Transparency in political fortune – Bill 2837

It is and has never been a secret that Ukrainian politicians have always, and still do, see politics as a way not only of insuring the retention of their personal interests against others who may like the look of them, but also to use their position within the most elite business club in Ukraine to expand their interests, often across party lines – after all why let political party lines stand in the way of personal interest.

There has to be a reason to pay up to $5 million to get onto the “party list” and allocated a seat in the RADA after all – and $5 million is the price of a RADA seat offered to my good lady by BYuT in 2007, despite her absolute loathing and complete and utter disinterest in politics.

That $5 million, the sales pitch goes, will be quadrupled at least during a 5 year parliamentary term – an excellent return on investment.  A mere $100,000 would buy a seat in the regional legislature, which although not adding multiple millions in return for your investment, would certainly leave her a $ millionaire at the end of any term.

Naturally anything she did not want to declare could be assigned to my name and the usual annual income return for public officials farce would continue with all declaring an absolute pittance in comparison to the real incomes – something that still happens today due to hiding wealth, assets and income via family members amongst other shenanigans.

However, this may well be about to change.

Bill 2837 was submitted on 14th April 2013 which will go some considerable way to changing and limiting the ways of hiding real earnings and personal worth for politicians and state officials.

Granted it may not stop the shenanigans any more than tax avoidance laws gather in more tax – avoidance systems simply become more complex.

However, this bill is jointly drafted by Petrenko, Chumak, Tigipko and Mahnitski – 4 MPs form different parties amongst the 5 of relevance in the RADA.  Thus with cross-party authors there should be enough cross-party support to get this bill through its first reading which is due immanently.

It is quite a radical bill in terms of the transparency it may bring about in comparison to the current opaque methodology.

There is a citizens corruption  register (open to all citizens), big changes in the amount of, and reporting methods relating to, expenses paid for by the public purse, and perhaps most interestingly, the incomes and assets of public officials and their family members must be reported – including those family members who do not live with the public officials a favoured way of hiding personal worth of the officialdom.

Now it maybe that this bill will not change much in respect to actual transparency once ways to circumvent it have been discovered and organised – however it will be interesting to see if the bill will be adopted given the spirit in which it has obviously been drafted and the attempt at transparency it intends to install.

I expect it to pass, despite the fact it is not perfect having read it.

A purging of the pro-EU Ministers or a significant ideological split?

Smart readers will recall I wrote this at the beginning of November relating to “Who’s in and who’s out?” – It was aimed specifically at Valery Khoroshkhovsky and Poroshenko.

By 16th December, Khoroshkhovsky resigned from the Ukrainian government as I had predicted, citing the returning of Mykola Azarov to the position of Prime Minister as the reason.

As I wrote in that post “For now it is Khoroshkovsky and Poroshenko to keep a watchful eye on…..” – and that remains the case – but also we should now look to those close to Khoroshkovsky in the year ahead as well.

A quiet, much needed, slow burning. internal revolution within the PoR may just have started!”

Well, over the weekend, Sergiy Tigipko has stated he will also not be part of the new Cabinet of Ministers although will remain an MP.

Both Khoroshkovsky and Tigipko are very much front and centre pro-EU Party of Regions heavyweights and very “EU orientated” reformists.

The question is, as a new Cabinet of Ministers is due to be announced within the next 48 hours, will there be many, if any, such “EU orientated” heavyweight reformists left within the next Cabinet of Ministers?

If the likes of Poroshenko also state their desire to leave the cabinet, or are simply not reappointed, the pointed, jabbing internal finger within the Party of Regions relating to all things EU will be severely blunted.

Returning to my point about a “much needed, slow burning, internal revolution withing the PoR”, then it may very well have been quite accurate.

Tigipko’s reasoning for not wanting to remain in the Cabinet of Ministers, as stated by him live on national television is “Now it’s very important for the Regions Party to deal with ideology.”

It seems that the pro-EU and pro-Russian elements within the Party of Regions are about to lock horns in what may be a very slow, painful and ultimately disastrous battle for the PoR  – the pro-EU heavyweight reformists making their positions quite clear by removing themselves from the highest offices in the land, one by one.

It could be quite an interesting year ahead should genuine ideology catch on within the Party of Regions.  Two very distinct camps will emerge, both with some serious money and very public figures within them championing their respective causes!

