“United Opposition” election manifesto launched

Well somewhat surprisingly, the “united opposition” parties of Ukraine (which does not include all opposition parties in Ukraine) has launched its manifesto for the forthcoming parliamentary elections in October.

I say surprisingly, as generally there is very little said by political parties in Ukraine about proposed policy as politics normally revolves around personality here.

Manifesto/policy launch may also be something of an exaggeration, but it is as close as we may actually get in Ukrainian politics for a while yet.  When I say manifesto launch, what I really should say is that Arseniy Yatseniuk rattled of a list of things the “United Opposition” will do if they are returned to power in parliament (and if President Yanukovych will actually sign anything into law that comes from a “United Opposition” majority in parliament of course).

So, what are these society engaging, clever, policy effective and implementable changes that will bring Ukraine rapidly to an ultra-modern State fully incorporable with European norms and the EU?

How are they different from the current government’s programme of reform and legislative change towards EU norms, and how are they different from 2.5 years ago when the “United Opposition” parties were last in the majority in parliament but failed to reform anything?

Well firstly they plan to increase the wages of government employees.  There is no mention of whether they will also cut the very bloated number of employees in an overly bureaucratic system in every part of Ukrainian life though.  Quite why they didn’t raise the wages of government employees or take any steps to tackle the overly bureaucratic administrative systems of Ukraine when they were in power for 5 years is anybodies guess.  They did have 5 years to do so and have only been in opposition for 2.5 years so far.  Surely the period in opposition has not opened their eyes to the major problems they ignored when in power in this regard for so long.

Where is the money for all these additional governmental wages (and subsequent pensions) going to come from if they are not going to slash the number of governmental employees?

Next, they plan to fight corruption.  Again something that they failed to do when in power.  In fact the cost of corruption when they were in power absolutely rocketed under their tenure comparatively to their predecessors.  Not only did it rocket but it seeped further and further into every day life and into parts of everyday life it hadn’t been so coercively present in before – this I can tell you from personal experience.  In short they did absolutely nothing to combat corruption and indeed looked on as it get far, far worse.

How are they going to tackle corruption effectively when successive governments (including their own when last in office) have failed dismally at taking on the regional fiefdoms and regional administrations?  Simply sacking corrupt heads of departments to replace them with corrupt deputy heads of departments will not achieve much at all.  If you sack all the corrupt judges, lawyers, prosecutors and defenders, where exactly will all the experienced replacements come from that are untainted by corruption in their careers to date?  Is there a box of uncorrupted experienced professionals laying around somewhere in a cold dank cupboard in the RADA?

Having mentioned corrupt judiciary, they also claim they will reform law enforcement and judicial systems.  Despite the Euro hundreds of millions pumped into trying to accomplish exactly that via EU aid and grants during their time in office, nothing changed.  Not technically, legislatively or in reality.  Are they going to undo the recently passed Criminal Procedures Code which by and large, whilst in no way perfect, is certainly on paper better than what was there before?

Arseniy Yatseniuk also promised that Ms Tymoshenko (and others) would be freed – quite naturally as the “United Opposition comprises ostensibly of her party and his – but there will be tricky legal and political questions over simply decriminalising the offences under which she was convicted and then retrospectively applying  them in order to free her (and others).  Can and should any legal changes be retrospectively applied and if so, should they be, and what precedent does that set across any further legal changes that do not affect headline prisoners?

All of that said, it is still unclear in this “United Opposition” power conglomerate,  who would become Prime Minister?  Mr Yatseniuk or Ms Tymoshenko (when released)?  The President is not up for reelection until 2015 after all.

Most right-thinking people would probably suggest Mr Yatseniuk has to become the PM as he is not as historically tainted as Ms Tymoshenko (even discounting her current plight), does not invoke the same fatigue across a Tymoshenko/Yanukovych weary domestic and international audience and indeed could be seen as something of a breath of fresh air in Ukrainian politics.  However, one doubts Ms Tymoshenko’s ego could play second fiddle for long (if at all) and any “United Opposition” majority coalition would soon disintegrate upon regaining power – if it doesn’t disintegrate before the elections even begin.

