Tymoshenko loses court case – in New York

What seems long ago, back in July 2011 in fact, I wrote about Ms Tymosehnko launching legal proceedings against – well anybody involved in her then on-going court case and also anything that could be directly attributed to Dmitry Firtash or his business dealings.  That list has continued to grow, with new names being added to the action every time Ms Tymoshenko felt suitably offended by somebody.

This is the court class action complaint – Number 11 CIV 2794, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

Back in July 2011, I wrote here - “You have to say the law suit she submitted reads as though it was written by somebody not overly conversant with the fact that every word must be chosen carefully in any litigation process,……. 

………Suffice to say it reads as though it was written by somebody with at best, only a passing interest in law. I have seen far more accomplished legal writing in standard contracts to be honest.”

Well, yesterday, a large part of the class action complaint 11 CIV 2794 was kicked out by the US judge stating there was insufficient evidence.  Having reread the above link, it is hardly surprising given just how terribly written the above class action is.  (In fact having read it again, I was extremely diplomatic in the above quote).

Given Ms Tymoshenko’s liking for suing in US courts – and looking at the standard of the class action prepared and filed that will subsequently get kicked out in its entirety I strongly suspect – perhaps she should consider suing the lawyers that allowed such a poorly written class action to enter a courtroom in the first place?

Anyway, I stated such a course of action was folly at the time – and thus it is proving to be so.

Yatseniuk for President!…….if I’m not released

The Ukrainian presidential elections are not that far away.  Less than 2 years in fact.  Current opinion polls predict a fight between the current incumbent Yanukovych and Vitali Klitscho should the election be held in the immediate future – with the polls having the current incumbent the likely winner.

A long way behind these two in the opinion polls sits Arseney Yatseniuk – somebody I have previously supported when running as Front for Change.  Sadly, I have to say, that since including himself and his party under the Batkivshchnya banner of Ms Tymoshenko my support for him has wained as his policies (not that I agreed with them all) have become evermore lost in that circus.

However, 24 hours is a long time in politics and things can change – rapidly.  As Harold Macmillian is supposed to have stated “Events dear boy, events“.

And so it seems that Ms Tymoshenko, fresh from having her calls for a single opposition party thoroughly crushed, first by UDAR and Klitschko and then by Vyacheslav Kyrylenko and “For Ukraine, has decided to take control – or at least try – of the opposition presidential candidature and eventual race in 2015 instead.

According to RADA MP Oleksandra Kuzhel, Ms Tymoshenko has stated “Definitely, Yulia Tymoshenko said: “Oleksandra, if I am not released, you have to work and help Yatseniuk.  This was the position that she clearly voiced.” 

She added that Tymoshenko also reminded about the importance of consolidated action, the need to stop infighting within the opposition.

 ”If all three parties do not stand together, we will be first swept away by the people because those who once again believed, will not be able to forgive unrealistic expectations.”

“And if it so happens that she would not be able to participate in the elections, so we must all work for Yatseniuk. No other position.“

So there we have the supposed nomination(s) of a United Opposition – Tymoshenko if freed and Yatseniuk if not – an opposition that is clearly neither particularly united in so much as it is unlikely to stop Klitschko running given his standing in current opinion polls, nor paying very much attention to present public opinion.

Thus looking forward to 2015, for the benefit of Ukraine and the absolutely necessary break from choosing between Kuchma administration political hangovers (and their very skeleton filled closets), to install a different face with a far less murky past and even some ideology that surpasses “power for powers sake” and “gorging from the trough whilst you can”, we have to hope for two things – the first is that Tymoshenko remains in jail until the elections are over, and subsequently a defeat for Yanukovych by whomever runs against him.

If breaking the cycle of electing Kuchma’s corrupt old guard is critical – and it is – the question is then who stands the best chance of defeating Yanukovych?  Yatseniuk or Kiltschko?  Today my money is on Klitschko from the two of them – by 2015, who knows?

