Yes, yes I know I am posting much later in the day than normal – and this will be incredibly short too as I have been busy with other things, such as god-daughter’s birthdays.
However here is an interesting read from the Central Asia Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University relating to the benefits – or not – of membership of the Customs Union.
Tomorrow the usual, overly wordy ruminations will return!
Well here is an interesting article that states the extremist Ukrainian Bratsvo Party will train Russian activists in Ukraine this summer.
The Bratsvo Party agenda being the break up of the Russian Federation by organising the peripheral and anti-Moscow States and youth with training camps focusing upon civil disobedience, battling law enforcement, agitation and propaganda – not to mention “the theoretical foundations of Russian autonomy” and the “theology of the Russian Autonomous Church”.
Blimey – I wonder how many disenfranchised Russians will turn up!
It’s probably better I not hold my breath to see any effective results from the Bratsvo Party plan, and am wiser waiting for Putinism without Putin – a time that will eventually arrive – to watch the Russian Federation possibly fray at the periphery.
Still, always interesting to keep an eye on what the ultra far right nationalists are doing.
Today I have very little to say, as I want to draw attention to the work of chaps at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office together with HM Embassy Kyiv under the imaginatively titled “A blueprint for enhancing understanding of and support for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement including DCFTA in Ukraine“
It is also available in Ukrainian - Угода про асоціацію ЄС – Україна: дослідження обізнаності цільових груп та стратегія комунікаційної кампанії - a title just as lengthy as in English!
It is a very interesting read that will go a long way to questioning the predispositions of some relating to the Ukrainian public desire to head West (or East).
I could go on and on but I won’t – have a read, it will be worth it.
A very short post today because I am decorating the balcony – the weather is good enough and the good lady’s “lobbying” has eventually ground me down into compliance!
It also has nothing to do with Ukraine (at least directly or currently).
However, there has been a lot in the press in the build up to – and subsequent release of – The US Magnitsky List.
The US public release was naturally followed by a public Russian list of US officials also considered to be “human rights abusers” ranging from those involved in Guantanamo, those involved in”enhanced interrogation techniques” and legal opinion allowing it, to the Victor Bout prosecution.
Indeed an expected Russian response.
However, if we are to presume that human rights are at the core of the US Magnitsky law and list, then there is one very poignant question to be asked -
Will it advance human rights in any way whatsoever in Russia?
With Russia responding with nothing more than a list of its own as expected, quite obviously the answer is clearly not!
Therefore was it a policy driven by human rights – or a policy driven by other motives considering the very predictable short, medium and long term outcomes?
For certain human rights within Russia will gain nothing from the US Magnitsky Law or list, regardless of the real or perceived motivation behind them – in fact the effects are likely to be sadly quite counterproductive.
Not so very long ago, 11th February to be exact, I wrote about the 5 + 2 talks occurring in Lviv relating to the Transnistria-Moldova frozen conflict, somewhat wisely adding a caveat about whether or not the Moldavian government would hold together.
By 17th February, it had become clear that it would not, and I went on to describe some diplomatic shenanigans that were under way by Russia in relation to a consulate from Transinistra – something likely to only further complicate matters – as well as undermine a Ukrainian chairmanship OSCE headline issue.
Now, the pro-EU Moldavian coalition government has officially fallen – as was clear it had (unofficially) when I wrote on 17th February.
What chance for the next 5+2 meeting in Odessa in May?
It seems there is now yet another possible twist to this diplomatic manipulation by Russia.
Whereas previously, opening a consul actually on Transnistrian soil had been pooh-poohed and a very clever alternative had been organised by the Russians to use Transnistrian property in the Moldavian capital to act as a consulate on “Transnistrian soil” - it now seems that Russia may be able to return to Plan A and open a consulate within the Transnistrian region itself if it is prepared to remove its troops from the region – with the blessing of the Moldavian President.
Naturally this would demilitarize the issue – but it has to be said, could make the politicisation of the issue far more difficult to navigate in the future. It may be seen as something more than de facto – if not strictly de jure – recognition of Transnistria by Russia – something it (and no other nation) has done previously.
It seems that the EU-EaP Vilnius Summit in November is looking quite likely to be something of a major anti-climax for the EU – where none of the 6 EaP nations will have achieved anything like what the EU expects if it is to sign anything. In fact, there must be an ever increasing chance that the summit could turn into a disaster.
Difficult days, weeks and months ahead for the EEAS and European Commission ahead if it is to salvage anything from the EaP nations by November it seems!
Only six days ago, I wrote this entry entitled “5+2 Lviv meeting – Frozen Conflict progress?“
It relates to a conversation I had with several people over lunch from Moldova and Ukraine in Odessa, and the prospects of some positive momentum in the protracted issues on the Ukrainian border between Moldova and Trasnistria.
Two days ago, I received an email from a reader drawing my attention to the very last line of that entry – “assuming the Moldavian government can hold it together that long! ” – Something quite prophetic considering within the last six days, we have indeed seen the Moldavian government collapse.
The question in the email was simply how did I know? The simple and honest answer is I didn’t know – but given the amount of political turmoil Moldova forever seems to find itself in, it appeared to be a caveat worthy of inclusion regardless of the chances of any collapse occurring before the Lviv 5+2 meeting.
Thus prophetic I am not – wise enough to consider any possible collapse and include in the entry, well maybe so.
To prove just how blind to the future I am, I would suggest you, dear readers, take a moment to reread the above entry via the link, and then read what I am about to write – which will probably bring my rather hopeful post crashing back down to reality with an unceremonious and rather abrupt bump.
