An aligning of the planets? Tymoshenko

Recently I seem to have mentioned the circus that is and surrounds Yulia Tymoshenko far more than normal.

That is perhaps understandable given some EU leaders insistence upon her release to guarantee the signing of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement in November at the Vilnius Summit.  Other EU leaders would prefer to march on and sign the agreement whether she be free or not.  A not uncommon state division over policy EU foreign policy affairs it has to be said.

A few days ago, I wrote about the prospects of a Tymoshenko release after the official recognition of an all female MP plea, during the Orthodox Easter and why such timing would be no bad thing.

As I wrote, that petition was sent to the Pardons Committee.

Since then Prime Minister Azarov has stated that her pardoning cannot occur until all pending court cases have been heard – which is completely untrue.  She can of course be pardoned for those offences of which she has been found guilty already – albeit other cases in the judicial arena are bound to carry on until guilt or innocence is found.

For Prime Minister Azarov, it make make bureaucratic sense for all her pending cases to come to whatever conclusion they may prior to any pardoning – but that is not how the rule of law, Pardons Committee nor human rights work.  More to the point, the Prime Minister does not consider or grant pardons and therefore his opinion should be seen only as that – despite his position.

The system indeed allows for her to be pardoned at any time for the offences she has been found guilty of – regardless of any pending legal proceedings despite what Mr Azarov states.

In fact, the Pardons Committee is due to consider the aforementioned all female MP plea on 29th April, and following on from yesterday’s entry where I pondered just how fast ECfHR fast-tracked cases actually move, I now discover that the ECfHR ruling is supposedly due on 30th April – giving Ukraine the opportunity to grant her pardon prior to what is likely to be a rather pointed judgment from the ECfHR in favour of her release over procedural issues that fall well below the expected European normative.

In short Ukraine internally has the opportunity to recommend and grant her release immediately prior to the ECfHR ruling,  thus taking much the sting and media interest out of that particular tail, whilst also being seen by much of the domestic audience to meet the symbolic motivations due to the Orthodox Easter.

Of course regardless of the Pardons Committee recommendations (if in favour of a release), or the ECfHR ruling, Ms Tymoshenko may remain in jail anyway pending any Ukrainian appeal against said ruling.

Nevertheless, perhaps the planets are indeed aligning for an Orthodox Easter pardon – which I have mentioned many times, would not surprise me should it occur.

That said, as I have written before, if Tymoshenko is not released before or during the RADA summer recess then I seriously doubt that she will be before 2016 – thus it is unlikely any deal will be signed and everyone will have to resort to Plan B – the quiet implementation of parts of the DCFTA most expedient to both sides.

Fast tracked? ECfHR ruling on Tymoshenko

A very short thought for the day as I have just had an operation on my right eye and currently can only see with one – which changes my perspective quite literally, notwithstanding any desire to write something lengthy.

Nevertheless, to ponder today as I did on the operating table, as certain leaders within the EU are still insisting that Ms Tymoshenko be released before any signing of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine – and with Ukraine having stated many times publicly it will honor any ECfHR ruling – one has to ask why the alleged fast-tracking of her case and any  subsequent ruling seems to be anything but fast?

This is surely the biggest possible almost politically neutral lever to expedite her release given Ukraine’s public statements that it will comply.

It must be terribly slow for those standard pending cases at the ECfHR if her case is an example of being “fast-tracked”!

Another vote of “No Confidence”? What did Einstein state about insanity?

Following the United Opposition’s 0/4 disastrous failure in the RADA last week relating to their demanded resolutions, due to selecting battles they simply could not win – with one possible exception in which they conspired amongst themselves to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory - we could possibly expect a change of tactics, if not rhetoric?

Alas it seems not.

Following the comprehensive failure in the vote of “No Confidence” – managing to get only 190 votes of the 226 needed to be successful – Arseney Yatseniuk, leader of the Batkivshchyna Party immediately stated “We plan to submit an issue of non-confidence to the government again.”

Where are those additional 36 votes required to win a “No Confidence” vote going to come from?

Is Albert Einstein not attributed to the quote “Insanity:  doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results?“

There is perhaps a slim chance of a successful vote of “No Confidence” should the EU Association Agreement not get signed at the Vilnius Summit in November – but it would be just that – a slim chance.

In all probability, regardless of a successful or otherwise Vilnius Summit, and despite the United Opposition rhetoric, the next presidential elections will not happen before 2015.  If Yanukovych was then unseated, that is then the best opportunity currently foreseeable, where there could well be a realistic chance of winning a “No Confidence” vote in the government.