The rule of law or more shenanigans? Ukraine v Tymoshenko (UESU Case)

Here is an interesting little development - if true – and thus far the lack of noise from the opposition about it is noticeable which casts doubts on its authenticity at the time of writing at least.

According to the above link, it seems the Prosecutor General’s Office has dropped the charges, or some of the charges at least, against Yulia Tymoshenko regarding the USEU tax avoidance case it opened against her.

It would be nice to believe that any dropped charges are indeed to do with lack of evidence – and maybe that is just what it is – but I have lived here a long time and am thus quite cynical.

Given recent reports in the media by the wife of Yuri Lutsenko, now an opposition MP herself, it is claimed that the government have reached out to him indirectly offering an immediate pardon.  This he has refused, as it necessarily follows that to be pardoned you have to admit your guilt – which he won’t do as he claims he is not guilty.

Therefore one wonders if a “deal” of some sort has been negotiated with Tymoshenko over the UESU tax avoidance case – particularly so as there is probably not a RADA MP from the past 20 years that has not avoided tax, and such instances may well be able to be proven against a large number of them across the entire political spectrum.

An attempt to put the lid back on Pandora’s Box having foolishly opened it – possibly.

It may just be that the PGO has decided to go for broke with the currently pending murder investigation against her – but there are other cases still pending over Kyoto Protocol accounting and the procurement of new ambulances (with associated presidential campaign slogans attached to said new ambulances for good measure) – to name but two more pending investigations.

Could it be that EU political and diplomatic pressure on Ukraine is paying dividends and thus the out-reaching to Lutsenko and a deal with Tymoshenko over current sentencing for the former and on-going investigations with another? – Unfortunately that possibility, similar to the possibility that the rule of law is simply being followed when dropping some charges, does not seem too realistic when talking about the Ukrainian elite – despite what may subsequently be claimed by any parties involved.

Has Lazarenko done a “deal” of some sort with the authorities in which his former nefarious UESU deeds with Tymoshenko will be forgotten should he give evidence against Tymoshenko in the murder case?

If the TVi link turns out to be genuine, it raises more questions than answers considering the murky world of Ukrainian political and business shenanigans.

Again though, I will refer you to paragraph one of this post – as I have doubts over any such charges being dropped completely – what is more likely is that it will be shoe-horned into the murder case somehow.

Vlsenko on Trial by Jury

Way back on 19th January 2012, I wrote:  “The Constitution of Ukrainian provides a right to trial by jury.  So far nobody has had a trial by jury even when they have asked for one as stated in the constitution.

Why? – Well because although the constitution provides a right to trial by jury, it does not define who, what, or how many make up a jury. It allows that definition to be set by other subsequent legislation. Fair enough, a constitution is not a document intended to go into legal technicalities but is a broad document covering Ukrainian life and a basic framework of unassailable rights.

However, since the writing of the constitution, no president, prime minister or government has made any attempt to provide the right to trial by jury as per the nation’s supreme law. In effect all political leaderships and parliaments since independence have duly denied any Ukrainian who has entered the legal system their constitutional right to trial by jury.

That duly means every Ukrainian president has failed to uphold their oath to protect the Constitution of Ukraine and the associated rights within. Every single one of them. Every single prime minister and government since independence has also failed to draft and pass the legislation necessary to bring into force what would allow a president to uphold Ukrainian rights as specified in the Constitution.

The entire political class, past and present, regardless of political party, is responsible for the fact that a constitutional right cannot be implemented.

What remains to be seen is the definition of a juror. Every nation has a different criteria for those who can be considered to act as a juror. The composition of a jury is also going to be interesting. Again, nations differ globally as to the number of jurors and the make-up of the jury. As an example, France and Brazil function quite differently to the UK, which in turn functions differently from many other nations.

What cases can and will be heard by a jury? Again there are global differences. Some nations set a minimum jail tariff for a crime as a trigger for trial by jury, others have a list of crimes that define a trial by jury or not, some allow juries only for criminal proceedings, others for any proceeding, criminal or civil. There are indeed variants of all the above and combinations of all the above.

