Schizophrenia, Dissociative Identity Disorder or pragmatism? Ukrainian opposition

What to make of an opposition leadership that submits official resolutions of “No Confidence” in the current Cabinet of Ministers on 22nd March 2013 – and by 3rd April 2013, some 13 days later, post a joint  statement on the Batkivshchyna Party website stating:

“We supported and will support all EU integration laws that were properly prepared and considered, in accordance with the parliamentary procedure, including those submitted by the government, as it was, for example, during the ratification of amendments to the visa facilitation agreement.”

Well, what to think?

That must surely infer that they have some confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers they submitted an official resolution of “No Confidence” against – How can the leaders of opposition parties encourage their parties MPs to vote for government legislation otherwise?

Perhaps it is a less than simple matter of schizophrenia or dissocative identity disorder?

Does the “no confidence” exist only with legislation aimed at solely domestic issues – “confidence” obviously existing in legislation aimed at synchronising with the EU normative as far as the capabilities of the Cabinet of Ministers is concerned?

Of course they are being pragmatic.

They can hardly go against their own joint statement with the ruling PoR, in which they all stated their intention to drag Ukraine towards the EU.  As such they had already committed themselves to support EU normalising legislation from a Cabinet of Ministers they later had “No Confidence” in – but now reaffirm they have confidence in – as far as the EU legislation goes.

However, as I wrote on 24th March relating to the particularly ill-timed submission of the “No Confidence” resolution – “Possibly worse, should this vote of “no confidence” fail – which seems likely – how will the public psyche be affected when it comes to confidence in Yatseniuk and the opposition? To continually indulge in political grandstanding or showboating with few, if any results, eventually will erode further public confidence in the ability of the opposition.”

Since then a few Batkivshchanya MPs have left the party, two of which claimed they were not prepared to support Yatseniuk’s “one-man show”.  Whether that reasoning is true or not is irrelevant.  That is what they have said publicly and will further give the perception of failed political grandstanding and showboating to the point at which MPs are leaving the party – and it is the public perception that counts in politics.

It also seems Yatseniuk is expecting an internal leadership coup within the Batkivshchnya Party.

Further, it is somewhat strange to see a very muted reception on opposition MPs twitter an Facebook accounts relating to the releasing of Lutsenko (as I predicted in February) and Filipchuk.  One could think there there are those within the opposition who are not exactly overjoyed at their release – at least that is the perception their social media accounts infer simply by complete lack of, or little reference to, such a major event for the opposition and EU/Ukrainian relations.

Can voters have confidence in those who demand votes of no confidence, who then less than 2 weeks later, display confidence enough in those they have no confidence in, to state they will vote with them over EU legislation – thus displaying a degree of confidence they apparently do not have in those drafting the legislation?

Especially so after not voting for what would be EU normative legislation only a few days ago?

Is anybody advising the leaders of the opposition – or are they simply jumping from one grandstanding position to another – with few results, and even less consistency?

Perhaps, given the differences between Svoboda, UDAR and Batkivshchyna parties, we should expect nothing less than such a populist, ill-thought out and schizophrenic output.  As Klitschko said only yesterday “UDAR, Batkivshchnya and Svoboda have different ideologies.  However we have one thing in common:  We want to live in a democratic country” – Is one thing in common enough, when inevitably there will be a need to convince the voting public that they are capable of ruling and creating policies they all agree on despite different ideologies that will prevent good policy making?

If there is one lesson to be learned from the Yushenko/Tymoshenko period, it is that democracy requires hard work and hard choices after it puts you in power to cement both veritical and horizontal democratic principle into all walks of government, governmental agencies and society – something that they collectively simply did not do in any shape, form or manner.

I do so wish the opposition would start to form and articulate solid policy that will benefit society and that voters can understand and rally around, instead of consistently showboating which is a policy that is destined to fail more often than not.

However just how possible it would be to align Svoboda social policy with that of UDAR, or Batkivshchnya economic policy with Svoboda or UDAR etc., remains to be seen.  I suspect these issues are deliberately being passed over as they will no doubt become divisive – leaving us with more failing grandstanding to come for the foreseeable future -  in lieu of real policy.

Sooner or later however, they are going to need to convince people they can govern collectively and effectively – and that means agreed policies which they can take to the public.   A return to such dysfunctional governance – or alternatively Yanukovych-lite – is not what Ukraine needs.

Maybe Lutsenko, now he’s been released will provide something like a policy rudder?  We’ll see.

Italy to open Consulate in Odessa soon

A very short and sweet entry today.

Yet another diplomatic mission will soon open in Odessa – this time Italian - which will please the good woman if it has the ability to produce Visas, as Italy is a nation that particularly attracts her for reasons of history, architecture, food and of course fashion.

