Enhancing public support for the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement – FCO Report

Today I have very little to say, as I want to draw attention to the work of chaps at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office together with HM Embassy Kyiv under the imaginatively titled “A blueprint for enhancing understanding of and support for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement including DCFTA in Ukraine“

It is also available in Ukrainian - Угода про асоціацію ЄС – Україна: дослідження обізнаності цільових груп та стратегія комунікаційної кампанії - a title just as lengthy as in English!

It is a very interesting read that will go a long way to questioning the predispositions of some relating to the Ukrainian public desire to head West (or East).

I could go on and on but I won’t – have a read, it will be worth it.

Human Rights – The US Magnitsky List

A very short post today because I am decorating the balcony – the weather is good enough and the good lady’s “lobbying” has eventually ground me down into compliance!

It also has nothing to do with Ukraine (at least directly or currently).

However, there has been a lot in the press in the build up to – and subsequent release of – The US Magnitsky List.

The US public release was naturally followed by a public Russian list of US officials also considered to be “human rights abusers” ranging from those involved in Guantanamo, those involved  in”enhanced interrogation techniques” and legal opinion allowing it, to the Victor Bout prosecution.

Indeed an expected Russian response.

However, if we are to presume that human rights are at the core of the US Magnitsky law and list, then there is one very poignant question to be asked -

Will it advance human rights in any way whatsoever in Russia?

With Russia responding with nothing more than a list of its own as expected, quite obviously the answer is clearly not!

Therefore was it a policy driven by human rights – or a policy driven by other motives considering the very predictable short, medium and long term outcomes?

For certain human rights within Russia will gain nothing from the US Magnitsky Law or list, regardless of the real or perceived motivation behind them – in fact the effects are likely to be sadly quite counterproductive.

Great expectations? – Errr No! (EU/Ukraine summit)

OK, having employed a Dickens title within this post title, I will now quote from a Tale of Two Cities – just to keep you Dickens fans on your toes.

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

And so it is with Ukraine both domestically and further afield.

On 25th February, Ukraine and the EU have a summit.  Summits when they occur usually like to produce signed agreements to show they were worthwhile in the eyes of a usually disinterested or politics weary public who foot the bill for such events.

Signed agreements are a politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and occasionally diplomats way of apparently justifying such events to anybody who will listen.

So what of the EU/Ukraine summit?  Well if anything gets signed, it will be a case having “something” to sign – anything – so whist they disagree and make very little headway over these serious and complex issues, they did agree on these minor and irrelevant points- and signed an agreement to prove it – despite its irrelevance and despite such agreements would otherwise be signed by far lesser beings than Presidents.

This undoubtedly will be the case on 25th February – at least as far as signed agreements go.

Of far more significants, is what headway if any, will be made over the issues that are difficult (for one side or the other), that do have entrenched positions, and that have publicised those positions to the extent that there is very little wiggle room for any party in either  re-framing demands, or accepting some form of movement – but not quite enough.

Can we realistically have great expectations from the next EU/Ukrainian summit that will take relations forwards to the satisfaction of both sides?  I very much doubt it.

What I expect, aside from the signing of a few agreements of irrelevance, is the search for wiggle room on both sides in order to make some progress, possibly enough, to make the signing of the EU DCFTA and AA documents a reality in November.

Certainly there will not be anything like the significant movement to make ratification of those signed agreements possible this year or next – and even if there were – ratification is still unlikely due to elections in the European Parliament and Germany to name but two where the outcomes of which may have significant implications for ratification.

Ergo anybody with a modicum of sense will know that there will have been a presidential election in Ukraine in 2015 before ratification of this agreement even becomes close to reality, or another attempt to muster the political will on either side is found to try and sign it again – no matter what happens in Vilnius in November this year.

The question is then only whether Ukraine will stand firm against the ever increasing Russian pressure it is under.

Whatever diplomatic and political wriggle room remains, will be a precious thing indeed to both sides for this forthcoming encounter in preparation for November.  Look not to the fluff that may be signed, but the the efforts of the staff in the boiler rooms to expand and exploit any wiggle room within both entities as November moves ever closer.

How best to play the interests verses values matrix with such overt Russian pressure as a complicating factor?

Thus we must also watch the hand of the Kremlin as it attempts to win this geopolitical battle – if not by getting Ukraine to join the Customs Union, then by at the very least, forcing it to abandon the EU – or the EU to abandon Ukraine – temporarily or permanently.

Can enough wiggle room be found within the EU/Ukrainian camps to allow for signing if the specter of Moscow’s shadow looms too great – regardless of progress?

We will soon find out – but not on 25th February.

Prophetic and too hopeful – A reassessment of an earlier post “5+2 Lviv meeting – Frozen Conflict progress?”

Only six days ago, I wrote this entry entitled “5+2 Lviv meeting – Frozen Conflict progress?“

It relates to a conversation I had with several people over lunch from Moldova and Ukraine in Odessa, and the prospects of some positive momentum in the protracted issues on the Ukrainian border between Moldova and Trasnistria.

