A step in the right direction – Law 2901 signed by President

Law 2901 relating to a major shift in transparency amongst leading public officials – from the President down – and their families – was signed yesterday by President Yanukovych.

Whether or not RADA MPs actually knew what they voted through last month for presidential signature I’m not sure – most of the time I strongly suspect many do not even read the laws they are voting for or against, sticking firmly to the tribal stance their party takes over any particular proposed legislation.

Sad, but probably true!

Thus, Law 2901 – very similar to Bill 2837 and 2082 submitted by the opposition – comes into force and presents major changes to the declarations of leading public officials.  I understand from Anatoly Gritsenko (Batkivshchyna Party) competing Bills with very similar content will now be withdrawn by the opposition.

Significantly, Law 2901 now proscribes that not only state appointees and their immediate families living with them must make declarations of income and expenditure – but also immediate family from great-grandfather through the generations to great grandchildren, whether they live with the official or not.

Thus the days of signing over assets to trusted loved-ones within the immediate families of public and state officials to avoid scrutiny are now over.  A little more cleverness is going to be needed to hide assets and incomes.

Importantly, the Hryvnia sum of what must be declared has been radically reduced from UAH 150,000 down to UAH 80,000.  Logically the smaller the sum exempt from declaration, the greater the scrutiny.

Lastly, and what makes me think that many RADA MPs will have voted along party lines and not have read what they voted through, is a matter of public transparency.  Henceforth, a unified State Register relating to declarations of public and state officials will be compiled and open to the public – with all changes to, and declarations from those who must now do so, being published within 3 days of submission.

Naturally, I am not so deluded as to think this will make significant changes to the level of corruption that occurs within the political and state appointed elites – but it will make things a little more difficult than they have been to date – and that can only be a good thing.

GOPAC Ukraine

Heavens – Here is Lesya Orobets MP, going slightly overboard when stating the effect on corruption a new Ukrainian branch of “Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption - GOPAC” will bring.  Welcome as it undoubtedly is – it is no panacea when it comes to Ukrainian corruption.  If it were, then it would have cured corruption in all the other nations in which it is already active – but it hasn’t.

Quite simply corruption cannot be eradicated in Ukraine – or anywhere else – but it can be made far more difficult to accomplish and thus controlled by creating coalitions for reform from below and within civil society, from within the political elite themselves, from above via government leadership and from without via the international community.

To raise expectations that GOPAC will have a significant impact upon Ukrainian corruption is to raise them far beyond the limits GOPAC has proven to have.

The facts are simple.  Independent Ukraine has been thoroughly corrupt within the political elite, business elite and state institutional hierarchy since the USSR collapsed.

The unfortunate, then President Kravchuk in 1991, was rather rudely thrown the very difficult problems of transitions to democracy, retaining the rule of law,  initiating horizontal accountability and all the other things that took many European nations hundreds of years, occasional civil wars and several attempts at democracy to successfully achieve – and events overtook Kravchuk’s ability to do much about any of them.

Thus events solidified corrupt relationships during the Kuchma years of dominant party politics, and continued unashamedly under the feckless politics Yushenko/Tymoshenko and on-going Yanukovych years.

It really doesn’t matter whether we identify the obvious cronyism that has miraculously turned the current president’s eldest son into the richest dentist on the planet, whether we identify the corrupt relationship between Lazarenko and Tymoshenko earning her the title “gas princess”, or a UDAR party list full of long-in-the tooth MPs such as Edward “six zeros” Gurvitz, once mayor of Odessa.  Not withstanding the current grubby little deals on-going between the opposition parties as to who gets to access what trough if they manage to regain power – Corruption is pervasive and endemic amongst the entire Ukrainian political class, respecting no party lines.

Ever since Ukrainian independence arrived, it has been, and remains, a predatory state run by a feckless political class.

When Putman described the predatory state in “Making Democracies Work” he stated “Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, political participation is mobilised from above, civic engagement is meager, compromise is scarce, and nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited or unhappy.”

