Social matters – Ukraine

One of the key advantages of any political incumbent with elections on the horizon, is the ability to indirectly bribe sections of the community through social policy – slowly but surely – in the run-up to campaigning.

Now 2015 and the next presidential elections may seem far, far away – although as that is all the opposition leaders seem to talk or be bothered about, with the exception of the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU – one maybe forgiven for thinking the election is far closer than it actually is.

Thus with the opposition leadership distracted by the possibility that one day one of them may become president – it is maybe not surprising that two open goals with political points freely available seem to have passed without comment – ridiculous as that may sound to anybody expecting an opposition to hold a majority to account.

After all, they seem determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory at every given opportunity, as I wrote only a few days ago.

And so it has come to pass that a truly woeful piece of legislation has been tabled in relation to a new Labour Code – so woeful that the Social Policy Minister has gone out of her way to underscore just how awful it is to journalists prior to any voting.

On the same day, the Ukrainian Ombudsman for Human Rights has just highlighted that of social cases brought before Ukrainian courts, only 30% of the nations court decisions are actually carried out – meaning that 70% of court decisions relating to social matters therefore fail to protect the human rights of individuals the judgments are there to protect – And most of these cases involve the non-payment of legally guaranteed benefits by the State as the State funds are several UAH billion underfunded.

To any opposition party leaderships that were not preoccupied with egocentric pondering of just how good they would look sat in the Presidential residence, these are golden opportunities to highlight incredibly poor performance by the current majority in the social, legislative and administrative spheres – issues that would have been pounced upon by any functioning opposition leadership immediately these statements were made – in the full knowledge that in the coming 18 months, the current incumbent will begin to use social policy to bribe voters ahead of the elections.

Seriously, if the figures the Ombudsman states are correct, 2 million judgments in 2012 alone, of which 70% go unfulfilled – that is 1,400,000 voters who have failed to get justice from the State, despite court decisions going their way.  That is about 3% of the population – and 3% is a sizable constituency in the zero sum, first past the post, presidential electoral system.

Such figures simply demanded an immediate and robust response from opposition leaders themselves -  rather than any mutterings from underlings.

Maximum opposition impact in relation to these statements with both media and society alike has now passed – another missed opportunity.

Insuring failure – Ukrainian opposition

Now if you happen to be the opposition – ergo the minority – in any parliament, it goes without saying that getting the laws you support passed – or those you are against to fail – requires party discipline to insure the maximum turnout at any such vote, as well as erosive lobbying of those within the majority to gain support that goes against their party line.

Very difficult in any parliament and it is certainly not easy in a corrupt and self-serving cesspit  such as the Ukrainian RADA.

I have written previously of the critical and headline votes that the opposition could have won had they the discipline to insure their party members turned up to work as they are paid to do.  However snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is becoming something of an unofficial policy for the “United Opposition”.

After such public leadership and party disciplinary failures that caused the opposition to lose all 4 headline votes in the above link, you would think that thereafter the mandatory attendance of all opposition MPs would have been required by parties when bills they sponsor or support are up for vote.

After all what harm could the occasional victory over the government do for their image and the public perception of their effectiveness – let alone display weakness within the majority coalition occasionally?

And yet, Anatoliy Grychenko, a leader within the United Opposition on the Batkivshchyna Party list, now almost daily decries the fact that party discipline is non-existent, together with party leadership being noticeable by its absence.

Анатолій Гриценко
Опозиція має відрізнятися від влади!

Сьогодні Рада провалила два проекти опозиції. Опозиція допомогла їх провалити.

1) проект 2126 – про зарахування екологічного податку до бюджетів місцевих Рад. Логічний і правильний. Внесла Свобода, Сех. Опозиція активно агітує за підтримку. Голосування: Батьківщина – мінус 30 голосів, УДАР – мінус 15, Свобода – мінус 5 голосів. Разом – мінус 50 голосів!

2) проект 2503 – про охорону тварин і рослин від винищення браконьєрами. Логічний і правильний. Внесла Батьківщина, Томенко. Опозиція активно агітує за підтримку. Голосування: Батьківщина – мінус 42 голоси, УДАР – мінус 16, Свобода – мінус 4 голоси. Разом – мінус 62 голоси.