If anybody is to bring Ukrainian politics out of the cesspit that it currently dwells within, it will not be Mr Yanukovych or Ms Tymoshenko.  It needs to be a completely new and far less corruption tainted figure.  Neither of the Yanukovych/Tymoshenko personalities can bring anything like the feel of a truly representative parliament, the feeling that a new page has been turned or indeed the belief that anything which leaves their mouths could actually be true.

Returning to the manifesto as described by Mr Yatseniuk, then aside from freeing Ms Tymoshenko, there is very little difference between the claims of the current government when it comes to refom of legal and justice systems, fighting corruption or increasing wages.  In fact there is no difference between this manifesto and the previous promises made by the current opposition when they were last in power and which they spectacularly failed to deliver (and even made worse in some cases).

So, once again, despite the existence of a manifesto (of sorts) the parliamentary election will come down to personality politics and who the electorate believe is more likely to actually deliver even a tiny percentage of what they say they will as both government and opposition talk of reforming exactly the same things.  Until we know where and how Ms Tymoshenko will fit into any new government should the “United Opposition” be successful, it is quite difficult to gauge whether a vote for Yatseniuk (and de facto the United Opposition and thus Ms Tymoshenko) will place him or her in a position to deliver, and which will be ultimately accountable for doing so, in the role of Prime Minister.

As the elections draw nearer, this question will not only be asked but will necessarily need to be answered.  How it is answered may very well have a positive or negative effect on the fate of the “United Opposition”.  Several more years of President Yanukovych verses Prime Minister Tymoshenko will be as disastrous for Ukraine as President Yushenko verses Prime Minister Tymoshenko was.

Let’s hope that this critical decision has already been decided between Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Yatseniuk, not only to avoid the “United Opposition” falling apart in the run up to the election,  but also to clearly inform the voting public who need to know sooner rather than later.

As for the manifesto promises – well as has always been the case in Ukraine, effective policy implementation rather than the creation of policy will be the critical issue – regardless of who wins the parliamentary elections.

The unpopularity race – Politics in Ukraine

When all major political parties in Ukraine manage to gain 18% or less individually in the straw polls of public opinion regardless of what provocative or pacifying actions they make take in an attempt to either motivate or buy off the voting public, the one clear result opinion polls show is that the Ukrainian public simply don’t like any of the political choices they have.

Whilst Ms Tymoshenko’s circumstances and hunger strike may be preoccupying Baroness Ashton at the EEAS, not a single spontaneous protest from the people of any note Ukraine has occurred.  In fact even some of the western media sees the hunger strike tactic as flawed.  The Economist recently calling her antics “grating“, and that from a media outlet hardly friendly to the Yanukovych camp (or any authoritarian rule for that matter), and calling foul on her damsel in distress tone.

Over at Der Tagesspeigel my twitter friend Claudia Von Salzen, a stalwart defender of human rights and who regularly highlights Ms Tymoshenko’s plight, does not see her as the lens through which Ukraine should solely be viewed.  She is quite right.

Tymoshenko fatigue seems to be setting in even amongst her foreign supporters, just as it did when she was Prime Minister.

That does not help the current ruling majority however.  They are less popular than a particularly rancid fart in a very air-tight spacesuit.   Then they would be.  They put up the pension age, put up gas and electricity prices, changed the tax code to capture more people, all obviously unpopular, and yet still managed to make themselves more unpopular with insider business deals, plundering the public purse and failing to implement laws they pass that may actually change life even myopically for the better.

In short, the vast majority of Ukrainians do not trust Yanukovych or Tymoshenko and would rather have no government at all than either of those two.  Unfortunately they are the two people who have the only two parties big enough to form a government.  It is therefore absolutely no surprise that none can even pass the 20% popularity threshold.

Only two nights ago, Andrey Shevchenko of BYuT tweeted that BYuT and Yatseniuk’s Front for Change need Klitchko’s party join them to be sure of having a good chance of beating the PoR at the October elections and asking why he has not joined the ranks of the United Opposition yet.

At the same time Carl Bildt tweeted and suggested that Ukraine is going to force the EU into cutting ties.

