Almost a month ago when a few lines appeared relating to the “Donbas Blockade”, it was inferred that an almost inevitable reshuffle of the Cabinet would occur very soon – “None of this bodes well for Prime Minister Groisman and his Cabinet with such a small (and often infrequent) majority in the Verkhovna Rada.” and “How can the Energy Minister survive if those manning the blockade are to be pacified? With who to replace?”
That reshuffle remains very likely, and it is said that Prime Minister Groisman has already privately put two Ministers on notice.
But what makes this reshuffle imminent?
As of 14th April, Volodymyr Groisman has been Prime Minister for 1 year, which therefore triggers the ability to engage in votes of “no confidence” – and a vote of “no confidence” there will surely be.
It is likely (at the time of writing) the PM and the Cabinet will survive (this first attempt) with a little encouragement and/or coercion of parliamentary votes from without the (slight) majority coalition.
Nevertheless changes will have to be seen to be made, albeit what is made to be seen will change nothing.
The theatre being required give an additional veneer of credibility to the argument against early Verkhovna Rada elections, despite the internal dynamics of the Verkhovna Rada being unchanged by a ministerial merry-go-round.
(Would the dynamics of the Verkhovna Rada change with early elections? Only if a critical mass of genuinely reform minded new faces entered – and remained – rather than be subjected to deselection games on party lists post election.)
Ergo – a questions for the next few weeks are which Minister’s will go – and who will replace them?
Inevitably another question is how many populist statements will come from Prime Minister Groisman prior to the inevitable vote of “no confidence”?