Reducing bureaucracy – Tax

It has to be said that the new Tax Code brought in under the current government was by and large quite welcome and far simpler than that which previously existed.

Many of us who have to deal with tax in Ukraine will have noticed the situation is somewhat easier and far less duplicitous than it previously was.

However, the new Tax Code was not perfect – is any tax system?

There remains still, a significant (if reduced) amount of duplicity when compiling tax returns, despite the amount of taxes dropping to 23 – many of which don’t apply to everybody anyway.

Nevertheless, it appears that further changes are to be made to the Tax Code and those 23 formal taxes reduced to a total of 9.  That in turn will no doubt reduce the duplicative bureaucracy required.

All that can be said is “hurrah and huzzah!” – Although no doubt bedlam will rule as it is almost guaranteed that any changes will be ineffectively implemented, thus taking time to trickle down through the system and “interpretations” slowly worked out by tax authorities and accountants alike.

Nevertheless, less categories of tax and less bureaucracy theoretically should translate into less time for me messing about with tax returns.  The trouble is theory and practice are likely to be two very different things. – We will see!

Tigipko – Stating the obvious!

There are a few things that all good politicians can do in any nation on earth.  The first is deftly avoid answering a question, the second is manipulating statistics in an attempt to add credence to their position, and the third is to make an address or speech without reading it and sounding like a robot or a 7 year old stumbling along in front of an elementary reading class whilst managing to stick to the text.

All necessary qualities for today’s modern mealymouthed, over-educated, under-experienced from university to retirement, career politicians (in the UK at least).  Indeed in my lifetime, back in the UK, I anticipate watching the careers of those who left university and immediately entered the Palace of Westminster in some guise or another and will eventually become MPs in “safe seats” and thus spend their entire working lives in that building (baring the occasional constituency visit around voting time).

In Ukraine, however, there is a distinct lack of “professional politicians” as Sergey Tigipko pointed out on his Facebook page on  Thursday.  A fact that he laments.  As if nobody in Ukraine was aware that very few would pass as credible politicians in most other nations.  Stating the obvious!

His criticism was not aimed at the opposition during electioneering alone but also at the government of which he is a part.

To save you finding the entry on his Facebook page and then translating it, I’ve done it for you:

“I think that, first and foremost, Ukraine lacks professional politicians. Here, as they say, ‘a fish rots from the head down.’ This concerns both the government and the opposition.

There’s a lot of populism. There’s little understanding of what to do in economics, the social sphere, culture and education.”

Well, all quite true and again stating the obvious, but “professional politicians”?  Competent politicians would be a far better prospect and competent, honest, politicians with integrity would be outstanding – amazing even!

Unfortunately Mr Tigipko  and his party “Strong Ukraine” lost a lot of support when it merged with Party Regions.  Until that time he and his party were seen as a reasonable alternative to both PoR and BYuT, so much so, that he finished a very comfortable 3rd in his first ever attempt at the presidential elections.

It also has to be said that when I was sat with one of our more senior chaps from HM Embassy Kyiv not so long ago, we played the “who’s in and who’s out” of favour game relating to the current government, and when Tigipko was discussed it was agreed that he is actually one of the very few politicians who actually sounds and acts like a politician that could fit into any parliament of any nation.  He is a very good speaker and clearly at ease when doing so.

In case you wondering, Tigipko fell into the “necessarily in” but “out” category when it came to absolute confidence from those above and around him.

Actually not such a bad place to be if a diplomat wants a sensible conversation with somebody at the top of the Ukrainian government if he is seen to be “in” but not so “in” to be tarred with the same brush as others who are seen to be completely and absolutely “in” regardless of the nefariousness involved.

Those shades of grey are important in such matters.

Anyway, Tigipko is right that the state of Ukrainian politicians leaves more than a lot to be desired in the vast majority of cases, and is thus stating the obvious although not under a title I find particularly appealing – but – making such statements after all parties have filed their party lists with the same incompetents he is complaining about, would seem a statement made some time after the horse has disappeared over the horizon with the gate still swinging in the breeze.

Still, as things stand today, as I have previously written, it looks very likely it will be his incompetent colleagues in power again come the end of October.

Ukraine – “Countries in transit” – Freedom House Report

Well Freedom House has just released its “Countries in Transit” report of which Ukraine is one.  Quite where Ukraine is transiting too is debatable, though there must be an assumption that Freedom House feels Ukraine should be transiting towards democracy – or if not democracy, certainly a set of basic fundamental human rights and protections thereof.

