Privat nationalisation and political weight lossDecember 19, 2016
Ukraine has eventually taken the decision to nationalise Ihor Kolomoisky’s (and others) Privat Bank.
In some ways it is a surprise that the will to do so was actually found, despite that for more than 2 years everybody and anybody with any knowledge of Privat Bank has hardly been shy in opining that it presented serious risk to the Ukrainian economy and had it not been systemically vital to the Ukrainian banking system it would otherwise have been closed.
To a man/woman, of those spoken to one to one by the blog, be they politicians, economists, diplomats or international bankers, all recognised that the Privat problem had to be addressed and that nationalising it was the better of the options available – if the will could be found to do so.
Lo it has come to pass that 100% of Privat shares are now owned by the State.
How grubby the deal struck between Ihor Kolomoisky and The State is, remains unknown. For a man like Ihor Kolomoisky to “voluntarily” “sell” his shares to the State in what has been a significant political and financial lever over the State for him for many years with no gains to him pushes the boundaries of belief. With the ability to simply put the Ukrainian banking sector into melt down, there is presumably a quid pro quo no matter how small yet favourable that may be in return for the “voluntary” handing over of all shares.
So be it.
Questions will undoubtedly be asked regarding the large amount of PrivatBank loans to its owners (Mr Kolomoisky and friends), other companies with the same owners, and to those associated with the owners, that have consistently been taken out with no intention of repaying them.
What is the exact cash figure these nefarious loans amount to? What are the chances of those loans now being serviced and eventually repaid by those that took them and who are extremely skilled at historically saddling the State with their debts?
On balance, should a reader accept that those loans will probably not be repaid, thus in assuming these non-performing loans (debts) in however many $ billion they amount to, is that still a price worth paying to insure that PrivatBank can no longer collapse the entire Ukrainian banking system?
Even if agreements have been reached to now begin to repay these loans, the question is then over what period of time (in the unlikely event they will be repaid in full and in the spirit of any agreements made)?
The question presented is therefore one of short term (debt assumption leading probable loses when loans are not repaid) verses the medium/longer term view of what price is put upon insuring the entire national banking system will not collapse due to Prvat?
Financial issues aside, there is of course politics to consider.
The last time the nationalisation of Privat was mentioned by the blog in September, the politics were “Tymoshenko orientated”. Mrs Tymoshenko is not in favour of the nationalisation of Privat as it doesn’t really work to her advantage.
Ms Tymoshenko aside, broader questions need now be asked about how the nationalisation of Privat changes the political and/or oligarch power dynamics with a major Kolomoisky lever now surrendered.
Mr Kolomoisky can no longer use Privat as a personal piggy bank. How does it change his ability to buy parliamentary votes for hire and/or buy entire political parties? Will it effect any future voting outcomes? To mitigate, will key voting personnel previously simply bought, now start to appear in Kolomoisky business structures instead for the purpose of leverage over their vote?
In short, just how much political weight loss has been incurred by Mr Kolomoisky – if any?
Without the “ace up the sleeve” of a persistent ability to cause national banking melt down, how does that effect the Kolomoisky position when negotiating how next to screw the State?
How will the rest of the oligarchy class react? Will they make peace with the State or solidify around a common cause yet further in screwing it over?
How will this effect a poor presidential poll rating if he is perceived to have engineered the right thing for the country, or alternatively is perceived as having used his position to weaken yet another oligarch to his own advantage? The two are not mutually exclusive, but that is how it will be presented.
Can Mr Kolomoisky now be certain that in what appears prima facie to be a weakened position, he will now not be called to account for innumerable scams and schemes over the years? Was a de facto arrangement made that in effect grants amnesty via a promise of non-prosecution as part of the deal? Are there other “compensatory” arrangements reached that will filter into the system over time that will be beneficial to Mr Kolomoisky’s other interests?
The repercussions of this nationalisation financially are on balance likely to be beneficial for Ukraine and the least worst option that could have been taken. As long as Privat is managed prudently henceforth over the medium term this act is the most sensible option available. In the long term, it would be wise to eventually return Privat to the private sector – once its systemic and internal risks have been mitigated against.
What is far less clear are the political and oligarchy/power behind the curtain repercussions. It may be some time before those become fully evident.