I’m not sure his description missed anything in respect of Ukraine 1991 – 2013 (and counting).

When looking at some of the key features of a predatory state,  such as the government generating private goods for rulers, families, cronies, ruling party, security apparatus through a vertical patron-client relationship – and not public goods for development – low trust in public institutions, opportunistic and cynical decisions made against short-term horizons, a weak civil society undermined further by a lack of trust and ties amongst its horizontal counterparts – it is hard to argue Ukraine has ever been anything other than predatory during its recent history.

So just how much effect on that can GOPAC have?  Despite Ms Orobets overtures, quite obviously it will have limited impact, at most adding a strong player to civil society that has a political reach further than most.  A small bonus for those trying to enforce some vertical accountability, and a little additional weight to external accountability.

GOPAC will do nothing to address the two core issues that would have a tremendous effect upon corruption.  The first being the political will of the political elites themselves to actually deal with the issue effectively – thus asking turkey’s to vote for Christmas – and secondly in the absence of that political will,  it cannot create institutionalised (both overlapping/reciprocal oversight or independent ) horizontal state agencies to hold the vertical to account.

Until that happens, the only accountability available relating to the vertical is the chance of changing one corrupt leadership and political party for another every few years via the ballot box.

In short Ms Orobets, look not externally for the solutions to the problem, look to yourself and your colleges internally, as whilst external crutches maybe welcome, the fixing of the Ukrainian problem can only be done from within.

Insuring failure – Ukrainian opposition

Now if you happen to be the opposition – ergo the minority – in any parliament, it goes without saying that getting the laws you support passed – or those you are against to fail – requires party discipline to insure the maximum turnout at any such vote, as well as erosive lobbying of those within the majority to gain support that goes against their party line.

Very difficult in any parliament and it is certainly not easy in a corrupt and self-serving cesspit  such as the Ukrainian RADA.

I have written previously of the critical and headline votes that the opposition could have won had they the discipline to insure their party members turned up to work as they are paid to do.  However snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is becoming something of an unofficial policy for the “United Opposition”.

After such public leadership and party disciplinary failures that caused the opposition to lose all 4 headline votes in the above link, you would think that thereafter the mandatory attendance of all opposition MPs would have been required by parties when bills they sponsor or support are up for vote.

After all what harm could the occasional victory over the government do for their image and the public perception of their effectiveness – let alone display weakness within the majority coalition occasionally?

And yet, Anatoliy Grychenko, a leader within the United Opposition on the Batkivshchyna Party list, now almost daily decries the fact that party discipline is non-existent, together with party leadership being noticeable by its absence.

Анатолій Гриценко
Опозиція має відрізнятися від влади!

Сьогодні Рада провалила два проекти опозиції. Опозиція допомогла їх провалити.

1) проект 2126 – про зарахування екологічного податку до бюджетів місцевих Рад. Логічний і правильний. Внесла Свобода, Сех. Опозиція активно агітує за підтримку. Голосування: Батьківщина – мінус 30 голосів, УДАР – мінус 15, Свобода – мінус 5 голосів. Разом – мінус 50 голосів!

2) проект 2503 – про охорону тварин і рослин від винищення браконьєрами. Логічний і правильний. Внесла Батьківщина, Томенко. Опозиція активно агітує за підтримку. Голосування: Батьківщина – мінус 42 голоси, УДАР – мінус 16, Свобода – мінус 4 голоси. Разом – мінус 62 голоси.

3) проект 2149 – зараз розглядається. Про адміністративні послуги, теж від опозиції, УДАР, Продан – результат буде аналогічним, а то ще й гіршим, бо в секторі опозиції все більше пустих крісел.

Не може бути виправдання такій недисциплінованості й безвідповідальності депутатів. Сектор влади теж напівпустий, але влада мене менше турбує. Турбує те, що опозиція – діє так само, а мала би задати інший стандарт поведінки. Говорю про це вождям і депутатам майже щодня. По барабану. Біда…

To save you translating, an environmental taxation bill (566) aimed at funneling environmental taxes to local government rather than central government, and vigorously supported by the opposition, failed because 30 Batkivshchyna MPs did not turn up to vote, neither did 15 from UDAR and another 5 from Svoboda.  A total of 50 opposition votes missing from a bill the opposition wanted to pass.