Quite simply there is no global norm or closer to home, EU norm.”

All very clever of me, really quite obvious, and still to be resolved – but why am I bringing this matter up again?

Well because of this statement by Serhiy Vlasenko, the lawyer of Ms Tymoshenko, complaining that there is no jury system in Ukraine – a fact his defendant did absolutely nothing to change whilst she had the power to do so.

But what is bizarre seems this comment by Vlasenko,  “There is no trial jury in Ukraine. Under the new Criminal Procedure Code, a trial jury in Ukraine is the composition of the court, which includes two judges and three jurors as they [the authors of the Criminal Procedure Code] call them. But in reality there is no trial jury. These are what in Soviet times were called ‘people’s assessors.”

It seems bizarre as  any Ukrainian lawyer, particularly one supposedly charged with defending such a high-profile defendant, political ally and personal friend as he is, should know that the role of “people’s assessors” was removed in June 2011, and thus “people’s assessors” which he seems to have a distaste for, were not only a “Soviet” institution, but also very much alive and well through his defendants time as Prime Minister and his party’s time in power – when they could have changed things, but didn’t.

It follows then, he may very well have said “These are what in Tymoshenko times were called “people’s assessors” – One wonders who he is trying to fool with the inference to the perceptions of dark Soviet times and a suggestion of a long bygone system.

Certainly such comments cannot be aimed at a Ukrainian audience who were still subject to “peoples assessors” until 2011.  It is hardly going to wash with those within the Venice Commission or the Council of Europe that are well aware of when such roles and titles were officially and legally put to the sword in Ukraine as they had a hand in drafting the new Criminal Code.  Thus the diplomatic and a large part of the European political class will also see directly through such a statement.

A play for the sympathy of the western masses and less than diligent western media?

It is hardly surprising that there are recent statements on record from the Ukrainian prosecution stating they are happy with Mr Vlsenko’s defence of Ms Tymoshenko.  He seems to be very preoccupied with spinning media sound-bites and picking holes in the system that made him rich, famous and that he and his defendant did nothing to change – rather than doing much good at actually defending her.

That said, after 13 requests to Ms Tymoshenko to attend court, and 13 refusals to attend (with more to follow no doubt) due to ill health, he has no defending to do in any court so I suppose he may as well play games with a less than clued-up media and western audience.

Integration, assimilation or ideological identity (where it exists) – Ukrainian Opposition

A few days ago, Yulia Tymoshenko made the following statement calling for the opposition parties to unite.

“The ideal scenario would be further integration processes among opposition forces and the creation of a united party because the steam roller of the Regions Party can be stopped only by a powerful opposition force, which will enjoy unquestionable support in society. A merger of opposition forces and society will accelerate the death of this colossus on clay feet, in other words the Yanukovych regime“.   At least that is what her Batkivschnaya Party website quotes her as saying.

On 24th January, Vitali Klitschko, leader of the UDAR party promptly rejected such a call stating, “We have different programs, different political platforms, different ideologies, and, consequently, different voters. It’s more efficient when there are several [political] forces. This has been proved by the latest elections; the opposition ran separately and three parties scored more than if they have been a political association.”

He has a very valid point – but I would say that, as on 26th April 2011, I wrote the following when ruminating at the time of a possible opposition merger – or not:

“It makes more sense, at least if we are to consider issues as adults, for the opposition parties to act in unison on issues they agree upon and where they differ from the current government, rather than to try and force together a united opposition party that is not based on a shared ideology other than the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Whilst there may be issues to be concerned with within Svoboda ideology, it at least has a clear and identifiable political ideology – even if it is one that doesn’t sit well with many within UDAR for example.  UDAR too seems to have an identifiable ideology which is located in a far more central part of the political spectrum.

