Klitschko talks of time running out and personal sanctions

Only a few days ago, I mentioned a statement from Stefan Fule relating to no time extension for Ukraine to meet EU expectations in November.

As I stated, despite the bullish tone, this has far more to do with the European political calendar preventing any extension, rather than Stefan Fule developing a rigid, rather than flexible, backbone.

Let’s be quite honest, after 7 difficult years of negotiation for both sides – including some serious concessions by Ukraine – the EU would not normally throw that away for the sake of a few months if there were a few additional months in the political calendar to play with.

The fact is, due to national elections in very influential member states, notwithstanding the European parliamentary elections during the next 2 years, quite simply there is not much room, if any, to allow any political deadlines to slide for a few months.  A few years – yes.  Look to 2016 at the earliest after German, European parliament, French and UK elections to name but a few – including Ukrainian presidential elections.

Allowing any signing to slide until then, naturally removes the desire for political momentum on either side – raising the question of whether that momentum can be regained several years from now.

Even if the Association Agreement and DCFTA is signed in Vilnius in November, due to the same European  political calendar, ratification will still take years for the same reasons.

All blatantly obvious to anybody with half an eye on the European political electoral calendar.

Unfortunately, this seems to an issue completely overlooked by the opposition in Ukraine if Klitschko’s recent comments are anything to go by:

“Even if the association agreement is negotiated and signed, in order to have it ratified by all the EU countries, Ukraine has to comply with the basic political values and principles of the European Community, such as the rule of law, the absence of selective justice, real reforms, and democratic electoral law. To achieve this, Ukraine has much to do and the time is very short.

For our part, we, as the opposition, are pressing on the authorities to make them meet the commitments so that the country should not lose the chance to join the European community. If the Ukrainian authorities fail to adhere to the commitments, the issue of personal sanctions against officials cannot be avoided.”

Firstly, when looking at these comments, it has to be said that negotiations have concluded some time ago – indeed the agreements were initialed by both sides in March 2012, thereby effectively sealing them to major and significant amendment.  Thus it is a question of singing the already initialed agreements and no longer negotiating as Klitschko states.

The second paragraph in which he makes reference to personal sanctions on members of the existing government should it fail to adhere to those commitments is really not something that the opposition are likely to achieve – and they must surely be aware of that given the interaction they have with th EU and its member states – so why say it?

What are the chances of the EU placing sanctions on Ukrainian officials – seriously?

Not only are the outcomes of sanctions hit and miss and lengthy when it comes to getting any result, they are actually fairly limited in their scope.

Looking at EU sanctions, they consist of arms embargo, economic and financial sanctions and visa/entry restrictions.  No more and no less.

EU sanctions have proven to be of little impact to those individuals within Belarus to whom they are applied.  They are not being very seriously considered as far as a mirror of the US Magnitsky Act in respect of Russia and persons therein.

Applying EU sanctions to individuals within Ukraine, without for example, applying them to fellow EaP nation  Azerbaijan or individuals within government circles there – which has a far worse democratic, human rights, repression of freedoms and electoral manipulation record – would be difficult to justify to the European public.  Particularly so given the lack of impact and results in Belarus.

There is also a lack of EU diplomatic will to raise sanctions on individuals in Ukraine.  Only recently I spoke with somebody in the Brussels bubble (Chatham House Rule applied), and he stated that sanctions are not the way forward.  They are difficult to gain consensus over to implement, and even harder to then garner the consensus to  remove – and Ukraine has its supporters within the EU that would make gaining consensus over sanctions very difficult.

It is somewhere that sufficient numbers of EU bureaucrats do not want to go with regard to Ukraine.

Now if I am reliably informed of this, then surely this must have been made very clear indeed to the likes of Mr Klitschko and the other opposition leaders, who will have undoubtedly raised the issue several times – so why raise the issue again publicly if there is a high probability that it simply won’t happen.

When – as will more likely than not – sanctions against individuals are again publicly called for by the opposition, and again rebuffed by the EU – with a presidential election in Ukraine now on the horizon, how would any refusal reflect on the ability, authority and perception of international influence of any opposition candidate be in the eyes of the Ukrainian electorate?