That being so, the only EU/Ukraine agreement that is not tied to politics, the fate of Tymoshenko and others, or the nefarious actions of Yanukovych and his sponsors, is the road map for Visa-free travel which Stefan Fule consistently states is about the free movement of people and not the politics of a nation.

Very good.  Therefore whether it be the PoR of BYuT that are annoying the EU when in power, and they both have and do, the Visa-free issue should progress regardless theoretically.  Which ever government is sitting in Ukraine when this eventually comes to pass, may get some begrudging recognition by society for actually doing something in their interest.

And yet this process is stalled.  Not by the EU but by Ukraine.  Not for any obscure issues contained within the road map either.  It is stalled over the issue of biometric passports which are necessary as part of the Visa-free agreement and an EU norm for EU nations.

Is it any wonder that the Ukrainian populous have so little faith in their political classes?

One of the few beneficial things for the everyday Ukrainian not hanging by a thread through purely political shenanigans between the EU and Ukraine, and it is the Ukrainian politicians who can’t get their act together once again.

Pathetic!

New laws for NGOs – Dramatic and radical changes for the better (possibly)

As I have written here before many times about NGOs, civil society and Ukrainian academia, occasionally in a supportive way when writing about specific individual NGOs, but also in a robust and critical way when writing about them in general, I should not let the new radically and dramatically better Ukrainian laws relating to NGOs pass unnoticed.

I have issues with NGOs collectively in Ukraine as anybody who puts “NGOs” in the search facility of this blog will see,  however the RADA, with massive bipartisan support, has passed a significant piece of legislation that comes into effect in January 2013 which may (or not) dramatically improve the below par performance of most Ukrainian NGOs.

Certainly it will dramatically increase the number of NGOs and civil society groups, but as we all know, quantity does not always deliver quality.

To summarise the main features of the new law, actively lobbied for by Yuri Miroshnichenko (Party of Regions) and Andriy Shevchenko (BYuT, and no, not the footballer of the same name) it reduces the registration time from what is currently a month or more to about a week, there is no longer a need for 42 like-minded people to stand up and be counted as part of a NGO and the 23 documents required for registration have been slashed comprehensively to 4.

Not for profits will be able to register without any fees whatsoever and conduct business activities and thus raise funds to continue and expand.

The new law no longer regionalises NGOs to activities within the region of registration but allows for national activity regardless of location of registration and allows NGOs to act on behalf of those who have no connection with that NGO.

In short a very heavy bureaucratic and unevenly applied boot will be removed from the neck of NGOs and civil society in January 2013.

Excellent news for small, local NGOs and civil society groups who we will hopefully see begin to hold local administrations more accountable in a much more formal and publicised fashion.

Maybe the expatriate and immigrant community will form a NGO and hold State agencies like the OVIR to account for the inconsistent and  foggy interpretations they apply to the immigration laws or the customs service that applies random “taxes” that differ from one point of import to another.  Blimey!  If so, I volunteer to be part of the Odessa regional infrastructure of such an NGO.  (I am joking, perseverance and patience is all that is required to win those frustrating battles.)

I would be interested in any newly formed human rights, human trafficking, rule of law or domestic violence NGOs that may appear in Odessa.  I may actually be an asset to a newly formed NGO/NFP in Odessa.  Who knows?

The new law is also something of a god-send for the EU, who, having given up on the dysfunctional Ukrainian opposition and being stone-walled by the current government over several issues, have decided on a public  strategy of NGO/civil society engagement for Ukraine at great expense through numerous platforms.

All very exciting!  It will be even more exciting if government, society and academia will actually agree on what civil society actually is.  On that note, I will leave you with an excellent piece by Michael Edwards contemplating exactly that.

I should also thank Sir Mike Aaronson, for bring Mr Edwards’ sterling article to my attention two days ago. – Thank you Sir Mike (but no cheque in the post for your timely assistance!)

Still, a good piece of legislation passed.  Let’s hope that civil society and quality NGOs will flourish under the new law when it comes into effect, as the current landscape is somewhat barren to put it politely.

