Yet more wetwork – Colonel Yuri Voznyy assassinated

June 28, 2017

Regrettable as it is, following on seamlessly from yesterday’s entry and the assassination of Colonel Shapoval, Chief of Ukrainian Military Special Ops Forces Intelligence, yet another senior Ukrainian intelligence soul can added to that tally of the assassinated.

Colonel Yuri Voznyy of the SBU Counterintelligence Department was assassinated on the same day as his colleague in Kyiv..

Colonel Voznyy, like Colonel Shapoval and other recently assassinated senior UA IC officers met his fate via a bomb in or under the car he was in.

Colonel Voznyy’s assassination occurred in the Konstantinov region of Donbas.  3 colleagues were injured in the explosion.

On 31st March, Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Kharaberiush, Deputy Chief of the Mariupol Counterintelligence Department was also assassinated by a bomb in or under the car he was in.

The entry yesterday relating to the assassination of Colonel Shapoval concluded thus – “Aside from the immediate “who dunnit” however, there are other just as important questions to be asked and answered – or left unanswered.

Which incidents are linked, and which are not?  Is there a single operational decision making centre regarding such acts or not?  If not, which incidents are linked to which decision centers, who do they choose to carry out the wetwork, and why?  If there is more than one operational decision making centre, how many can be identified, and do they have their own unique modus operandi or a common one?  Where are they based?  Who sits within them?  What are the commonalities between victims if any?  What were the victims about to do, or had recently done that may connect them, or may prove to be the specific trigger for assassination?  Are they simply names on a list held by one or more operational centre designated for assassination when the opportunity presents?  Do any of the answers arrived at suggest the most likely next target from among so many potential targets?

There are also internal questions regarding how this happened, what was missed if anything, and if something was missed why was it missed?  What can be done to do better, (both preventative and reactionary) next time? – For there will assuredly be many more next times.”

With regard to the last paragraph, and internal IC operational issues and Ukraine having lost at least 3 senior IC officials to car bombs over the past 3 months, questions will surely be asked about Ukrainian counterterrorism and counter surveillance measures institutionally, but necessarily have also to be asked with regard to vital issue of personal awareness and/or drills relating to counterterrorism and counter surveillance.

It may be that somewhere within the lofty ranks of the Ukrainian IC community there is a Kremlin mole simply handing out names, vehicles registrations together with dates and destinations to facilitate Kremlin wetwork around Ukraine of important IC personnel.  Such is the level of political and institutional infiltration, it is not only possible but indeed probable that The Kremlin has more than one mole in almost any institution a reader may choose.

However, it is equally as likely that surveillance has played more than a small part in identifying personnel, vehicles, routes of travel, as well as noting any counter surveillance and counterterrorism awareness displayed by those targeted – if any were employed.

That the Russian GRU has managed either directly, through collaborators, or via organsied crime (for a fee) to plant 3 bombs in or under vehicles used by 3 senior Ukrainian IC personnel within the last 3 months and in 3 different locations across Ukraine, would tend to suggest some serious flaws within internal institutional, and equally importantly personal countermeasure drills of the most basic kind – as opposed to any display of exceptional GRU tradecraft and subsequent wetwork.

As yesterday’s entry concluded, so shall today’s – “What can be done to do better, (both preventative and reactionary) next time? – For there will assuredly be many more next times.”  

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: