Extremist Ukrainian Bratsvo Party to train Russian activists

Well here is an interesting article that states the extremist Ukrainian Bratsvo Party will train Russian activists in Ukraine this summer.

The Bratsvo Party agenda being the break up of the Russian Federation by organising the peripheral and anti-Moscow States and youth with training camps focusing upon civil disobedience, battling law enforcement, agitation and propaganda – not to mention “the theoretical foundations of Russian autonomy” and the “theology of the Russian Autonomous Church”.

Blimey – I wonder how many disenfranchised Russians will turn up!

It’s probably better I not hold my breath to see any effective results from the Bratsvo Party plan, and am wiser waiting for Putinism without Putin – a time that will eventually arrive – to watch the Russian Federation possibly fray at the periphery.

Still, always interesting to keep an eye on what the ultra far right nationalists are doing.

Death of the EaP if Vilnius is a disaster?

Following on nicely from yesterday’s post, and in particular from the below paragraph,  I was asked via an email from a reader, whether I thought a disastrous EU/EaP summit would be the death of the EaP project.

“One wonders whether the initialing of this document will take place at the EaP Vilnius Summit simply so the EU can come away claiming to have had some form of success in November should Ukrainian-EU documents fail to be signed thus preventing them going forth into years of ratification wilderness.”

My answer is no it will not be the final nail in the EaP coffin – I really don’t think a final nail will ever come – though policy and strategy may change from those currently in place.

It appears EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, is of the same opinion when it comes to the demise of the EaP project.

After all, when all is said and done – and even in spite of EU failure to walk its own talk on occasion – democracy and democracy promotion is a core theme and collective foreign policy for the EU and its Member States.  Thus from an ideological viewpoint,  it can never entirely walk away from promoting and supporting democracy within the EaP nations – particularly those that sit within feckless or dominant party democracies, as both states of transition have made the final leap to full and liberal democracies historically.

How could the EU walk away from such “transitional democracies” when it attempts to promote democracy in the most autocratic and despotic nations globally that are yet to witness any form of democratic breakthrough – let alone those on its borders with which it is to some degree dependent upon over security issues such as energy, migration, organised crime etc ?

Is it good policy to be seen to abandon transitional democracies – even if they appear stalled – and instead of at least trying to prevent a complete roll-back, wait for democracy to ultimately collapse before trying again?  How would allowing that to happen be viewed, not only by the pressurised democrats within any nation desperate for any and all support they can get, but also by the international community?

What self-pronounced democracy promoting entity wants to be seen walking away from the fight – especially one on its doorstep?

So, a disastrous Vilnius Summit or not, the EaP project to support democracy and democracy promotion will continue – in on guise or another – for the EU has few other “value” choices, despite any rhetoric to the contrary.

Human Trafficking training – Ukraine

I find myself heartened somewhat by a Ukrainian government policy!

As chair of OSCE, yesterday Ukraine called for a joined-up, comprehensive strategy and legislative foundation to combat the totally abhorrent issue of human trafficking.

As somebody who has a great interest in human trafficking – particularly from/to/through Odessa – I cannot in anyway pooh-pooh such a call.  The EU strategy is fine, but not all OSCE members are EU members and it is an issue that affects the entire continent (like every other continent).  Personally I would be quite happy to see the issue subject to the International Criminal Court (ICC) – but perhaps that bar is set too high given it only deals with the most grievous offences against humanity on a truly massive scale perpetrated by a very select and well known few.

However, whilst I do applaud the quite necessary Ukrainian call for a comprehensive OSCE strategy at an institutional, international – thus by default national – and legislative level,  enforcing and adhering to any such strategy through such mechanisms is but part of the necessary package in such a fight.

Prevention and victim support are also two very necessary accompanying working parts of any such mechanism, deserving of equal attention, financing and awareness campaigns.  In fact, an effective policy would work by prioritising prevention, then protection/victims support and lastly concern itself with prosecution.

Thus, I was further encouraged by the Ukrainian declaration that Ukraine will, forthwith, begin to train border control staff in spotting potential victims – and in many cases they are not difficult to spot.

However, the state institutions and authorities whilst the first line of detection are not and cannot be the be-all and end-all.  For a start, one of the obvious indicators of trafficking is the victim is indeed the fear of the authorities and state institutions.  There are other obvious signs at points of entry and egress – but this is not a training site for the Ukrainian authorities – so there is no need to detail them all.

