Archive for the ‘Yatseniuk’ Category

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“United Opposition” election manifesto launched

May 31, 2012

Well somewhat surprisingly, the “united opposition” parties of Ukraine (which does not include all opposition parties in Ukraine) has launched its manifesto for the forthcoming parliamentary elections in October.

I say surprisingly, as generally there is very little said by political parties in Ukraine about proposed policy as politics normally revolves around personality here.

Manifesto/policy launch may also be something of an exaggeration, but it is as close as we may actually get in Ukrainian politics for a while yet.  When I say manifesto launch, what I really should say is that Arseniy Yatseniuk rattled of a list of things the “United Opposition” will do if they are returned to power in parliament (and if President Yanukovych will actually sign anything into law that comes from a “United Opposition” majority in parliament of course).

So, what are these society engaging, clever, policy effective and implementable changes that will bring Ukraine rapidly to an ultra-modern State fully incorporable with European norms and the EU?

How are they different from the current government’s programme of reform and legislative change towards EU norms, and how are they different from 2.5 years ago when the “United Opposition” parties were last in the majority in parliament but failed to reform anything?

Well firstly they plan to increase the wages of government employees.  There is no mention of whether they will also cut the very bloated number of employees in an overly bureaucratic system in every part of Ukrainian life though.  Quite why they didn’t raise the wages of government employees or take any steps to tackle the overly bureaucratic administrative systems of Ukraine when they were in power for 5 years is anybodies guess.  They did have 5 years to do so and have only been in opposition for 2.5 years so far.  Surely the period in opposition has not opened their eyes to the major problems they ignored when in power in this regard for so long.

Where is the money for all these additional governmental wages (and subsequent pensions) going to come from if they are not going to slash the number of governmental employees?

Next, they plan to fight corruption.  Again something that they failed to do when in power.  In fact the cost of corruption when they were in power absolutely rocketed under their tenure comparatively to their predecessors.  Not only did it rocket but it seeped further and further into every day life and into parts of everyday life it hadn’t been so coercively present in before – this I can tell you from personal experience.  In short they did absolutely nothing to combat corruption and indeed looked on as it get far, far worse.

How are they going to tackle corruption effectively when successive governments (including their own when last in office) have failed dismally at taking on the regional fiefdoms and regional administrations?  Simply sacking corrupt heads of departments to replace them with corrupt deputy heads of departments will not achieve much at all.  If you sack all the corrupt judges, lawyers, prosecutors and defenders, where exactly will all the experienced replacements come from that are untainted by corruption in their careers to date?  Is there a box of uncorrupted experienced professionals laying around somewhere in a cold dank cupboard in the RADA?

Having mentioned corrupt judiciary, they also claim they will reform law enforcement and judicial systems.  Despite the Euro hundreds of millions pumped into trying to accomplish exactly that via EU aid and grants during their time in office, nothing changed.  Not technically, legislatively or in reality.  Are they going to undo the recently passed Criminal Procedures Code which by and large, whilst in no way perfect, is certainly on paper better than what was there before?

Arseniy Yatseniuk also promised that Ms Tymoshenko (and others) would be freed – quite naturally as the “United Opposition comprises ostensibly of her party and his – but there will be tricky legal and political questions over simply decriminalising the offences under which she was convicted and then retrospectively applying  them in order to free her (and others).  Can and should any legal changes be retrospectively applied and if so, should they be, and what precedent does that set across any further legal changes that do not affect headline prisoners?

All of that said, it is still unclear in this “United Opposition” power conglomerate,  who would become Prime Minister?  Mr Yatseniuk or Ms Tymoshenko (when released)?  The President is not up for reelection until 2015 after all.

Most right-thinking people would probably suggest Mr Yatseniuk has to become the PM as he is not as historically tainted as Ms Tymoshenko (even discounting her current plight), does not invoke the same fatigue across a Tymoshenko/Yanukovych weary domestic and international audience and indeed could be seen as something of a breath of fresh air in Ukrainian politics.  However, one doubts Ms Tymoshenko’s ego could play second fiddle for long (if at all) and any “United Opposition” majority coalition would soon disintegrate upon regaining power – if it doesn’t disintegrate before the elections even begin.

If anybody is to bring Ukrainian politics out of the cesspit that it currently dwells within, it will not be Mr Yanukovych or Ms Tymoshenko.  It needs to be a completely new and far less corruption tainted figure.  Neither of the Yanukovych/Tymoshenko personalities can bring anything like the feel of a truly representative parliament, the feeling that a new page has been turned or indeed the belief that anything which leaves their mouths could actually be true.

Returning to the manifesto as described by Mr Yatseniuk, then aside from freeing Ms Tymoshenko, there is very little difference between the claims of the current government when it comes to refom of legal and justice systems, fighting corruption or increasing wages.  In fact there is no difference between this manifesto and the previous promises made by the current opposition when they were last in power and which they spectacularly failed to deliver (and even made worse in some cases).