The ideology (narcissistic and autocratic as it is) of personality politics with the associated grab power and keep it mentality, which is shared by both PoR and Batkivschnaya parties – certainly amongst the leaderships of both in equal measure – is most certainly going to fail eventually.  Sooner rather than later one hopes.

There are other issues that both Klitschko and Tymoshenko will undoubtedly be aware of relating to external influences that will affect their futures.

Foremost amongst them is the noticeable desertion of many oligarchs (and ergo their money and media assets) from the PoR conclaves.  They have now been replaced by trusted family and friends of the current President.  If the oligarchy needs are not met for the most part, having been removed from the inner santum, there is every chance their money and media assets will seek to back another horse – any horse other than Tymoshenko.

Seemingly the best fit would currently be UDAR – either overtly or covertly.

With enough oligarchy money and media time behind UDAR, there can be little doubt that unless Klitschko seriously stains his copy-book before the next Presidential elections, the run off would be between him and the current incumbent as things stand today.  Something both he and the ego of Tymoshenko will be aware of and something that Tymoshenko is all too aware she can do nothing about (whether in jail or not) short of assimilating him.

It is therefore understandable, as this realisation (amongst many) looms, that she is calling for a single opposition party to take on the PoR.  A party that should it be formed now, would have a majority of her MPs and thus possibly propel her back to the pinnacle of Ukrainian politics if/when she is ever released.

Bugger ideology, the enemy of my enemy should be my friend as her public mantra – if not her personal driver – that driver being the same as it always has been, personal power for power’s sake – no different from Yanukovych.

Thus the entry of real ideology into Ukrainian politics (rather than wafer thin ideological rhetoric), the disillusionment of some of the oligarchy with the PoR and a probable need for them to find a better horse to bet upon should their needs fail to be met by the current majority, and the emergence of those within her own party using her absence to further their own future political prospects (namely replacing her) would make it seem natural for her to use the veneer of a single opposition party to protect her own interests whilst she still remains with sufficient support within her party to reinstall her as head honcho should she be released.

As time passes, all her concerns are going to become realities, thus consigning her to the political minor league upon her eventual release – even within her own party.

Klitschko however, needs only to continue to do what he is doing, avoid any major media scandals, stick to his party ideology and keep his own and his party’s identity separate from Tymoshenko and her Batkivschaya Party (and others for that matter).  In the long game of politics, ideology will eventually beat personality politics – and fortunately that means both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will be consigned to the dustbin of Ukrainian public life within the next decade – and not a moment too soon.

One wonders just how much time will pass before Tymoshenko takes a very public swipe at UDAR and Klitschko out of desperation, just as she has did Yatseniuk in 2009/2010.  A few weeks, a few months, a year?  Place your bets!

Questions over Christmas – Ukrainian civil society…..again

Whilst we here in Ukraine celebrated Christmas, esteemed colleagues, thinkers, policy makers, commentators, advisors, academics, think-tanks et al in western Europe had returned to work revitalised and energised from their own festive season.

So whilst 6th, 7th and 8th have been days of festive excess for me, my email has been steadily collecting questions from a diverse selection of people – from think-tanks in Brussels to PhD students at Surrey University to give you and idea of the spectrum.

From the assorted bag of issues to which my thoughts have been requested to wander and comment, these three questions I will share with you – as well as my initial comments.

1.  ”How would you describe the level of activity of civil society in Ukraine?”

2.  ”How would you describe the level of engagement with government of civil society in Ukraine?”

3.  ”What is your perception of the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in Ukraine?”

Blimey!

As normal academics ask such simple questions that always involve very long answers – none of which can be black or white, are exceptionally difficult to measure, and almost impossible to judge depending upon what time-frame we are to put on the answer.

So in order to keep this short (and less than academic for the purposes of this blog), I will combine the first two questions.  How would I describe the level of activity of civil society in Ukraine and how would I describe the level of engagement with government of civil society in Ukraine?

Well it is active – and it is vibrant.  It is also mostly ineffective and ignored by government and society alike.