3) проект 2149 – зараз розглядається. Про адміністративні послуги, теж від опозиції, УДАР, Продан – результат буде аналогічним, а то ще й гіршим, бо в секторі опозиції все більше пустих крісел.

Не може бути виправдання такій недисциплінованості й безвідповідальності депутатів. Сектор влади теж напівпустий, але влада мене менше турбує. Турбує те, що опозиція – діє так само, а мала би задати інший стандарт поведінки. Говорю про це вождям і депутатам майже щодня. По барабану. Біда…

To save you translating, an environmental taxation bill (566) aimed at funneling environmental taxes to local government rather than central government, and vigorously supported by the opposition, failed because 30 Batkivshchyna MPs did not turn up to vote, neither did 15 from UDAR and another 5 from Svoboda.  A total of 50 opposition votes missing from a bill the opposition wanted to pass.

Bill 2503, drawn up by Mikola Tomenko relating to the protection of flora and fauna.  Tomenko is a man who sits amongst the elite of the elite in the Batkivshchyna Party and his bill faired even worse.  Despite his position in the party hierarchy, 40 of his fellow Batkivshchyna MPs, almost all of which his junior in both parliamentary longevity, party position and most importantly political ability, were absent.  Add to this another 16 missing from UDAR and 4 missing from Svoboda and that is a total of 62 opposition votes AWOL for one of their own pieces of legislature up for the vote!

Grychenko rightly summarises that there can be no excuse for such indiscipline and irresponsibility that the United Opposition is consistently displaying – quite rightly.  As he states, complaints about opposition leadership and deputies within are now an almost daily occurrence from within its own ranks.

Fair play to him for stating the obvious- not that the disunity within the opposition is a closely guarded secret.  It is obvious to anybody who cares to look amongst either the leadership, the rank and file, or both.

Leadership-less, discipline-less, rudderless and feckless – As far as the Ukrainian public and EU are concerned, this coalition will once again turn out to be hopeless – whether it regains power or remains in opposition.

So terribly sad that they cannot even muster being an effective opposition, as that would at least assist giving some credibility to any opposition presidential candidate – and whilst Ukraine is no doubt capable of suffering another Yanukovych term, one has to hope it won’t have to.

- And before I am asked who I would prefer to see as the next president of Ukraine – whilst it may read like anybody other than the present incumbent or Yulia Tymoshenko – it’s not – at least not quite.  In no particular order:

Klitschko (UDAR leader) – likely to run and likely to reach the second round if there is one according to current opinion polls

Tomenko (Batkivshchyna) – very unlikely to run which is a shame as he is a very competent politician

Poroshenko (Independent) – may run but will not get the votes his experience deserves

Grychenko (Batkivshchyna) – very unlikely to run as not enough support at the ballot box despite TV popularity in debates

In the unlikely event of an internal Party Regions competitor:

Serhey Tigipko

You see, if I had listed those who I would not want to see as the next president, the likes Yanukovych, Tymoshenko, Tyahnybok, Yatseniuk and the vast majority of each of the parties hierarchy, it would have been a very long list indeed!

But what if the Association Agreement gets signed?

Much has been said and written about the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement and DCFTA.  Much has been said and written about how it would necessarily anchor Ukrainian policy within the EU normative.  Much has been said and written about whether – or not – the Association Agreement will be signed in November.

But what if it does get signed – apart from the much repeated long term economic benefits to Ukraine – not to mention short term geopolitical victory for the EU (and perhaps Ukraine depending on your point of view) – where does democracy fit into this equation in a relationship with an EU in flux which seems to simply add layers of complexity where they are not needed but ignoring necessary layers of complexity where they are required?

There are already nations outside the EU that are in the European Economic Area (EEA) such as Switzerland and Norway which in short are effectively regulated and somewhat controlled by the EU through decisions relating to the single market, without having the voting or veto rights of full EU membership – EU-Lite for want of a better expression.