So, once again, despite the existence of a manifesto (of sorts) the parliamentary election will come down to personality politics and who the electorate believe is more likely to actually deliver even a tiny percentage of what they say they will as both government and opposition talk of reforming exactly the same things.  Until we know where and how Ms Tymoshenko will fit into any new government should the “United Opposition” be successful, it is quite difficult to gauge whether a vote for Yatseniuk (and de facto the United Opposition and thus Ms Tymoshenko) will place him or her in a position to deliver, and which will be ultimately accountable for doing so, in the role of Prime Minister.

As the elections draw nearer, this question will not only be asked but will necessarily need to be answered.  How it is answered may very well have a positive or negative effect on the fate of the “United Opposition”.  Several more years of President Yanukovych verses Prime Minister Tymoshenko will be as disastrous for Ukraine as President Yushenko verses Prime Minister Tymoshenko was.

Let’s hope that this critical decision has already been decided between Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Yatseniuk, not only to avoid the “United Opposition” falling apart in the run up to the election,  but also to clearly inform the voting public who need to know sooner rather than later.

As for the manifesto promises – well as has always been the case in Ukraine, effective policy implementation rather than the creation of policy will be the critical issue – regardless of who wins the parliamentary elections.

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Are there limits to democratic legitimacy? Ukraine’s Constitutional Assembly

May 22, 2012

How far and how oblique can a democratic mandate be before it loses legitimacy?

As regular readers of this blog will know, in 2010, at the request of Arseniy Yatseniuk (leader of the opposition party Front for Change), shortly after becoming president Viktor Yanukovych created a Constitutional Assembly tasked to examine and recommend amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution.

The chairmanship of this Constitutional Assembly was given to the first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and is compromised of representatives from all political parties currently with MPs sitting in the RADA.  It is a long and labourious  task made longer and more labourious due to various opposition parties withdrawing, reentering the process cyclically in attempts to frustrate the process when they aren’t happy with the current government over other issues.  It is a joint committee lever they can pull that has some immediate effect.

Currently it is Arseniy Yatseniuk and his Front for Change party which have now withdrawn from the process.

Why?

One of the suggestions is that the Constitution be amended so that the President be elected by the members of the RADA and not by direct public voting as is currently the case.

Outrageous?  Unheard of? – Well I will return to that, but for now it is sufficient to note that currently, with 3 years before the next public presidential vote, the current president would come in 3rd behind Arseniy Yatseniuk and Yulia Tymoshenko respectively according to several public opinion polls.  However, should the ruling party retain its majority in the October elections and the constitution be amended before the next 2015 presidential election, the current incumbent would remain president in all likelihood.

As somebody who thinks another 5 years of Yanukovych or Tymoshenko would be a retrograde step for Ukraine, the fact Yatseniuk currently sits in 1st place if there was a presidential election tomorrow by public vote is quite encouraging.  It is also clear why Yatseniuk would not want any changes to the president being elected by direct public vote and has thus pulled out of the Constitutional Assembly effectively stalling its work once again.

So how oblique and how legitimate would a president be if voted into office, not by direct public vote, but by MPs who are voted into office by direct public vote?

Well, the German president isn’t directly voted into office by the public.  The German president is voted into office via the MPs of the Bundestag and an equal number of representatives from the 16 regions of Germany.  A major difference however, is that the German president has a largely ceremonial role and the governance of the country is parliamentary and not presidential – unlike Ukraine.

Are there any European systems where the presidents are not directly elected by the people but who have the power of the Ukrainian president to instigate the adoption of laws, set foreign and domestic policy, chastise directly elected MPs and be far more than ceremonial figureheads?

Well, the most powerful people in the EU are the EU commissioners and presidents who are responsible for introducing EU laws, directives, policy and bullying national elected leaders into towing the EU line.  None of these people are directly elected by the people of Europe but are appointed in a very similar fashion to that of Germany and the proposed changes for Ukraine.

Therefore, should Ukraine adopt the proposals (and I really hope it does not), it would be following a very European model – that of the European Commission – who are extremely powerful and yet never face a public vote and never hold a direct public mandate for the office they hold despite the power that comes with that office.

Now if more than half a billion people across the EU allow themselves, and their directly elected representatives, to be dictated to by the powerful and rather oblique democratic legitimacy held by those within the European Commission, (and those in the European Commission claim to have democratic legitimacy via being elected by elected representatives), should the people of Ukraine have anything to be concerned about?

After all, should Ukraine ever join the EU, its elected leaders will be lectured, bullied and coerced by those within the European Commission the people of Ukraine (or any other EU nation) never had the opportunity to vote for.  Does it therefore matter if the Ukrainian president is appointed via the same stretch of democratic legitimacy as well?

My own view? – Well that has always been that Ukraine should not join the EU (at least under the current dysfunctional, wasteful, overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and ever increasingly centralised model).  The DCFTA and AA is as far as it needs to go when it eventually gets there.  Therefore my view on the democratic legitimacy of a Ukrainian president is that it can only come via a direct public vote, as hopefully that office will never become in part (or in full) subservient to European Commissioners who legitimacy is oblique, via Ukraine actually joining the EU.