Very good.  That makes half a dozen Consulates opened in Odessa in as many years and leaves Odessa housing close to 20 diplomatic missions.

Naturally the UK isn’t one of them – not even an Honorary Consul, despite an ever growing and vibrant local diplomatic community – but I have come to expect nothing less.

From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking? – Ukraine

As is well known to regular readers of this blog, when it comes to UN commitments, Ukraine is somewhat stalwart in its support and engagement – Quite rightly too when we consider Ukraine was a founding member of the United Nations.

As such it has not and does not shy away from supplying troops and equipment for UN peacekeeping missions.  Ukrainian troops are deployed today in various nations under the auspices of the UN in various parts of the world.

It therefore seems quite reasonable, in light of significant reforms within the Ukrainian defence department – in particular the end to military conscription this year which will lead to a fully contract military half the size of the current numbers – that Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania will form a joint military brigade for peacekeeping missions.  The Ukrainian contingent will comprise of 545 military personnel plus equipment.

Jolly good – but…..

At the same time this announcement was made, the UN announced it was putting together a peacemaking entity for engagement within the Central African Republic.

There is a significant difference between the parameters of peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking.

If the UN is about to actively enter the far more proactive and assertive realm of peacemaking  - which is nothing short of proactive intervention at a political and diplomatic level, how long before that peacemaking has the inevitable mission creep that will move troops involved in peacekeeping into a far more interventionist peacemaking role?

Thus far Ukrainian military casualties and overt military action in UN peacekeeping roles in the past decade amount to the recent use of a Mi 24 helicopter firing upon compounds in Cote D’Ivoire a few years ago, and a peace-keeper being killed in rioting in Kosovo in 2008.  (Not withstanding accidental deaths due to traffic accidents etc.)

How long before the UN rules of engagement change from those currently in existence for peacekeeping, to rules far more suited to the interventionist role of peacemaking?

How quickly will this new brigade see its UN role change?

Privitising State/municipal print media – Ukraine

There were an awful lot of low profile but interesting things said at the Party of Regions Council meeting at which both President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Azarov were present on 21st March – some of which made it to the President’s website.

So many in fact, I may return to the statements and comments of the meeting over the next few days.

However, today, I will pick up on the issue of the privitisation of the State and municipal print media – a necessary privitisation in line with the commitments of Ukraine to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

It would seem the President is rather tired of waiting for this to happen and has issued a direct instruction for this matter to be legislatively prepared and submitted to the RADA by 5th April.

Hmmm!

Firstly, it is of course quite right that Ukraine honour its international commitments – but -

The President’s instruction calls for the input of journalists, editors and professional associations for this legislative bill.  Today is 22nd March.  Unless there has been considerable work on this bill already – including their input – then the time line would seem either impossible to achieve, or the result of the legislation will leave much to be desired.

That said, as is so often the case, Ukraine is not reinventing the wheel here – it is not the only FSU/Warsaw Pact nation to have to deal with this issue.  Many have successfully managed it already.  Models and legislation therefore already exist amongst Ukraine’s neighbours – albeit every nation is slightly different.

Arguably this privitisation is one of the easiest and less politically fraught ways of displaying progress in media reforms – as demanded by both the EU and CoE respectively, whilst not forcing the oligarchy to hold media assets that are not part of their core business to save the media falling under the control of the opposition – if indeed they have that much interest in owning it.

After all, what exactly does the State and municipal print media produce that could rival the TV, radio and on-line media assets controlled by the oligarchy?  What immediate danger is there in privitising those who, in the main,  produce forms, books and information pamphlets – particularly when any owner of a newly privitised print company will be needing the national and local government work to survive whilst they try and expand into other areas of print?

But therein is the problem for would-be owners when this privitisation comes to pass.

Buying such entities leaves a heavy reliance on the patriarchal benevolence of central and/or local government to have continued State and municipal work come your way.

Given the issues facing print media in general via the competition from TV, radio and the Internet, what chance of meaningful and profitable expansion?

In short, unless you are guaranteed a lucrative central/local government contract – for example the production of biometric passports, or the Odessa City Administration contract for forms and pamphleteering – why would you entertain buying a privitised State print entity?  You would surely have to sit very comfortably within the existing national or local patriarchy to entertain the idea.

That being so, whilst it is an international commitment of Ukraine to privatise the State and municipal print media, any successful privitisation would seem destined to simply give control of the State/municipality entities to vested interests via nothing more than an intermediary/shell in practice.