Firstly, despite the glee of the Moldavian Communist opposition party at the collapse of the pro-EU ruling coalition, does the government’s collapse actually change the position of Moldova relating to Transnistria? After all, it was still an issue for the Communists when they were in power in Moldova – despite both the Communists and the leadership of Transnistria having a prima facie preference for the Kremlin rather than the EU.
That said, as the EU will be very unwilling to have Moldova enter its ranks with an on-going protracted conflict - (lessons learned from the Cypriot entry one hopes) – thus the real political will to resolve the issue under Communist rule may very well have be missing despite any rhetoric.
None of that however, seems equal to the very recent and significant spanner that Russia has seemingly thrown into the works – undoubtedly with the limited real purpose – in part – of insuring Ukraine fails to achieve what is one of its headline OSCE chairmanship issues – progress in the OSCE regional frozen conflicts.
One more stick to beat Ukraine with and cause international embarrassment in failing to make progress with a Ukrainian nominated headline OSCE issue.
What is the said spanner I write of? Well, as I wrote in the afore linked post, there were issues I was not prepared to write about – then. Some I considered too sensitive. However with the subsequent fall of the Moldavian government a few days ago and where that leaves the Lviv 5+2 talks, it seems right to enlighten readers on one or two matters.
Russia has tried, with no success, to open a Russian consulate in Transnistria historically. Something that would have complicated matters greatly as it would at the very least, diplomatically and politically be an overt recognition of Transnistria’s absolute autonomy from Moldova by Russia.
Now, not to be defeated, Russia has a different plan which will be equally as problematic when it comes to any solution other than, at the very least, the absolute autonomy of Transnistria.
The Transinistria government has property within the capital of Moldova, Chisinau. It has given a small building to the Russian government who plan to open what is in effect going to be a consulate on what will probably be seen as Trasnistrian soil in the Moldavian capital.
This office is due to officially open, I now understand, at the end of the month and at least four Russian diplomats are already in place with the express aim of creating parity between Transistrian and Russian laws and regulations.
Thus it is quite clear that any hopeful scribblings I wrote only a week ago, are very likely to turn to dust as Russia sets out to scuttle any form of progress – and indeed probably complicate matters further – in what undoubtedly is in whole or in part, a deliberate sabotaging (one of many, and likely to increase in force and number this year) of Ukrainian policies, for refusing the Customs Union and still loudly shouting pro-EU rhetoric – even if that all turns to dust before November’s Vilnius summit – and it may very well turn to dust too!
Another summit with no progress, together with the collapse of the pro-EU coalition government is also likely to have implications for the signing of a DCFTA between the EU and Moldova.
Russia, it would appear, has, and is taking, the opportunity to undermine and increase pressure on two FSU nations who, currently at least, continue to make favourable pro-EU statements about their direction rather than favourable statements about heading into the Customs Union.
That Russian pressure will only increase between now and November for both Ukraine and Moldova. It’s going to be a long, diplomatically and politically fraught summer in this part of Europe for sure!
Well – I’ve just had a fairly interesting lunch with a very interesting group of people.
As is fairly well known, on 18th and 19th February the next 5 + 2 (Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, EU and USA) members will sit down again and try to gain some moment towards a resolution of the current frozen conflict that has existed since 1992 between Moldova and Transnistria.
Thus far it has been a very long and arduous road that has been traveled with precious few results.
With Ukraine currently holding the chairmanship of OSCE and being a guarantor in the 5 + 2 process, much stands to be gained for Ukraine on the international stage should there be tangible progress – and to be honest any tangible progress given the severe lack of results since 1992, will be worthy of note.
So what are the chances of anything worthy of note happening now?
Well, somewhat to my surprise, it appears that there is likely to be agreement to open the Guru Bicului bridge between the two regions, as well as direct and hopefully frequent inter-parliamentary dialogue between the regional political assemblies – which hopefully will be no bad thing as both will allow for confidence and trust building between both populations by way of free movement, and between authorities of both sides, respective of each action mentioned above.
It also appears that both the Prime Minister of Moldova and the leader of Transnistria have agreed to have a joint meeting on the margins of the summit, instigated by Ukraine, with the OSCE representative for conflicts.
These were not the only noteworthy issues we discussed, but they are the only ones I am prepared to write about – for now – as these are probably the least sensitive and most overtly easy to note for on-lookers from the public domain as/when/if they become a reality.
If they do become reality, considering we are only 2 months into the Ukrainian 2013 OSCE chairmanship, it represents a very good start indeed.
Let’s hope for positive action, and not just media spin, emerging from Lviv next week – assuming the Moldavian government can hold together that long!
Well this should be an interesting week.
Russia slaps Ukraine with a well timed $7 Billion bill for unused and unwanted gas within the contractual parameters of the awful deal crafted by Ms Tymoshenko, rumours are rife of a Ukrainian default on foreign debt this year (and let’s be honest, any debt payment rolled over or delayed is indeed a default on the original agreement), and the IMF has rolled into town with the same demands including the of raising gas tariffs to an impoverished population and sluggish less than competitive industry by 50%. (That would be another 50% after the last 50%.)
Naturally Ukraine is not keen on paying Russia the $7 Billion it contractually owes. Neither is it keen on raising the gas prices for its population or export producing industries to please the IMF. Rumours of Ukrainian default to foreign debt holders will simply drive the cost of external borrowing through the roof via traditional sources.
Very difficult for any of those involved in any of the negotiations with any external party – not that any of those that make the press statements are likely to have been directly involved in such difficult discussions.
Very grim – but there is always the calculating Chinese to sell or rent what is left of the family silver to……which I touched upon yesterday.
Naturally the EU is publicly mute thus far.
Update!: Rumour has it that on 30 January, Naftagaz has borrowed $5.9 billion from Delta Bank to deal with the Russian gas bill, with the bank profit being $240 million. Who owns Delta Bank these days?