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Ukrainian opposition rally in Kyiv – A flop

May 14, 2012

For some months now I have been somewhat encouraged by the Ukrainian opposition political parties when looking at the opinion polls.  Not that they are certain to win the parliamentary elections looking at the polling figures, far from it.  It will be a close run thing as things stand today.

What has been encouraging is that now they shade the lead in opinion polls, the current government has actually started to do change things on the statute books towards a more favourable business and social climate, removing  state involvement in services they really have no need to be involved in.

A few examples in the last week alone, relate to food quality regulations and the proposal to scrap grain export certificates.  Such small but important changes  have been consistently happening for over a month where small but unnecessary bureaucracy has been scrapped or is proposed to be scrapped imminently.  The American Chamber of Commerce (Am-Cham) in Kyiv has been very supportive numerous government moves in the past few months, to the point they would be considered cheerleaders if it were not for the occasional and correct criticism intermingled with praise and encouragement.

Being non-politically aligned to either government or the opposition, and having far greater interest in policy, policy implementation and policy effectiveness, rather than political party or personality, for now I remain to be convinced that the benefits on paper that have been announced will translate into any changes at the point of delivery with the public, given the consistent obstruction of the regional fiefdoms and regional administrative agencies.

All things being equal, the Ukrainian opposition is part fulfilling its role by pressuring the current government to act over some issues rather than sit idly in Kyiv and simply count its ill-gotten gains.  Unfortunately the fact it is fulfilling part of its role, (and it certainly isn’t fulfilling the entire role opposition parties are meant to do), comes by default rather than design via popularity polls rather than any directly relevant opposition strategy over any particular issue.

To appear strategy-less with an election in October as the opposition is really very disheartening for people like me looking in, who live here and pay taxes here (but cannot vote).

So it was with some eagerness and anticipation I looked forward to the opposition rally that took place on 12th May in central Kyiv.  You would expect a huge public turnout given the circumstances surrounding Ms Tymoshenko (and others) amongst the opposition ranks, the fact Ms Merkel considers Ukraine to be “repressed” by the current authorities and the foreign MSM wondering where the protest marches are.

It would be reasonable to expected, given the impression Ukraine has, proclaimed by the opposition and media, huge numbers of protesters would turn out.  Even if those protesters were limited to Kyiv, you would expect 10,000 or more to attend from a city of 2.7 million.  30,000 or more from the surrounding areas if they came.

You would expect that the united opposition forces that took the stage would tell eager supporters of new policies and new approaches to issues that will change their lives for the better.  Domestic policies that are truly motivational and aspirational, what the opposition will do when in power relating to pensions, the stand-off with the IMF, how they will restart relations with the EU, how it will deal with Russia over the crippling gas contract.  Many, many issues that impact the lives of every one of their supporters.

In short, a rallying cry to those loyal to the opposition cause and policies to change Ukraine for the better and a road-map to those listening as to how it will be done.  Go home and spread the good opposition word to your friends and neighbours.  This is our creative and inspiring grand plan for Ukraine if you return us to power, and this is how we will deliver it!

Alas, that is not what happened.

On a warm and sunny Saturday in Kyiv, the opposition rally gathered a very meager 2000 supporters, some of which like me, can’t even vote and were there to see if the opposition have learned anything in the past decade when it comes to politics and policy.  In fact, if we subtract the number of people who will have been paid to attend (and at all political events in Ukraine, regardless of political party, there is a percentage of the crowd that has been paid to be there to bolster the numbers) the real number of genuine attendees will be reduced.

What is possibly even worse about the number of supporters present is that this was the sum total gathered by the “united opposition” and not just a single opposition party.  Given the easily accessible location, good weather and huge amount of publicity prior to the rally, the turnout is pitifully grim and should be a cause for concern to the united opposition.

So how did they do on policy and strategies?  Again, a dreadful waste of opportunity.  Aside from reiterating the united election list strategy amongst the united opposition, a strategy where they will field one candidate amongst all the parties to run against the current government to avoid splitting the opposition vote,  there were no new imaginative or clever strategies or policies announced.

This reiteration of the ballot strategy was announced in January.  It is not new or exciting anymore.  (It has also to actually happen without in-fighting causing this coalition to fall apart yet.)

Nothing has been learned by the opposition whatsoever.  There were statements such as this from Eugania Tymoshenko (daughter of Ms Tymoshenko currently serving a prison sentence for abuse of office), “Our sacred duty is to free Ukraine from this cruel and criminal occupation.”

Really?  Only a few years ago, her mother publicly stated she would be happy to act as Prime Minister under Yanukovych  if he became President.  She was then quite happy to be a major cog in such a cruel and criminal occupation back then.  The trouble with making public statements and then conveniently forgetting them is that people like me remember and document them.