Spending the next 2 years wandering around the country inferring “Yes we were bad when we were in power, but these people are worse – so return us to power (early)”, is not the best use of the time available to you and does nothing to make the United Opposition a more credible governance alternative.

Note to the United Opposition leadership – If I have any bias in Ukrainian politics, however slight it may be, it is towards the opposition.  It remains slight because you are engaging in ineffective populist political showboating and hollow grandstanding that will lead to public failures time and time again, when what you need to do is formulate alternative political, economic and social policies communicated consistently prior to the presidential elections in 2015.

Policies that clearly inform me not how you will be a  different set of faces governing the country, but how you will be better than the current president and current majority at governing the country.  I want to know what policies I can expect you to attempt to fulfill, how and how much it will cost if you are successful.

That needs to start now!

Am I doomed to have my “face palm” set in stone like the poor chap above due to your seemingly purposeful strategy of wanting to appear completely feckless and credibility-less – or are you actually going to throw me a small raft of qualitative policy that can be effectively implemented, to I can cling to in order to salvage some hope?

Tymoshenko release probable very soon? Maybe so

Two days ago, as my twitter and Facebook followers will have seen, I highlighted this from the presidential website.

It is official recognition from the President that a formal plea from numerous female RADA MPs have petitioned for Tymoshenko’s pardon and the petition has been formally recorded and recognised.

It is not the first petition for her pardon the president has received – there have been many – but it is the first I have seen acknowledged in such a way.

The following day, it was followed by a similar appeal by historical members of the Ukrainian diplomatic corps.

Previously I forecast that Yuri Lutsenko would be released on the occasion of the Orthodox Easter, but he was released 3 weeks earlier than my crystal ball declared.  That said, I made that prediction at the beginning of February, so perhaps it was a little smudged when I gazed in it.

Could it have been so smudged that I mistook the release of Lutsenko for Tymoshenko and yet the timing between 28th April and 5 May will still prove to be accurate?

It certainly wouldn’t be a bad time to do it for numerous reasons, if that is the decision.

Obviously the symbolism of releasing a woman due to an all female petition, together with if not the resurrection of an omnipresent – the rehabilitation (in part or in full) of a foe by a president many consider likes to think of himself as omnipresent, could sit very well with the Orthodox faithful during the Orthodox Easter.

Symbolism aside, the United Opposition are in something of a mess when it comes to leadership and discipline, Kyrylenko resigning as Deputy Leader of the United Opposition yesterday and MPs leaving, and yet another enormous ego in the shape of Tymoshenko’s entering the daily fray would probably prove more divisive than unifying for them in the medium term – possibly immediately.

Particularly so as there will be those dreading her release amongst the United Opposition just as there were Lutsenko’s release – and for good reason when it comes to personal ambitions.  For them the question is whether Tymoshenko is indeed a spent force amongst opposition parliamentary politics or not.

It would also allow 18 months for any warm (be it very warm or lukewarm) reception from the public she may receive upon release to have cooled greatly prior to presidential elections in 2015, as well as defining her reception amongst an opposition that has moved on somewhat, without her.

Naturally it would all-but guarantee the signing of the EU Association Agreement and DCFTA in Vilnius in November, despite many other demands Ukraine may fail to fulfill in their entirety to the EU time line.

It is though,  an agreement document that will forever go down in Ukrainian history with the signature of President Yanukovych thereon.  Something history will never be able to deny him.  History will equally record his failure to engineer its success.   Let us not underestimate ego.

Perhaps most importantly, and therefore the most unlikely to be mentioned immediately by many, for Yanukovych’s reelection ambitions, should the agreements get signed, it may very well help prevent the further courting of a fairly disgruntled traditionally Party of Regions biased oligarchy with potential new lovers in both Klitschko and Yatseniuk – something that has recently been happening albeit tentatively.

None will back Tymoshenko if released and able to stand for election – “anybody but her” is still very much the current thinking amongst the vast majority of that particular clique.

It maybe that her release, in true Ukrainian style, is done at the very last minute prior to the Vilnius Summit in November – but I doubt that.  If not at Easter, then possibly during the summer RADA recess.  If not by then, then probably not prior to the Vilnius Summit at all.

Whatever the case, the announcement on the presidential website does raise speculation – if not necessarily the odds – of it happening soon.

I will certainly not need to sit down due to shock, should her release come far sooner than most have anticipated – not that on-going investigations would stop.