Bill 2503, drawn up by Mikola Tomenko relating to the protection of flora and fauna.  Tomenko is a man who sits amongst the elite of the elite in the Batkivshchyna Party and his bill faired even worse.  Despite his position in the party hierarchy, 40 of his fellow Batkivshchyna MPs, almost all of which his junior in both parliamentary longevity, party position and most importantly political ability, were absent.  Add to this another 16 missing from UDAR and 4 missing from Svoboda and that is a total of 62 opposition votes AWOL for one of their own pieces of legislature up for the vote!

Grychenko rightly summarises that there can be no excuse for such indiscipline and irresponsibility that the United Opposition is consistently displaying – quite rightly.  As he states, complaints about opposition leadership and deputies within are now an almost daily occurrence from within its own ranks.

Fair play to him for stating the obvious- not that the disunity within the opposition is a closely guarded secret.  It is obvious to anybody who cares to look amongst either the leadership, the rank and file, or both.

Leadership-less, discipline-less, rudderless and feckless – As far as the Ukrainian public and EU are concerned, this coalition will once again turn out to be hopeless – whether it regains power or remains in opposition.

So terribly sad that they cannot even muster being an effective opposition, as that would at least assist giving some credibility to any opposition presidential candidate – and whilst Ukraine is no doubt capable of suffering another Yanukovych term, one has to hope it won’t have to.

- And before I am asked who I would prefer to see as the next president of Ukraine – whilst it may read like anybody other than the present incumbent or Yulia Tymoshenko – it’s not – at least not quite.  In no particular order:

Klitschko (UDAR leader) – likely to run and likely to reach the second round if there is one according to current opinion polls

Tomenko (Batkivshchyna) – very unlikely to run which is a shame as he is a very competent politician

Poroshenko (Independent) – may run but will not get the votes his experience deserves

Grychenko (Batkivshchyna) – very unlikely to run as not enough support at the ballot box despite TV popularity in debates

In the unlikely event of an internal Party Regions competitor:

Serhey Tigipko

You see, if I had listed those who I would not want to see as the next president, the likes Yanukovych, Tymoshenko, Tyahnybok, Yatseniuk and the vast majority of each of the parties hierarchy, it would have been a very long list indeed!

A mixed day for the Ukrainian Ministry of Health

A day of contrasts for the Ukrainian Ministry of Health on Wednesday – albeit one with symptoms that runs through the current government.

Firstly and in a move lauded by Human Rights Watch, the decision to approve easier access and dispensing of pain killing drugs such as morphine to terminally ill people was approved.

“This is a major advance, ensuring that Ukraine’s drug policy addresses the legitimate needs for medical opiates for pain relief.  Tens of thousands of patients who are in pain will benefit from this reform.” – Diederik Loham, Human Rights Watch

Some pain relief for a nation all too often decried for its human rights issues.

Thus it should have been a good day for those within the Health Ministry, and in particular the Health Minister Raisa Bogatyryova.

Raisa Bogatyryova

However whilst Human Rights Watch was quite properly lauding the aforementioned decision, the cancer called corruption, a systemic disease that cannot have the pain dulled by morphine, was simultaneously being called to account in relation to the Health Ministry by the RADA.

With the Communist Party unusually siding with the opposition, a vote was taken and passed to create a parliamentary committee and inquiry into corruption within the Health Ministry and opaque purchases of UAH 203.48 million of drugs from certain companies.

One has to strongly suspect that once the biopsy of the opaque drug purchases has been made, more than a hint of corruption will be found in the system of the Health Ministry.

The question then arises over whether the infected parts can or will be efficiently surgically removed and if so, whether remission will be a long lasting result.

Sadly, I fear not!