You wonder whether, perhaps, such entities could have been spun off to become something similar to a “University Press” – possibly under an LLC protective umbrella for respective universities – and then such municipal funds spent for books, pamphlets and forms et al., could at least then be used to off-set the costs of – or indeed expand – the universities in local cities and towns.

It is just one thought that comes to mind without spending no more than 5 seconds contemplating the issue.  If I gave it more thought, undoubtedly other, and perhaps better,  proposals would come to mind.

Anyway – two immediate issues come to mind.  The legislative time table, and lack of time to arrive at anything resembling decent legislation – and secondly, who will want to buy such entities without some form of long term guarantee of continued work from the State/local government?

If such guarantees are forthcoming, then these entities will most certainly be bought by those who sit snuggly within the patriarchy.  Is that then privitisation – or cronyism/corruption adopted under the cloak of promises to the EU and Council of Europe?

Please mind the gap! (Managing expectations)

Just as the London Underground regularly states “Please mind the gap” to prepare passengers disembarking for what could be a large gap between their expectations and the reality of distance between carriage and platform when the doors open – Stefan Fule is now trying to insure there is a similar preparation of expectations between the European Commission and European Parliament regarding Ukraine and the signing – or not – of the Association Agreement and DCFTA.

The signing of these agreements is now a matter of national security for Ukraine - Presidential Decree 127/2013 dated 12th March now officially makes it a matter of national security.

Yet not many would guarantee that this will mean Ukraine manages to do all that is expected of it either by May, when matters are next assessed, or more importantly November when the agreements are planned to be signed.

Whilst the RADA not working due to the opposition blocking it may seem as though the opposition are destined to allow themselves to be a scapegoat should May assessments prove negative on progress reports, that does not mean the legislation is not being worked upon – by majority and minority alike – it undoubtedly is, for neither side wants to be the side held up as responsible for failing to meet the rhetoric contained within the joint RADA pro-EU statement made only a few weeks ago.

Principled grandstanding keeps media attention, at least for a while, but no politicians home or within the EU are running around like Lewis Carroll’s White Rabbit staring at their watch – at least not yet – though there may be a concerned glance at their time pieces now and again.  When the laws are ready (and quite possibly pre-agreed  by majority and minority behind closed doors with the RADA still blocked), it doesn’t really take that long to unblock the RADA and pass the relevant laws – even if thereafter the RADA is blocked once more to prevent non-EU orientated laws being tabled and/or passed.

As I wrote back on 10th February, it seems very likely Lutsenko will be released soon.  A step in the right direction – whether it be a step far enough with Tymoshenko likely to remain in jail  is the question.  Much will be determined by the Ukrainian actions upon receiving the ECfHR rulings relating to her case.  It is unlikely that pending proceedings will be dropped.

So, Ukraine will work towards the May and November dates undoubtedly – even if it appears that nothing is happening to a casual observer.

Whether is will do enough is a completely different matter.

Whether the European Commission and the European Parliament have no gaps between their respective expectations  is an issue that Stefan Fule is trying to address now it seems.

If these agreements do get signed, then the next expectation gap that hasn’t been addressed is that of the Ukrainian public who hear and read about these agreements all the time – but who will see absolutely no difference after they are signed and a period of years thereafter – And it will take years for all parties to actually ratify these agreements.

You cannot help but feel that even if these agreements are signed in November – there will be a lot of expectations that fall into the gap – both immediately and in the immediate time frame that follows – the agreements are, after all, not a panacea that will cure all the ills of Ukraine.

From the NATO website…..

As all eyes focus on the EU/Ukraine summit in Brussels today, quite unsurprisingly issues such as the NATO/Ukrainian meeting last Friday have been widely ignored.

That said, what appears on the NATO website really doesn’t inspire much coverage.

No mention of the exceptionally unrealistic time line to turn the Ukrainian army from a conscription based to a contract based entity – the last conscription draft due to be September 2013, or the fact that in doing so, the army will be reduced by 50% very swiftly and yet still armed with nothing more than a blunt and rusty knife, fork and spoon for the majority of servicemen and women.

No mention that there is an imperative for a massively reduced Ukrainian military to therefore concentrate on precision equipment – and thus by extension, a necessary imperative for the Ukrainian arms producers to concentrate on developing and producing precision equipment.

No mention of the financial implications of such massive personnel reductions when NATO funds a scheme for the retraining of Ukrainian ex-service personnel.

No mention of the Russians now upgrading the weaponry of the Black Sea Fleet – not that such a Cold War hangover has much effect on the regional balance of power or any significant implications for NATO or Ukraine.  Turkey remains the Black Sea naval presence of note.

Of the usually bland announcements to be found on the NATO website – this is no exception.

