Social matters – Ukraine

One of the key advantages of any political incumbent with elections on the horizon, is the ability to indirectly bribe sections of the community through social policy – slowly but surely – in the run-up to campaigning.

Now 2015 and the next presidential elections may seem far, far away – although as that is all the opposition leaders seem to talk or be bothered about, with the exception of the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU – one maybe forgiven for thinking the election is far closer than it actually is.

Thus with the opposition leadership distracted by the possibility that one day one of them may become president – it is maybe not surprising that two open goals with political points freely available seem to have passed without comment – ridiculous as that may sound to anybody expecting an opposition to hold a majority to account.

After all, they seem determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory at every given opportunity, as I wrote only a few days ago.

And so it has come to pass that a truly woeful piece of legislation has been tabled in relation to a new Labour Code – so woeful that the Social Policy Minister has gone out of her way to underscore just how awful it is to journalists prior to any voting.

On the same day, the Ukrainian Ombudsman for Human Rights has just highlighted that of social cases brought before Ukrainian courts, only 30% of the nations court decisions are actually carried out – meaning that 70% of court decisions relating to social matters therefore fail to protect the human rights of individuals the judgments are there to protect – And most of these cases involve the non-payment of legally guaranteed benefits by the State as the State funds are several UAH billion underfunded.

To any opposition party leaderships that were not preoccupied with egocentric pondering of just how good they would look sat in the Presidential residence, these are golden opportunities to highlight incredibly poor performance by the current majority in the social, legislative and administrative spheres – issues that would have been pounced upon by any functioning opposition leadership immediately these statements were made – in the full knowledge that in the coming 18 months, the current incumbent will begin to use social policy to bribe voters ahead of the elections.

Seriously, if the figures the Ombudsman states are correct, 2 million judgments in 2012 alone, of which 70% go unfulfilled – that is 1,400,000 voters who have failed to get justice from the State, despite court decisions going their way.  That is about 3% of the population – and 3% is a sizable constituency in the zero sum, first past the post, presidential electoral system.

Such figures simply demanded an immediate and robust response from opposition leaders themselves -  rather than any mutterings from underlings.

Maximum opposition impact in relation to these statements with both media and society alike has now passed – another missed opportunity.

The symbolic signing of nothing special

There is much to be said for symbolism.

It can be inspiring, it can be unifying, it can be a moment of hope or defiance that ignites the courage of others – in short, it can have impact.

It can also be completely empty of meaning, condescending, devoid of rationale and ultimately, pointless in the extreme.

And so, 18th May brought to an end the 2 month “Rise Ukraine” strategy of the United Opposition – Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda parties – in Kyiv.

After countless rallies in numerous (opposition friendly) cities drawing crowds of a few thousand people each time – worryingly low numbers if you are an opposition party leader to be blunt – the finale in Kyiv attracted a only few thousands people once again.

I would have expected for 10,000 – 15,000 after months of rallies leading up to a well publicised finale – and even that number would be disappointing.

All the issues I raised in the above link back in March have proven to come to fruition – not that it would take anybody with a modicum of common sense and even the most basic understanding of Ukrainian politics and society any effort to come to that same conclusion.

When adding all the reported attendance numbers from all the rallies over the past 2 months, it doesn’t even get close to the gate numbers of Manchester United playing an average team on a very wet and cold Tuesday night at Old Trafford.

To be quite honest I still have no idea why the opposition embarked on such a strategy that was so clearly doomed to failure.  I still cannot deduce why I was asked to “rise” over the past 2 months just to now sit back down again – possibly until October 2015 when the next presidential elections are due.

There has certainly been no impact or identifiable causal effect from the “Rise Ukraine” campaign, other than to identify just how few people the opposition parties have managed to turn out during this time.

Hmmm.

Anyway, back to today’s “Rise Ukraine” (anti)climax of the 2 month campaign, which saw the opposition party leaders sign a joint agreement in front of a pitiful crowd of about 4,ooo people relating to the presidential elections in 2015.