There is much to be said for timing.  Being right and/or decent is not enough to win an election.  There is the overriding need to be convincing.

Time is indeed running out, not only for Ukraine to have progressed enough to allow the signing of the Association Agreement and DCFTA, but also for the opposition to stop the political showboating and empty rhetoric.

It is now time for the opposition to prepare their own political, economic and social policies ready for an effective delivery to the electorate by whomever is put forward as an opposition presidential candidate.  To frame their election campaign as “We were bad when in power, but they are worse” is really not an inspiring electoral campaign – and yet that is all that is currently on offer.

The first to frame the elections in a better way than that, will probably keep the upper hand.

Is working in Ukraine as a foreigner about to get easier?

As it is my umteenth anniversary today, and thus via the “ball and chain” and the goodwill of Ukraine, I have permanent residency here, this entry really does not affect me in any way.

In fact it doesn’t affect anybody I know either.

It will undoubtedly affect some readers however – both currently and in the future.

It seems that the State Employment Centre has made assurances that the current (and no doubt overly bureaucratic) systems for granting work permits and temporary resident status (for the purposes of work) are going to be simplified – requiring far less documentation than currently is required – especially so as far as renewals/extensions are concerned, and which will subsequently be gratis if granted for those who have navigated the bureaucratic circus before.

They also state that consideration is being given to raise the duration of such permits from 1 year to 3 years.

A particularly good idea should the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA actually be signed – as not only will foreign confidence increase (to a greater or lesser degree) relating to entering the Ukrainian market at an SME/entrepreneurial level, those who want to do so, may actually stand a reasonable chance of navigating the bureaucratic hurdles that prevent so many currently.

It is necessary of course, to see just how the bureaucracy will be reduced – if at all – and I suspect not at all, other than the more expedited time line requirement for the bureaucracy to function and process applications.

Which documents will be subsequently scrapped from the current list will be far more interesting, as currently some of the documentation required is the barrier to entry – rather than the business environment itself!

Best guess thus far is here.

Lutsenko circus nears its finale

Yesterday, as per the script, the prison sentence of Yuri Lutsenko was upheld by The Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases.

Now, as per the script, it falls to the President Yanukovych to release Lutsenko on humanitarian grounds due to ill health, negating the need for Lutsenko to ask for a pardon which he will not do.

It also follows that his conviction would remain if released from prison on humanitarian grounds.

For the sake of the continuing circus performance, one has to suspect Easter would be a good time for the President to intervene and have him released.  So possibly around 5th May?  It would fall in rather nicely with the EU time line to see some “progress”.

Anyway, the circus performance must go on, even if for just a little longer with respect to Lutsenko – After all it would simply be boring to just have him finish his sentence in 2014 now wouldn’t it?

Italy to open Consulate in Odessa soon

A very short and sweet entry today.

Yet another diplomatic mission will soon open in Odessa – this time Italian - which will please the good woman if it has the ability to produce Visas, as Italy is a nation that particularly attracts her for reasons of history, architecture, food and of course fashion.

Very good.  That makes half a dozen Consulates opened in Odessa in as many years and leaves Odessa housing close to 20 diplomatic missions.

Naturally the UK isn’t one of them – not even an Honorary Consul, despite an ever growing and vibrant local diplomatic community – but I have come to expect nothing less.

Shell (companies), Ukraine, hydrocarbons and the limits of Ukrainian journalism (not to mention a willfully blind EU eye)?

The day after the EU met with Edward Stavysky, the current Ukrainian Energy Minister, a meeting that will bring about a high level round table over EU sponsorship over the upgrading of the Ukrainian gas transport system (GTS) amongst other things – I am left pondering many things.

There has been a bad smell over the inclusion of a company called GEO Service arbitrarily in Ukrainian government deals with major oil and gas explorers and producers.  The reason for the bad smell becomes a little clearer with this piece in the Ukraine Pravda – but it no surprise.  It is no surprise that the oil majors are going along with it either.  Big oil (and gas) is a very murky business no matter who is involved.  This for them is standard practice no doubt.

