic) candidate to purchase the CHP.  However, Mr Babakov is on the current sanctions lists due to activities in Crimea (not that it seems to have affected his activities in Odessa).

Thus there is a need for a pair of deft and experienced hands to navigate the murky waters surrounding these circumstances and eventual sale.

Who then has Mayor Trukhanov nominated to deal with this asset?

Ivan Donchenko, by coincidence (cynicism) was appointed in late August 2018 as the new municipal head for heating supply of Odessa by Mayor Trukhanov.  The previous incumbent unexpectedly resigned.

Again by coincidence (cynicism), Mr Donchenko owns shares not only in the current CHP company, but also he owns shares in Odessaoblenergo.

Coincidence continues, as Mr Donchenko’s wife, Ekaterina Kovalchuk works in Odessa City Hall within the Department for Economic Development.

Of course there may well be other interested parties in the Odessa CHP (monopoly) if and when the debts are written off by the courts.  Odessaoblenergo may yet meet with some competition (or “competition”) in anything vaguely appearing to be a transparent privatisation (an event that Odessa City Hall continually goes to great lengths to avoid).

However, if there is a plan then at the time of writing, very few politicians within Odessa City Hall seem to know of one for there has been no leaks thus far – and there is no such thing as a secret within Odessa City Hall.

In short, all the ingredients for the next criminal scandal for Odessa City Hall are present – let’s see what it manages to cook up.

The faithful voter – Ukraine

Back in April 2018 an entry appeared relating to the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchy.

That entry concluded “That said, it is not often a president puts aside 7 hours for a meeting, the political rhetoric and momentum prima facie appears to be slightly different to the norm associated with presidential rhetoric, so perhaps, just perhaps, a positive decision has been signaled to President Poroshenko by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (and the Synod).

This appeal is something to watch that will have repercussions across the Ukrainian constituency should it come to pass.  It will also be interesting, should it come to pass prior to Verkhovna Rada elections in October 2019, as to which clergyman a politician will seek to recruit for their reelection campaign (and their Facebook and Instagram accounts will be replete with photographs of politicians with their “chosen” clergy as those elections draw near).”

To be blunt it was clear then that this was not the usual rhetoric from either side – and thus the entry was written.

Matters have progressed.

The Russian Orthodox Church has threatened to spit its dummy far from the orthodox manger should the Ukrainian church be removed from its administrative and social influence.  The usual threats of not recognising the decision of Constantinople, or leaving, suspending, and generally ignoring the Holy See of Constantinople have been made – no surprise when looking at Russian reactions in PACE, the G8 (no G7) and so on.  Entities wherein Russia expects to get its way or for matters to be understood through the Russian interpretation or it will leave/suspend its participation have witnessed Russia act as a petulant child when its desires have been rejected.

As it appears very probable that autocephaly for Ukraine will occur before the year end, and almost certainly well before the presidential elections of March 2019, it is perhaps worth pondering the impact of such an event.

Just how much of an effect will such a genuinely historic and fundamental nation building event actually influence the Ukrainian voter?

There is no doubt the current president would benefit from any electoral bounce relating to autocephaly – but will there be a bounce, and if so how big and for how long?

There is an obvious “other side to the coin” relating to potential voters of a significant leaning toward the Moscow Patriarch who may be swayed against President Poroshenko for delivering such nation building and yet perceived schism creating historic event.

There will also be those of the Kyiv Patriarch that have long been committed to it and for whom this event is simply political and bureaucratic machinations that otherwise do not influence their long-since committed leanings.

Many of the remainder are those that attend church for hatch, match and dispatch (christenings, marriages and funerals) and the occasional “special day” but otherwise are fairly indifferent to the church and its influences.

As such it is somewhat difficult to see any election changing outcomes for the current president as a result of this event in and of itself (despite it cementing his place in Ukrainian history when people look back decades from now).

Perhaps for maximum effect the presidential election team will have to incorporate this event into the other successes during his tenure as some form of multiplier in any claim of nation building.  It is otherwise difficult to see President Poroshenko gathering much electoral momentum from such a genuinely historic event.

Gritsenko

Anatoli Gritsenko is a perennial presidential candidate and leader of the Civil Position party.

He is a man trading on a political past of long ago in relation to his last holding office – far enough back in history for his face to remain familiar but his acts and deeds (be they good, bad, or indifferent) somewhat dulled with the passage of time.