As I have previously written, whilst it is often politically expedient for politicians to compare nation A with nation B in an effort to state “At least we aren’t as bad as Country B” as some form of justification and legitimacy for their own policy failings, what really matters in comparisons is how Country A stands today in respect of how it stood historically.

That is what matters to the people who live within Country A.  Is it better or worse than before?  It is after all, possible for Country A to decline internally but still climb a Freedom House ranking because new counties have been added to the numbers, or other countries have declined faster than Country A.

So, we will leave the somewhat flawed picture that politically expedient international comparisons toss out to the populous as mitigation for their own policy failures, or the media for headlines that will sell copy, and look at how Ukraine has done in the past decade according to Freedom House vis a vis Ukraine.

It should be noted that the best possible score allocated by Freedom House is 1 and the worst is 7.

It is rather grim reading to see that Ukraine has been backsliding on almost every front, not with the current government alone, but also quite obviously under the last one as well, since 2006.

Now one could put the perceived improvements recorded in 2006 down to great expectations of the 2005, rather than an accurate reflection of reality, following the Orange Revolution.  That is the problem with opinion based surveys.  They tend to be emotional rather than reality based and therefore bias unintentionally or deliberately either through the slant of the surveyor, the surveyed, or both.

One can ponder if there has ever really been very much improvement whatsoever during the past decade, and whether the perceived improvement immediately following the Orange Revolution was nothing more than great expectations.  The relative slide backwards thereafter across most of the board was the slow dawning of the realisation that, in fact, nothing has changed since ex-President Kuchma.

Thus today’s overall score of 4.82 compared to a Kuchma score in 2003 of 4.71 maybe interpreted to be the reality that all illusionary bubbles and Orange Revolution hangovers have now, eventually, evaporated.  The population polled for this survey now realise there was actually no improvement between 2003, as shown by the consistent ebbing of hope during the tenure of the past, and present government as displayed in the above table.

If interpreted that way, it is certainly time for the new political faces of Yatseniuk, Tigipko and Koloevska to step forward and replace the old guard if there is to be another positive bump in perception across the above categories.

The question is, should that actually happen (and Ukraine not sentence itself to more years of Yanukovych or Tymoshenko), can they actually change anything? – Or would there still simply be another 2006 spike followed by yet another decline as reality set in?

The Korolevska Foundation – Right questions, wrong location!

Well not so very long ago I wrote a small entry on Natalia Korolevska and debated whether she was to be the new female face of Ukrainian politics replacing her former leader and mentor, Ms Tymoshenko.  It certainly seems that if her star is not rising through ability and worthy recognition, she is catapulting it into the celestial realms on the back of self-promotion.

As such I was not overly surprised to see that on 27th March the Korolevska Foundation, (it is popular to have a foundation/think tank if you are a politician), is holding a meeting to discuss 3 very important issues:

1.   Creating a credible opposition.

2.   Defending civil liberties and justice.

3.   Campaigning for EU democratic values.

Very good.  All worthy of discussion and all worthy of engagement with the Ukrainian opposition leaders, Ukrainian civil society and academia and most importantly the Ukrainian public I am sure we would all agree.  I would even go along myself if it was local to Odessa.

Unfortunately it isn’t local to Odessa as many political meetings involving leaders aren’t.  Lest we forget, Kyiv is the centre of the Ukrainian universe and we in the provinces are but a far flung orbiting meteor visited only when campaigning for votes or random and infrequent public relations events.  Apart from that we are left to defecate in the streets for the amusement of passing tourists in the hope they will through their loose change in our hats.

To be fair though, most people in Odessa are very pleased to be left alone by the powers that be residing in Kyiv, so tourists please continue to throw your loose change in our hats.  That is generally far better than unwelcome attention from Kyiv.

Nevertheless, if the Korolevska Foundation cannot or will not do a traveling roadshow around Ukraine to promote her and debate these 3 relevant issues with Ukrainians, then Kyiv is obviously the place to engage with all levels of Ukrainian society.  On that most would agree.

However, this meeting is not going to be held in Kyiv.  It is not even going to be held in Ukraine.  If you want to attend, debate or simply listen to the Korolevska Foundation over such important issues here is the address:

Scotland House, Round-Point Schuman 6, 1000 Brussels.