Anyway, back to the point, the opposition had a significant opportunity to put forward new policy ideas and strategies to those in attendance and the listening foreign and domestic media – and what did they do?  They continued with the “us” verses “them”  mud-slinging, name calling tactics which doesn’t sway any voters that would not already vote for them.  There was nothing said that would or could entice the less partisan voter over to them on the basis of any forward looking policy.

In short it was “Kill the King, and when the King is dead, long live the King” but we can’t or won’t tell you how we will reign any better than the current King, or any better than when we were King last time you gave us the chance  either.

Furthermore, when looking at the politicians on stage, it was as depressing as watching the current government huddle for photo ops.  Looking at almost each and every person on that stage, you are reminded just how they came to be who they are and the nefarious routes they have taken before, and since, being in Ukrainian politics.  It is truly grim.

So, on a warm and sunny Saturday in Kyiv, is it really surprising that a meager 2000 people came to listen to the same old “us” verses “them” rhetoric, completely devoid of imagination, charisma, integrity or policy?  Who wants to listen to such a well worn record?  Where is the creativity, imagination and new policy that will lead Ukraine to a better future and will make me want to vote for the opposition (if I could)?

The answers were not found on the united opposition rally stage in Kyiv on a warm and sunny Saturday afternoon, that’s for certain.

Off the stage (and in English) Arseniy Yatseniuk had this to say when challenged to name some actual policies by the foreign media in attendance:

You wonder if he has told the fellow members within the “united opposition” of his ideas – then again, does it matter?  At the moment, according to him, everything is “conceptual”.  It needs to be far more than conceptual, and pretty quickly with an election soon, as the nation is full of disenchanted voters.

All-in-all, when an almost leaderless opposition movement in Moscow can still gather 10,000 people yesterday, a full 6 months after protests began, in comparison, you can only say 2000 people turning up to an opposition rally replete with numerous potential leaders on show in Kyiv on a very nice day, is nothing short of a flop!

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EYP (European Youth Parliament) Ukraine

April 21, 2012

Well this is something I don’t normally do, however I am going to raise awareness of a NGO.  In fact a European NGO but specifically it is the Ukrainian branch I am highlighting.  It is the European Youth Parliament (EYP).

Why am I doing this?  Because it is not tied to Yanukovych or Tymoshenko or Yatseniuk or any other dubious politicians in Ukraine.  It is domestically A-political and free from the stench of Ukrainian political parties and personalities.  It is for and by the youth and it encourages youth to youth/people to people contact across the European continent on policy rather than political party issues.

Amongst these young people, one day Ukraine may end up with leaders that are not recycled Soviet machinery with a single style of autocratic leadership regardless of party you vote for.

To promote it and encourage  the Ukrainian youth to actually participate in something bigger than Ukraine, which does not function by the power vertical or is identified by a single personality (to the point of a Bloc name), and is not subject to oligarchy orchestration or the endemic corruption that runs through the main party politicians of all colours when it comes to policy debates, can only be a good experience for any who engage in it.

For the youth in Odessa, the EYP hold their regional session 15 – 19 August.

I have no vested interests in the EYP to declare.  I am far too old to be classed as a youth and I am in no way affiliated to the EYP currently or historically.  My interests such as they are, rest only in the fact I live permanently in Odessa and have the firm belief that policy politics and not personality politics is the only viable road ahead for Ukraine if the current cycle of useless (with a few notable exceptions across party lines) and corrupt politics is ever to be broken.

Anyway, plug for the EYP now made in English.  You can ignore the next bit as it will say the same thing but in Russian for Cyrillic SEO reasons.

Also, before I forget, happy birthday to HM Queen Elizabeth II who is 86 today.  What a fantastic monarch she has been!

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Ну это то, что я обычно не делаю, но я повышаю осведомленность о НПО. На самом деле европейские НПО, и особенно это украинский филиал выделяющий это Европейский молодежный парламент (ЕМП).

Почему я это делаю? Потому что это не связано с Януковичем или Тимошенко или Яценюком или любых других сомнительных политиков в Украине. Это внутри-политический и свободный от вони украинских политических партий и личностей. Это для молодежи и призывает молодежь к молодежи / между людьми контактирующиж на европейском континенте, о политике, а не политическим вопросам партии.

Среди этих молодых людей, в один прекрасный день Украина может закончить с лидерами, которые не утилизируются советскими машинами с одного стиля самодержавного руководства независимо от партийного голосования.

Чтобы продвигать и поощрять украинскую молодежь реально участвовать в чем-то большем, чем Украина, которая не работает в вертикали власти и определяется одной личностью (вплоть до блока имени), и не подлежат олигархии или оркестровкакоррупции, которая проходит через основной политической партии всех цветов, когда дело доходит до политических дебатов, может быть только хороший опыт для любого, кто участвует в нем.

Для молодежи в Одессе, ЕМП проводить свои региональные сессии 15 – 19 августа.