However, it does not stop at Geoservice and the inferences made within that article – possibly more so when mentioning the current Ukrainian Energy Minister.

Unfortunately Ukraine Pravda does not go further than to elaborate on what it was spoon fed/given to build a story around – and investigative journalism in Ukraine is not particularly the safest of jobs.

However, if there was a Ukrainian investigative journalist at a loose end, they may not go far wrong in looking at the Energy Minister himself and other seemingly “no value” or “strange” business entities somehow involved in hydrocarbons in Ukraine – other than the infamous Geoservices which seems to concentrate media attention.

If they were to need a few dots to join together, some interesting dots amongst the vast mosaic of opaque vested interests could be a dot/company called “Vodi Ukraine”.  Another dot would necessarily be Nadra Ukraine.  Perhaps those dots could be joined together?

The Vodi Ukraine  (which means Water Ukraine)  misnomer should not put off our investigative journalists.  Vodi Ukraine may have more to do with hydrocarbons than water perhaps?

Maybe if these dots do connect, they should look to the dots relating to shale gas exploration in western Ukraine and who holds the exploration licenses.  The oil majors who are going to explore there know already – it shouldn’t be too difficult to find out – officially or via leaks.

Naturally if all those dots can be connected – that leaves the dot that is the current Energy Minister, Eduard Stavysky.

Now he is not the dot behind Nadra Ukraine.   He is not the dot behind the oil majors exploring shale in western Ukraine.  So how does his dot connect if indeed it does?

As Vodi Ukraine adds no value to the chain but somehow managed to get the exploration licenses in western Ukraine and is therefore within the chain for no apparent reason that to siphon/make a profit from actually doing nothing of value – one might ask, perhaps, who is the dot behind the Vodi Ukraine dot?  Our ministerial dot perhaps?

As I say, I am no investigative journalist, and far be it from me to make categorical statements when lacking the type of evidence produced in the Ukraine Pravda link above, that there would be a story there waiting to be broken – but I was always very good at dot to dot as a child and never once messed up the picture.

Now if all those dots did make a pretty (but nefarious) picture just as the Geoservice dots do, given the open door policy to Ministers the oil and gas majors have, then the EU must have a completed dot to dot picture – and thus must be willfully turning a blind eye – even if for the greater good as they may see it.

Anyway, what chance that an investigative journalist would join all the dots I mention eh?

Sold – Odessa Oil Refinery (A crude and murky business)

Back in October 2011, I mentioned that the LukOil terminal in Odessa had just been put up for sale.

It has now sold.  At least it is sold subject to contract exchange.

The new owners are an umbrella company called VETEK LLC based in Kyiv.  VETEK was registered as a company in Kyiv on 28th February 2013 and is headed by a chap named Andrey Koshel.

VETEK LLC, appears to be a holding/umbrella company for Gaz Ukraine – fronted by Serhiy Kurchenko, the Kharkiv lawyer, owner of Metalist Kharkiv FC, and friend of Olexander Yanukovych, son of the current president of Ukraine.

If that seems simple, Gas Ukraine is indeed a holding/umbrella company for a number of companies and has its head office in Simferopol Crimea, and who owns what behind the front of Serhiy Kurchenko is far more difficult to determine.  Gas Ukraine, naturally, is an importer of gas, LNG, oil and owns a rapidly expanding empire of several hundred petrol stations dotted around the country.

It also appears that Odessa refinery was not the first choice acquisition for VETEK/Gaz Ukraine – It originally went after the Lysychansk refinery owned by TNK/BP who subsequently removed it from sale due to it being an asset it could charge Rosneft for during its take over.

Anyway, the net result is that whomever is behind VETEK LLC and Andrey Koshel – or should we say whomever is behind Serhiy Kurchenko who fronts Gaz Ukraine, now own the Odessa refinery – which has not operated since 2010.

In fact the only Ukrainian refinery to operate in the past 3 years has been Ukrtatnefta – who I mentioned exactly one month ago - embroiled in nefarious circumstances - naturally.

So, it will be interesting to see whether the new owners of the Odessa refinery will make it the second of the six existing oil terminals to be operating in Ukraine, or whether Ukrtatneft will be allowed to continue as the only refinery in the nation to be active.