Debate rages in the UK over EU withdrawal – or not – and a much mentioned issue is the de facto issue that by leaving it would put the UK in a very similar position to the EEA nations – whereby a certain amount of arbitrary compliance will be necessary for trade without any voting rights over the rules and regulations that come with compliance.

And so, taking that issue one constituency further from the centre, to the most ambitious agreement ever attempted between the EU and an external State (Ukraine) – where does that leave Ukraine should the Association Agreement and DCFTA get signed?  A position that is likely to be effectively EU Lite-lite or EEA-Lite.

It will be left to implement EU and EEA rules and regulations without any voting rights whatsoever over EU or EEA decisions.

It is hardly likely when lobbying the Ukrainian cause without any robust voting or veto rights, that Ukraine will change EU minds when future decisions change the EU internal political/trading/economic environment to which it may have signed up to.  28 internal nations will have already agreed – what chance an EU Lite-lite nation making any impact on that decision?

If the decision is made that all bread sold within the EU must be coloured green, then any Ukrainian bread imports into the EU would have to be green, whether Ukraine can make green bread or not – or whether it can do so cost-effectively – to make a point in a rather juvenile way.

Basically, if the EEA (EU-Lite) is a constituency without democratic normative tools to influence the EU, then what is equivalent to being EU-Lite-lite – should the agreements be signed – is no different.

Should these documents be signed and all content within effectively implemented by Ukraine, it will be as close to being an EEA nation without being an EEA nation as is possible – part of a constituency with no effective democratic tool box or representation within the EU.

The more integrated it becomes in that EEA or EU constituency, the more Brussels decisions with impact within Ukraine will seem undemocratic to the Ukrainian society – a society already desperately clinging on to democratic ideology despite seeing absolutely nothing delivered by the democratic system since 1991.

How can this be overcome when there are no explicit promises of accepting Ukraine into the EU other than vague references to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union?

An EU-Ukrainian council in which, should no agreement be reached, a third party with a decisive vote in case of deadlock – the EEA nations perhaps, in the form of the EEA Council – can settle matters?

If not that way, or in cases of appeal, who would act as the final court if legal challenges were made?  The ECJ or another jurisdiction?

How do you deal with an effectively enlarged constituency when denying it the basic rights of the democratic tool box and representation to rules and regulations are made by the core?

After all this is not a simple matter of bilateral relations – nothing is simple when it comes the EU foreign policy!

Democracy, tolerance and habit – The Ternopil Incident

We often read about democracy through the lenses freedom of speech/expression, rule of law, human rights, or free and fair elections, or political responsiveness to the public, accountability, transparency etc -  and rightly so – they are all necessarily required for an effective democracy.

But democracy is a very complex structure, and a list of its defining features would be very lengthy indeed.

Less often do we read about democracy needing to be habitual and tolerant.

For any democracy to consolidate there are numerous factors of course, but habit and tolerance are extremely important ingredients – not just recognised and mutually assured by and between the political elite, but also by the society which underpin any democracy if it is ever to consolidate.

It is far easier to change the habits and tolerances of a political party, or the political strata, than it is to change the habits and tolerances of society quickly.

If a political party or the political elite generally, are institutionalised, complex and coherent then internal change is swift – at least in comparison to the speed of societal change, more often than not.

Thus democratic habit and tolerances need to be clearly and robustly displayed amongst the political elite, consistently and over an extended period of time to assist in any changing of societal habit and tolerance.

Democracy after all, is a system in a state of continual friction between opposing/differing ideas, policies, ideologies etc.  Thus it demands tolerance for it to work effectively.  It demands habit for longevity and consolidation.

It is therefore very sad to read that apparently Svoboda MPs and party officials were at the forefront of what is most definitely a display of intolerance during the Ternipol Victory Day celebrations, that according to the account in the link above, prevented veterans from marking the end of WWII with any  degree of reverence and dignity – as those across the rest of European continent and Ukraine managed to do, if they so wished.

Perhaps of even greater sadness following this incident, there are as yet no words of condemnation from the Svoboda leadership, or the other parties in the opposition coalition with Svoboda – all of whom – including Svoboda – claim to be the “democratic opposition” and/or fighting for a democratic Ukraine.