У меня нет никаких корыстных интересов в ЕМП. Я слишком стар, чтобы быть классифицированым как молодежь, и я никоим образом не связанных с ЕМП в настоящее время или истории. Мои интересы, такие как они есть, отдыхать, только я живу постоянно в Одессе и есть твердое убеждение, что политика политикой, а не личности политика является единственной жизнеспособной дорогой для Украины, если текущий цикл бесполезных (с некоторыми исключениями по партийной линии) и коррумпированных политики ли будет побит

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Yatseniuk speaks in Brussels

April 4, 2012

Well it is no secret that I consider Ukraine will be stuck in a rut until Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and the other (in)famous political personalities which seeped from the Kuchma government into power are consigned to the history bin of Ukrainian politics.

I have said any future worthy of getting even slightly enthusiastic about will come when those further down the food chain, such as Tigipko, Yatseniuk and Korolevska get their time in the political sun.  That is not to say they do not have skeletons in their cupboards because they do.  They all do.  It is just a matter of how scary and how big those skeletons in their cupboards are in comparison to the truly “Nightmare on Elm Street” proportions that Yanukovych and Tymoshenko try very unsuccessfully to hide.

It is also no secret that of the three, I currently prefer Yatseniuk by a very small margin, although I disagree with several of his historically stated policy positions.   That said, when it comes to policy, if all manifestos of all parties were placed in front of me there would be parts of them all I agree with and parts in all of them I simply don’t.

The same can equally be said of the UK political parties and their manifestos.  Quite frankly both in Ukraine and the UK, I don’t care which party is in power.  I care about what they propose to do when they are in power and the policies they have to achieve what I consider are the most important issues of the years ahead during their tenure.

Anyway, this is what Arseniy Yatseniuk had to say when interviewed in Brussels.

What particularly caught my eye were these two statements:

“He said a solution to the problem could be an amnesty law, which would clear politicians of “minor felonies”, but not pardon corruption.”  

He has said such things before and I have to say that whilst it is a solution of sorts, it is not a solution I am particularly keen upon.  I can see the attraction, particularly given the fact no Ukrainian politician is whiter than white, and it is a way to draw a line under many wrong-doings in their past (and present in many cases one suspects).

However, what image does that display to the Ukrainian public who undoubtedly would not be subject to having their slates wiped clean in a similar fashion for “minor felonies”.  How far down the political tree would such an amnesty go?  Simply the RADA, or the regional administrations also?  What about City Halls or district administrative organs of State bureaucracy as well?

Who decides?

Who decides what is and is not a “minor felony” that is subject to the amnesty?  There must be parameters but who sets them?

Would such an amnesty actually release Ms Tymoshenko?  Whilst it may free her from the current reasons for incarceration, an alleged $405 million debt to Russia (which she publicly admitted but disputed the amount) , $18 million pending in claims against her in the US from a US company via the US courts, and accusations of UAH several billion in tax avoidance from when she ran UESU, would hardly qualify as “minor felonies” to most people.

Considering both her companies UESU, Somolli Ent and Ms Tymoshenko are named in the US court documents that convicted  her business partner Lazarenko in the US, the citizens of Ukraine may be less likely to believe there is only smoke and no fire in this particular instants.  They may have suspicions about Ukrainian courts and due process, but US courts as well?

There is certainly very little trust between Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Yatseniuk as has been very well reported in the Ukrainian media of late.  Is it therefore Yatseniuk’s plan to be seen as willing to engineer her release from misuse of office charges to then see her incarcerated for more than a “minor felony”?  That seems to be the current majority game plan as well.

That may not be such a far-fetched idea considering the next quote from him that caught my eye.  When asked if he thought he would be President in 2020, he replied,  “Maybe this is not fiction … Things could happen faster…”.   Anyone with any first (or even second or third) hand knowledge of Ms Tymoshenko would know that there is no way on earth any opposition politician other than herself will become President of Ukraine whilst she is still active in domestic politics.  She simply wouldn’t allow it to happen again after her failed tandem with ex-President Yushenko.

Therefore if Arseniy Yatseniuk really believes he could be President of Ukraine before or by 2020, then Ms Tymoshenko would have to be removed from domestic politics.  I can see that happening in only two ways –  via ill health or being imprisoned for more than a “minor felony”.

As always, very interesting what politicians say (or don’t say) when talking about their potential coalition party leaders and the future.  Particularly so when their main opposition rivals are living through difficult times.

Nevertheless, maybe we should be thankful for the dysfunctional politics of Ukraine.  Ukraine has yet to head towards the Kirchheimer Catch-All politics which seems to have enveloped many European political parties and political personalities.  Hopefully that time is a long way from being reached in Ukraine.

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The Korolevska Foundation – Right questions, wrong location!

March 21, 2012

Well not so very long ago I wrote a small entry on Natalia Korolevska and debated whether she was to be the new female face of Ukrainian politics replacing her former leader and mentor, Ms Tymoshenko.  It certainly seems that if her star is not rising through ability and worthy recognition, she is catapulting it into the celestial realms on the back of self-promotion.