Just as importantly for a Ukrainian internal strategy is an awareness campaign amongst landlords, hotel staff, medical staff, police, housing authorities, pub, club and bar owners, NGOs and civil society that deal with domestic violence, prostitution, truancy  etc – as well as the general public (similar to the AIDS/STD campaign regularly on Ukrainian television) with a well publicised hot-line to report suspected incidents – or indeed for victims themselves to call if possible – and this is writing in broad brush-strokes without going into the nuts and bolts.

As you can tell I can go on and on with regards to creating and implementing an effective human trafficking strategy and awareness campaign – and I feel as though I am starting to go on and on – so I will stop.

Anyway, something positive from the government of Ukraine both on an international and domestic level for a change!

 

Momentum in the release of Tymoshenko?

I have written several times about the possible release of Tymoshenko – and more specifically the timing and implications of doing so over the past few months, speculating that thee summer RADA recess would be a realistic time if it were to happen at all prior to the Vilnius summit.

It seems that others are also are speculating now, at a slightly later date in September – based upon comments from within the EU and Ukraine recently.

It is not secret that the electoral law and prosecutors code are on the RADA timetable for September for amendment in line with the EU normative, all current cases against Tymoshnko officially are “stopped” (if not closed), leaving the issue of Tymoshenko’s incarceration as a stumbling block for signatures to be exchanged in Vilnius as planned.

In short, the statements quoted in the article to form this theory add up to the old idea of releasing Tymoshenko on the grounds of ill health and sending her to Germany for treatment.  All the statements do give some plausibility to this political maneuvering.

However – for this to occur, it still needs the goodwill of Tymoshenko to agree.  Needless to say there are no statements from Tymoshenko that infer her agreement or otherwise.  That said it is doubtful that Tymoshenko would jeopardise the signing of the documents in Vilnius when she so ardently supports it – whether she is released or not.

Perhaps the bigger question, should she enter voluntary exile to facilitate these political maneuvers is just how long she would remain in Germany for treatment?  If released at the end of September, one would presume she would remain in Germany until after the signing of the AA in November if for no other reason than to add credibility to the seriousness of her illness in the eyes of the public and global audience.

It maybe she will be sent for treatment and not released officially, thus claiming asylum in Germany whilst there, but I do not think she would go for such a deal and neither would the EU – despite the rhetoric relating to the aspirations of 46 million Ukrainians being sacrificed at the alter of the Tymoshenko case, not to mention facilitating the rebuilding of the USSR under another name, as some within the EU frame the issue, should signatures not occur in November.

The next question, should this all play out as the linked article believes, is what will happen to the United Opposition upon her return?  So polarising and so destructive a force is she, that it seems unlikely they would remain “united” for very long should she try to reenter opposition politics as a major decision making figure – and her ego would not allow any other type of entry.

Anyway – an interesting article that is at least plausible when built around the recent statements made.

So whether I am right having stated the beginning of September – or not at all – or others are right in stating her release will occur by the end of September is a matter of splitting hairs.  It seems we agree that September is the month to watch for any finale in relation to Tymoshenko prior to Vilnius.

A step in the right direction – Law 2901 signed by President

Law 2901 relating to a major shift in transparency amongst leading public officials – from the President down – and their families – was signed yesterday by President Yanukovych.

Whether or not RADA MPs actually knew what they voted through last month for presidential signature I’m not sure – most of the time I strongly suspect many do not even read the laws they are voting for or against, sticking firmly to the tribal stance their party takes over any particular proposed legislation.

Sad, but probably true!

Thus, Law 2901 – very similar to Bill 2837 and 2082 submitted by the opposition – comes into force and presents major changes to the declarations of leading public officials.  I understand from Anatoly Gritsenko (Batkivshchyna Party) competing Bills with very similar content will now be withdrawn by the opposition.

Significantly, Law 2901 now proscribes that not only state appointees and their immediate families living with them must make declarations of income and expenditure – but also immediate family from great-grandfather through the generations to great grandchildren, whether they live with the official or not.

Thus the days of signing over assets to trusted loved-ones within the immediate families of public and state officials to avoid scrutiny are now over.  A little more cleverness is going to be needed to hide assets and incomes.

Importantly, the Hryvnia sum of what must be declared has been radically reduced from UAH 150,000 down to UAH 80,000.  Logically the smaller the sum exempt from declaration, the greater the scrutiny.