This agreement states that all opposition parties will support any opposition candidate that makes it to the second round of voting in the presidential elections.

That is a significant change in rhetoric from the past few months where is has been consistently claimed that a single nominee from the United Opposition would run.

Now it seems rather than a single opposition candidate to run against the current incumbent from the very beginning of any presidential election campaign (in the first round), the opposition leaders have failed (unsurprisingly) to agree on one of them running for the top job with the unified support of the others from the off.

Thus the plan after the least popular two have been eliminated in the first round of voting, leaving one to go head to head with Yanukovych, is to then unite behind their last man standing for the second round of voting.  A cozy little agreement granted – but will the opposition voters turn out in sufficient number in the second round to vote for a candidate that is not the man they voted for, not from a party they voted for, and does not share the same ideology as the man and party they voted for in the first round only a few weeks previously?

As Klitschko never seems to tire of saying, there are ideological differences between himself, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok, and the parties they lead.  That is also true of their supporters differing ideologies.

Time will tell if opposition unification around a single presidential candidate after the first round of voting, rather than prior to any voting, will prove to be a sound strategy – I have serious doubts that it is a good strategy, although I also have serious doubts (at the time of writing), that Yatseniuk, Klitschko or Tyahnybok will beat Yanukovych anyway (even with full transparency and on a level playing field – which they may not get).

And so to the impact and underlying realities of the symbolic signing of the joint statement of opposition leaders,  pledging to support each – other only when they themselves have been eliminated from the presidential race.

The underlying  and sad reality is, there is little genuine unity amongst the opposition.  The impact of this agreement is almost zero, given that when all is said and done, ultimately, the public will be faced with the choice between Yanukovych or another in the second round of voting – opposition agreement or not.

* * * * *

On a completely different subject, there will probably be nothing from me tomorrow as I am doing something for the BBC – and their filming may take some time as I am not a great fan of being on camera, so single takes are very unlikely.   Thus I doubt I will have the time or interest to blog after being “Beeb’d” all day.

Ukrainian civil society and the media – A bit of a mess

Not for the first time I turn my eye to Ukrainian civil society – in particular the issue of a perceived need for a specific law guaranteeing the right to peaceful assembly and protest (which is indeed guaranteed by the Constitution).

Regular readers will know, so many times have I written about Ukrainian civil society that if I were to link to each entry there would be dozens of links in this entry.  For those who don’t want to enter “Civil Society” in the search facility of this blog and be faced by the numerous entries that will be listed, a suitably median sample of my thoughts on Ukrainian civil society can be found here.

Naturally the problems listed in that link – and others in many other entries – continue to exist within Ukrainian civil society.

Excluding the Orthodox Church as a civil society actor, civil society still operates with about 5% of the Ukrainian populous taking part – an almost static percentage since 1991 and Ukrainian independence.

Ukraine still has far less civil society actors per capita than the vast majority of Europe – something that is hardly surprising considering civil society’s inability to capture and expand public participation over the past 22 years.

Thus civil society remains further away from the society it purports to represent than the political class does both in overall presence by way of meeting the public face to face frequently (if at all) and also by self-projection via the media to the public.  A few clever lines and quotations on Interfax Ukraine or a brief appearance on Inter or Kanal 5 television channels etc, are not likely – and have actually proven not to – increase the Ukrainian public participation in civil society.

It is seen – and acts like – an elitist bubble serving either its own, or its financial donors interests first and foremost – both reasons not endearing to a cynical and distrustful Ukrainian public.  An image not helped in any way by the clever thinking, quotations and TV appearances coming across as an “adult to child” lecture to the population, rather than the “adult to adult” conversation it necessarily needs to be when purporting to represent society over issues the political class demonstratively fails to respond to.

In short, the visibility of civil society in every day Ukrainian life for almost all 46 million Ukrainians is practically zero – I don’t even remember the last time I saw a civil society actor raising awareness of its existence or cause in the streets, let alone engaging in something as basic as face to face public opinion surveys in relation to support – or not – for its cause.