If you want to attend, simply complete this application form, but if you are Ukrainian, unless you already have a valid Schengen Visa, it is very unlikely you will get one in time to attend now!  I expect it will be an interesting jolly for those who go along but what will that achieve other than being interesting?

It would appear that the Korolevska Foundation will be asking how to create a credible opposition in Ukraine, how to defend civil liberties and justice in Ukraine and how to campaign for EU democratic values in Ukraine, not with Ukrainians (unless they happen to be there), but with anybody except Ukrainians who can make it to Scotland House in Brussels on the 27th!

One must seriously question the legitimacy of this gathering.  Is it to genuinely find answers to these questions or is it simply another event to reinforce Natalia Korolevska as the new female face of Ukrainian politics amongst the Brussels technocracy.

For certain such advice from Brussels can be given to the Korolevska Foundation in Ukraine.  Ukraine hosts ambassadors, political scientists, advisors et al from every EU nation as well as an EU Ambassador and staff as well.  She could gather 80 – 100 very smart top level EU policy advisors and policy implementors amongst the diplomatic ranks posted in Ukraine quite easily.

The input holding such a meeting in Ukraine would be no less qualitative or clever than the input given by holding it in Brussels.  Certainly such a gathering in Ukraine would get far more Ukrainian media and public attention, but I suspect it is not Ukrainian media attention Ms Korolevska is seeking, but that of the Brussels Quarter and more for her own ends than any to receive substantive answers she hasn’t already arrived at herself.

To answer the first question relating to creating a credible opposition, then firstly there must be trust between the 18 or so opposition parties.  As most of the opposition parties have had experience of working together within the Tymoshenko government, then trust is a very rare commodity.  Nobody within the opposition trusts her and equally she has no trust in other opposition parties (or some members of her own).  That lack of trust is equally apportioned around the opposition parties about each other.

To understand this you must consider the RADA as closed shop business where majority and opposition change places as majority and minority shareholders at election time, and the personal dividends that brings individual deputies is dependent upon what position they hold.  That is a situation that becomes very complicated indeed when a coalition government is made up of numerous parties and each party and each deputy is focused in retaining and improving their position and personal dividend windfall.

In order to gain any sort of trust amongst all opposition parties, Ms Tymoshenko would have to permanently leave politics.  She currently has a dislike for Yatesniuk (again – and not for the first time) which makes uniting a credible opposition very difficult when Yatseniuk and his party are the second most popular opposition party in Ukraine, not far behind her own.  Recent Ukrainian political history is replete with examples of what happens to careers, positions and actions when Ms Tymoshenko took a disliking to somebody within her coalition, something Ms Korolevska discovered herself on 14th March when expelled from Ms Tymoshenko’s BYuT faction.  Trust therefore, is severely lacking.

Next is a complete lack of policy.  There is a policy void amongst the opposition, individually and combined, that is so vast it makes the Grand Canyon seem like a hair-line fracture.  The only thing they have agreed on publicly is to try and create a single voters list amongst themselves to stand against the current government but even that, despite being announced in January, has still to be done and even if it is done, not only does it stand a chance of falling apart before the October elections, it also significantly reduces voter choice.

That does not even begin to address the vastly differing ideologies and places on the political spectrum that so many different opposition parties occupy.  The opposition ranges from the extreme right of Svoboda all the way across to the centre left socialists.  It is no wonder there can be little agreed policy to act as a platform for electioneering other than “we are not the PoR”.

As unpopular as the PoR may be, when push comes to shove at voting time, it is not hard for the Ukrainian public to remember what happened last time there was a populist, policy-less, dysfunctional, multi-party coalition in power.  As all political observers know, any polls today are meaningless with the elections 6 months in the future.

It may already be too late to create a credible opposition as credibility and legitimacy is not given, but earned over time through policy and action.  The clock ticks towards election day and there is as yet no credible united opposition.

When it comes to defending civil liberties and justice, the opposition have a very difficult task.  When in power they did a particularly poor job of doing either, let alone improving it.  The EU policy as per the recent EEAS policy document and numerous statements and meetings by Stefan Fule, is now to engage with civil society and NGOs to do this.  Just as Ukraine fatigue set in within the EU when the opposition were in power, it seems quite clear by the EU adopting this policy towards civil society and NGOs, it suffers from the same fatigue now these parties are in opposition.

