Developments in the Transnistra frozen conflict?

Here is an interesting little tweet from Sergey Lavrov via the Russian MFA relating to the frozen conflict that is Transistria – a place under 2 hours drive from where I live, and which I have traveled through many times.

“#Lavrov: The 5+2 talks on Transnistria will resume in February. We expect to start discussing the political aspects of a settlement.”

Is the persistent German (more than any other nation or entity involved) direct and indirect influence with Russia having some effect?

Despite a cooling of personal relations between Ms Merkel and Mr Putin, the increasing healthy political, diplomatic and in particular business relations between Russia and Germany of late, across many levels an via many channels, are so obvious that they cannot be ignored.

It is no secret that concessions from both Germany and Russia (sometimes seemingly completely disconnected  to  (but not – as everything is connected if one side wants it to be)  Transnistra have been made over how to move forwards with a Transnistra settlement over the past 2 years.

Something to keep an eye on – a lazy eye that is – a speedy resolution is still very unlikely!

A federal rather than feral Ukraine?

Over the weekend I have been sent a few questions to contemplate, as is often the case these days.

Not unusual, other than these two following questions stand out amongst the much of a muchness from the others.

The first which caught my eye was not whether Ukraine would or would not be any more democratic under Ms Tymoshenko’s rule, but whether she has any historical precedence of being the beacon of democracy she claims to be.  In effect what actions back up the rhetoric and western media image she is given?

It is a good question but one which I will return to after the elections rather than deal with now.  With the elections less than 1 month away, I am going to enter a voluntary state of purdah relating to political individuals whilst retaining the right to comment on party policy and campaigning more broadly – unless something truly extraordinary occurs relating to a specific individual – which I doubt.  The usual name calling and circus tricks, predictable as they are, will undoubtedly continue but ultimately effect nothing in the grand scheme of things.

Thus the tangible democratic actions – or not – that would support her rhetoric and her image as built by the western media, will be left until the elections are over.

The second question relates to the federalisation of Ukraine – namely should it become a federal nation?

A very good question indeed given the quite obvious fault lines between the western and eastern regions relating to history, language, political preferences, economic output etc – not withstanding the already Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine’s south.

It could be said the recently adopted law on regional languages would support even further the federalisation of Ukraine when added to the already feral regional patriarchies  that run each oblast with scarcely any recognition of policies adopted by Kyiv if they don’t suit those running the regions.

It is no secret that the current Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, indeed toyed with the idea when in opposition as a possible election platform – but decided against it.

There is though something to be said for considering the federalisation of Ukraine.  As a firm supporter of local government and the decentralisation of power, I would be naturally inclined towards considering anything that keeps the miners of Donetsk, the nationalists of Lviv, the power projectionists from Kyiv etc, firmly at arms length when it comes to the running of Odessa and accountability of the Odessa Administration to the people of Odessa.

In fact, one of the very few electoral policy ideas over which I completely agree with my neighbour, Igor Markov, (who is standing for the RADA and will probably win his constituency seat), is the issue that far more tax raised in Odessa should come back to Odessa to improve the city rather than get swallowed up in the black hole that is Kyiv.

All of that said, I am not predisposed to thinking federalism is the way to go, despite recognising that Germany works very well under this system and the Ukrainian electoral system now matches that of Germany.  Thus there is a tried and tested model very close to Ukraine that works – and works quite well.

Whether a federal Germany will work quite as well within a federal Europe we may one day discover – but not anytime soon I suspect.

Naturally for any federalised Ukraine to work, it would need to be underpinned essentially by the rule of law.  And that simply is not the case at the moment.  To say the regional administrations are feral is not an exaggeration.  Another issue with the federal system is that, certainly within the US, one or more of the parts seem to be continually in litigation with the federal whole.  In fact it can often appear that many US States would prefer to return to the days of confederation rather than be part of a federation.

However, I do not want to dwell on the US system, as Germany is a much better federal model for Ukraine to observe.  As I have already said, the electoral models are now both the same in Ukraine and Germany.  There are major differences also – the role and power of the German President vis a vis the Ukrainian counterpart is an obvious example.  However  Ukraine is slowly but surely eventually getting around to installing “European” methods in most all walks of life, from banking to construction to alternative energy production.  There is a long, long way to go, but it is moving along nonetheless.