(By the way, the law passed with 334 votes in favour from those present in the RADA at the time of voting.  The only party not to vote in favour was the cancerous Communist Party – No surprises there!)

EYP (European Youth Parliament) Ukraine

Well this is something I don’t normally do, however I am going to raise awareness of a NGO.  In fact a European NGO but specifically it is the Ukrainian branch I am highlighting.  It is the European Youth Parliament (EYP).

Why am I doing this?  Because it is not tied to Yanukovych or Tymoshenko or Yatseniuk or any other dubious politicians in Ukraine.  It is domestically A-political and free from the stench of Ukrainian political parties and personalities.  It is for and by the youth and it encourages youth to youth/people to people contact across the European continent on policy rather than political party issues.

Amongst these young people, one day Ukraine may end up with leaders that are not recycled Soviet machinery with a single style of autocratic leadership regardless of party you vote for.

To promote it and encourage  the Ukrainian youth to actually participate in something bigger than Ukraine, which does not function by the power vertical or is identified by a single personality (to the point of a Bloc name), and is not subject to oligarchy orchestration or the endemic corruption that runs through the main party politicians of all colours when it comes to policy debates, can only be a good experience for any who engage in it.

For the youth in Odessa, the EYP hold their regional session 15 – 19 August.

I have no vested interests in the EYP to declare.  I am far too old to be classed as a youth and I am in no way affiliated to the EYP currently or historically.  My interests such as they are, rest only in the fact I live permanently in Odessa and have the firm belief that policy politics and not personality politics is the only viable road ahead for Ukraine if the current cycle of useless (with a few notable exceptions across party lines) and corrupt politics is ever to be broken.

Anyway, plug for the EYP now made in English.  You can ignore the next bit as it will say the same thing but in Russian for Cyrillic SEO reasons.

Also, before I forget, happy birthday to HM Queen Elizabeth II who is 86 today.  What a fantastic monarch she has been!

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Ну это то, что я обычно не делаю, но я повышаю осведомленность о НПО. На самом деле европейские НПО, и особенно это украинский филиал выделяющий это Европейский молодежный парламент (ЕМП).

Почему я это делаю? Потому что это не связано с Януковичем или Тимошенко или Яценюком или любых других сомнительных политиков в Украине. Это внутри-политический и свободный от вони украинских политических партий и личностей. Это для молодежи и призывает молодежь к молодежи / между людьми контактирующиж на европейском континенте, о политике, а не политическим вопросам партии.

Среди этих молодых людей, в один прекрасный день Украина может закончить с лидерами, которые не утилизируются советскими машинами с одного стиля самодержавного руководства независимо от партийного голосования.

Чтобы продвигать и поощрять украинскую молодежь реально участвовать в чем-то большем, чем Украина, которая не работает в вертикали власти и определяется одной личностью (вплоть до блока имени), и не подлежат олигархии или оркестровкакоррупции, которая проходит через основной политической партии всех цветов, когда дело доходит до политических дебатов, может быть только хороший опыт для любого, кто участвует в нем.

Для молодежи в Одессе, ЕМП проводить свои региональные сессии 15 – 19 августа.

У меня нет никаких корыстных интересов в ЕМП. Я слишком стар, чтобы быть классифицированым как молодежь, и я никоим образом не связанных с ЕМП в настоящее время или истории. Мои интересы, такие как они есть, отдыхать, только я живу постоянно в Одессе и есть твердое убеждение, что политика политикой, а не личности политика является единственной жизнеспособной дорогой для Украины, если текущий цикл бесполезных (с некоторыми исключениями по партийной линии) и коррумпированных политики ли будет побит

New social spending, elections and Ukraine

Now a few days ago, you will remember that I wrote about the necessary government policy to stimulate housing and mortgages.  You will remember I questioned just how the government would get the banks to lend for 20 or 30 years at 10% when they currently and traditionally have lent for much shorter terms but at rates often close to 30%.

The question was how this could be implemented amongst private banks and what encouragement/coercion the government could use to make it happen.

That so far remains unclear, however we now have some idea of the additional money the government is going to provide to make it happen.  The answer is about UAH 10 billion from government.  Quite how this UAH 10 billion gets into and is taken up by the mortgage and banking system still remains unclear.