To the contrary, walk along any high street in the UK and you can expect to be accosted by Help the Aged, Amnesty International or any number of international, national or local civil society actors.

However, this is not the issue I raise today.  I have historically written that NGOs and civil society actors will often turn on each other – for various reasons.

This may be because they are a pseudo-NGO that is in fact a government sponsored entity thrown into the civil society mix in order to back the government line and therefore give the government line some form of civil society credibility, or they have simply allowed themselves to become too close to government to advance their cause (even glacially) to the point they deem it necessary to attack other civil society actors who may begin to gain the government ear to which they have become accustomed, or simply to rubbish competitors in the fight for funding.

With this in mind, one wonders what is going on here, why, to what end and who is ultimately behind it?

This statement in relation to human rights and freedom of peaceful assembly legislation may actually be correct in its content relating to the options on the legislative table – “According to UHHRU, best of all meeting these standards is the bill supported by the Coordination Council for the Development of Civil Society under the President of Ukraine. The Union believes that it may serve as a basis for the successful achievement of the purpose set by human rights activists.“

Just because it comes from the presidential circles doesn’t make it necessarily bad or something to rally against simply because of the legislative origin.  Good policy and good legislation is just that – whether it comes from the presidential administration, parliamentary majority or parliamentary minority.

And yet this statement follows – “UHHRU called on civil society organizations and activists to stop manipulating its position in relation to the law on freedom of peaceful assembly, and on the media and journalists to take into account that the statements of the initiative For Peaceful Protest have nothing in common with the position of UHHRU.“

Which is worse?  A fellow civil society actor with similar goals manipulating the UHHRU position – or the media who seemingly (and unfortunately regularly) are muddying the waters with slip-shod reporting, rather than helping set public opinion by accurately reporting the different and definitive positions of the civil society actors involved?

For me, the media come out of that statement far worse than any competing civil society actor.

As ineffective as civil society in Ukraine generally is, whatever individual actors do say, should at the very least be accurately reported and their positions clearly identified if the media is to fulfill its role in framing public opinion and debate.

Thus, not only is the Ukrainian opposition in a mess as far as lack of policy, leadership etc. is concerned, civil society which would be the next vanguard against any government running amok is seemingly intent not only upon remaining out of touch with society itself, but also engaging in infighting.

A situation nicely topped of with a slipshod 4th estate incapable of reporting on “independent” civil society actors accurately.

Amongst all this, due to the circus now surrounding it, I have almost forgotten about the freedom of assembly legislation and the inherent human rights/liberties issues that should be the only story.

Did you?

Enhancing public support for the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement – FCO Report

Today I have very little to say, as I want to draw attention to the work of chaps at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office together with HM Embassy Kyiv under the imaginatively titled “A blueprint for enhancing understanding of and support for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement including DCFTA in Ukraine“

It is also available in Ukrainian - Угода про асоціацію ЄС – Україна: дослідження обізнаності цільових груп та стратегія комунікаційної кампанії - a title just as lengthy as in English!

It is a very interesting read that will go a long way to questioning the predispositions of some relating to the Ukrainian public desire to head West (or East).

I could go on and on but I won’t – have a read, it will be worth it.

Closed door meeting over Ukraine – Strasbourg 18th April

Not for the first time there is to be an official and rather important closed door meeting over Ukraine amongst EU leaders to discuss reports by the Cox-Kwasniewski mission to Ukraine.

The last such meeting occurred on 2nd October 2012 and neither the report nor the minutes of that meeting have ever been made public.

Whether the latest report or minutes of the meeting on the 18th April will be made public is unclear, but if it follows the precedent of the last report then it will remain something the public are not deemed  suitable for inclusion – despite the fact this report will quite clearly be a key document in the decision or not to sign the AA and DCFTA in Vilnius in November.

Further, a decision on whether to extend to Cox-Kwasniewski mission to Ukraine will be taken.

Adamantly against its extension is Elmar Brok the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee for the European Parliament and Rebecca Harms of the Green Party – both German if that means anything.