No effective credible opposition means no effective and credible actions over civil liberties and justice will come from it.  Better to go directly to those who are united in a cause, have far fewer internal conflicts, have policies and plans and fund them directly- which is exactly what the new EU policy does with civil society and NGOs.  Whether it will be an effective policy or not remains to be seen, but it can certainly be no less effective than the Ukrainian opposition.

Quite why the Korolevska Foundation is holding a meeting in Brussels about which campaigning for EU democratic values is on the agenda I am unsure.  National ambassadors from every EU nation, the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, the Council of Europe, OSCE, European Commission, European Parliament and European Council are hardly likely to be saying nothing to the leadership of Ukraine when the most important nation in their EaP strategy is baulking at the DCFTA and AA final fence and the stumbling block is indeed EU democratic values.

Ukrainian society is quite aware what EU democratic values are.  Well at least they thought they knew what EU democratic values are.   Events in Italy, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia this year may well have caused the Ukrainian public to rethink just exactly what EU democracy really is.  If it has then they would not be alone.  Many in the EU are now wondering as well.

Anyway, the Ukrainian public know/knew what EU democratic values are.  They do not live in a cocoon.  They travel, they have the Internet, they have millions of European visitors to Ukraine every year with whom they can and do interact.

The Ukrainian public can organise itself over issues it feels overstep the mark or are decidedly wrong.

They did it over the Tax Code without any organisational help from the opposition parties.  In fact the opposition parties were told by the demonstrators the protests was A-political and they would not allow the opposition to hijack it.  To date, since the current government came to power, that has been easily the biggest demonstration, dwarfing any other.

Locally, as yesterday’s post shows, they are also capable of forcing appropriate action where none is taken.

Should the Korolevska Foundation not be asking these questions of themselves, other opposition parties and in particular, the Ukrainian public in Ukraine rather than technocrats, journalists, interns, bloggers, and associated bodies within the Brussels bubble?

Has she not noticed the increasing perception amongst the EU citizenry of a democratic deficit between themselves and the Brussels bubble?  Even the EU elites are waking up to that fact, although the only answer they seem to have is more central power and political union which simply increases nationalist rhetoric amongst the EU nations and their citizens.

There is bountiful foreign advice to be had here in Ukraine if that is what the foundation seeks, not to mention a large amount of quality domestic advice from the academia of Ukraine.

The future of Ukraine lays with Tigipko, Yatseniuk and yes with Korolevska.  At some point in the next 10 years the European stage will be theirs without the clutter of Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and the other recycled parts of the old Soviet apparatus.  Her star will rise in its own good time and I see so very little to be gained from this meeting being held in Brussels in comparison to holding it in Ukraine, other than some egotistical attempt to force her mobile number onto the speed-dial of mandarins she will soon enough put in the political shadows of the fairly near future.

New social spending, elections and Ukraine

Now a few days ago, you will remember that I wrote about the necessary government policy to stimulate housing and mortgages.  You will remember I questioned just how the government would get the banks to lend for 20 or 30 years at 10% when they currently and traditionally have lent for much shorter terms but at rates often close to 30%.

The question was how this could be implemented amongst private banks and what encouragement/coercion the government could use to make it happen.

That so far remains unclear, however we now have some idea of the additional money the government is going to provide to make it happen.  The answer is about UAH 10 billion from government.  Quite how this UAH 10 billion gets into and is taken up by the mortgage and banking system still remains unclear.

Another UAH 15 billion is required for other social programmes such as pension increases, which are to be fair, pitifully low.

Fortunately, if that is the right word to use,  these programmes being domestic programmes, are not dependent upon external monetary sources or loans which is just as well given the current impasse between the IMF and Ukraine which is likely to go on into 2013.  Quite possibly the IMF lending programme will simply not be restarted at all as neither side are prepared to move over the core sticking point of raising gas prices another 50%.

What will happen is that the UAH printing presses will be cranked up to produce to 25 billion or so needed to fund these government induced programmes prior to the next election, no doubt in the hope that it will turn into votes at the ballot box.

All very good and understandable until we think about the effect of dumping an additional UAH 25 billion in cash into the economy will have.  Now I am not an economist and only briefly studied economics as part of a business degree, however, my albeit rather basic calculations would suggest that in pursuing these policies and financing them by cranking up the printing presses, it will add an additional 1.2% to national inflation.