European Commission takes the next step in allowing for Ukrainian Association

Not at all surprisingly, on Wednesday 15th May, the European Commission took the necessary steps to draw up the documentation allowing for the Commission and Member States to sign the Association Agreement (and DCFTA) during the Vilnius Summit in November.

Such things do indeed take time when 28 nations have to agree to every word, phrase and punctuation mark on any document such as this.  Failing to do this now, and still have all national capitals agree with what is stated in time for November, would be something of an ask considering just how unwieldy the EU machinery is.

Naturally Ukraine is nowhere near dealing with all the issues that the EU institutions have demanded – but it has made some progress and may possibly address in their entirety, or significantly advance, many if not all of them prior to Vilnius in November – possibly to a degree where signing could be accomplished.

That is not withstanding the media headline issue of Ms Tymoshenko, who looks set to still be in prison by November.

The question is really whether the issue surrounding her will prevent any signing.

It is, after all, not that the EU or its Member States consider her innocent – nobody has commented on her guilt or innocence (officially) – but an issue of “selectivity”.

Now, there are those within the EU who feel that the Tymoshenko issue should not prevent the signing of this document – particularly given the year or two (minimum) it will take to ratify throughout all Member States – and thus a political lever of “ratification” can still be used against Kyiv over the Tymoshenko issue.

For example, it is becoming quite clear that influential States such as Poland and Sweden want the agreement signed whether Ms Tymoshenko is in jail or not – and it seems their lobbying on this issue is having some effect in Berlin over recent weeks.

There is also the old problem of interests verses values to consider – and with almost all EU economies in recession once more – and Germany only posting a +0.1% growth rate for the first quarter of 2013, opening up parts of the DCFTA on the basis of a signed agreement (if not ratified) will not do Europe any harm when it comes to easier trade and lower customs tariffs, thus increasing access and lowering prices respectively, with 46 million potential customers.

Will EU economic interests trump EU values as far as Ms Tymoshenko is concerned – even for a percentage point bump in economic fortune?

Is Berlin’s apparent softening due to Swedish and Polish lobbying, or the dire current German economic growth rate – or both?

Will Berlin actually soften enough to allow the signing by November – and how will the German elections in September change matters if at all?

There are also two sides to every “values” coin.  Should Ukraine as a nation be held at arms length over the singular issue of Ms Tymoshenko where it seems likely little progress will be made?  Will the Ukrainian public turn its back on the EU if that happens, considering themselves abandoned by the EU?  What of all the millions of Ukrainians who believe her guilty regardless of the standard of the trial or the selectivity of the prosecution?  The mass mobilisation of the public in her support has been noticeable by its absence.

Even the Untied Opposition, UDAR and Svoboda make only scant reference to her these days – albeit with on eye on the presidential election horizon, one suspects they would see her release as something of a fly in their ointment for several reasons.

It really is quite tough to call regarding the signing – or not – of these documents.  At the moment I am inclined to say they won’t get signed, although it would not take much to tip me over to a more positive view – and if 24 hours is said to be a long time in politics, then 6 months hence is  still too hard to forecast.

Failing to plan or planning to fail? United Opposition

I seem to be consistently critical of the “United Opposition” recently – not because I don’t like them, but because I despair at their lack of policy, lack of planning and lack of strategy.  Not to mention the whitewash over ideological differences that whilst in opposition may make little difference, but when in power will become significant and provide yet another dysfunctional government focused on internal division rather than governance in all probability.

All of these things need to be tackled robustly, quickly and without default to the lowest common denominator between the 3 major “United Opposition” parties.  Failure to do so now, well in advance of a presidential election, will not lead to the confidence needed to bring about a change in president – no matter how bad the incumbent is.

Personally I do not care which political party arrives at sound policy with effective implementation – all that matters is good policy is forthcoming and effectively implemented.

A few days ago I wrote about the “United Opposition” allowing the normal running of the RADA this week as four opposition motions were to be debated:

“The setting of an election date for the position of Kyiv Mayor.

A vote of “No Confidence” in the current government.

The abolition the new pension reforms.

The removal of the Articles of law under which Ms Tymoshenko is currently jailed.”