However there are those adamantly in favour of extending the mission until the Vilnius Summit.  It is likely to be a fractious affair – and with every man and his dog keen to take the credit for the release of Lutsenko and Filipchuk, no doubt the supporters for the extension of the Cox-Kwasniewski mission will claim (possibly quite rightly) that it is they, rather than the claims of the United Opposition and those of civil society that were most effective in engineering their release.

After all, the word “effective” can be associated with very few in civil society or the United Opposition when it comes to influencing the views and decisions of President Yanukovych.

Ergo, the Cox-Kwasneiwski mission has brought results – albeit eventually – the lack of which had been a major criticism of (the rather inflated egotistically, by way of ability and quite literally) Elmar Brok.  A major argument to end the mission now, due to lack of headway, if not removed from his arsenal then far less potent.

With Vilnius seen (even if not entirely accurately) as make or break for EU/Ukrainian relations for the next few years, the question has to be asked, conceding that some momentum has been gathered and results achieved, is it wise, literally for the sake of an additional 6 months, to disengage their mission now?

What signals would either continuing or ending their mission give considering there is little hope that their key report is unlikely to be seen by the public?

Perhaps the most important question, regardless of whether these agreements are signed or not, is how to keep any momentum going in the immediate period after the Vilnius Summit with major elections in 2014 and 2015 in the European Parliament and several influential nations driving EU/Ukrainian relations – including of course – Ukraine?

Opposition demands to be debated next week in the RADA

The United Opposition have stated that the will unblock the RADA next week as agreement has been reached to allow their 4 key “issues” to be considered during that time.

Those 4 key issues are:

The setting of an election date for the position of Kyiv Mayor.

A vote of “No Confidence” in the current government.

The abolition the new pension reforms.

The removal of the Artilces of law under which Ms Tymoshenko is currently jailed.

And?

Well the issues relating to the Kyiv Mayor are currently being considered by the Constitutional Court which the law proscribes must give their decision upon within 3 months.  Would it not be wise to allow the court to come to its conclusions prior to this debate?  At least everybody would know what cards they have to play with then.

A vote of “No Confidence” is very likely to be unsuccessful and will do the image of the United Opposition no good whatsoever if they prove ineffective at removing the government.  The “Rise Ukraine” campaign is for what exactly if they cannot deliver?  To prove they still cannot deliver perhaps?

And what if they win a vote of “No Confidence”?  New elections at a time when all in the RADA should be concentrating on getting as much EU compatible legislation passed within the very limited time frame available before the Vilnius Summit in November  - as their joint pro-EU statement proclaimed.

Elections under the same electoral laws that are a key EU demand for reform and under which the opposition lost only 6 months ago?  Why is electoral reform not a key demand of the United Opposition – does it not help their cause to have a far more equitable playing field?

Should the EU/Ukraine AA and DCFTA not get signed in November as planned, is that not a far better time to call for a vote of “No Confidence”?  It would be a major failure of both Yanukovych and the government.  Or do the United Opposition believe that it will be signed and that to try and win a vote of “No Confidence” after a successful signing would be far harder?

I have to be honest and say that just as I doubted the timing (and effectiveness) of the “Rise Ukraine” campaign, I also have serious doubts about the timing of the attempts to topple the government – a central plank of the “Rise Ukraine” campaign.

I have no problem with the politics, but the timing seems very poor given the wider best interest of Ukraine being at least able to function until November and the Vilnius Summit if there is to be a glimmer of hope relating to signing EU agreements.

Abolishing the pension reforms?  To be replaced by what?  The old and economically unsustainable rules that previously existed?  What is the United Opposition policy to deal with a serious economic issue facing not just Ukraine, but almost all European nations relating to pensions, in lieu of the current reforms?  What is their policy, how will it be financed, and is it any better than the current reforms they are balking against?  Does anybody know?  As a follower of the opposition I am yet to hear their alternatives.