Lastly, and what makes me think that many RADA MPs will have voted along party lines and not have read what they voted through, is a matter of public transparency.  Henceforth, a unified State Register relating to declarations of public and state officials will be compiled and open to the public – with all changes to, and declarations from those who must now do so, being published within 3 days of submission.

Naturally, I am not so deluded as to think this will make significant changes to the level of corruption that occurs within the political and state appointed elites – but it will make things a little more difficult than they have been to date – and that can only be a good thing.

GOPAC Ukraine

Heavens – Here is Lesya Orobets MP, going slightly overboard when stating the effect on corruption a new Ukrainian branch of “Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption - GOPAC” will bring.  Welcome as it undoubtedly is – it is no panacea when it comes to Ukrainian corruption.  If it were, then it would have cured corruption in all the other nations in which it is already active – but it hasn’t.

Quite simply corruption cannot be eradicated in Ukraine – or anywhere else – but it can be made far more difficult to accomplish and thus controlled by creating coalitions for reform from below and within civil society, from within the political elite themselves, from above via government leadership and from without via the international community.

To raise expectations that GOPAC will have a significant impact upon Ukrainian corruption is to raise them far beyond the limits GOPAC has proven to have.

The facts are simple.  Independent Ukraine has been thoroughly corrupt within the political elite, business elite and state institutional hierarchy since the USSR collapsed.

The unfortunate, then President Kravchuk in 1991, was rather rudely thrown the very difficult problems of transitions to democracy, retaining the rule of law,  initiating horizontal accountability and all the other things that took many European nations hundreds of years, occasional civil wars and several attempts at democracy to successfully achieve – and events overtook Kravchuk’s ability to do much about any of them.

Thus events solidified corrupt relationships during the Kuchma years of dominant party politics, and continued unashamedly under the feckless politics Yushenko/Tymoshenko and on-going Yanukovych years.

It really doesn’t matter whether we identify the obvious cronyism that has miraculously turned the current president’s eldest son into the richest dentist on the planet, whether we identify the corrupt relationship between Lazarenko and Tymoshenko earning her the title “gas princess”, or a UDAR party list full of long-in-the tooth MPs such as Edward “six zeros” Gurvitz, once mayor of Odessa.  Not withstanding the current grubby little deals on-going between the opposition parties as to who gets to access what trough if they manage to regain power – Corruption is pervasive and endemic amongst the entire Ukrainian political class, respecting no party lines.

Ever since Ukrainian independence arrived, it has been, and remains, a predatory state run by a feckless political class.

When Putman described the predatory state in “Making Democracies Work” he stated “Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, political participation is mobilised from above, civic engagement is meager, compromise is scarce, and nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited or unhappy.”

I’m not sure his description missed anything in respect of Ukraine 1991 – 2013 (and counting).

When looking at some of the key features of a predatory state,  such as the government generating private goods for rulers, families, cronies, ruling party, security apparatus through a vertical patron-client relationship – and not public goods for development – low trust in public institutions, opportunistic and cynical decisions made against short-term horizons, a weak civil society undermined further by a lack of trust and ties amongst its horizontal counterparts – it is hard to argue Ukraine has ever been anything other than predatory during its recent history.

So just how much effect on that can GOPAC have?  Despite Ms Orobets overtures, quite obviously it will have limited impact, at most adding a strong player to civil society that has a political reach further than most.  A small bonus for those trying to enforce some vertical accountability, and a little additional weight to external accountability.

GOPAC will do nothing to address the two core issues that would have a tremendous effect upon corruption.  The first being the political will of the political elites themselves to actually deal with the issue effectively – thus asking turkey’s to vote for Christmas – and secondly in the absence of that political will,  it cannot create institutionalised (both overlapping/reciprocal oversight or independent ) horizontal state agencies to hold the vertical to account.

Until that happens, the only accountability available relating to the vertical is the chance of changing one corrupt leadership and political party for another every few years via the ballot box.

In short Ms Orobets, look not externally for the solutions to the problem, look to yourself and your colleges internally, as whilst external crutches maybe welcome, the fixing of the Ukrainian problem can only be done from within.

New domestic geographical regions for Ukraine? What determines new boundaries?

