The CyberJunta hack – How will the populists respond?October 24, 2016
CyberJunta, one of the Ukrainian hacking groups has apparently (and unsurprisingly) targeted Vladislav Surkov and an email address email@example.com purported to be used by him under the pseudonym Nikolay Pavlov.
Also compromised was an email address of a Surkov associate/underling firstname.lastname@example.org used by Pavel Karpov.
Within the documents thus far released in two pdf files file-1 and file-2 – 17.4 MB in total (with more to come undoubtedly) it has to be said there are absolutely no surprises when it comes to the tactics and instruments to be used in undermining Ukraine beyond the occupied Donbas.
Neither would the suggested time frame between November 2016 to March 2017 for implementation of destabilisation within Ukraine come as a surprise to many. Events both external and internal of Ukraine would dictate this period as being optimal.
Clearly fermenting social unrest during the heating season when tariffs have risen so sharply requires little tactical thinking within the Kremlin when Ms Tymoshenko long-since grasped that opportunity – and she has been banging the social unrest drum for several months over the issue.
Forcing/encouraging new Verkhovna Rada elections in Spring 2017, something long anticipated, is another goal that would fit the Opposition Block, Batkivshchyna/Tymoshenko, and possibly Radical Party design. As all are populist, if they cannot force early elections following the hardship many will face during a heating season of high tariffs then they will probably never manage to force early elections.
Plans attempting to bring about calls for a “federal Transcarpathia” are an obvious alternative to the failed Novorossiya project. (Although not specifically mentioned, how great a role Viktor Orban would/could play in agitating the Hungarian diaspora is unknown.)
What is perhaps most informative about the documents is that Mr Surkov aka Pavlov (if the email address is genuinely one of Surkov’s pseudo-email addresses) is that it is not the most Kremlin friendly Opposition Block that is identified as the critical political machinery to push the Kremlin active measures within the Ukrainian constituency. Neither is it the Radicals.
The main focus was/is to concentrate upon the Batshchivyna (Ms Tymoshenko’s) Party. This because it has the best outreach/network throughout Ukraine of the 3 political parties identified that would/could dance to the Kremlin tune – wittingly or unwittingly. It is indeed true that of the Oppo Block, Radicals and Batkivshchyna, the latter has by far the widest regional networks.
The obvious question is whether Ms Tymoshenko would willingly allow her (and it is hers and nobody else’s) party to be used to further Kremlin active measures?
If so, wittingly or unwittingly? (And would it matter either way when it comes to issues of implementation?)
A reader is left to ponder the morality (or not) of Ms Tymoshenko and the integrity (or not) of Batkivshchyna in pursuit of its vision for Ukraine even if it meant becoming a covertly willing accomplice of Mr Surkov/The Kremlin.
To be blunt, that Batkivshchyna vision probably goes no further than Ms Tymoshenko ruling Ukraine, for there is nothing whatsoever offered by way of detailed policy (as a reader would expect from a populist) and to be frank during her nearly 20 years in Ukrainian politics, meaningful and credible policy is not something that Ms Tymoshenko has ever actually offered (let alone delivered). Her political judgement is also somewhat suspect, for despite many years involved in grubby deals with The Kremlin/Gazprom whilst in control of UESU and Somoli Ent, she still managed to hand Ukraine the most punitive gas deal in its history in 2009.
Whatever the case, how does Ms Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna, (notwithstanding the Radicals and to a lesser extent the Opposition Block of whom such cooperation would be expected) mitigate the revelations within the apparently hacked emails detailing Kremlin plans as authored by Mr Surkov/Pavlov?
If denying (perhaps rightly) any political activity coordinated, or even useful to The Kremlin, the fact of having been identified as the political parties most likely to further Kremlin active measures to undermine Ukraine is a rather damning frame to be placed within.
Ms Tymoshenko/Bakivshchyna (and the others) may try to label CyberJunta a presidential provocation, but that carries risks – particularly if it is not, for hacker retribution is unlikely to be kind. Batkivshchyna (or other named parties) emails becoming public is probably not a something that would be appreciated (unless you are employed within the Presidential Administration or are a Deputy of the People’s Front), nor is it likely to contain nothing but wholesome morally upstanding text and thoughtful policy alternatives. Scams and scheming may well dominate any correspondence, be it party or personal in nature.
To be effectively labeled The Kremlin’s best ally/option in destabilising Ukraine, wittingly or unwittingly, within allegedly Kremlin designed active measures takes some explaining even if the entire incident is a fake – for unfortunately for Ms Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna (and more or less the entirety of the political class more broadly), anonymous pro-Ukrainian hackers probably have as much, if not more credibility with the constituency than she does.
How to respond with the minimum of political damage sustained?
If it is a fake (or parts therein are fake), then who is responsible? The Bankova or People’s Front? It is doubtful it was a joint project. If not either of those two, who else benefits?