Another UAH 15 billion is required for other social programmes such as pension increases, which are to be fair, pitifully low.

Fortunately, if that is the right word to use,  these programmes being domestic programmes, are not dependent upon external monetary sources or loans which is just as well given the current impasse between the IMF and Ukraine which is likely to go on into 2013.  Quite possibly the IMF lending programme will simply not be restarted at all as neither side are prepared to move over the core sticking point of raising gas prices another 50%.

What will happen is that the UAH printing presses will be cranked up to produce to 25 billion or so needed to fund these government induced programmes prior to the next election, no doubt in the hope that it will turn into votes at the ballot box.

All very good and understandable until we think about the effect of dumping an additional UAH 25 billion in cash into the economy will have.  Now I am not an economist and only briefly studied economics as part of a business degree, however, my albeit rather basic calculations would suggest that in pursuing these policies and financing them by cranking up the printing presses, it will add an additional 1.2% to national inflation.

Yes that is a small amount, however the last official inflationary figures I saw for Ukraine stated there national inflation stood at 7.9%.  A scary figure but certainly not unmanageable.  If we add on my crudely calculated 1.2% then we are at almost 10% inflation for 2013 if all things remain constant in 2012.

Even that may not be so bad, except we all know the any governmental figures are never a true account of actual inflation, even if they are worked out via World Bank or IMF models.  Maybe especially so if worked out by those models!

Thus, considering what is likely to be close to an official 10% inflationary figure once these social programmes are introduced, and taking into account what is likely to be a sizable gap between them and the real inflationary figures faced by the average Ukrainian each day at point of purchase, the additional UAH allocated for pension increases will have to be close to a net 20% (or more) pension increase for the pensioners to come out ahead in any meaningful way due to this policy.

To be frank, a rise in pensions in excess of the real every day inflation rate, (as opposed to the official government inflationary figures), faced by pensioners seems rather unlikely.

I might very well be quite wrong in my calculations because as yet no opposition party has raised this issue in the public domain, however this is the Ukrainian opposition we are talking about and when it comes to challenging governmental policy, or heaven forbid having policies of their own,  they are incredibly inept and noticeable by their absence.

That said, it may very well be that if the opposition had a policy between them, it could very well have been the same policy, so pointing out any possible downside would not be in their interests either.  After all, with parliamentary elections 6 months away, would the opposition campaign on a platform against such increases?

Will I be proven correct?  Will my calculations stand up?  Will a well intentioned policy turn out to be counterproductive? – Let’s hope I’m wrong!

Invitations and refusals – President and opposition

Two days ago saw the conclusion of the latest Council of Europe (PACE) meeting and amongst many statements made about many nations, Ukraine was one.

The Council of Europe statement was, as you would expect, critical of Ukraine and also the current situation with Ms Tymoshenko and her past colleagues.

Now Ukraine has given assurances behind closed doors that it will abide by any ECfHR ruling relating to Ms Tymoshenko and others.  That ruling however seems to be months away even in the fast tracked system.  This is really the only legal way the President has of releasing Ms Tymoshenko without breaking the law himself unless she asks for a pardon which she categorically states will never happen.

However, in light of the Council of Europe statements, the Presidential Administration issued invitations to the Speaker of the RADA and heads of parliamentary factions to discuss what can be done about the issues raised.

In response to those invitations, the political parties of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, who happen to be the parties that have the most high profile people in jail, point blank refused to attend because others would be there.

This leaves the rather bizarre situation where the President, RADA Speaker, leader of the ruling PoR and several leaders of other opposition parties will meet for 2 days and discuss issues amongst which relate directly to the two opposition parties who flatly refuse to attend but should have the most interest in being there.

Is it reasonable for BYuT and OU-PSD to refuse an attempt at an all-inclusive discussion on matters criticized by PACE?  After all only 2 years ago BYuT and OU-PSD were in power and many of the issues unrelated to their party members incarceration but mentioned by PACE in its statement, happened and were left unchanged under their watch.