Two days ago, I received an email from a reader drawing my attention to the very last line of that entry – “assuming the Moldavian government can hold it together that long! ” – Something quite prophetic considering within the last six days, we have indeed seen the Moldavian government collapse.

The question in the email was simply how did I know?  The simple and honest answer is I didn’t know – but given the amount of political turmoil Moldova forever seems to find itself in, it appeared to be a caveat worthy of inclusion regardless of the chances of any collapse occurring before the Lviv 5+2 meeting.

Thus prophetic I am not – wise enough to consider any possible collapse and include in the entry, well maybe so.

To prove just how blind to the future I am, I would suggest you, dear readers, take a moment to reread the above entry via the link, and then read what I am about to write – which will probably bring my rather hopeful post crashing back down to reality with an unceremonious and rather abrupt bump.

Firstly, despite the glee of the Moldavian Communist opposition party at the collapse of the pro-EU ruling coalition, does the government’s collapse actually change the position of Moldova relating to Transnistria?  After all, it was still an issue for the Communists when they were in power in Moldova – despite both the Communists and the leadership of Transnistria having a prima facie preference for the Kremlin rather than the EU.

That said, as the EU will be very unwilling to have Moldova enter its ranks with an on-going protracted conflict -  (lessons learned from the Cypriot entry one hopes) – thus the real political will to resolve the issue under Communist rule may very well have be missing despite any rhetoric.

None of that however, seems equal to the very recent and significant spanner that Russia has seemingly thrown into the works – undoubtedly with the limited real purpose – in part – of insuring Ukraine fails to achieve what is one of its headline OSCE chairmanship issues – progress in the OSCE regional frozen conflicts.

One more stick to beat Ukraine with and cause international embarrassment in failing to make progress with a Ukrainian nominated headline OSCE issue.

What is the said spanner I write of?  Well, as I wrote in the afore linked post, there were issues I was not prepared to write about – then.  Some I considered too sensitive.  However with the subsequent fall of the Moldavian government a few days ago and where that leaves the Lviv 5+2 talks, it seems right to enlighten readers on one or two matters.

Russia has tried, with no success, to open a Russian consulate in Transnistria historically.  Something that would have complicated matters greatly as it would at the very least, diplomatically and politically be an overt recognition of Transnistria’s absolute autonomy from Moldova by Russia.

Now, not to be defeated, Russia has a different plan which will be equally as problematic when it comes to any solution other than, at the very least, the absolute autonomy of Transnistria.

The Transinistria government has property within the capital of Moldova, Chisinau.  It has given a small building to the Russian government who plan to open what is in effect going to be a consulate on what will probably be seen as Trasnistrian soil in the Moldavian capital.

This office is due to officially open, I now understand, at the end of the month and at least four Russian diplomats are already in place with the express aim of creating parity between Transistrian and Russian laws and regulations.

Thus it is quite clear that any hopeful scribblings I wrote only a week ago, are very likely to turn to dust as Russia sets out to scuttle any form of progress – and indeed probably complicate matters further – in what undoubtedly is in whole or in part, a deliberate sabotaging (one of many, and likely to increase in force and number this year) of Ukrainian policies, for refusing the Customs Union and still loudly shouting pro-EU rhetoric – even if that all turns to dust before November’s Vilnius summit – and it may very well turn to dust too!

Another summit with no progress, together with the collapse of the pro-EU coalition government is also likely to have implications for the signing of a DCFTA between the EU and Moldova.

Russia, it would appear, has, and is taking, the opportunity to undermine and increase pressure on two FSU nations who, currently at least, continue to make favourable pro-EU statements about their direction rather than favourable statements about heading into the Customs Union.

That Russian pressure will only increase between now and November for both Ukraine and Moldova.  It’s going to be a long, diplomatically and politically fraught summer in this part of Europe for sure!

Lviv 5+2 meeting – Frozen conflict progress?

Well – I’ve just had a fairly interesting lunch with a very interesting group of people.

As is fairly well known, on 18th and 19th February the next 5 + 2 (Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, EU and USA) members will sit down again and try to gain some moment towards a resolution of the current frozen conflict that has existed since 1992 between Moldova and Transnistria.

Thus far it has been a very long and arduous road that has been traveled with precious few results.

With Ukraine currently holding the chairmanship of OSCE and being a guarantor in the 5 + 2 process, much stands to be gained for Ukraine on the international stage should there be tangible progress – and to be honest any tangible progress given the severe lack of results since 1992, will be worthy of note.

So what are the chances of anything worthy of note happening now?

Well, somewhat to my surprise, it appears that there is likely to be agreement to open the Guru Bicului bridge between the two regions, as well as direct and hopefully frequent inter-parliamentary dialogue between the regional political assemblies – which hopefully will be no bad thing as both will allow for confidence and trust building between both populations by way of free movement, and between authorities of both sides, respective of each action mentioned above.