It also has to be said, I will also not be surprised if her reception amongst the opposition parties and many of their supporters is far cooler than she may expect either.

Enhancing public support for the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement – FCO Report

Today I have very little to say, as I want to draw attention to the work of chaps at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office together with HM Embassy Kyiv under the imaginatively titled “A blueprint for enhancing understanding of and support for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement including DCFTA in Ukraine“

It is also available in Ukrainian - Угода про асоціацію ЄС – Україна: дослідження обізнаності цільових груп та стратегія комунікаційної кампанії - a title just as lengthy as in English!

It is a very interesting read that will go a long way to questioning the predispositions of some relating to the Ukrainian public desire to head West (or East).

I could go on and on but I won’t – have a read, it will be worth it.

The Rome Statute – Again

Not that long ago I wrote about the Rome Statute and the fact that Ukraine, whilst a signatory, was not a ratified signatory due to a 2001 Constitutional Court ruling.  My entry is also here in Russian.

In fact my ruminations made it to publication on the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) website also – Blimey!

I have since mentioned the Rome Statute in an entry relating to the Constitutional Assembly and their first submissions to the Venice Commission – pondering the probabilities that any such amendments may facilitate the eventual ratification of the Rome Statute by Ukraine.

What I have not mentioned since my very first entry on the subject is the CICC NGO itself – despite telephone conversations and emails between Kristen Meersschaert Duchens, the Regional Coordinator for Europe, and myself.

Naturally the CICC has not sat idly in The Hague whilst I have failed to mention them since.

That said, I have deliberately not mentioned them in order to keep their “powder dry” for a long planned campaign to influence Ukraine which starts now – beginning with the expected letter to the head of state and press releases etc.  All of this is likely to culminate in personal lobbying by CICC people at very lofty Ukrainian political heights within the next 8 weeks or so, which hopefully will coincide with the return of the Venice Commission’s words of wisdom in relation to the first proposed constitutional changes by the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly.

So, whilst this is likely to be a rather slow battle for ratification, largely due to the constitutional ruling of 2001 and the need for constitutional amendments that may or may not be within the Constitutional Assembly’s recommendations currently under the wise noses of those within the Venice Commission, it is a battle that can eventually be won – particularly if Ukrainian good will regarding pro-EU normative legislative momentum can continue after the Vilnius Summit (regardless of its signing or not), and not be slowed by the external forces of European Parliament elections or Ukrainian elections over the next 2 years.

Now Ukraine has been targeted, every thing depends on momentum, even if that momentum ends up seemingly glacial – for glacial is far better than stationary!

Closed door meeting over Ukraine – Strasbourg 18th April

Not for the first time there is to be an official and rather important closed door meeting over Ukraine amongst EU leaders to discuss reports by the Cox-Kwasniewski mission to Ukraine.

The last such meeting occurred on 2nd October 2012 and neither the report nor the minutes of that meeting have ever been made public.

Whether the latest report or minutes of the meeting on the 18th April will be made public is unclear, but if it follows the precedent of the last report then it will remain something the public are not deemed  suitable for inclusion – despite the fact this report will quite clearly be a key document in the decision or not to sign the AA and DCFTA in Vilnius in November.

Further, a decision on whether to extend to Cox-Kwasniewski mission to Ukraine will be taken.

Adamantly against its extension is Elmar Brok the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee for the European Parliament and Rebecca Harms of the Green Party – both German if that means anything.

However there are those adamantly in favour of extending the mission until the Vilnius Summit.  It is likely to be a fractious affair – and with every man and his dog keen to take the credit for the release of Lutsenko and Filipchuk, no doubt the supporters for the extension of the Cox-Kwasniewski mission will claim (possibly quite rightly) that it is they, rather than the claims of the United Opposition and those of civil society that were most effective in engineering their release.

After all, the word “effective” can be associated with very few in civil society or the United Opposition when it comes to influencing the views and decisions of President Yanukovych.

Ergo, the Cox-Kwasneiwski mission has brought results – albeit eventually – the lack of which had been a major criticism of (the rather inflated egotistically, by way of ability and quite literally) Elmar Brok.  A major argument to end the mission now, due to lack of headway, if not removed from his arsenal then far less potent.

With Vilnius seen (even if not entirely accurately) as make or break for EU/Ukrainian relations for the next few years, the question has to be asked, conceding that some momentum has been gathered and results achieved, is it wise, literally for the sake of an additional 6 months, to disengage their mission now?

What signals would either continuing or ending their mission give considering there is little hope that their key report is unlikely to be seen by the public?