So far, two days ago, as expected they failed with the setting of a date for the mayoral elections of Kyiv – and with the Constitutional Court still considering the legalities of any delay or not, maybe that is no bad thing.  The court’s answer due no later than July as per the legal time frame allowed .

Nevertheless an unnecessary failure for the “United Opposition” with a Constitutional Court decision pending.  Far better to have tackled the matter once a court decision was known.

Next, when it comes to the vote of “No Confidence” in the current government, UDAR wanted the vote on 17th April (yesterday) and Batkivshchyna on the 19th April (tomorrow) – A sorry state of affairs when two of the three “United Opposition” parties cannot even agree a preferred date on a vote as potentially important as a vote of “No Confidence” in the current government.

However, perhaps the most damning display of failed “United Opposition” planning and strategy was laid bare in the vote relating to pension reform on 17th April (yesterday).  If there is one issue they were most likely to get any kind of result from per their list, pension reform was likely to be it.  It is not that popular amongst the ruling coalition either – though it is necessary.

Thus, whilst I firmly believe the reforms are necessary as the current pension system is simply unsustainable, this was also a matter that the “United Opposition” could have realistically won and come away from the week with a significant result – and significant result they need!

So how did they do?

They managed to garner 223 votes in favour of scrapping the planned pensions reforms.  To have scrapped the planned reforms they needed 226 votes (a RADA majority of one).

Now we may sit back and say it was a valiant effort and they came very close – but that is until we consider the fact that absent from the RADA for this vote were 7 Batkivshchyna MPs, 7 UDAR MPs, 1 Svoboda MP and 4 independent MPs who favour the “United Opposition” in most votes.

Ergo a total of 19 votes likely to have been cast in favour of the “United Opposition” motion to scrap the pension reforms were not cast because the MPs were absent.  Had they been present and voted as anticipated, the “United Opposition” would have scrapped the pension reforms by a fairly comfortable margin.

Having made the RADA unworkable for months in an effort to get these four motions tabled for a RADA vote, you have to ask why were there 19 “United Opposition” absentees from a vote that would have displayed to the public the fact the “United Opposition” are more than ineffective, feckless, window dressing had they won?

How did they not manage to rally all their MPs to be in the RADA for a week when their demands are being voted on?  Especially so on the day a vote on pension reforms occurs that they realistically could have won?

Where is the party discipline?  Where is the “united” discipline?  What sort of leadership allows that many MPs to be absent in a key “United Opposition” parliamentary week?

How do they explain to their supporters (plus the larger public and media) that they failed to scrap the pension reforms because 19 of their own MPs failed to turn up to vote?

Suffice to say, it is nothing short of a political disaster.  A distinct underlining of ineffective leadership and party discipline is laid bare for all to see.

What could have been a golden result for the “United Opposition” has turned out to be an absolute debacle of a magnitude it is difficult to overstate.

The chances of this feckless group getting 0/4 results from their demands must now be considerable – a result now proven to be delivered by their own ineptitude!

Planning and preparation prevents piss-poor performance – the “Rule of P”.

This is certainly an epic illustration of piss-poor performance, thus one can only presume there was either no planning or preparation, or it was ignored – raising serious doubts about the credibility and ability of the three leaders involved, even amongst their own troops.

Very disappointing that a chance of gaining real credibility was so easily squandered!

US Aid 2014 and Ukrainian Feckless Plurality

It seems amongst a total of approximately $88.5 million allocated by the US to aid Ukraine in 2014, $54 million of that is to support democracy and reform.

To quote the US Department of State:

“U.S. assistance [of $54 million to Ukraine] aims to promote the development of a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine, fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community as it struggles to overcome the effects of the global financial crisis and worsening backsliding on democratic reform,” according to the Department of State’s FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary.

The Department of State, in particular, noted that funding would strengthen democratic institutions and processes, and accountable governance, support civil society, independent media, judicial reform, and anti-corruption efforts, improve conditions for investment and economic growth, improve energy security, and help bring the damaged Chornobyl nuclear facility to an environmentally safe and stable condition and properly store its nuclear waste.