The numbers of civil society entities certainly falls well short of those for most other nations in Europe per capita, if we are to stick to the hard definitions of recognised NGOs, think-tanks, NFPs etc.

It is very, very difficult to think of an instance where civil society has changed any Ukrainian government policy, past or present.  The reasons for this relate not only to the “arbiter/rental society” system that still very much runs through Ukrainian society itself, but also the same ‘rental society” system that covertly runs through civil society – not only in Ukraine.

As far as civil society goes, it needs funding and thus  becomes beholding to those that fund it.  This places it into two broad categories. The first, State funded, and thus assimilated, coerced, cajoled, controlled – anything but independent in the purest sense of the word.

That in turn leads to access to government and possible small victories at the very periphery of the cause the NGO was set up for, in return for defence of, or silence over, government policy that may very well seemingly run quite contrary to the cause of the NGO – but funding is needed for longevity and success requires access to, and a listening government.  Civil society, lest we forget, has become a profession unto itself for many, with access to the elite if you play the game right.

Needless to say, a government funded civil society entity can also be unleashed to pooh-pooh others in the same field who are less government friendly.  In short, and throughout global history, civil society has by and large been treated with hostility by almost all governments of every nation.  The need to now lobby for funds, or “rent seek” for want of a better expression, leads in many cases to complicity for those who receive State funding.

The other group falls into the category of externally funded.  By and large, in Ukraine, these actors in civil society are given nothing more than lip service by the government of the day – at best – and are completely ignored most of the time.

It is not only government that ignores civil society either.  To give two recent examples where civil society was ignored by Ukrainian society at large, the protests that drew more than 10,000 Ukrainians to the streets over the proposed tax code only a few years ago was certainly A-political, was not driven by any NGO, but was simply outrage amongst the populous from every corner of the nation.

Changes were made to the tax code – civil society little more than a witness.

The horrific case of the young girl in Nikoliev last year, raped, burned alive and who eventually died some weeks later, led almost to lynch mobs in the city streets when it became apparent that the well-to-do culprits may well bribe their way out of the repercussions.

Those responsible did receive lengthy prison sentences eventually, but no rule of law entity took that situation by the horns and led the populous either.

Ukrainian society is seemingly suspicious of civil society just as much as any Ukrainian government of the day.  This leaves civil society in its very own bubble, in most cases divorced from a listening ear in government and also divorced from society and the causes within society it claims to champion.

Thus civil society is left to have conversations with itself and any external sponsors it may have, but gets no traction in society or victories from government.

The next tax law amendment to be submitted to the RADA is being done after discussion with PriceWaterhouseCooper – a corporate entity – with almost no civil society input whatsoever – a case in point and an indicator to where influence truly sits and the implications for the future of Ukrainian policy making?

Ukrainian society it seems is prepared to wait for a serious wrong to occur before it will rise up and force government to amend policy – at which point it will return to daily life – with no place/use for civil society whatsoever as the intermediary.

I could go on and on, but now to the 3rd question -  “What is your perception of the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in Ukraine?”

This is actually quite difficult to assess.  Over what time-frame should it be assessed?  It took the UK 900 years to become a “democracy” as we see it today.  Independent Ukraine is only just over 20 years old.  Not that time is necessarily a justifiable excuse.  Poland managed to progress very well in a very limited time-frame.

That said, Poland had a far more autonomous administrative infrastructure than Ukraine when the USSR and Warsaw Pact dissolved and Poland was left with a real and urgent need to modernise every part of the national psyche when Germany and not Russia became the most important geopolitical entity overnight.  Needs must – and in Ukraine the need thus far has not been a must.

Despite the Euro hundreds of millions pumped into EaP civil society by the EU, it is actually quite unclear how this money is being effectively measured when it comes to “success”.  What is “success” when it comes to Ukrainian civil society?  The longevity of the entities?  The number of entities?  The almost non-existent civil society victories when changing government policy?  The support of society for civil society?  Is it simply a case of getting to a stage where most Ukrainians could name just 5 civil society entities working in Ukraine – let alone their region?