Perhaps it is necessary to point out to the opposition parties of Ukraine, that in a democratic Ukraine, old men and women would be free to mark the end of WWII with dignity and reverence – whether they like them doing so or not!

Authoritarian, dictatorial, disciplinarian, democratic or “managed” democracy?

How would you interpret the following – Authoritarian, dictatorial, disciplinarian, democratic, a form of managed democracy, or something else?

“No one is banned from proposing their candidacy for the mayor.  We are a democratic organization, a democratic party and the united opposition is building its policy on democratic foundations.  Any MP, and not only MPs, but members of the party can be nominated.

 But as soon as the united opposition passes a decision to nominate a single candidate, those who oppose this decision will in fact oppose the opposition and help the ruling party.

Therefore there should be a single candidate.  Anyone who disagrees with this, all those who play along with the authorities, will certainly be expelled from the faction and the party.  Everyone has an opportunity to offer their candidacy and be nominated, but after the decision is made, we should strictly follow it.  This is the principle for our victory.”

Those are the words of Olexandr Turchynov MP, one of the most senior members of the Batkivshchanya Party.

If you genuinely believe in the party but continue to disagree with a party nomination after it is made – does it truly warrant being expelled – particularly so when the party nomination may be for somebody external of your party, as is the case with these tactics of the “United Opposition”?

Should Batkivshchyan MPs be expected (under threat of expulsion) to unconditionally support the nomination of  UDAR’s Klitschko or Svoboda’s Tyahnybok, when these parties and these leaders chose quite deliberately not to assimilate with Batkivshchyna, but retain their own identities and ideologies?

What about society?

Should the voters not have the right to vote for a candidate from the same party they supported and propelled into the RADA, for the position of Kyiv Mayor?  Is it really democracy when voters are denied the opportunity to vote for a candidate from the party they support?

Cyprus, Leveson and direction – Ukraine

Not that long ago in Ukraine, a very unwise MP called for a 25% tax on savings to assist Ukraine in its current financial and economic plight.

That MP was castrated publicly and immediately by the current prime minister, numerous business and bank leaders, NGOs both foreign and domestic, and several media outlets – Quite rightly.

Hardly a plan that would inspire confidence in either the current government or the banking system – not withstanding the morality and possible illegalities of such a proposal.

Naturally there are some differences between the circumstances of Ukraine and Cyprus when we consider the external factors and entities relating to the Cypriot decision, and the simply moronic thoughts of a RADA MP with no clue about the concept of casual effect.

However, Ukraine is not renowned for the intelligence of the vast majority of its parliamentary representatives.  As such, we can expect a large amount of folly – and indeed we get it – though fortunately much of that folly does not get adopted as social or economic policy.

However, the fact that Ukraine – given all its political and internal problems, and no small number of self-interested dullards sitting as MPs – immediately pooh-poohed the suggestion of a tax  (or if you are a Cypriot, a “levy”) on savings, would seem to show a far greater awareness for causal effect than that of the supposedly very clever EU “troika” and their original “deal” with Cyprus.

One is reminded of Albert Pike’s Morals and Dogma (1871) – in which he writes “Even the fool will sometimes hit the mark……..The finger even of the idiot may point to the great highway.”

Well, even the fools running Ukraine immediately shot down the idea of taxing savings and had the ability to recognise what the reaction of society would be if they even momentarily entertained – let alone carried out – such a proposal.

Now the EU “troika” has gone far beyond momentarily entertaining the idea – and have been roundly rebuffed by the Cypriot Parliament who have rejected the plan categorically – so we will now see just how far the causal effects will run if not necessarily in practice, then on the psyche of society.

Naturally any changes to the original deal to mitigate the casual effects will amply display the complete incompetence of those who formed the “deal” in the first place.

It has to be said, thus far it is only Wednesday, and with the proposed Eurozone sponsored Cypriot savings raid, and the truly awful attack on free speech in the UK yesterday as a result of the Leveson inquiry, I am – not for the first time – watching parts of Europe large and small, entity and sovereign nation, moving towards Ukraine rather than Ukraine moving towards the EU in significant areas of democracy, rule of law, human rights and media freedom.