 These funds belong to the so-called Economic Support Fund, which the U.S. uses to advance its interests by helping countries “meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs.” 

A big ask indeed.  If all that could be achieved on such funding in Ukraine, the promotion of democracy globally would cost no more than a few dozen drones.

Of course it cannot be achieved on such funding and nobody expects it to be achieved – even with all the pooled funding numerous global actors provide relating to these areas of Ukrainian “democratic development”.  The end game of a consolidated democracy in Ukraine – both vertically and horizontally – is not much closer than it was in 1991 when independence was rudely dumped into the lamp of Ukraine.

If we are to stick to the scholarly terms of “opening” – where democratic opportunity appears and gives chance to replace a previous non-democratic regime, or “breakthrough” where democracy actually replaces the old governance system – often rapidly and normally on that back of a new legal foundation (Constitutions), and lastly “consolidation” whereby the state institutions, civil society, judiciary and all other horizontal democratic institutions are reformed, together with vertical of regular elections and the habitual recognition by society of the rules of democracy, it is quite clear that no democratically elected Ukrainian government has ever got anywhere near achieving the consolidation of democracy – particularly so when it comes to the horizontal.

What Ukraine does have is a rather hollow – or lacking – horizontal which needs to be addressed with far more political will and effort than the issues with the vertical at this moment in time.  Whilst laws addressing these issues may now be getting written, they will be useless unless implemented and monitored both fairly and consistently by an independent and competitive horizontal.

There are few Ukrainian politicians past or present, who would not classify as being part of a rather nicely named scholarly group of “feckless pluralists” – and “feckless pluralism” is certainly where Ukraine would find itself seated in most academics eyes by way of theory definition over the past decade.

Those few which do not would generally fall into the category of “feckless pluralists” would fall into the category  “dominant power” politics whereby the State and the leader/ruling party become almost indistinguishable rather than necessarily clearly defined.  Ex-President Kuchma would probably be the closest to a Ukrainian period where “dominant power” politics prevailed in the 1990s.

Sticking rigidly to scholarly definition, President Yanukovych, despite prima facie efforts to move back towards “dominant power” politics would not manage to fully meet all the necessary theoretical determining markers – Thus it is with a wry smile that I write that he currently remains “feckless”, and with all the other politicians of Ukraine, is  engaged in the “feckless pluralism”.

The definition which so encapsulates Ukrainian politics:

“Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting.  Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of power seems only to trade the country’s problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country.”  Thomas Carothers - End of the Transitional Paradigim, 2002.

What part of feckless pluralism doesn’t fit the Ukrainian political class from 2005 – present?

I doubt Yanukovych will manage to complete a move back to the “dominant power” politics of Kuchma due to internal and external pressure and economic realities, and thus Ukraine swings as a pendulum between absolute fecklessness and fecklessness with a dominant streak – none of which provides anything more than a hollow democracy of sorts, and provides leadership past and present that has not or is not overly interested in, or capable of, moving Ukraine entirely into the solid territory of a consolidated democracy.  All have, or will have a democratic legacy deficit rather than a positive democratic legacy to draw upon when times are hard and democracy is deemed to be failing rather than producing the results society expects.

So it is with more than a little pessimism that I look at the latest US funding announcement when it comes to Ukrainian political Dollar deliverables.

That is not to say that either feckless pluralism or dominant politics cannot move to establish a consolidated democracy – but it takes sustained political will, with oft hard and unpopular work to accomplish – not US$ or Euro when all is said and done.

Schizophrenia, Dissociative Identity Disorder or pragmatism? Ukrainian opposition

What to make of an opposition leadership that submits official resolutions of “No Confidence” in the current Cabinet of Ministers on 22nd March 2013 – and by 3rd April 2013, some 13 days later, post a joint  statement on the Batkivshchyna Party website stating:

“We supported and will support all EU integration laws that were properly prepared and considered, in accordance with the parliamentary procedure, including those submitted by the government, as it was, for example, during the ratification of amendments to the visa facilitation agreement.”