It is difficult to assess the pros and cons of the EU and in particular the EPP headlining Ms Tymoshenko as a democracy issue – almost “the” democracy issue – when scanning the Ukrainian and European press.

Throughout her trial, arrest and on-going imprisonment demonstrations for her release have not numbered more than a few thousand, even if we include those demonstrators paid to demonstrate.  A beacon of democracy she is not in the eyes of the Ukrainian public – no matter how much she may quote or plagiarise Vaclav Havel (and others) from her current accommodation.

The sting in the tail of the final ODIHR report on the Ukrainian 2012 elections seems somewhat muted due to Ukraine taking over the 2013 chair of the very organisation that generated the report.

Internal EU issues with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the Roma, the Euro, ad hoc adherence to ECfHR rulings, the structural issues of the supra-structure itself etc also do not go unnoticed.  The EU and its constituent parts are far from walking their own talk and this creates an apathetic atmosphere towards the EU.  An atmosphere frustrated and multiplied by the hassles of getting Visas to enter the EU for many Ukrainians.

Furthermore, the EU, or rather its constituent parts, seem to have no clear and identifiable plan for Ukraine – neither short or long term.  Certainly not one that has been conveyed to the people of Ukraine.  What is the external incentive for the average Ukrainian to move from the rental society model to a model of a supra-structure that has no clear plan for them or their nation, should such a painful social upheaval take place?

What carrot is on offer to them as individuals to force change from the bottom up – particularly when the model on offer has had some very significant flaws pushed into the limelight over the past 5 years, none of which seem to have been dealt with?

“Do as I say, not as I do” will not float here anymore than faith in civil society will come from the masses as an unconditional goodwill gesture.  Perception counts in a nation that has a deeply ingrained cynicism towards “the structure” and those within “the structure”.

For whatever effort the EU is putting into promotion of democracy in Ukraine, it is quite unclear how they are actually promoting it to the people – let alone effectively – as government is listened to with a massive degree of cynicism (regardless of government) and civil society talks only to itself and has yet to work out how to effectively engage with the populous.  Yet there seems to be absolutely no direct communication (or even attempt) by the EU to engage the people of Ukraine, despite these obvious issues.

That said, many a citizen within the EU would state that the EU is exceptionally poor at reaching out to them directly also.

These are naturally my first thoughts in response to the questions asked, and empirical they are in their context.  I may return to this in more depth later in the year!

Pre-judging the Ukrainian elections – The Tymoshenko lens

It is no secret to those who read this blog that I have on several occasions during this parliamentary election period, been asked to speak with LTOs (long term observers) from several international monitoring organisations with people in Odessa.

Whilst large sections of recent blog posts cover much of what has been said, lack of political ideology, lack of policy, poor strategy on behalf of certain parties, who is doing what in contravention of election laws etc., not all of what I have discussed for hours with these observes has appeared here – and neither will it – ever.

This is the second set of elections such organisations have sought me out for comment for official reports, and certain “off the record” comments made must remain “off the record” if they are to seek me out again in elections yet to come.

However, the object of this post is to view the Ukrainian elections through a different lens.  An EU lens to be exact.

That EU lens may or may not be tainted by what the election observers report in their final assessments.  As we all know, “political will” has a habit of being blind to reality when it suits.

Here is the latest OSCE interim report and here is the latest, second_interim_report_2012 from CSEOM.  Neither are exactly damning, although both raise the same electioneering issues some of which may very well have serious repercussions on election day itself.

Like so many matters of importance, election observers can only include in their reports what they personally observe.  Hearsay evidence is not evidence – and quite rightly – even if by excluding second hand/hearsay evidence a very ugly picture is sanitised in the process.

Thus, on the basis of what the international observers do observe personally, the results should influence the lens through which those their reports reach actually peer through.  That is indeed the theory.