He often polls well – right up until polling day when the survey forecasts have consistently abandoned him leaving him un-elected and his party outside the walls of the Verkhovna Rada.

He is currently polling at about 12-13% of the vote – at least among the voters who claim to have already decided who they will vote for, which is therefore nothing like being the same thing as 12-13% of the national vote.

Since the beginning of 2018 Mr Gritsenko has made public overtures toward Misha Saakashvili’s Rukh New Forces, as well as political parties The DemAliance, The People’s Control, the Libertarians, European Party of Ukraine, and has made several flirtations toward Samopomich.

Naturally Samopomich is the biggest fish among minnows – it already has MPs in the Verkhovna Rada and a fairly well run party machinery – and it’s leader is also polling with 3-4% of decided voters for the presidential campaign.  Clearly Mr Gritsenko would like that 3% of the vote being bequeathed to him by the Mayor of Lviv Andrei Sadovy, as well as then borrowing the Samopomich party machinery to enhance presidential and then Verkhovna Rada ambitions.

In short Mr Gritsenko has spent all year trying to attract the minnows to him and sought their support for his presidential candidacy.  He has had varying success thus far, and the larger Samopomich fish has yet to be caught from among the minnows.

Further while it appears that the somewhat infamous Viktor Bolha will (eventually formally) act as campaign manager, a message of “fighting corruption” may be a difficult sell when your campaign manager has long been associated with industrial scale smuggling.  There are also one or two questionable old school names such as Nikolai Katerinchuk currently in close orbit, notwithstanding political technologists who once worked with Sergei Liovochkin in what some will perhaps consider “questionable ways”.

That said the team coalescing around him does include younger faces external of politics too.

12th September witnessed another public appeal from Mr Gritsenko to Samopomich to join his coalition of minnows – maybe they will (after extracting concessions and Verkhovna Rada guarantees), but the odds are probably against it, for there appears little to gain for Samopomich in doing so.

The problem for Mr Gritsenko is that of perception – it all appears a little too desperate (and it will only look worse as the electoral horizon gets ever closer).  Will we witness yet another polling day collapse during his presidential campaign – or if he succeeds, how quickly can he for a parliamentary force that will allow him to control/significantly influence the parliament?

It all still appears that success remains rather unlikely regardless of any opinion surveys.

Constitutional Change (EU and NATO)

After travelling for a few days, perhaps a few lines are due relating to President Poroshenko’s proposals delivered to the Verkhovna Rada relating to constitutional change to enshrine NATO and EU membership within the Constitution of Ukraine.

There are of course many ways to perceive this decision domestically – considering the transparently expedient timing as presidential elections appear upon the immediate political horizon.  It is perhaps the last opportunity for the current president to display the ability to raise a constitution changing 300 (or more) votes from within the Verkhovna Rada during his current (and perhaps only) term.  A display (of sorts) of presidential political force.

Longer term however, there is also little chance over the following few decades that 300 votes would be gathered to overturn any changes that make the EU and NATO membership a constitutional obligation.

Blood has been spilled.  Rubicon crossed and all that.  Any amendments to remove such goals may well be seen as a course reversal at best, a turn toward Kremlin appeasement at worst.  Politically prickly for at least a generation.

In short, it would be a fairly robust constitutional insurance policy against a return to the past influences of the “northern neighbour”.  300 (plus) votes is far more difficult to gather than 226 for standard legislation when all is said and done.

Nevertheless, there is perhaps some debate to be had over whether the Constitution of Ukraine is the appropriate document for such political declarations.  Generally, a reader would probably associate a nation’s constitution as the basic principles and laws of a nation state that determine the powers and duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people within it.

That said, a constitution is perhaps best being living document to maintain a contemporary social contract between a State and its citizens.  However the direction of NATO and the EU for a democratic nation’s society can also be, and is perhaps far better settled at the ballot box by voting for political parties that declare that their goal.

So is embedding such goals within the constitution either necessary or desirable?

There is also the rule of unintended consequences.  Any statutory law that may be interpreted as not progressing Ukraine toward EU and NATO membership, perhaps simply by not meeting “the European normative” could well be interpreted as unconstitutional, ergo perhaps unintentionally limiting the concept of national sovereignty even over the most banal and prima facie entirely Ukrainian of affairs.

It doesn’t take many contrarian or mischievous parliamentarians to overwhelm the Constitutional Court with requests to review a never-ending flow of domestic legislation through the lens of progressing toward NATO and EU membership – or not.