Well, what to think?

That must surely infer that they have some confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers they submitted an official resolution of “No Confidence” against – How can the leaders of opposition parties encourage their parties MPs to vote for government legislation otherwise?

Perhaps it is a less than simple matter of schizophrenia or dissocative identity disorder?

Does the “no confidence” exist only with legislation aimed at solely domestic issues – “confidence” obviously existing in legislation aimed at synchronising with the EU normative as far as the capabilities of the Cabinet of Ministers is concerned?

Of course they are being pragmatic.

They can hardly go against their own joint statement with the ruling PoR, in which they all stated their intention to drag Ukraine towards the EU.  As such they had already committed themselves to support EU normalising legislation from a Cabinet of Ministers they later had “No Confidence” in – but now reaffirm they have confidence in – as far as the EU legislation goes.

However, as I wrote on 24th March relating to the particularly ill-timed submission of the “No Confidence” resolution – “Possibly worse, should this vote of “no confidence” fail – which seems likely – how will the public psyche be affected when it comes to confidence in Yatseniuk and the opposition? To continually indulge in political grandstanding or showboating with few, if any results, eventually will erode further public confidence in the ability of the opposition.”

Since then a few Batkivshchanya MPs have left the party, two of which claimed they were not prepared to support Yatseniuk’s “one-man show”.  Whether that reasoning is true or not is irrelevant.  That is what they have said publicly and will further give the perception of failed political grandstanding and showboating to the point at which MPs are leaving the party – and it is the public perception that counts in politics.

It also seems Yatseniuk is expecting an internal leadership coup within the Batkivshchnya Party.

Further, it is somewhat strange to see a very muted reception on opposition MPs twitter an Facebook accounts relating to the releasing of Lutsenko (as I predicted in February) and Filipchuk.  One could think there there are those within the opposition who are not exactly overjoyed at their release – at least that is the perception their social media accounts infer simply by complete lack of, or little reference to, such a major event for the opposition and EU/Ukrainian relations.

Can voters have confidence in those who demand votes of no confidence, who then less than 2 weeks later, display confidence enough in those they have no confidence in, to state they will vote with them over EU legislation – thus displaying a degree of confidence they apparently do not have in those drafting the legislation?

Especially so after not voting for what would be EU normative legislation only a few days ago?

Is anybody advising the leaders of the opposition – or are they simply jumping from one grandstanding position to another – with few results, and even less consistency?

Perhaps, given the differences between Svoboda, UDAR and Batkivshchyna parties, we should expect nothing less than such a populist, ill-thought out and schizophrenic output.  As Klitschko said only yesterday “UDAR, Batkivshchnya and Svoboda have different ideologies.  However we have one thing in common:  We want to live in a democratic country” – Is one thing in common enough, when inevitably there will be a need to convince the voting public that they are capable of ruling and creating policies they all agree on despite different ideologies that will prevent good policy making?

If there is one lesson to be learned from the Yushenko/Tymoshenko period, it is that democracy requires hard work and hard choices after it puts you in power to cement both veritical and horizontal democratic principle into all walks of government, governmental agencies and society – something that they collectively simply did not do in any shape, form or manner.

I do so wish the opposition would start to form and articulate solid policy that will benefit society and that voters can understand and rally around, instead of consistently showboating which is a policy that is destined to fail more often than not.

However just how possible it would be to align Svoboda social policy with that of UDAR, or Batkivshchnya economic policy with Svoboda or UDAR etc., remains to be seen.  I suspect these issues are deliberately being passed over as they will no doubt become divisive – leaving us with more failing grandstanding to come for the foreseeable future -  in lieu of real policy.

Sooner or later however, they are going to need to convince people they can govern collectively and effectively – and that means agreed policies which they can take to the public.   A return to such dysfunctional governance – or alternatively Yanukovych-lite – is not what Ukraine needs.

Maybe Lutsenko, now he’s been released will provide something like a policy rudder?  We’ll see.