The only thing of any interest is a fund to neutralise the legacy of ex-Soviet radioactive sites – which pales in significants to the highly toxic environmental and ecological legacy of ex-Soviet industry still to be dealt with.

Meanwhile, back to paying attention to the EU/Ukraine summit which will neither flatter nor deceive – or produce anything other than the realisation of low to zero expectations by way of concrete action – but it will produce more of the same rhetoric despite the ticking clock!

Just in time for the weekend – RADA back at work

Well, just in time for the EU-Ukraine summit on 25th February, and possibly more importantly for those UDAR MPs who have spent two weeks living in the RADA 24/7 to prevent its working (over a valid point of principle I hasten to add), the RADA began working normally yesterday – in time for weekend – and a few more days off.

It did manage to issue a multi-party pro-EU Association Agreement statement backed by all parties less the Communist Party.  The vote count 315 in favour, 24 against.

Jolly good – but political statements are two a penny in most nations, let alone Ukraine – and all too often empty of anything other than rhetoric.

What remains to be seen is whether the Party of Regions and the opposition parties can actually work together on the areas they agree to progress matters towards moving legislative changes that meet EU the normative – or not.

All too often both allow the areas where they disagree to prevent any progress on the matters where they do – insuring nothing gets done, when in fact, much could be achieved – to the obvious detriment to the people of Ukraine.

It would appear the Communists are not likely to help their coalition partners within the PoR get pro-EU legislative changes through the RADA if the voting on the pro-EU statement is any guideline.  Thus without some of the opposition voting with the PoR to achieve legislative changes and therefore legal parity with the EU, it would appear numerically impossible.

Are both sides mature enough to progress the issues where they agree and fight only over those they don’t?  Probably not, but we will see.

On a completely different subject, to answer a sharp-eyed reader, yes that is me at the bottom of this page on somebody else’s website.  It does happen every so often – Now move along, there is nothing further to see!

Great expectations? – Errr No! (EU/Ukraine summit)

OK, having employed a Dickens title within this post title, I will now quote from a Tale of Two Cities – just to keep you Dickens fans on your toes.

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

And so it is with Ukraine both domestically and further afield.

On 25th February, Ukraine and the EU have a summit.  Summits when they occur usually like to produce signed agreements to show they were worthwhile in the eyes of a usually disinterested or politics weary public who foot the bill for such events.

Signed agreements are a politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and occasionally diplomats way of apparently justifying such events to anybody who will listen.

So what of the EU/Ukraine summit?  Well if anything gets signed, it will be a case having “something” to sign – anything – so whist they disagree and make very little headway over these serious and complex issues, they did agree on these minor and irrelevant points- and signed an agreement to prove it – despite its irrelevance and despite such agreements would otherwise be signed by far lesser beings than Presidents.

This undoubtedly will be the case on 25th February – at least as far as signed agreements go.

Of far more significants, is what headway if any, will be made over the issues that are difficult (for one side or the other), that do have entrenched positions, and that have publicised those positions to the extent that there is very little wiggle room for any party in either  re-framing demands, or accepting some form of movement – but not quite enough.

Can we realistically have great expectations from the next EU/Ukrainian summit that will take relations forwards to the satisfaction of both sides?  I very much doubt it.

What I expect, aside from the signing of a few agreements of irrelevance, is the search for wiggle room on both sides in order to make some progress, possibly enough, to make the signing of the EU DCFTA and AA documents a reality in November.

Certainly there will not be anything like the significant movement to make ratification of those signed agreements possible this year or next – and even if there were – ratification is still unlikely due to elections in the European Parliament and Germany to name but two where the outcomes of which may have significant implications for ratification.

Ergo anybody with a modicum of sense will know that there will have been a presidential election in Ukraine in 2015 before ratification of this agreement even becomes close to reality, or another attempt to muster the political will on either side is found to try and sign it again – no matter what happens in Vilnius in November this year.

The question is then only whether Ukraine will stand firm against the ever increasing Russian pressure it is under.

Whatever diplomatic and political wriggle room remains, will be a precious thing indeed to both sides for this forthcoming encounter in preparation for November.  Look not to the fluff that may be signed, but the the efforts of the staff in the boiler rooms to expand and exploit any wiggle room within both entities as November moves ever closer.

How best to play the interests verses values matrix with such overt Russian pressure as a complicating factor?

Thus we must also watch the hand of the Kremlin as it attempts to win this geopolitical battle – if not by getting Ukraine to join the Customs Union, then by at the very least, forcing it to abandon the EU – or the EU to abandon Ukraine – temporarily or permanently.

Can enough wiggle room be found within the EU/Ukrainian camps to allow for signing if the specter of Moscow’s shadow looms too great – regardless of progress?

We will soon find out – but not on 25th February.