If not, and by failing to meet such norms, would any and all such statutory laws and institutional regulations therefore be deemed unconstitutional?

Could this perhaps get messy?

From the European and Trans-Atlantic perspective, making EU and NATO membership a Ukrainian constitutional goal is fairly irrelevant.

What is relevant first and foremost in that EU and NATO standards are met.

With regard to the EU, that firstly relates to meeting the ratified obligations of Ukraine with respect to the Association Agreement (and DCFTA).  Thereafter it would also be required to meet the higher and wider bar of the Aquis Communitaire.

With regard to NATO it requires not only meeting military interoperability and organisation structures, but also meeting the economic, political and social demands made clear within Article 3 of the Washington Treaty too.  Meeting those requirements is not only subjective but also must be recognised and accepted by every NATO member.

In short, even after meeting both EU and NATO requirements, membership is still entirely dependent upon the political will of the existing members.

All of this raises the question as to whether the constitution/basic and fundamental law of Ukraine is the best place to legislatively set the political course of Ukraine – if it needs to be set in law at all.

Maybe it is.  Maybe not.

The consequences (if any) of these amendments if passed by the Verkhovna Rada remain to be seen.

GUAT – A gangsters paradise no more?

Readers familiar with the Ukrainian world and acronyms associated with it will probably be aware of GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.  Created in June 2001, GUAM set the lofty aims of promoting democratic values, ensuring stable development, enhancing international and regional security and stepping up European integration.  Obviously regardless of any progress made, there remains varying distances, but generally a long way to go for these nations.

The 5th September 2018 would appear to herald the creation of what the blog will term GUAT.

This time Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkey setting the task of taking on the (infamous scourge that are) “thieves-in-law” – at least as far as announcements by First Deputy Chairman of the National Police of Ukraine Vyacheslav Abroskin and Chairman of the National Police of Turkey Jalal Uzulka are concerned.

In short an attempt by these nations to tackle the organised criminality created by the “Thieves-in-Law” that impacts on each nation and yet rarely sees them prosecuted – rather they are usually deported, persona non grata, then arriving in one of these States after expulsion by another of these States.

A matter of all moving the problem on rather than any effectively dealing with it.

Indeed on numerous occasions, the Verkhovna Rada has refused to create legislation making being a “Thief-in-Law” a criminal offence in and of itself – perhaps it is the right position to take on the issue, perhaps not.

Some form of definition of what a “Thief-in-Law” is would be required.  Thereafter those parameters would have to be met.  Who decides?  Who decides who decides?

Would that decision be based upon police intelligence, or the recognition of a “Thief-in-Law” among their peers?

Being adorned with the traditional ink no longer necessarily acts as an identifier.  Neither would adherence (or increasingly non-adherence) to “the Code”.

There are those that would be tattooed with such symbolism as “fashion” in today’s world where once they would not dare.  There may also be some that would meet “Thief-in-Law” definitions that carry no such ink these days.

The fundamental question is whether it is the authorities or the criminal underworld decide who is in fact a “Thief-in-Law” if the mere fact of being a “Thief-in-Law” were to be an offence in and of itself.  What are the chances of a successful prosecution for being a “Thief-in-Law” if the underworld doesn’t recognise that an individual does indeed hold such distinction/infamy?

Further is simply being a “Thief-in-Law” sufficient grounds for a criminal conviction if no direct and/or obvious personal criminal activity that would otherwise lead to an arrest and probable successful prosecution?  Prima facie there would appear to be some human rights issues that could be debated.

Perhaps it is indeed wiser to actually take down a “Thief-in-Law” for their criminal activity rather than any label they may have (or be thought to have)?

This then brings about questions of jurisdiction.

As “Thieves-in-Law” have more oft than not earned the right not to directly get their hands dirty (that often), jurisdiction of crimes is normally that in which the offence is committed – but if the conspiracy, or acts more than merely preparatory occur elsewhere, and without which no crime would have been committed, where then is the jurisdiction?

How easy would it be to make arrests in Ukraine of those that directly carry out the crimes, to then successfully tie that to the Thieves-in-Law who conspired and plotted in Azerbaijan for their successful prosecution there for example?

“It is important for Ukraine to continue cooperation with Turkey in the fight against cross-border organized crime and “thieves in law.”  It is important that in this issue we have a common vision – only tough steps,” – Vyacheslav Abroskin

Bravo!  Quite right!