Following on from yesterday’s post relating to reforms in local governance, this article appeared in Дело with a proposal from Party of Regions MP Sergei Grinevetsky to reduce the current 24 Ukrainian regions down to 8 – quoting unnamed scientists having stated this would be the best way forwards.

(Oh yes, Ukrainian politicians are like all other politicians globally when it comes to quoting unnamed scientists and unnamed scientific papers to the media in order to add the appearance of academic support for their views.)

The proposed new regions would be:

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea – Donetsk Region (Donetsk and Luhansk) – the Carpathian Region (Lviv, Ivano Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia) – Kyiv Region (Kyiv, Kirovograd, Cherkassy, Chernogov) – Podolsky Region (Vinnitsia, Khmelnytsky, Ternopil region) – Polessky region (Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr region) – Dnieper region (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia region) – Black Sea region (Odessa, Kherson, Mykolaiv region) – Slobozhanskiy region (Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava region)

The rationale behind it, to provide a clear vertical to the executive (as if the current 24 regional governors don’t accomplish that) – consolidation of monetary and financial resources (bringing real concerns over the equalisation of funding between major cities in a particular region) – reducing bureaucracy and therefore corruption (although as the bureaucratic system will not change even if those who administer it sit in a different building, I’m not sure how it will reduce bureaucracy or corruption).

He claims it will also increase the optimisation of inter-regional links and strengthen them (by creating cross cutting cleavages as it is known in political science one presumes), it will miraculously reduce the number of depressed areas (because 8 regional heads are better than 24 at dealing with this issue?) thus reducing the socio-economic gaps in development.

It all appears to be purely and simply based on ease of administration, and nothing considered relating to the  opportunities the redrawing of regional geography can provide – thus it is entirely flawed from any other perspective other than making life easy for “the administration” of whomever is in power.

Now there is much to be said when it comes to political power structures and the number of geographical regions within a nation as scholars such as Lijphart, Horowitz, Lipset, Sklar and Dahl (to name but a few) have written – and there are broadly two schools of thought when it comes to breaking down regional polarising identifiers necessary for a tolerant society.  There is the Lijphart school of thought, of which I am not a fan – and there is the Horowitz school of thought, to which I am much more sympathetic.

If the Ukrainian internal geopolitical landscape is to be redrawn, there are several challenges to meet if the opportunity is to be fully grasped – and with due respect to Sergei Grinevetsky and his unnamed scientists, the proposed new regions fail to address three critical dimensions as well as they could – and probably should.

The proposed new borders do not address the political need to create new cross cutting cleavages (and thus create  more than one identity for people in the new regions founded upon their individual numerous diverse interests).  The political and ethnic orientated (and much written about) east/west divide in Ukraine is simply not addressed.  The economic geographical realities are not dispersed and inclusive enough for the same reason – and a growing and visible middle class is necessary for any democracy.  By failing to be more creative and mixing up the political, social and economic dimensions of Ukrainian life when drawing new borders, there is no initiative to generate more inclusive institutions that create compromise.

Neat lines on the map are not what is required to gain, consolidate and develop a tolerant democratic society – whether it be from the top, down – or the bottom, up.  If it is necessary to create a messy jigsaw of varied and uneven pieces to break up the current polarity where the opportunity arises – so be it.

Why not put Odessa with Vinnitsia, Mykolaiv and Kirovograd with whom it has land borders, but very different political, social and economic biases?  Why not divide Ukraine horizontally top, middle and bottom?  Or Diagonally?  Why not divide it north and south bisecting the current east/west divide?  If 8 regions is the magic number (which it isn’t) – why not 8 regions running north to south, insuring every region includes cities, urban and rural demands with both orange and blue political centres in each region, insuring everything is done in shades of purple?

Does society as a whole benefit in the long term from a blue regional administration sitting very comfortably in a blue region, or an orange administration in an orange region – or does it benefit more from either a blue or orange administration sitting far less comfortably in a purple region, whereby inclusiveness and compromise are necessary to enjoy more broad based support and get thing done that are mutually desired by all?

Why not complicate the patriarchal regional fiefdoms as much as possible given the chance?  Why not make it harder for them to function by mixing up the constituencies in which they are used to working?

Why change it at all if there is no obvious attempt to maximise the long term democratic outcome for social development and inclusiveness?