Lastly, the removal of the legal Articles under which Ms Tymoshenko was jailed.  I am not sure if this is the second or third attempt to do so – but previous attempts have failed.  The reality, unfair as the entire process may have been, is even in removing the offending Articles now, they were still the law when she was found guilty under them.  It will not do nothing to remove her conviction even if it would perhaps give greater scope for moral pressure relating to her release.  Laws are not retrospective in their application or removal – and neither are convictions under them unless officially pardoned.

Given the United Opposition’s very subdued reaction to Lutsenko’s release, are the United Opposition simply going through the motions for the public relating to Tymoshenko anyway?

What do they gain by her release in the long run vis a vis her continued incarceration?

What happens to their little power-sharing deals if she was released?  A major “cause” and easy headline maker in her de facto political prisoner/martyr status will also be removed, not to mention they would immediately be standing in her very considerable vocal and political shadow the moment she left the prison gate.

Would or could the United Opposition even manage to remain united if she was released and took the helm of Batkivshchnya again – giving a public perception of sending the three current captains back to being nothing more than deck-hands in the process?

Do Yatseniuk, Klitschko and Tyhanbok willing want to take that chance with their own political futures – or will they simply go through the motions for the public?

More broadly, what are the chances next week of the United Opposition winning any, let alone all, of the above 4 issues over which they have blocked the working of the RADA for months?

If they fail to make any progress after these issues are debated – are they going to block the RADA again?  To what end?  The dissolution of parliament and with it any hope of timeliness in legislative progress toward the EU normative within the EU nominated time frame?

Shell (companies), Ukraine, hydrocarbons and the limits of Ukrainian journalism (not to mention a willfully blind EU eye)?

The day after the EU met with Edward Stavysky, the current Ukrainian Energy Minister, a meeting that will bring about a high level round table over EU sponsorship over the upgrading of the Ukrainian gas transport system (GTS) amongst other things – I am left pondering many things.

There has been a bad smell over the inclusion of a company called GEO Service arbitrarily in Ukrainian government deals with major oil and gas explorers and producers.  The reason for the bad smell becomes a little clearer with this piece in the Ukraine Pravda – but it no surprise.  It is no surprise that the oil majors are going along with it either.  Big oil (and gas) is a very murky business no matter who is involved.  This for them is standard practice no doubt.

However, it does not stop at Geoservice and the inferences made within that article – possibly more so when mentioning the current Ukrainian Energy Minister.

Unfortunately Ukraine Pravda does not go further than to elaborate on what it was spoon fed/given to build a story around – and investigative journalism in Ukraine is not particularly the safest of jobs.

However, if there was a Ukrainian investigative journalist at a loose end, they may not go far wrong in looking at the Energy Minister himself and other seemingly “no value” or “strange” business entities somehow involved in hydrocarbons in Ukraine – other than the infamous Geoservices which seems to concentrate media attention.

If they were to need a few dots to join together, some interesting dots amongst the vast mosaic of opaque vested interests could be a dot/company called “Vodi Ukraine”.  Another dot would necessarily be Nadra Ukraine.  Perhaps those dots could be joined together?

The Vodi Ukraine  (which means Water Ukraine)  misnomer should not put off our investigative journalists.  Vodi Ukraine may have more to do with hydrocarbons than water perhaps?

Maybe if these dots do connect, they should look to the dots relating to shale gas exploration in western Ukraine and who holds the exploration licenses.  The oil majors who are going to explore there know already – it shouldn’t be too difficult to find out – officially or via leaks.

Naturally if all those dots can be connected – that leaves the dot that is the current Energy Minister, Eduard Stavysky.

Now he is not the dot behind Nadra Ukraine.   He is not the dot behind the oil majors exploring shale in western Ukraine.  So how does his dot connect if indeed it does?

As Vodi Ukraine adds no value to the chain but somehow managed to get the exploration licenses in western Ukraine and is therefore within the chain for no apparent reason that to siphon/make a profit from actually doing nothing of value – one might ask, perhaps, who is the dot behind the Vodi Ukraine dot?  Our ministerial dot perhaps?