Yes that is a small amount, however the last official inflationary figures I saw for Ukraine stated there national inflation stood at 7.9%.  A scary figure but certainly not unmanageable.  If we add on my crudely calculated 1.2% then we are at almost 10% inflation for 2013 if all things remain constant in 2012.

Even that may not be so bad, except we all know the any governmental figures are never a true account of actual inflation, even if they are worked out via World Bank or IMF models.  Maybe especially so if worked out by those models!

Thus, considering what is likely to be close to an official 10% inflationary figure once these social programmes are introduced, and taking into account what is likely to be a sizable gap between them and the real inflationary figures faced by the average Ukrainian each day at point of purchase, the additional UAH allocated for pension increases will have to be close to a net 20% (or more) pension increase for the pensioners to come out ahead in any meaningful way due to this policy.

To be frank, a rise in pensions in excess of the real every day inflation rate, (as opposed to the official government inflationary figures), faced by pensioners seems rather unlikely.

I might very well be quite wrong in my calculations because as yet no opposition party has raised this issue in the public domain, however this is the Ukrainian opposition we are talking about and when it comes to challenging governmental policy, or heaven forbid having policies of their own,  they are incredibly inept and noticeable by their absence.

That said, it may very well be that if the opposition had a policy between them, it could very well have been the same policy, so pointing out any possible downside would not be in their interests either.  After all, with parliamentary elections 6 months away, would the opposition campaign on a platform against such increases?

Will I be proven correct?  Will my calculations stand up?  Will a well intentioned policy turn out to be counterproductive? – Let’s hope I’m wrong!

Will the opposition unite and remain united in Ukraine?

It is probably best to open this post by quoting the opening paragraph from A Tale of Two Cities by the one and only Charles Dickens:

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

It will be important to remember the stark contrasts of this passage as we take a superficial walk through the politics leading up to the next Ukrainian parliamentary elections in October 2012, for they too, as far as the opposition can manage, will be painted in such extremes.

Such is the diktat issued by Ms Tymoshsenko to those in opposition who will still listen to her.  “Remember that the key to the elimination of the regime lies in the unity of the opposition, down to a single party list, in the clear division of the political field into black and white, good and evil, into Ukraine and its occupants.”

Of course she has a point.  Members of her party would not have voted through the new election laws if they hadn’t included a 5% threshold forcing minor parties to join with larger ones to retain their seats in the RADA.  In doing so a handful of smaller opposition parties have no choice but to unite with some of the bigger ones who will pass this threshold.

Cynical for opposition “democratic forces”, as they label themselves, to vote through an arbitrary threshold that would remove democratic representation for those who voted for a candidate that received 4.9% of the vote or less possibly, but maybe effective in garnering those smaller parties who would otherwise meet the political history rubbish bin to rally around the Tymoshenko party flag that will certainly pass the 5% threshold.

However, there are other opposition parties who will also expect to pass the 5% threshold.  Klitchko’s party, Yatseniuk’s Front for Change,  the extreme far-right Svoboda party should all get over that line so there is still a need to unite the opposition.

One wonders if Ms Korolevska’s move from Ms Tymoshenko’s party to lead the Ukrainian Social Democrat Party was more planned than surprising.  A stalwart and loyal Tymoshenko ally, she is guaranteed to bring the USDP to the Tymoshenko heel.  Alternatively Ms Korolevska may simply be following the path of her old leader Ms Tymoshenko.  Lest we forget within 3 weeks of Lazarenko being arrested in the USA, the once loyal Ms Tymoshenko broke ranks and formed her current party.  In the same vein, once Ms Tymoshenko was jailed, Ms Korolevska leaves Ms Tymoshenko’s party for another.  History repeating?

Anyway, even with the 5% threshold forcing some parties to rally to the Tymoshenko flag, there are 4 or 5 opposition parties that will pass this threshold without having to give allegiance to Tymoshenko, thus possibly splitting the opposition vote and increasing the chances of PoR (and allies) retaining a parliamentary majority.

Recently the “democratic opposition” announced they had signed a unity agreement under which to fight the next election, agreeing to field a single candidate from amongst themselves to run against the ruling majority candidates for each seat.  All very good and tactically sound on the face of it until you realise that not all opposition parties actually signed up.  Hrytsenko’s party didn’t for example, and whilst a small party, he is particularly effective on the never ending Ukrainian televised political debate shows.  Oliynyk’s party is another that will not sign up.