But what?  And how?

A new GUAT police task force targeting the “Thieves-in-Law” is naturally to be welcomed.  But that task force will have to work primarily within individual domestic legislation, and thereafter that of ratified regional and international instruments.

How complimentary is that legislation and how problematic are the gaps?

Will the constituent parts of the police task force benefit from additional legislation to fill in those gaps – or will the “Thieves-in-Law” continue to exploit them?  Is it better to concentrate on the crimes and their prevention rather than the criminals?  Put pressure upon the methods as a way to pressure the perpetrators?  If “cure” is so problematic, is “prevention” a better antidote (not that they are mutually exclusive)?

If “only tough steps” is the common vision, how will they be effectively and cooperatively be implemented?  What is to be the commonly agreed and commonly enforced holistic approach?

How robust is any political will behind this police task force initiative – is it just noise rather than signal?

Perhaps the only way to find out is to wait and see.

Crime statistics for August – Odessa

Every now and again the blog visits the crime statistics of either Ukraine or Odessa, depending upon what is published, by who, and when.

There are numerous entries relating to how crime statistics are manipulated around the world, and Ukraine is no different.  A brief historical example highlighting a few (and by no means all) the methods employed in the UK here.

The police of Odessa have released to reported (obviously they cannot record what is unreported) crime figures for August in Odessa.  Quite what the “best guess” reported/unreported ratio is remains an unknown quantity.

It should also be acknowledged that August is tourist season and with tourists come both criminal opportunity and itinerant criminality, both of which will have an uplifting effect upon reported crime.

Further, the crimes cited by the police are not an exhaustive list.

Local media reports include busting drug dens/factories, weapons seizures, smuggling, serious and organised criminality, corporate raiding and no end of corruption and “white-collar” shenanigans  – none of which are mentioned or specifically identified in the police figures given to the media.

The figures stated related to the most “street orientated” criminality – violence/assault, theft, and alcohol related naughtiness.

In short they represent a distorted and half-blind, or at least squinting look, at the lower level criminality in Odessa.  A snap-shot is presented that does not provide a clear view, albeit for those wandering around the streets of Odessa it is perhaps the most relevant snap-shot when it comes to “getting caught up in events” – insofar as reported/recorded street criminality is concerned.

The police of Odessa recorded 3 murders, two attempted murders/conspiracy to commit murder (including that upon a female investigator of the Primorsky police department), and a further 17 cases of grievous/serious assault.

70 robberies were recorded, together with almost 600 thefts (which include 40 burglaries/theft from premises (despite the clear legal difference there was no differentiation made in the statistics announced), 76 fraud cases, and 20 vehicle thefts.

57 people were detained who were officially wanted and/or unlawfully at large.

More than 3000 traffic offences were recorded, of which 235 were drunk drivers.

Unfortunately no mentioned regarding the arrest/clear up rate for these crimes were disclosed.  (Successful prosecutions are a different matter entirely – see the above link regarding the UK where the distance and distinction between detection and successful prosecution is made clear.

Nevertheless, for an Oblast of over 2 million citizens, and a city of over 1 million people, considering Odessa’s location and suitability for criminal activity (of historic/legendary infamy) , the seasonal influences, statistical massaging/recording gymnastics, and even accounting for the somewhat distorted picture (by way of obvious exclusions) painted by the statistics released – does a reader not consider even these numbers somewhat low even when taking all that into account?

Zakharchenko no more

Igor Plotniotsky should be feeling rather relieved right now.  After all, he was removed as “leader” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” in a “coup” that saw him officially retire due to health issues and disappear into Russia.

Alexander Zakharchenko, the “leader” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” retired from the position on 31st August 2018, the same way many other “public personalities/leaders” were retired – via a violent death, in his case being blown up in a restaurant.

(Also injured was Alexander Timofeyev, “Finance Minister” according to initial reports.)

Suffice to say no tears will be shed by the blog.

The late Mr Zakharchenko has been replaced by “First Prime Minister” Dmitry Trapeznikov.  Mr Trapeznikov was once the leader of the official Shaktar Donetsk fan club, and latterly a local government official in Dontesk.  The football and local governance positions will lead many to find inference that Mr Trapeznikov will be known to Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov and perhaps still influenced by him.