And yet I cannot help but feel that to allow Ukraine to become a federal state would be an acceptance of failure to unite the country as a more common sovereign national structure found within Europe.  It would seem like giving in to the differences rather than forging a truly unified future.

That said, Ukraine currently only has polarising political leaders, and perhaps until a unifying personality appears and the likes of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are consigned to political irrelevance, nothing can change.  Both are undoubtedly guilty of seeking power for power’s sake rather than the well-being of the nation.  If so, then there is no alternative but to wait.

It is necessary to take into account also, the growing global significance of cities individually.  We have reached a point where individual cities will take on international loans, will no doubt be issuing their own bonds and managing their own global debt repayments and equity raising.  This necessarily goes some way to undermining the entire premise for the nation state at an economic level – particularly so if the EU becomes a federal entity and Ukraine subsequently joined the EU, as it may magnify the power of individual cities irrespective of larger  national governance living under a federal umbrella.

As a robust supporter of local government, local democracy and local transparency, naturally the more autonomous Odessa can be without undermining the national identity (such as it is), the better.  The fewer reasons the Odessa Administration has to point the finger of blame in the direction of Kyiv the better.  The higher the degree of autonomy, the higher the degree of accountability and the fewer the scapegoats and excuses available.

Why then do I feel a huge surge of caution when considering the federal option for Ukraine – not that this option is likely to present itself within the next 20 – 30 years anyway?  Maybe, if I am still alive in 30 years time, I will have less concerns.  Maybe Ukraine will be grown up enough to rationally consider the pros and cons of federalism by then.  More importantly, maybe it will have an administrative infrastructure that is not subject to the whims of the local fiefdoms and patriarchal leaderships that do so much to undermine the policies of governments past and present, and a belief in the rule of law and the State will have reached and embedded itself in the populous.

If that were to happen though, given the dysfunctional state of independent Ukraine thus far, who would want to change a functional state when it eventually arrives?

Ukraine signs new gas deal – with RWE of Germany!

You will remember back in early March I mentioned a cunning plan from the government of Ukraine to buy gas from RWE in Germany and reverse the flow of sections of the transport system in order to import it, thus reducing the amount of contractually very expensive Russian gas?

Well, Naftogas Ukraine has quietly signed an agreement earlier this month with RWE  just as predicted.

Now then, what are the chances of Turkish LNG being shipped Bulgaria and reversing the flow back to Ukraine (another option) until the Odessa LNG terminal is build?

Bold political and energy moves indeed, as it will certainly annoy the newly installed Mr Putin and Gazprom who have happily been milking Ukraine for the last few years.

Let’s see what the Russian response will be!

* * * * *

As an aside, if you read yesterday’s post and are wondering what the outcome of the EU-Ukraine summit was, here is the official press release.  No surprises in it just as it was no surprise the EU Euro 2012 boycott failed to take off.

What should be clear to the EU by now is that the current government is quite happy to, and indeed is doing quite well at, creating the legislative norms that run parallel to those of the EU and as such the DCFTA side of the EU/Ukraine negotiated agreement will continue to progress fairly well.  The political AA side of the agreement will not progress much at all.  All such signs are documented by the EU itself in its ENP Country Progress Report – Ukraine!

Quite a contrast to the previous government where the political integration was far more achievable, but it was also a government completely unable to to draft and pass anything like legislation meeting EU norms.

Given both sides will continue to have the same strengths and weaknesses, it would seem a reasonable tactic to encourage the current government along the legislative reformation path as much as possible, and then hope for a change of government who are legislatively incompetent but will politically meet the grade.

Failing that, sooner or later the EU will realise that financial investigations and the seizure of nefariously acquired or hidden  assets held within the EU territory relating to all Ukrainian politicians, from all parties, will be the most feared stick they have in their bag that may force Ukrainian politicians to go along the EU’s preferred path regardless of their strengths or weaknesses. – Now there’s a bold policy step!

(Alternatively, the EU can just let Ukraine drift back to Russia and watch it help make the Eurasian Union become a workable model.)