It also appears that both the Prime Minister of Moldova and the leader of Transnistria have agreed to have a joint meeting on the margins of the summit, instigated by Ukraine, with the OSCE representative for conflicts.

These were not the only noteworthy issues we discussed, but they are the only ones I am prepared to write about – for now – as these are probably the least sensitive and most overtly easy to note for on-lookers from the public domain as/when/if they become a reality.

If they do become reality, considering we are only 2 months into the Ukrainian 2013 OSCE chairmanship,  it represents a very good start indeed.

Let’s hope for positive action, and not just media spin, emerging from Lviv next week – assuming the Moldavian government can hold together that long!

IMF arrive in Ukraine on the heels of a $7 Billion bill from Russia

Well this should be an interesting week.

Russia slaps Ukraine with a well timed $7 Billion bill for unused and unwanted gas within the contractual parameters of the awful deal crafted by Ms Tymoshenko, rumours are rife of a Ukrainian default on foreign debt this year (and let’s be honest, any debt payment rolled over or delayed is indeed a default on the original agreement), and the IMF has rolled into town with the same demands including the of raising gas tariffs to an impoverished population and sluggish less than competitive industry by 50%.  (That would be another 50% after the last 50%.)

Naturally Ukraine is not keen on paying Russia the $7 Billion it contractually owes.  Neither is it keen on raising the gas prices for its population or export producing industries to please the IMF.  Rumours of Ukrainian default to foreign debt holders will simply drive the cost of external borrowing through the roof via traditional sources.

Very difficult for any of those involved in any of the negotiations with any external party – not that any of those that make the press statements are likely to have been directly involved in such difficult discussions.

Very grim – but there is always the calculating Chinese to sell or rent what is left of the family silver to……which I touched upon yesterday.

Naturally the EU is publicly mute thus far.

 

Update!:  Rumour has it that on 30 January, Naftagaz has borrowed $5.9 billion from Delta Bank to deal with the Russian gas bill, with the bank profit being $240 million.  Who owns Delta Bank these days?

Developments in the Transnistra frozen conflict?

Here is an interesting little tweet from Sergey Lavrov via the Russian MFA relating to the frozen conflict that is Transistria – a place under 2 hours drive from where I live, and which I have traveled through many times.

“#Lavrov: The 5+2 talks on Transnistria will resume in February. We expect to start discussing the political aspects of a settlement.”

Is the persistent German (more than any other nation or entity involved) direct and indirect influence with Russia having some effect?

Despite a cooling of personal relations between Ms Merkel and Mr Putin, the increasing healthy political, diplomatic and in particular business relations between Russia and Germany of late, across many levels an via many channels, are so obvious that they cannot be ignored.

It is no secret that concessions from both Germany and Russia (sometimes seemingly completely disconnected  to  (but not – as everything is connected if one side wants it to be)  Transnistra have been made over how to move forwards with a Transnistra settlement over the past 2 years.

Something to keep an eye on – a lazy eye that is – a speedy resolution is still very unlikely!

A purging of the pro-EU Ministers or a significant ideological split?

Smart readers will recall I wrote this at the beginning of November relating to “Who’s in and who’s out?” – It was aimed specifically at Valery Khoroshkhovsky and Poroshenko.

By 16th December, Khoroshkhovsky resigned from the Ukrainian government as I had predicted, citing the returning of Mykola Azarov to the position of Prime Minister as the reason.

As I wrote in that post “For now it is Khoroshkovsky and Poroshenko to keep a watchful eye on…..” – and that remains the case – but also we should now look to those close to Khoroshkovsky in the year ahead as well.

A quiet, much needed, slow burning. internal revolution within the PoR may just have started!”

Well, over the weekend, Sergiy Tigipko has stated he will also not be part of the new Cabinet of Ministers although will remain an MP.

Both Khoroshkovsky and Tigipko are very much front and centre pro-EU Party of Regions heavyweights and very “EU orientated” reformists.

The question is, as a new Cabinet of Ministers is due to be announced within the next 48 hours, will there be many, if any, such “EU orientated” heavyweight reformists left within the next Cabinet of Ministers?

If the likes of Poroshenko also state their desire to leave the cabinet, or are simply not reappointed, the pointed, jabbing internal finger within the Party of Regions relating to all things EU will be severely blunted.

Returning to my point about a “much needed, slow burning, internal revolution withing the PoR”, then it may very well have been quite accurate.

Tigipko’s reasoning for not wanting to remain in the Cabinet of Ministers, as stated by him live on national television is “Now it’s very important for the Regions Party to deal with ideology.”

It seems that the pro-EU and pro-Russian elements within the Party of Regions are about to lock horns in what may be a very slow, painful and ultimately disastrous battle for the PoR  – the pro-EU heavyweight reformists making their positions quite clear by removing themselves from the highest offices in the land, one by one.

It could be quite an interesting year ahead should genuine ideology catch on within the Party of Regions.  Two very distinct camps will emerge, both with some serious money and very public figures within them championing their respective causes!