Smelly? – Maybe it’s just the gas!

Vereskiy and Vlasenko – Cause and (unintended?) effect

Cause and effect – Not something that really registers with many, if any, of the politicians in Ukraine.  Why would it?  The vast majority are in the RADA for no other reason than to defend and expand their own personal interests.  Others are hungry for power for power’s sake.

Examples of legislative initiatives or political actions for personal benefit, or revenge – one way or another – litter the history of the RADA.  There are high profile cases and there are low profile cases – but there are a lot of cases.

Now much is in the press about the removal of the Deputy mandate – and by extension immunity – of Serhey  Vlasenko, the high profile lawyer currently defending Ms Tymoshenko.  Even if this act is actually strictly within the parliamentary rules as is claimed, one has to ask why now?  Why was this not done earlier – a year or more ago?

Mr Vlasenko’s circumstances that have led to this action have not changed as far as his Deputy status and professional advocacy on behalf of Ms Tymoshenko are concerned since she was first pursued and in need of legal representation.  Whether or not you actually believe he is doing a good job or not on behalf of Ms Tymoshenko – and that is debatable – the reasons as stated for his sudden removal of Deputy mandate have existed ever since he decided to represent Ms Tymoshenko.

Politically motivated?

It would appear that at the same time Vlasenko was stripped of his Deputy mandate, so was a man called Andrey Vereskiy.

Andrey Vereskiy is a billionaire who created and sits on the board of Kernel Holdings.  His political career – and one suspects the reason Kernel did so very well – began just prior to the Orange Revolution.  After the Orange Revolution he joined Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party.  No doubt both his personal wealth and that of Kernel flourished under her patronage as Prime Minister.

However, as I have already written, many are in Ukrainian politics to defend and expand their personal interests – no more and no less.

Thus in June 2010, Vereskiy changed parties and joined the Party of Regions, the party currently in power after Ms Tymoshenko was defeated by now President Yanukovych.  Undoubtedly his personal wealth and that of Kernel continued to flourish.

And what has this to do with Vlasenko?

Well, at the behest and after official demands of Svoboda, the issue was forced relating to Vereskiy holding a Deputy’s mandate and also heading a commercial entity – in accordance with the parliamentary rules this, it appears, is not allowed.

Fair enough – The rules are the rules – However, if you are intent on removing a Party of Regions billionaire from the RADA via such rules, that cause naturally has an effect.

That effect being that because Vlasenko is practicing advocacy whilst remaining a Deputy, he too was subject to the very same complaint and procedure via the Party of Regions, that Svoboda instigated against Vereskiy.

Vereskiy had his Deputy’s mandate stripped from him 4 days ago, (5th March) in accordance with the parliamentary rules and Svoboda demands that they be adhered to.

Consequently, Vlasenko had his Deputy’s mandate stripped from him also – in accordance with the same rules and demands from Party of Regions on the same day.

Net effect – Svoboda force a point of principle, remove a one time  Batkivshchyna Party political turncoat and the Party of Regions lose a billionaire from their political RADA ranks – and also manage to get a  Batkivshchyna Party Deputy and Ms Tymoshenko’s high profile lawyer removed as a consequence of others enforcing the same principle and rules.

Not a bad result for Svoboda it has to be said, – after all they operate independently of the  Batkivshchyna Party despite both being amongst the opposition ranks – neither is it necessarily a bad result for those who want the entire cesspit that is the RADA to play by its own documented rules on a level playing field.

However, such is political expediency and media bias, we can expect very little mention of Vereskiy’s removal from the RADA, who instigated it and why it happened – or the effect that cause managed to create.  The stripping of Vlasenko’s Deputy status and immunity is likely to be all we will hear about with next to no mention of how it came about.

As the procedural cause and effect that resulted in both Vereskiy’s and Vlasenko’s Deputy mandate being removed are not a secret to anybody who closely follows the internal workings of the RADA – instead of simply being spoon-fed the headline news which concentrates on only one of them – it seems incredulous that some public figures outside of Ukraine are demanding explanations as to why Vlasenko has been subject to his mandate being stripped as if they are aware of nothing other than the headline news.