As I say, I am no investigative journalist, and far be it from me to make categorical statements when lacking the type of evidence produced in the Ukraine Pravda link above, that there would be a story there waiting to be broken – but I was always very good at dot to dot as a child and never once messed up the picture.

Now if all those dots did make a pretty (but nefarious) picture just as the Geoservice dots do, given the open door policy to Ministers the oil and gas majors have, then the EU must have a completed dot to dot picture – and thus must be willfully turning a blind eye – even if for the greater good as they may see it.

Anyway, what chance that an investigative journalist would join all the dots I mention eh?

Privitising State/municipal print media – Ukraine

There were an awful lot of low profile but interesting things said at the Party of Regions Council meeting at which both President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Azarov were present on 21st March – some of which made it to the President’s website.

So many in fact, I may return to the statements and comments of the meeting over the next few days.

However, today, I will pick up on the issue of the privitisation of the State and municipal print media – a necessary privitisation in line with the commitments of Ukraine to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

It would seem the President is rather tired of waiting for this to happen and has issued a direct instruction for this matter to be legislatively prepared and submitted to the RADA by 5th April.

Hmmm!

Firstly, it is of course quite right that Ukraine honour its international commitments – but -

The President’s instruction calls for the input of journalists, editors and professional associations for this legislative bill.  Today is 22nd March.  Unless there has been considerable work on this bill already – including their input – then the time line would seem either impossible to achieve, or the result of the legislation will leave much to be desired.

That said, as is so often the case, Ukraine is not reinventing the wheel here – it is not the only FSU/Warsaw Pact nation to have to deal with this issue.  Many have successfully managed it already.  Models and legislation therefore already exist amongst Ukraine’s neighbours – albeit every nation is slightly different.

Arguably this privitisation is one of the easiest and less politically fraught ways of displaying progress in media reforms – as demanded by both the EU and CoE respectively, whilst not forcing the oligarchy to hold media assets that are not part of their core business to save the media falling under the control of the opposition – if indeed they have that much interest in owning it.

After all, what exactly does the State and municipal print media produce that could rival the TV, radio and on-line media assets controlled by the oligarchy?  What immediate danger is there in privitising those who, in the main,  produce forms, books and information pamphlets – particularly when any owner of a newly privitised print company will be needing the national and local government work to survive whilst they try and expand into other areas of print?

But therein is the problem for would-be owners when this privitisation comes to pass.

Buying such entities leaves a heavy reliance on the patriarchal benevolence of central and/or local government to have continued State and municipal work come your way.

Given the issues facing print media in general via the competition from TV, radio and the Internet, what chance of meaningful and profitable expansion?

In short, unless you are guaranteed a lucrative central/local government contract – for example the production of biometric passports, or the Odessa City Administration contract for forms and pamphleteering – why would you entertain buying a privitised State print entity?  You would surely have to sit very comfortably within the existing national or local patriarchy to entertain the idea.

That being so, whilst it is an international commitment of Ukraine to privatise the State and municipal print media, any successful privitisation would seem destined to simply give control of the State/municipality entities to vested interests via nothing more than an intermediary/shell in practice.

You wonder whether, perhaps, such entities could have been spun off to become something similar to a “University Press” – possibly under an LLC protective umbrella for respective universities – and then such municipal funds spent for books, pamphlets and forms et al., could at least then be used to off-set the costs of – or indeed expand – the universities in local cities and towns.

It is just one thought that comes to mind without spending no more than 5 seconds contemplating the issue.  If I gave it more thought, undoubtedly other, and perhaps better,  proposals would come to mind.

Anyway – two immediate issues come to mind.  The legislative time table, and lack of time to arrive at anything resembling decent legislation – and secondly, who will want to buy such entities without some form of long term guarantee of continued work from the State/local government?

If such guarantees are forthcoming, then these entities will most certainly be bought by those who sit snuggly within the patriarchy.  Is that then privitisation – or cronyism/corruption adopted under the cloak of promises to the EU and Council of Europe?