Perhaps the most important question, regardless of whether these agreements are signed or not, is how to keep any momentum going in the immediate period after the Vilnius Summit with major elections in 2014 and 2015 in the European Parliament and several influential nations driving EU/Ukrainian relations – including of course – Ukraine?

US Aid 2014 and Ukrainian Feckless Plurality

It seems amongst a total of approximately $88.5 million allocated by the US to aid Ukraine in 2014, $54 million of that is to support democracy and reform.

To quote the US Department of State:

“U.S. assistance [of $54 million to Ukraine] aims to promote the development of a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine, fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community as it struggles to overcome the effects of the global financial crisis and worsening backsliding on democratic reform,” according to the Department of State’s FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary.

The Department of State, in particular, noted that funding would strengthen democratic institutions and processes, and accountable governance, support civil society, independent media, judicial reform, and anti-corruption efforts, improve conditions for investment and economic growth, improve energy security, and help bring the damaged Chornobyl nuclear facility to an environmentally safe and stable condition and properly store its nuclear waste.

 These funds belong to the so-called Economic Support Fund, which the U.S. uses to advance its interests by helping countries “meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs.” 

A big ask indeed.  If all that could be achieved on such funding in Ukraine, the promotion of democracy globally would cost no more than a few dozen drones.

Of course it cannot be achieved on such funding and nobody expects it to be achieved – even with all the pooled funding numerous global actors provide relating to these areas of Ukrainian “democratic development”.  The end game of a consolidated democracy in Ukraine – both vertically and horizontally – is not much closer than it was in 1991 when independence was rudely dumped into the lamp of Ukraine.

If we are to stick to the scholarly terms of “opening” – where democratic opportunity appears and gives chance to replace a previous non-democratic regime, or “breakthrough” where democracy actually replaces the old governance system – often rapidly and normally on that back of a new legal foundation (Constitutions), and lastly “consolidation” whereby the state institutions, civil society, judiciary and all other horizontal democratic institutions are reformed, together with vertical of regular elections and the habitual recognition by society of the rules of democracy, it is quite clear that no democratically elected Ukrainian government has ever got anywhere near achieving the consolidation of democracy – particularly so when it comes to the horizontal.

What Ukraine does have is a rather hollow – or lacking – horizontal which needs to be addressed with far more political will and effort than the issues with the vertical at this moment in time.  Whilst laws addressing these issues may now be getting written, they will be useless unless implemented and monitored both fairly and consistently by an independent and competitive horizontal.

There are few Ukrainian politicians past or present, who would not classify as being part of a rather nicely named scholarly group of “feckless pluralists” – and “feckless pluralism” is certainly where Ukraine would find itself seated in most academics eyes by way of theory definition over the past decade.

Those few which do not would generally fall into the category of “feckless pluralists” would fall into the category  “dominant power” politics whereby the State and the leader/ruling party become almost indistinguishable rather than necessarily clearly defined.  Ex-President Kuchma would probably be the closest to a Ukrainian period where “dominant power” politics prevailed in the 1990s.

Sticking rigidly to scholarly definition, President Yanukovych, despite prima facie efforts to move back towards “dominant power” politics would not manage to fully meet all the necessary theoretical determining markers – Thus it is with a wry smile that I write that he currently remains “feckless”, and with all the other politicians of Ukraine, is  engaged in the “feckless pluralism”.

The definition which so encapsulates Ukrainian politics:

“Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting.  Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of power seems only to trade the country’s problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country.”  Thomas Carothers - End of the Transitional Paradigim, 2002.

What part of feckless pluralism doesn’t fit the Ukrainian political class from 2005 – present?

I doubt Yanukovych will manage to complete a move back to the “dominant power” politics of Kuchma due to internal and external pressure and economic realities, and thus Ukraine swings as a pendulum between absolute fecklessness and fecklessness with a dominant streak – none of which provides anything more than a hollow democracy of sorts, and provides leadership past and present that has not or is not overly interested in, or capable of, moving Ukraine entirely into the solid territory of a consolidated democracy.  All have, or will have a democratic legacy deficit rather than a positive democratic legacy to draw upon when times are hard and democracy is deemed to be failing rather than producing the results society expects.

So it is with more than a little pessimism that I look at the latest US funding announcement when it comes to Ukrainian political Dollar deliverables.

That is not to say that either feckless pluralism or dominant politics cannot move to establish a consolidated democracy – but it takes sustained political will, with oft hard and unpopular work to accomplish – not US$ or Euro when all is said and done.