Kremlin DCFTA expectationsSeptember 19, 2014
There is no better way to outline the Kremlin plans regarding the future of the DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine than to let The Kremlin officially state it:
And so, there it is. The Kremlin position as of 15th September – the day prior to AA and DCFTA ratification.
Russia demands a legally binding instrument between the EU and Ukraine recognising that the DCFTA between the two parties will not, in any shape or form, be brought into force prior to 31st December 2015 as far as Ukrainian commitments are concerned – even the parts Russia has raised no objection to. If Russia believes Ukraine, even in part, implements this agreement prior to that date, then Russia will react adversely to Ukraine either symmetrically or asymmetrically as it decides is appropriate. Furthermore Russia expects the DCFTA to be amended to accommodate its concerns – despite the fact it has already been ratified by the European Parliament, Ukraine, and several EU Member States.
Quite a set of demands for a third party to a bilateral legal instrument that has already been ratified.
What, if any, changes can or will be made to the ratified DCFTA to accommodate Russia?
Should any official replies to the Kremlin letter, from either the EU or Ukraine find their way to the blog, then naturally a suitable entry will be forthcoming. Perhaps the mutual ratification the day after this Kremlin letter was received by the EU and Ukraine was indeed their answer – or part of it. After all, ratification occurred without any changes despite what appears to be a desperate attempt to prevent it by The Kremlin.
Can the Ukrainian economy be transformed into an economy that can be competitive in the European marketplace in a 15 month time frame, whilst being capable of dealing with any Kremlin punishment for doing so when it does?