As such I was not overly surprised to see that on 27th March the Korolevska Foundation, (it is popular to have a foundation/think tank if you are a politician), is holding a meeting to discuss 3 very important issues:

1.   Creating a credible opposition.

2.   Defending civil liberties and justice.

3.   Campaigning for EU democratic values.

Very good.  All worthy of discussion and all worthy of engagement with the Ukrainian opposition leaders, Ukrainian civil society and academia and most importantly the Ukrainian public I am sure we would all agree.  I would even go along myself if it was local to Odessa.

Unfortunately it isn’t local to Odessa as many political meetings involving leaders aren’t.  Lest we forget, Kyiv is the centre of the Ukrainian universe and we in the provinces are but a far flung orbiting meteor visited only when campaigning for votes or random and infrequent public relations events.  Apart from that we are left to defecate in the streets for the amusement of passing tourists in the hope they will through their loose change in our hats.

To be fair though, most people in Odessa are very pleased to be left alone by the powers that be residing in Kyiv, so tourists please continue to throw your loose change in our hats.  That is generally far better than unwelcome attention from Kyiv.

Nevertheless, if the Korolevska Foundation cannot or will not do a traveling roadshow around Ukraine to promote her and debate these 3 relevant issues with Ukrainians, then Kyiv is obviously the place to engage with all levels of Ukrainian society.  On that most would agree.

However, this meeting is not going to be held in Kyiv.  It is not even going to be held in Ukraine.  If you want to attend, debate or simply listen to the Korolevska Foundation over such important issues here is the address:

Scotland House, Round-Point Schuman 6, 1000 Brussels.

If you want to attend, simply complete this application form, but if you are Ukrainian, unless you already have a valid Schengen Visa, it is very unlikely you will get one in time to attend now!  I expect it will be an interesting jolly for those who go along but what will that achieve other than being interesting?

It would appear that the Korolevska Foundation will be asking how to create a credible opposition in Ukraine, how to defend civil liberties and justice in Ukraine and how to campaign for EU democratic values in Ukraine, not with Ukrainians (unless they happen to be there), but with anybody except Ukrainians who can make it to Scotland House in Brussels on the 27th!

One must seriously question the legitimacy of this gathering.  Is it to genuinely find answers to these questions or is it simply another event to reinforce Natalia Korolevska as the new female face of Ukrainian politics amongst the Brussels technocracy.

For certain such advice from Brussels can be given to the Korolevska Foundation in Ukraine.  Ukraine hosts ambassadors, political scientists, advisors et al from every EU nation as well as an EU Ambassador and staff as well.  She could gather 80 – 100 very smart top level EU policy advisors and policy implementors amongst the diplomatic ranks posted in Ukraine quite easily.

The input holding such a meeting in Ukraine would be no less qualitative or clever than the input given by holding it in Brussels.  Certainly such a gathering in Ukraine would get far more Ukrainian media and public attention, but I suspect it is not Ukrainian media attention Ms Korolevska is seeking, but that of the Brussels Quarter and more for her own ends than any to receive substantive answers she hasn’t already arrived at herself.

To answer the first question relating to creating a credible opposition, then firstly there must be trust between the 18 or so opposition parties.  As most of the opposition parties have had experience of working together within the Tymoshenko government, then trust is a very rare commodity.  Nobody within the opposition trusts her and equally she has no trust in other opposition parties (or some members of her own).  That lack of trust is equally apportioned around the opposition parties about each other.

To understand this you must consider the RADA as closed shop business where majority and opposition change places as majority and minority shareholders at election time, and the personal dividends that brings individual deputies is dependent upon what position they hold.  That is a situation that becomes very complicated indeed when a coalition government is made up of numerous parties and each party and each deputy is focused in retaining and improving their position and personal dividend windfall.

In order to gain any sort of trust amongst all opposition parties, Ms Tymoshenko would have to permanently leave politics.  She currently has a dislike for Yatesniuk (again – and not for the first time) which makes uniting a credible opposition very difficult when Yatseniuk and his party are the second most popular opposition party in Ukraine, not far behind her own.  Recent Ukrainian political history is replete with examples of what happens to careers, positions and actions when Ms Tymoshenko took a disliking to somebody within her coalition, something Ms Korolevska discovered herself on 14th March when expelled from Ms Tymoshenko’s BYuT faction.  Trust therefore, is severely lacking.

Next is a complete lack of policy.  There is a policy void amongst the opposition, individually and combined, that is so vast it makes the Grand Canyon seem like a hair-line fracture.  The only thing they have agreed on publicly is to try and create a single voters list amongst themselves to stand against the current government but even that, despite being announced in January, has still to be done and even if it is done, not only does it stand a chance of falling apart before the October elections, it also significantly reduces voter choice.

That does not even begin to address the vastly differing ideologies and places on the political spectrum that so many different opposition parties occupy.  The opposition ranges from the extreme right of Svoboda all the way across to the centre left socialists.  It is no wonder there can be little agreed policy to act as a platform for electioneering other than “we are not the PoR”.