Naturally the “Donetsk leadership” will blame Ukraine for the assassination (despite that meaning subversive Ukrainian operatives waltzed into the centre of occupied Donetsk, planted explosives and assassinated the “leader”, and also escaped undiscovered – posing questions over the security within the “occupied Donbas”).

The Kremlin will sit upon the fence and made statements about “an act of terrorism”, from which many will draw the inference the Kremlin/Russian Security Services were involved/gave (at least tacit) approval for the assassination.

Ukraine will seek to exploit any gaps between The Kremlin and the “Donetsk leadership” and infer both are responsible (individually and in collusion).  Given the long list of assassinations of “leaders/public figures” within the “republics” – a framing that most people within and without the occupied territories also believe.  This is likely to be the narrative which gains the most traction (and is most likely).

It follows that there will be those who will now look to see whether this assassination and the appointment of Mr Trapezikov signifies a change of direction within the occupied territory, or a move toward a “leadership” more acceptable for “Minsk progression”.  Others will ponder whether this is more a question of “business/money flow” redirection within occupied Donetsk and onward within Moscow.

In truth it is perhaps too soon to make any assumptions – and neither are both necessarily mutually exclusive.  Further it would be foolish to harbour the idea that the late Mr Zakharchenko actually had much influence over the direction or administration of the “Donetsk Republic” with regard to any meaningful policy – for that was and remains the purview of Moscow.

Whatever the case, The Kremlin, Ukraine and the “Republic” will swiftly move on without  Zakharchenko – a man who was living on borrowed time from the moment he assumed the role.

UA seeks AD systems from the US – but which?

Long ago when Valery Chaly was working as a leading light in President Proshenko’s Bankova administration, the blog once stated that he could become a political threat to President Poroshenko and that a move would probably occur.

10th July 2015 unsurprisingly witnessed Mr Chaly moved from the Presidential Administration and become His Excellency the Ambassador of Ukraine to the USA.

As expected as Ambassador he has done a very good job.

It is difficult think of anybody else within Ukraine that could or would have done a better job.

Thus when he makes public statements they are usually worth listening to – especially if they relate to matters some still consider “sensitive” when it comes to selling/giving arms to Ukraine.

(The blog is clearly insensitive when it comes to the matter of providing Ukraine with defensive lethal weaponry as it very much supports such action.)

Thus when Amb Chaly makes a statement on public radio in the US relating to Ukraine officially requesting what prima facie appears to be modern and significant air defence systems, it is probably an accurate statement.

Further Amb Chaly went on to state that one such system has the price tag of $750 million and that Ukraine would require 3 to meet its current needs.  Nevertheless the statement appears clear enough that at the current time a single unit has been officially requested.

Indeed his statement left no room for misunderstanding, orating that the issue has been discussed between the relevant presidents and John Bolton on more than one occasion.

The US State Department gave its usual (and wise) boilerplate response to requests for further information, or even confirmation – “In accordance with the official policy of the State Department, we do not comment on potential deals on the sale or transfer of weapons and agreements that are at the stage of agreement – before they are officially informed of the US Congress.”  Quite right.

What was also (deliberately) left unspoken was which system Ukraine has requested.

The price tag may give an indication as to which system – or not.  It is unclear whether that price tag is discounted, or whether a proportion of the cost is shifted onto a long term maintenance contract etc. thus blurring the true system price tag.

Whatever the case, as the blog has long lamented the obvious inability of Ukraine to defend its airspace or maritime territory effectively – thus A2AD, EW, more EW, yet more EW, UAVs etc becoming a priority above ground forces – this appears to be a very positive assessment of the current Ukrainian limitations and weaknesses.

That is not to belittle the requirements for more counter-battery and counter-sniper equipment, it is simply to acknowledge that previously (slightly) lesser priorities are reaching the top of the Ukrainian military procurement list – and that in and of itself indicates some form of progress/momentum.

A reader may ponder just how interoperable, or indeed the ability to assimilate (in the future) the requested system with the US (and domestic) systems in neighbouring nations (read Poland and Romania) will be.

How much Ukrainian (or US) thought went into that when the Ukrainians were requesting this system is unknown.  After all, behind price, capabilities, maintenance, and reliability, there are other broader and long term issues to consider.

Whatever the case, discussions behind the curtain have now seen the curtain skirts raised a little by this statement, and the issue is now unambiguously in the public realm – which then raises the question of the timing of this statement for both Ukraine and the US Congress.