Now much can change between now and election day on Sunday.  The PECs and DECs may very well get some severe criticism that will radically change the final reports, condemning the elections to a farce.  However if the PECs and DECs manage to do a fairly competent job, the question arises will the elections be seen as free and fair via what is included, rather than excluded, from the international observer reports?

A long time prior to the electioneering, there were serious noises coming from the EU that if Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Lutsenko did not take part due to their jailing, via below par international judicial systems, the elections would not be deemed free and fair – regardless of whether they were technically free and fair or not.

Despite that threat, both have remained in jail.

The last opinion polls prior to the legal purdah over opinion polls being published so close to the election had Ms Tymoshenko’s party polling behind both Party of Regions and UDAR.

Undoubtedly, the EU takes note of the polls.

If only 15% of the nation will actually vote for her party, then naturally 85% of the nation have no desire to see her or her party in power as a result of their votes.  Thus, is viewing the Ukrainian elections via the “Tymoshenko lens” a viable thing for the EU to do?

Should some very robust positions by those looking via the “Tymoshenko lens” change within the EU given the polling figures?

Going by the last released polls, more Ukrainians would want to see Party of Regions continue to run the country than any other political party.  No party has the majority of the nation behind them, but that is not in itself either  unusual or peculiar to Ukraine when governments are formed after elections.   Whether the polls are accurate or not, and what gravity to give polls – I have written about before.  

If Yulia Tymoshenko and her party are as unpopular as the polls would suggest, does keeping the “Tymoshenko lens” firmly to the EU eye when viewing these elections therefore ignore Ukrainian public opinion?

Some recent statements from a meeting of EU leaders past and present that took place in Berlin on 24th October are as follows:

Guenter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 1999 – 2004 - “We should not allow the Tymoshenko case to decide our future relations.”  He also made a very long-winded case that some EU nations are using the Tymoshenko case as a “political instrument” to slow down Ukrainian EU integration.

Former Polish President and current co-leader of the European Parliament’s monitoring mission in Ukraine, Alexander Kwasneiwski:  “While the Tymoshenko case is front and centre, there have been real legal reforms, including a new criminal code”.  He went on to say “Ukraine needs Europe and Europe needs Ukraine”.

Mr Kwasneiwski has a point about reforms.  This year Ukraine has moved up 9 places to 73rd (of 144 evaluated economies) according to the influential World Economic Forum 2012 Report, and according to the World Bank’s 2012 Ease of Doing Business Report, Ukraine moved up 15 places to 137 (of 185 assessed nations).  Not brilliant, but upwardly mobile in no small part due to the reforms taken over the past year.

President of the European Commission 1999 – 2004, Romano Prodi said “Open the door, export democracy and encourage more trade”, going on to say “The Tymoshenko case cannot hinder the future of the country and deeper ties between Europe and Ukraine.  You cannot stop history.  A free and fair election must presage this change.”

Former President of PACE/Council of Europe, Mevlut Cavusoglu stated “The Tymoshenko case overshadows virtually everything, but it should not – the whole country should not be excluded from Europe merely because of Tymoshenko.”  He also went to great lengths to underline that fact that the current election laws under which the elections are taking place were supported by more than 80% of the RADA, including Tymoshenko’s own party.

Probably the most notable comments came from the former Austrian Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbaur who said “If the elections are free and fair, we have to make sure the Association Agreement is signed and ratified successfully.  Europe is dealing with itself at the moment rather than its neighbours.  I say Ukraine should become part of the EU, although this won’t happen overnight.  We should not give up on Ukraine and leave it to Russia.

We used to say Ukraine has to make a choice, but this is not true.  Ukraine has made its choice.  It is us, the EU, who have to make a choice,  We should clearly say that we want Ukraine to become a member of the EU as soon as it meets all necessary standards.”

Thus it appears there are a larger and larger number influential voices within the EU and PACE structures suggesting quite strongly that the issue of Ms Tymoshenko should be seen as exactly that – the issue of Ms Tymoshenko – not the issue with Ukraine.