As unpopular as the PoR may be, when push comes to shove at voting time, it is not hard for the Ukrainian public to remember what happened last time there was a populist, policy-less, dysfunctional, multi-party coalition in power.  As all political observers know, any polls today are meaningless with the elections 6 months in the future.

It may already be too late to create a credible opposition as credibility and legitimacy is not given, but earned over time through policy and action.  The clock ticks towards election day and there is as yet no credible united opposition.

When it comes to defending civil liberties and justice, the opposition have a very difficult task.  When in power they did a particularly poor job of doing either, let alone improving it.  The EU policy as per the recent EEAS policy document and numerous statements and meetings by Stefan Fule, is now to engage with civil society and NGOs to do this.  Just as Ukraine fatigue set in within the EU when the opposition were in power, it seems quite clear by the EU adopting this policy towards civil society and NGOs, it suffers from the same fatigue now these parties are in opposition.

No effective credible opposition means no effective and credible actions over civil liberties and justice will come from it.  Better to go directly to those who are united in a cause, have far fewer internal conflicts, have policies and plans and fund them directly- which is exactly what the new EU policy does with civil society and NGOs.  Whether it will be an effective policy or not remains to be seen, but it can certainly be no less effective than the Ukrainian opposition.

Quite why the Korolevska Foundation is holding a meeting in Brussels about which campaigning for EU democratic values is on the agenda I am unsure.  National ambassadors from every EU nation, the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, the Council of Europe, OSCE, European Commission, European Parliament and European Council are hardly likely to be saying nothing to the leadership of Ukraine when the most important nation in their EaP strategy is baulking at the DCFTA and AA final fence and the stumbling block is indeed EU democratic values.

Ukrainian society is quite aware what EU democratic values are.  Well at least they thought they knew what EU democratic values are.   Events in Italy, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia this year may well have caused the Ukrainian public to rethink just exactly what EU democracy really is.  If it has then they would not be alone.  Many in the EU are now wondering as well.

Anyway, the Ukrainian public know/knew what EU democratic values are.  They do not live in a cocoon.  They travel, they have the Internet, they have millions of European visitors to Ukraine every year with whom they can and do interact.

The Ukrainian public can organise itself over issues it feels overstep the mark or are decidedly wrong.

They did it over the Tax Code without any organisational help from the opposition parties.  In fact the opposition parties were told by the demonstrators the protests was A-political and they would not allow the opposition to hijack it.  To date, since the current government came to power, that has been easily the biggest demonstration, dwarfing any other.

Locally, as yesterday’s post shows, they are also capable of forcing appropriate action where none is taken.

Should the Korolevska Foundation not be asking these questions of themselves, other opposition parties and in particular, the Ukrainian public in Ukraine rather than technocrats, journalists, interns, bloggers, and associated bodies within the Brussels bubble?

Has she not noticed the increasing perception amongst the EU citizenry of a democratic deficit between themselves and the Brussels bubble?  Even the EU elites are waking up to that fact, although the only answer they seem to have is more central power and political union which simply increases nationalist rhetoric amongst the EU nations and their citizens.

There is bountiful foreign advice to be had here in Ukraine if that is what the foundation seeks, not to mention a large amount of quality domestic advice from the academia of Ukraine.

The future of Ukraine lays with Tigipko, Yatseniuk and yes with Korolevska.  At some point in the next 10 years the European stage will be theirs without the clutter of Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and the other recycled parts of the old Soviet apparatus.  Her star will rise in its own good time and I see so very little to be gained from this meeting being held in Brussels in comparison to holding it in Ukraine, other than some egotistical attempt to force her mobile number onto the speed-dial of mandarins she will soon enough put in the political shadows of the fairly near future.

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Invitations and refusals – President and opposition

March 14, 2012

Two days ago saw the conclusion of the latest Council of Europe (PACE) meeting and amongst many statements made about many nations, Ukraine was one.

The Council of Europe statement was, as you would expect, critical of Ukraine and also the current situation with Ms Tymoshenko and her past colleagues.

Now Ukraine has given assurances behind closed doors that it will abide by any ECfHR ruling relating to Ms Tymoshenko and others.  That ruling however seems to be months away even in the fast tracked system.  This is really the only legal way the President has of releasing Ms Tymoshenko without breaking the law himself unless she asks for a pardon which she categorically states will never happen.

However, in light of the Council of Europe statements, the Presidential Administration issued invitations to the Speaker of the RADA and heads of parliamentary factions to discuss what can be done about the issues raised.

In response to those invitations, the political parties of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, who happen to be the parties that have the most high profile people in jail, point blank refused to attend because others would be there.

This leaves the rather bizarre situation where the President, RADA Speaker, leader of the ruling PoR and several leaders of other opposition parties will meet for 2 days and discuss issues amongst which relate directly to the two opposition parties who flatly refuse to attend but should have the most interest in being there.

Is it reasonable for BYuT and OU-PSD to refuse an attempt at an all-inclusive discussion on matters criticized by PACE?  After all only 2 years ago BYuT and OU-PSD were in power and many of the issues unrelated to their party members incarceration but mentioned by PACE in its statement, happened and were left unchanged under their watch.