Hmmm

It’s not enough to be decent and right – You have to be convincing

Yet another opinion poll places  President Yanukovych in a second round run-off against Vitali Klitschko – with a big distance between other potential candidates for the 2015 presidential elections – such as Arseny Yatseniuk or anybody else directly associated with Ms Tymoshenko’s party for that matter.

For once I have little doubt in these results – and they are consistent and a continuation of previous and consecutive opinion polls by various polling companies over recent months.

Yet the question has to be asked why Yatseniuk, leading the biggest opposition party by far, does not get the same proportion of voter based support from the public carried over into the far more personal realm of presidential candidacy support.

The answer is quite simple.  It is simply not enough to be either decent and/or right – you have to be convincing – particularly when going up against an incumbent.

Yatseniuk  is simply not convincing – not even enough for sufficient numbers of the Batkivshchyna Party voters, which he leads, to want him as president – which then raises the question as to whether he is the right person to lead the party when the presidential elections get much closer.

If he is not, how close to the election do you have the internal strife of replacing him and leaving any new leader with a realistic chance?

Or will Batkivshchkyna stubbornly back a three-legged horse in this race – one that is simply going to get easily knocked out of the presidential race in the first round, as current opinion polls would suggest?

Great expectations? – Errr No! (EU/Ukraine summit)

OK, having employed a Dickens title within this post title, I will now quote from a Tale of Two Cities – just to keep you Dickens fans on your toes.

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

And so it is with Ukraine both domestically and further afield.

On 25th February, Ukraine and the EU have a summit.  Summits when they occur usually like to produce signed agreements to show they were worthwhile in the eyes of a usually disinterested or politics weary public who foot the bill for such events.

Signed agreements are a politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and occasionally diplomats way of apparently justifying such events to anybody who will listen.

So what of the EU/Ukraine summit?  Well if anything gets signed, it will be a case having “something” to sign – anything – so whist they disagree and make very little headway over these serious and complex issues, they did agree on these minor and irrelevant points- and signed an agreement to prove it – despite its irrelevance and despite such agreements would otherwise be signed by far lesser beings than Presidents.

This undoubtedly will be the case on 25th February – at least as far as signed agreements go.

Of far more significants, is what headway if any, will be made over the issues that are difficult (for one side or the other), that do have entrenched positions, and that have publicised those positions to the extent that there is very little wiggle room for any party in either  re-framing demands, or accepting some form of movement – but not quite enough.

Can we realistically have great expectations from the next EU/Ukrainian summit that will take relations forwards to the satisfaction of both sides?  I very much doubt it.

What I expect, aside from the signing of a few agreements of irrelevance, is the search for wiggle room on both sides in order to make some progress, possibly enough, to make the signing of the EU DCFTA and AA documents a reality in November.

Certainly there will not be anything like the significant movement to make ratification of those signed agreements possible this year or next – and even if there were – ratification is still unlikely due to elections in the European Parliament and Germany to name but two where the outcomes of which may have significant implications for ratification.

Ergo anybody with a modicum of sense will know that there will have been a presidential election in Ukraine in 2015 before ratification of this agreement even becomes close to reality, or another attempt to muster the political will on either side is found to try and sign it again – no matter what happens in Vilnius in November this year.

The question is then only whether Ukraine will stand firm against the ever increasing Russian pressure it is under.

Whatever diplomatic and political wriggle room remains, will be a precious thing indeed to both sides for this forthcoming encounter in preparation for November.  Look not to the fluff that may be signed, but the the efforts of the staff in the boiler rooms to expand and exploit any wiggle room within both entities as November moves ever closer.

How best to play the interests verses values matrix with such overt Russian pressure as a complicating factor?

Thus we must also watch the hand of the Kremlin as it attempts to win this geopolitical battle – if not by getting Ukraine to join the Customs Union, then by at the very least, forcing it to abandon the EU – or the EU to abandon Ukraine – temporarily or permanently.

Can enough wiggle room be found within the EU/Ukrainian camps to allow for signing if the specter of Moscow’s shadow looms too great – regardless of progress?

We will soon find out – but not on 25th February.