French election results and Ukraine

Well it hasn’t taken the political scientists and think tanks in Kyiv very long to start speculating over what the change of the French presidency will mean with regards to Kyiv and Ukraine.

Why would it?  These people are paid to state what they think.  Unfortunately they, like most political commentators, internal or external of Ukraine, will either state the blindingly obvious or slant things towards the bias of their paymasters.

So, let us have a look at the pearls of wisdom that have come forth (and I will do it all in English to save any of you the trouble of translation).

Institute of Global Strategies Director, Vadim Karasev:  “This victory is good news for Victor Yanukovych.  This may give rise to restart relations with the European elite, with whom Mr Yanulovych finally soured relations.”

He also went on to say that it is a blow to the Tymoshenko camp, stating, ” Now some of the lobbying capabilities in the EU, France, is lost to Tymoshenko.” 

Hmmm – Really?

Whilst it is true that there is a great deal to be said for personal relationships amongst political leaders on the international stage, and it is also true that the demise of Sarkozy may result in a weakened EPP, the EU umbrella party to which both Tymoshenko and Sarkozy belonged,  does that mean Mr Hollande will close the door to Ms Tymoshenko’s plight or human rights?

Now “Mer-kozy” is past and we now have “Mer-de” instead, (yes I know that means “shit” in French but it is funny and may well yet prove to be an apt name for the new Franco/German tandem), there will be trials and tribulations between these leaders, but also areas where easy political harmony can be found for the sake of public unity appearances.

Mr Hollande, like Ms Merkel have issues at home and within the broader Eurozone.  An unnecessary divergence over Ms Tymoshenko in public?  Hardly, when it is an easy political unity “win” to show to the rest of the world.  In short, there is little likelihood of a falling out over Ms Tymoshenko’s situation, when as many points of joint easily achieved public agreements are needed, no matter what they are.

Next we have Viktor Nebozhenko, political scientists of the” Ukrainian Barometer” who claims, “Regardless of who came to power now in France, in the next year the relationship between France and Ukraine will not change.”  

Now that is a safe prediction given the current situation, however as the saying goes, 24 hours is a long time in politics, and things change rapidly.  As Harold McMillan once stated when asked what he feared most, “Events dear boy, events.”

Now there are events in  Ukraine and several of them in the next few months.  There is the Euro 2012 who some are trying to politicise and others attempting to keep it a purely sporting event, and then there is the parliamentary elections in October in Ukraine which could well see the current government replaced by the opposition parties.  (The presumption is that should the opposition win, Ms Tymsoehnko will be released very swiftly, however that may not be the case with President Yanukovych remaining as President until 2015 before he is up for reelection.)

There is also the fact that whilst the issue of Ms Tymoshenko (and others) make the headlines, there is also numerous statements from EU bodies welcoming certain reforms and laws that have been passed under the Yanukovych tenure so far, and as such those positives have been recognised by France as an EU Member.

How much time and effort Mr Hollande will give to Ukraine is really rather unknown.  He certainly has some very big fish to fry domestically and internationally the markets have not reacted well to the democratic decision of the French people.  As far as foreign policy is concerned however, it remains to be seen where and how Mr Hollande will make his mark outside of the EU.  In the old French colonial territories or the EU bordering nations perhaps?

In short, it is far too soon to be making any predictions, particularly as he does not take office until 15th May and who knows what will happen between then and now, other than predictable and unpredictable “events.”

The Ukrainian foreign policy position must surely be to drive a wedge between France and Germany over Ms Tymoshenko if they plan to leave her in prison.  As yet, it remains to be seen if a crack appears into which a wedge can be pushed.

Too soon to say how the Franco/Ukrainian relationship will change, or even if it will change, so I won’t be jerking my knee just yet with predictions and pontifications.

* * * * *

Possibly more exciting than the guesses relating to the new French presidency towards Ukraine, is that tomorrow, on what is known as Victory Day in the FSU (and more politically correctly as Europe Day within the EU),  is that there will be a guest blog, fingers crossed, relating to Odessa, The Great Patriotic War/WWII, Hero City status and something for the TAOW/war-gaming community as well!