Do they want no others present so that any misleading or spurious allegations they may wish to make after any such meeting can go unchallenged?  (A common phenomenon in Ukrainian politics.)

Should they not be participating in this meeting for the voters who elected them and that have relatives in prison under the conditions highlighted by PACE?

The PACE statement is not all about Ms Tymoshenko and their political colleagues, but also about the conditions and suffering of relations of some of their voters.  Conditions they did nothing to change when in power and therefore BYuT and OU-PSD have a responsibility to discuss and address them with the President and current government for the sake of Ukraine and Ukrainian society.

Childish behaviour and refusal to attend and discuss such serious matters does nothing but undermine their self-appointed misnomer label of being democratic.  Continued refusal to engage through publicly open invitations for dialogue diminishes the claims that the current authorities are autocratic or a dictatorship as they orate.  Who is refusing to speak to who here and what message does that give to the Ukrainian public (and foreign observers)?

Diplomacy, negotiation and democracy all require dialogue and the willingness to take every opportunity for meaningful engagement when and where those opportunities arise.  That is even more essential when your political legacy is also being questioned by prominent external actors.

What will happen should the government put everything to the liking of PACE?  What part can BYuT and OU-PSD claim to have played in these human rights issues?  As far as the general population of Ukrainian prisons and their families go, obviously none having so publicly refused to take part in any dialogue!

One can only hope that politicians like Arseniy Yatseniuk and his Front for Change party not only continue to close the popularity gap on BYuT but overtake it and then some.  Maybe then as far as cross party pluralist democratic engagement goes in the corridors of power. the Ukrainian people will actually get to something resembling debates and discussion rather than the childish actions currently being displayed.

It is easy to look at this issue as one which relates solely to Ms Tymoshenko and colleagues, but when it comes to Ukrainian prisons and the conditions therein, it is a much broader matter and as such, BYuT and OU-PSD by not attending this meeting are not only letting down their supporters but also Ukrainian society in general.

Hardly the actions of a responsible leadership in waiting!

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Something a bit fishy within the (almost) united opposition

March 12, 2012

There is something a bit fishy going on between Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYuT and Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Front for Change political parties.

It is called COD.

That would be COD as is Committee to Oppose Dictatorship rather than the fish that swims in the sea.

However you will recall this post of mine  from a month ago where I stated that the falling out between the opposition parties would lay within the consolidation of a single entry list.  As seems quite evident, that has still to be agreed.

Also worthy of note is the statement that Ms Tymoshenko has taken a decidedly cooler attitude towards Arseniy Yatseniuk, something that probably has a lot to do with his party closing on hers in the polls amongst the opposition parties.

Should he get too close, it will be interesting to see if Ms Tymoshenko’s ego will be happy to play second fiddle to another party or whether she will try to call the whole united opposition attempt off.

She does have previous for breaking such agreements even at the last minute, as Oleh Rybachuk has witnessed “In August 2005, one year after the Orange Revolution, the two were fighting and I tried to broker a deal between them. Each agreed to fire three antagonistic people from their teams, hold a press conference the next day and promise not to oppose one other. It was a truce.  

Tymoshenko reneged on the agreement and that night tried to muster support to remove Yushchenko. He found out and it has been war ever since between the two.

I blame them both.  Politics is cold blooded, not a marriage. If you are seen together like they were they had no right to do this.  I resigned because the President and Prime Minister were behaving like teenagers. It was embarrassing to the country and they embarrassed Ukraine in front of NATO and the European Union which wanted to accept Ukraine in as members but needed to hear from one voice.”

As I have written here many times, the biggest single factor against any successful uniting of the opposition is Ms Tymoshenko herself.  She is far too divisive, authoritarian, undemocratic and simply not trusted by others in opposition.  It maybe worthy of contemplation that despite her numerous public calls for unification prior to her jailing, no such calls were welcomed by other opposition parties.   Now she is in jail and less egotistic BYuT members are the interlocutors with the other opposition parties,  progress between opposition parties appears to be more collective albeit very slowly.

Nevertheless, let us see what happens with COD.  The saying goes that a fish rots from its head downwards.  As the head is currently severed from the body due to being in jail, maybe, just maybe, the body will be spared the rot.  However if Yatseniuk’s Front for Change continues to close the gap on Tymoshenko’s BYuT, you can expect her to call the whole thing off and attempt to stab him in the back right up until the very last moment.

That won’t come as any surprise to Mr Rybachuk, me, or anybody else should it happen, but it is rather perverse that the opposition are far closer to uniting now Ms Tymoshenko is in jail, not because of her her jailing as those who know little about the workings of Ukrainian politics might think, but because she is out of the way and thus is causing far less problems for the opposition factions in their dialogue.

Quite possibly the worst thing that can happen as far as opposition unity is concerned, would be her release, as they would surely distance themselves from her upon her release just as they did before her incarceration.

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