I am quite sure Andrey Vereskiy can explain in detail how the system and the rules that removed his Deputy status the same day as Serhey Vlasenko works – if Mr Jagland cares to lend an ear.

Maybe Mr Jagland would care to explain to Mr Vereskiy why such rules should only apply to him and not Mr Vlasenko – or if Mr Jagland’s statement applies to both, why he didn’t mention his concerns over Mr Vereskiy’s removal by naming him in his statement about the RADA as well – as diplomacy would dictate.

Is it fair to say that Svoboda’s actions were politically motivated to remove a turncoat MP in the form of Vereskiy – or were they fighting a point of principle?

If they were fighting a point of principle, then by extension that principle applies to all in breach of it – and that would include Vlasenko.  It will also include numerous others, so perhaps we will see a large number of procedural complaints to follow and even more current MPs having their mandates removed from majority and minority parties, plus a large number of independents alike.  Or perhaps we will see a changing of the rules that would allow both to be reinstated?

Whatever the case – if you pursue a cause, then be sure the effect is what you expected.  And maybe from Svoboda’s point of view, it has been.  After all, what does Svoboda gain from Ms Tymoshenko getting out?

Great expectations? – Errr No! (EU/Ukraine summit)

OK, having employed a Dickens title within this post title, I will now quote from a Tale of Two Cities – just to keep you Dickens fans on your toes.

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

And so it is with Ukraine both domestically and further afield.

On 25th February, Ukraine and the EU have a summit.  Summits when they occur usually like to produce signed agreements to show they were worthwhile in the eyes of a usually disinterested or politics weary public who foot the bill for such events.

Signed agreements are a politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and occasionally diplomats way of apparently justifying such events to anybody who will listen.

So what of the EU/Ukraine summit?  Well if anything gets signed, it will be a case having “something” to sign – anything – so whist they disagree and make very little headway over these serious and complex issues, they did agree on these minor and irrelevant points- and signed an agreement to prove it – despite its irrelevance and despite such agreements would otherwise be signed by far lesser beings than Presidents.

This undoubtedly will be the case on 25th February – at least as far as signed agreements go.

Of far more significants, is what headway if any, will be made over the issues that are difficult (for one side or the other), that do have entrenched positions, and that have publicised those positions to the extent that there is very little wiggle room for any party in either  re-framing demands, or accepting some form of movement – but not quite enough.

Can we realistically have great expectations from the next EU/Ukrainian summit that will take relations forwards to the satisfaction of both sides?  I very much doubt it.

What I expect, aside from the signing of a few agreements of irrelevance, is the search for wiggle room on both sides in order to make some progress, possibly enough, to make the signing of the EU DCFTA and AA documents a reality in November.

Certainly there will not be anything like the significant movement to make ratification of those signed agreements possible this year or next – and even if there were – ratification is still unlikely due to elections in the European Parliament and Germany to name but two where the outcomes of which may have significant implications for ratification.

Ergo anybody with a modicum of sense will know that there will have been a presidential election in Ukraine in 2015 before ratification of this agreement even becomes close to reality, or another attempt to muster the political will on either side is found to try and sign it again – no matter what happens in Vilnius in November this year.

The question is then only whether Ukraine will stand firm against the ever increasing Russian pressure it is under.

Whatever diplomatic and political wriggle room remains, will be a precious thing indeed to both sides for this forthcoming encounter in preparation for November.  Look not to the fluff that may be signed, but the the efforts of the staff in the boiler rooms to expand and exploit any wiggle room within both entities as November moves ever closer.

How best to play the interests verses values matrix with such overt Russian pressure as a complicating factor?

Thus we must also watch the hand of the Kremlin as it attempts to win this geopolitical battle – if not by getting Ukraine to join the Customs Union, then by at the very least, forcing it to abandon the EU – or the EU to abandon Ukraine – temporarily or permanently.

Can enough wiggle room be found within the EU/Ukrainian camps to allow for signing if the specter of Moscow’s shadow looms too great – regardless of progress?

We will soon find out – but not on 25th February.