There are other issues as well.  The unity agreement states those selected for nomination on the united opposition single list meet certain requirements “the basic requirements for candidates – decency, adherence to one’s principles, professionalism, public authority and perfect reputation.”

Errm – Exactly!  Under such criteria, it is unlikely many candidates meet that criteria as any Ukraine politics watcher will know.  It is further made more difficult by another of Ms Tymoshenko’s diktats,  “Do not allow the nomination and election of random people not tested by time and struggle, as well as entrepreneurs who plan to use politics to strengthen their business. I insist that the candidates for deputy in majority districts from Batkivschyna be publicly and seriously discussed.”

Which is it to be?  Those with a “perfect reputation”, which immediately discounts any long (self) serving RADA member leaving only new blood, or those RADA members “tested by time” as Ms Tymoshenko puts it, but will not stand up to any serious scrutiny as far as a “perfect reputation” is concerned that is called for in the opposition agreement?  Quite simply the united opposition would do well to field a handful of candidates that met both criteria.

Next, would those liberally minded voters of Yatseniuk’s Front for Change be willing to vote for a “united opposition” that  includes the self-proclaimed ultra-fascist Svoboda party?

Would Yatseniuk’s supporters vote for a united opposition ticket, which according to Ms Tymoshenko’s diktat  “Do not let new kleptomaniacs deprive the country of its strategic facilities ahead of the parliamentary elections – land, the gas transport system, hydropower, Energoatom , Ukrzaliznytsia, museum valuables and so on.”  Yatseniuk made his millions by privatising Ukrainian State assets and is on record as siding with the EBRD, EIB, IMF as being in favour of privatising the State assets Ms Tymoshenko wants to retain as State assets.

The list of political and policy divisions between this eclectic group go on and on.

Let us work on the assumption this schizophrenic, multiple-personality disordered, united opposition entity actually wins a majority at the next election.  Well, we have been here before with Ms Tymoshenko’s last government made up of numerous coalition partners with very different political views across the political spectrum and it was a disaster.  She held power by a majority of 1 and consistently needed to concede values, principles and positions to hold it together.

Which direction does any united opposition take if it gets into power?  Is there a shift to the far right Svoboda position or  will Ukraine become far more liberal as per the Front for Change position?  Will it simply become a reactionary populist government as it was last time under Ms Tymoshenko drifting in the breeze of public opinion without a rudder or course of its own?

How long will such a government stand before it is either dissolved by the President (which happened many times under ex-President Yushenko) or simply voted out of office again a few years down the line having once again proved to be completely ineffective as far as the Ukrainian population is concerned.  Due to the deep divisions between political coalition partners will anything to get done?

Something else to be seriously considered is the public demand for a “third choice”.  If we look back at the last Presidential elections, Yatseniuk (and his Front for Change) and Tigipko (and his Strong Ukraine), between them took 20% of the vote in the first round, only 5% less than Ms Tymoshenko.

Surely that must tell the established camps of Yanukovych and Tymoshenko that in 2010, one in five Ukrainians wanted a third choice that did not include either of them.  That number has surely grown rather than diminished over the past two years, as would seem to be born out by opinion polls that have seen the PoR ratings positively plummet but Tymoshenko’s rating fail to go up anywhere near that same number.

Where is the third choice now?  For those of you familiar with the thoughts of Messrs Huntington or Lipset, I concur with their line of political science evaluation.  To employ their thinking to Ukraine, it is now too open and too educated to put up with much more than another 5 or 10 years of the likes of Tymoshenko or Yanukovych.

It may therefore be a massive mistake for any third choice to remain in this coalition of the united opposition (or a coalition with those in power).   Messrs Yatseniuk and Tigipko (or possibly even Ms Korolevska) please take note!

Will this strategy of a united opposition actually work?  Will it hold together when the candidate nomination process begins or will they fragment and fall out with each other?  If they win, how will they even begin to work together on agreed policy when they come from such vastly different places on the political spectrum?  How will the Ukrainian voters actually vote when a vote for their man/woman may also put in power those they find truly abhorrent?  If the enemy of your enemy also turns out to be your enemy on a united opposition ticket, will they vote at all?

In short, will a united opposition ticket based upon the theory, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, actually sell to the Ukrainian voting public once that ideal is put under the electoral microscope?

It will be very interested to watch all this unfold over the next few months.