In short, in this proposal of new regional borders, there is no attempt at diversification from the current political regional tribalism – and as Sklar noted, “tribalism is a mask for class privilege“, by which he meant it is in political interests to retain areas of political tribalism to insure a politician rises to the top based upon the divisions of society, rather than any attempt at inclusiveness.

Horowitz states something similar when he states “Parties that begin merely by mirroring divisions help to deepen and extend them.”  - Where exactly, do the newly proposed borders fail to mirror the existing divisions?

I see nothing within the proposed borders that will create cross-cutting cleavages outside of the east/west divide in any significant way.  In fact the new borders proposed solidify the current regional biases rather than diversify them.

It would be interesting to know just what field the scientists to which  Sergei Grinevetsky refers come from, and perhaps more specifically what the parameters surrounding their recommendations where.  Purely economic?  Purely social?  Purely political?

Purely for administrative ease to the cost of a great opportunity seems most likely!

A decentralising of power to local government by Yanukovych?

Now here is an interesting entry on the President of Ukraine website - a decentralising of every day democratic powers in line with the Ukrainian Law of Self Government 1997 and the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ratified by Ukraine in 1998) – which naturally enough, whilst existing on paper, have never actually been implemented by any Ukrainian government.

Needless to say, the poorly written Constitution of Ukraine indeed puts hurdles (relevant Articles within Chapters 9,10 and 11 are conflicting with Chapter 6 for example) in the way of implementation, even if there has ever been the political will to implement the laws of Ukraine relating to local self-governance or upholding its obligations under the ECLSG.

In 2004 a constitutional review highlighted the issues but nothing was done.  In 2009 a half-hearted attempt by the then government to reconcile these issues was pooh-poohed severely by Council of Europe and thus those half-baked amendments were quietly abandoned.  In March 2012, the Council of Europe supported a new draft of amendments due to be implemented between 2013 and 2015.

Thus almost 20 years after identifying legislative issues preventing a far more democratic local self-government to the degree most of the EU would recognise, very little has been achieved.  In fact nothing has been achieved other than getting an approving nod from the Council of Europe over the current proposed amendments – so it is with interest that there now seems to be some momentum, particularly in respect of Articles 118 and 119 as identified by the presidential website.

All jolly good, although Articles 118 and 119 are but the tip of the iceberg within the conflict between constitution and law surrounding Ukrainian local governance  – but – it still all seems very unclear as to what, exactly, these proposals will amount to.

Ideally, if local governance and constitutional conflict are to be addressed then it should be carried out completely rather than in-part.  The whole point would be to deliver both legal mechanism but also legal and institutional clarity – both of which are currently either lacking, blurred or conflicting.

To start with, identifying a unified concept of local authority and giving a constitutional basis for the legal protection of local government would seem a very basic but good idea.  To have effective local government there needs to be a legal financial basis that insures the State provides some form of equalisation between local governments and insuring a basis for the development of local democracy.  Some form of legally established and protected tiering of levels of government, their accountability and responsibilities and the formation of councils within communities, cities, regions etc. – A legal defining of their key functions and limitations.

I could go on and on, but to do so would probably require changes to 50% of the Constitutional Articles that deal with local self-governance – so what’s the point?

I have written that this is going to decentralise power – and that is true to a degree.  However whilst it certainly would decentralise responsibility of local issues to local regional governors it must be remembered that regional governors are actually appointed by the President after consultations with the Cabinet – they are not elected.

That said, their daily involvement with city mayors and administrations varies greatly from governor to governor, city to city and town to town and the elected mayors, local councils etc will all have far greater autonomy, responsibility and accountability if the nod from the Council of Europe is to be read as meeting an acceptable democratic normative.

Thus just how far this therefore decentralises power – rather than decentralising responsibility and accountability – is a very subjective issue given the President is still responsible for the hiring and firing of regional governors who will be responsible in controlling more liberated city halls.

However, regardless of existing laws and undertakings to European Charters – does it not serve the centre to decentralise responsibility and accountability to the periphery anyway?  After all if things go badly wrong in one region of the periphery, is it not far easier to deal with it out there and in isolation, without it necessarily infecting other peripheral regions or the centre itself, due to centralisation unnecessarily drawing itself into every scandal?

Anyway, lets see what happens in the next year or so relating to increased autonomous local self-governance, responsibility and accountability.  Social policy is bound to have a significant impact on the presidential elections in 2015, and a shift towards more accountable local self-government and autonomy is not likely to lose any votes.