If that fails, then you will be struck with more ruminations from me – Apologies in advance.

German foreign policy, the EaP and Ukraine

As many of you good people know, I regularly write about policy (mostly foreign), Ukraine and relations with its neighbours east and west.

My ramblings have given me a great many readers, some of who are extremely noteworthy and between emails and twitter I occasionally get to read things prior to publication thanks to such people.  Between them and membership of some rather prominent and renowned policy organisations I am never short of interesting things to read and my inbox can often look like an Aladdin’s Cave for a political science student.

Recently I received this Position Paper from associates in Germany relating to German foreign policy towards the EU and EaP.  Now that I know it has been received by those for whom it was intended and has been published I thought I would share it with you to give a German perspective on EU foreign policy towards the EaP and non-EaP candidate Russia.

Somewhat unsurprisingly the DGAP document is critical of the EU A-symmetrical negotiating stance relating to acquis communautaire which it states gives the impression of a protectionist market.  Well the EU single market is protectionist and by rigidly sticking to acquis communautaire it has every intention of remaining so.  A case of play by EU rules or do not play at all.

It bemoans a lack of flexibility and recognition of the needs of EaP partners in the negotiating process, arguing that a flexible approach and easing of entry will ultimately win over the other party towards EU standards through attrition.  All well and good as long as the interest verses values matrix seems politically bearable.

Also unsurprisingly it is critical of German unwillingness to influence EU foreign policy and suggests what would be a powerful joint position with Poland.  One suspect that if 2/3rds of the Weimar Triangle are heading in a joint direction that the remaining 1/3rd, France, would go along as well.

It raises interesting issues relating to Visa-free travel and dual citizenship, particularly citing those Ukrainians and Russians that hold both citizenships and seems to try to make the case that if either Ukraine or Russia adopt Visa-free travel with the EU it makes no sense to delay the other.

To be fair, they do make something of a reasonable point.  There are large numbers of Ukrainians who also hold Russian passports.  I am married to one.  There are also huge numbers of Russians who also hold Ukrainian passports.   However, whilst the number of such people is large, it is not by any means even close to a majority in either nation.  Several million at most and I suspect far less to be frank.  Not enough in my view to adopt such a position.

Anyway, a very short (4 page) document well worth a read when it comes to German thinking on its own foreign policy and lack or leadership, on EU foreign policy in general, and also thoughts towards the EaP nations.

Czech Rep, Germany and Ukraine – Extradition Imbalances

The scales of justice sometimes appear to be rather random in the cases of two recent requests by Ukraine for those wanted for alleged nefarious deeds who subsequently disappeared across its borders into the EU recently.

In the case of Bohdan Danylyshyn, former Ukrainian Economy Minister who disappeared when investigations were started against him relating to theft, fraud and double-dealing with the public purse, he made his way to the Czech Republic having been put on the international wanted list by Ukraine.

He was arrested in the Czech Republic in October 2010 and after four months, the Czech Republic decided not to extradite him back to Ukraine but granted him political asylum at the beginning of February 2011.

Meanwhile, Oleskiy Yevlah, the former Kyiv City Council Chief of the Permanent Commission for Land Issues, also had a criminal case opened against him in June 2010. Yavlah carried out the traditional Ukrainian politicians move of suddenly becoming very ill during the initial investigation and made his way to Germany for treatment.

Unlike the Czech Republic, Germany will be extraditing Yavlah back to Ukraine to answer allegations of forgery and other fraudulent acts in office after his arrest in Frankfurt due to an international arrest warrant issued by Ukraine.

One has to ask why the Czech Republic refused to return an individual wanted by Ukraine and granted asylum whilst less than four months later, Germany did not.

Both men would have faced the same Prosecutor General’s Office, the same Ukrainian legal system and broadly speaking were wanted for very similar allegations that we can categorise as dishonesty whilst in public office. Both sought sanctuary in an EU nation. Neither were particularly high-profile individuals.

Whilst the Czech Republic’s granting of asylum obviously did nothing for the credibility of the Ukrainian judicial system, Germany seems to a different view. Granted it is a sovereign decision of each nation to extradite or not, but the question is why are their views different?