Terrorist replacements – OdessaApril 13, 2015
Following along from an entry a few days ago which briefly outlined the SBU rolling up several terrorist entities/cells in Odessa (not withstanding the dim view they took over the separatist notions inferred by the People’s Council of Bessarabia), the entry ended with the following question:
“Undoubtedly a busy and difficult summer ahead for the SBU, when “Russian tourists” to Odessa maybe either “Russian tourists” or in fact “Russian Tourists”. A clearing of the terrorist and separatists decks to keep the surveillance numbers manageable before summer perhaps?”
It is a question that will be answered in all probability with “Russian Tourists” arriving in Odessa as Russian tourists when the summer season begins at the end of May/beginning of June. Perhaps now, somewhat necessarily so following the SBU rolling up of so many active (in various degrees) terrorist entities/cells in such a very short space of time.
With Novorussiya failing dismally to take hold, the chances of Russian military rolling down Deribasovskaya extremely low, and the terrorist bombings thus far failing to instill terror, there is now a “threat vacuum” to fill from the Kremlin point of view destabilisation – and fewer and fewer locals prepared to fill it.
That ever decreasing pool of locals prepared to engage in acts of terrorism relates to issues such as most prepared to fight against Kyiv, went to fight against Kyiv in eastern Ukraine about a year ago, post the 2nd May tragedy in Odessa. Others not prepared to fight, but prepared to facilitate, recruit, or generally carry out acts more preparatory with regard terrorism, split in several directions. Some went to eastern Ukraine, some to Russia, others to Crimea and yet more remained in Odessa where many have since been arrested, with others now under the watchful eye of the SBU.
Indeed those under the watchful eye of the SBU have probably increased in number since the many recent arrests, as there will be arrestees willing to do deals with the authorities – further arrests have already followed, including members of “The Church” caught in possession of munitions slightly more lethal than Monty Python’s “holy hand grenade”.
It is also not in the Kremlin interest to have all sympathetic locals that are prepared to carry out, or facilitate terrorist activities, arrested now – for the sake network and logistical longevity. Indeed some may remain “sleepers” perhaps for years before “activation” (if they are ever activated), unless the Kremlin has become so desperate as to throw the subversion handbook out of the window – which it hasn’t, and won’t.
Thus with many of the anti-Kyiv youth and middle aged that were prepared to fight, already in eastern Ukraine fighting with the “republics”, and the local organisations of the slightly more elderly subjected to recent SBU roll-ups, (the 3 from the Communist Party of Ukraine, all aged about 50, and the 30 Afghan Vets, whom by virtue of being Afghan Vets are not spring chickens either), locals sympathetic to “the cause” and prepared to take an active role, are an ever decreasing well from which to draw.
As a line from the seized diary (shown in the first link) of one of the elderly “Communist 3” stated, “Igor was sad, and bitterly joked, saying if young people do not support the acts then we have no future.” A telling line, particularly as the young people of Odessa are not about to follow the Communist Party, let alone Communists setting off bombs in their city. No longer do all roads lead to Moscow for the youth of Odessa, and no longer is there an unwritten attachment/unseen umbilical chord to Moscow amongst the youth either. This generation knows only an independent Ukraine, thus it is difficult to pull upon nostalgic sentiment that doesn’t exist for Igor and cohorts.
The Transnistrians sent to Odessa to commit terrorist acts have not been particularly successful in lieu of willing locals. Several have been arrested, and one died after being hit by a car leaving the scene of a detonation. The 3, aging 50-something local Communists, were far more effective with their 10+ bombings.
With the first anniversary of the 2nd May tragedy in Odessa now only a few weeks away, there may well be yet more locals rolled up by the SBU that are currently under surveillance, or who are given up by those currently under arrest as part of a deal. Whether there will be anything more than solemn gatherings of remembrance that day remains to be seen.
Indeed, the replacing of the current Odessa Governor who is a “Kolomoiski man”, with a “Poroshenko man” seems likely to occur after the 2nd May anniversary – simply to avoid the “president’s man” being in office if/when a bloody event to mark the anniversary occurs. Regardless of whether an incident occurs or not, be assured the current Governor will be replaced once 2nd May has been and gone.
It therefore seems likely that the “active” anti-Kyiv numbers require some externally generated inflating, and thus the terrorist “Tourist” replacements external of Odessa will arrive (as tourists) at a time when tourists numbers are reaching their peak 6 or 7 weeks from now.
It also provides time to pre-position any required tools of the trade/make arrangements with local “quartermasters”, as well as provide the training to use such tools effectively (5 from 28 explosive devices thus far in Odessa failed to go off), for those who may get beyond assignment to the eastern front, and make their way to Odessa under deniably nefarious instruction. Aside from the people arrested, a lot of munitions and weapons have been seized amongst the terrorist entities/cells in Odessa, and they too must be replaced.
What the use of “Tourist” in this entry doesn’t mean, however, is that all the “Tourists” will leave Odessa having safely arrived having done what they were sent to do. Some will be tasked with staying – for some time.
Nor does it mean all the “Tourists” will become immediately active. This is, as has been written here many times over the past 18 months, a long game. At least a decade of incidents is ahead in varying levels of intensity. Despite any desire to make a “statement” on the 2nd May anniversary, there are much longer term destabilising considerations too. Amongst those that arrive, some will be far more “expendable” than others – and those required for an extended period cannot all arrive as new employees of Russian firms/Kremlin friendly firms, freelance/accredited journalists and other standard ploys.
Keeping track of the 3 to 5 people “Tourist” cells arriving in drips and drabs before setting up shop “Tourists”, is not going to be the easiest of tasks – and surely not all will return from whence they came after a few weeks in the Odessa sunshine.