On many levels they are probably right.  By the time Ukraine ever fully meets the Copenhagen or Maastricht criteria for EU membership, both Ms Tymoshenko and President Yanukovych are likely to be exceptionally elderly, if not pushing up the daisies.

And if the elections are not deemed fair?  The EU still has to deal with the government that will be formed no matter how faulty or manipulated the system was that puts it there.  After all, the EU still deals with China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba etc – none of which can be said to have free and fair elections or governing bodies legitimised by free and fair public mandate.  Admittedly the Association Agreement probably would not get signed – but it isn’t signed now either.  You would expect the most useful bits of the DCFTA to the EU to somehow splinter off and get signed independently such is political expediency though.

There are issues between the EU and Ukraine that would require on-going cooperation regardless.  Pulling down the iron curtain is not a viable option on so many business, security and policy fronts it would become rather pointless to even try.  The “exceptions” could very well out number the “rule” if that were to be attempted.

It would probably suit both the EU and Ukraine to have these elections deemed free and fair (with necessary critical comment where appropriate) rather than have an additional obstacle put in the way of relations, and through the necessarily strict protocols involved in election monitoring and thus what is included (or not) in reports, if the “Tymoshenko lens” is removed from the EU eye, maybe, just maybe, that may very well just be what happens.

United Opposition in negotiations with UDAR

No, no, no.  UDAR are not about to join the United Opposition.  They are very much enjoying the 3rd choice position and have now overtaken the United Opposition in the opinion polls just as I suggested they would.

Simply they have much more to lose rather than to gain by joining the United Opposition, as should be clear from what I have written here, here and here just in the past few weeks.

No, the United Opposition are having a second attempt at convincing UDAR to come to an arrangement where they will not contest head to head constituency seats.  The first attempt months ago failed – thankfully.

Why thankfully?

Well why has Arseny Yatseniuk and Front for Change’s popularity plummeted?

The answer is that they joined the United Opposition and deprived the Ukrainian voter of a serious 3rd choice that was without Tymoshenko or Yanukovych.  There are an awful lot of non-Party of Regions voters who do not appreciate the United Opposition sham marriage and want a party to vote for that is not involved with Tymoshenko.

Previously that was going to be Yatseniuk and Front for Change – before it got into bed with Tymoshenko and formed the United Opposition.  Now that 3rd choice is Klitschko and UDAR.

The simple fact UDAR is not associated or involved with either Yanukovych or Tymoshenko is appealing to many, who have equal contempt for both.

For UDAR to come to some grubby little deal with the United Opposition that will deprive the Ukrainian voter of voting for an UDAR candidate in a constituency seat if it is one that is decided a United Opposition candidate will run in, will also not go down well with the Ukrainian voter who wants that serious 3rd choice – and more and more are wanting that choice.  Likewise devout Tymoshenko voters will not appreciate being forced to vote for UDAR in a seat whereby the United Opposition candidate bows out.  It is simply undemocratic.

It is to be hoped UDAR will refuse these desperate United Opposition overtures once again, as it will serve them well in elections yet to come in the years ahead, to remain completely independent and a genuine 3rd choice.

Anything less will ultimately be seen as a sell out – eventually.

Unfortunately, political purity and ideology seem likely to be sacrificed – again – both before and after the elections to short-termism.  How much any such decision will affect the opinion polls remains to be seen.

All that said, it is no secret that the Odessa Mayor’s future rests heavily on this election, even though he is not standing for the RADA, and as he has been an abject failure in almost every respect to the great annoyance to his PoR chiefs, I would not be sorry to see the axe fall should UDAR and the United Opposition do better than expected – separately or working in tandem.

Truth be told, regardless of how the elections go in Odessa, I am expecting his retirement on” ill-health grounds” by the year end.  There is only so much incompetence blind loyalty can counter-balance, and the causal effects of his incompetence may have a distinct eroding effect on the PoR vote in Odessa.