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And what of the RADA post elections?

May 21, 2014

Petro Poroshenko has recently stated several times that new RADA elections would be a good idea.  The majority of the Ukrainian voting constituency would seem to agree.

It is though, not that simple.

A newly invested President Poroshenko can only dissolve a legitimately sitting (until 2017) RADA per the constitution under certain conditions – none of which exist:

Article 90

The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is terminated on the day of the opening of the first meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of a new convocation.

The President of Ukraine may terminate the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine prior to the expiration of term, if:
there is a failure to form within one month a coalition of parliamentary factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as provided for in Article 83 of this Constitution;
there is a failure, within sixty days following the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, to form the personal composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine fails, within thirty days of a single regular session, to commence its plenary meetings.

The early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be decided by the President of Ukraine following relevant consultations with the Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and with Chairpersons of Verkhovna Rada parliamentary factions.

The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, that is elected at special elections conducted after the pre-term termination by the President of Ukraine of authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the previous convocation, shall not be terminated within one year from the day of its election.

The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall not be terminated during the last six months of the term of authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or President of Ukraine.

Thus any such early termination would therefore have to be “engineered” to fit – somehow.  Not the ideal way to start a presidency, either in practice or by way of external perceptions any such “engineering” will generate.

If that were not enough, resistance to early RADA elections from currently sitting RADA MPs is assured from almost all quarters except Klitschko’s UDAR and Poroshenko’s Solidarity, as they would be likely to gain numerous MPs at a cost to Batkivshchyna (and Ms Tymoshenko), Svoboda, Party Regions together with assimilating quite a few of the now independent MPs who fled the sinking Party Regions ship as well.

As has already been made clear by Ms Tymoshenko, she will not be working with Petro Poroshenko should he become president.  I have written dozens of times, Ms Tymoshenko is somebody you are allowed to work for, or if you do not work for her, are deemed by default to be working against.  She doesn’t do “work with”.

Logically it follows Ms Tymoshenko, and by extension Batkivshchyna, are not going to be that helpful to any president that is not Yulia Tymoshenko – unless Batkivshchyna either split, which seems quite likely – or retain their unity and  jettison Ms Tymoshenko – which is less likely.

It follows having “lost Crimea” and still extremely politically weak after the actions and revelations of Viktor Yanukovych and closest cohorts, that Party Regions will lose MPs.  Thus it will also not be keen for any new RADA elections.  The Communists likewise – if they have not already been lustrated into oblivion.

Many now independent MPs will also be somewhat shy of new elections with no party backing and no party keen to accept some of them.

In the current situation, regardless of constitutional amendments, few would put it beyond Ms Tymoshenko in gathering together 40 or so votes within the current RADA to join forces with the existing number of Batkivshchyna MPs in order to create an “anti-president” majority.   She could count on assistance – and money to buy off “independents” – behind the scenes from Andrie Portnov and Viktor Medvedchuk.  Her biggest threat to such a plan is an ever growing chance of a split within Batkivshchyna.

How many MPs can Poroshenko entice into his ranks to prevent an anti-president RADA?  Quality MPs like Mykola Tomenko have already joined him from Batkivshchyna – but he needs numbers.

To further complicate matters, it remains to be seen what constitutional amendments have been sent to the Venice Commission, and what their comments and recommendations will be.  That some powers and authority will move from president to parliament seems a forgone conclusion – but which, how many, and to what degree remains unknown.

Such is the snake pit of entirely feckless politicians in the RADA, should the Prime Minister effectively become the most powerful political office when constitutional amendments are made – deals between Ms Tymoshenko and anybody who will support her – at whatever cost – in returning her to that position are almost certain – and we then go full circle to the 2005 – 2010 era of presidential-prime ministerial in-fighting should she be successful.

It seems less than ideological, ethical or moral forces will once again combine – one way or another – to form yet another feckless majority in the RADA.

 

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One comment

  1. Perhaps the situation will depend upon just how many votes she gets. If she does very badly then will her power which is based on her popularity count not decrease and rats start leaving the ship etc? On the other hand if her vote holds up and in the worst case is more than expected then……



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