Do they want no others present so that any misleading or spurious allegations they may wish to make after any such meeting can go unchallenged?  (A common phenomenon in Ukrainian politics.)

Should they not be participating in this meeting for the voters who elected them and that have relatives in prison under the conditions highlighted by PACE?

The PACE statement is not all about Ms Tymoshenko and their political colleagues, but also about the conditions and suffering of relations of some of their voters.  Conditions they did nothing to change when in power and therefore BYuT and OU-PSD have a responsibility to discuss and address them with the President and current government for the sake of Ukraine and Ukrainian society.

Childish behaviour and refusal to attend and discuss such serious matters does nothing but undermine their self-appointed misnomer label of being democratic.  Continued refusal to engage through publicly open invitations for dialogue diminishes the claims that the current authorities are autocratic or a dictatorship as they orate.  Who is refusing to speak to who here and what message does that give to the Ukrainian public (and foreign observers)?

Diplomacy, negotiation and democracy all require dialogue and the willingness to take every opportunity for meaningful engagement when and where those opportunities arise.  That is even more essential when your political legacy is also being questioned by prominent external actors.

What will happen should the government put everything to the liking of PACE?  What part can BYuT and OU-PSD claim to have played in these human rights issues?  As far as the general population of Ukrainian prisons and their families go, obviously none having so publicly refused to take part in any dialogue!

One can only hope that politicians like Arseniy Yatseniuk and his Front for Change party not only continue to close the popularity gap on BYuT but overtake it and then some.  Maybe then as far as cross party pluralist democratic engagement goes in the corridors of power. the Ukrainian people will actually get to something resembling debates and discussion rather than the childish actions currently being displayed.

It is easy to look at this issue as one which relates solely to Ms Tymoshenko and colleagues, but when it comes to Ukrainian prisons and the conditions therein, it is a much broader matter and as such, BYuT and OU-PSD by not attending this meeting are not only letting down their supporters but also Ukrainian society in general.

Hardly the actions of a responsible leadership in waiting!

Ukraine’s opposition tactics – Effective or not?

A few days ago I rattled off some thoughts about Ukraine’s “united democratic opposition”.  Aside from noting that not all opposition parties had signed up to a unity agreement, I also questioned why popular “third option” parties such as Yatseniuk’s Front For Change should join such a collective when the only unifying political ideal is the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

I questioned whether Front For Change liberal voters would vote for a unified opposition ticket if it also meant the anything but liberal, ultra right-wing Svoboda party would benefit equally from their vote.  Since that post I have had several emails from Ukrainian readers (who preferred not to have their comments published) confirming that they will not vote at all if a vote for a combined Yatseniuk/Tymoshenko/Klitchko etc ticket also means a vote for putting more Svoboda politicians in power.

One can only assume that this will disadvantage the opposition on polling day if such boycotts occur on a fairly large scale, and also causes one to question whether the opposition parties are really following a sound policy.  As I stated in the highlighted link above, there is a genuine and growing call for a choice other than the Yanukovych and Tymoshenko parties as displayed by plumetting PoR ratings but hardly any gains of equal number for Tymoshenko’s party.

Of course there is still time for the agreement between most opposition parties to fall apart when it comes to actually agreeing who will run for what seat at the parliamentary elections, although if a united single nomination opposition candidate is the policy they chose to follow, such public displays of disunity would be a disaster.

It is though, the only policy I have found that has been publicly aired by the opposition parties.  Whether that is because they are a concoction of vastly differing political points on the left-right index of ideology and simply can’t agree on any other policies, as yet I am unsure.

Aside from the single announcement that the majority of opposition parties had united to run on a single candidate per seat ticket in an effort to consolidate the opposition vote, there has been nothing more.  Not on party websites, not in the media (not even on the opposition owned media). – Nothing.  No momentum since the “unity agreement” whatsoever.

All opposition media noise remains directed towards Yulia Tymoshenko’s imprisonment and nothing more, from various parties.  Now obviously they don’t want her to be forgotten, but as a paltry 2000 demonstrators at her trial and judgement day should display to the opposition, very few Ukrainians care enough to get off their backsides to do anything about it.

The A-political tax code demonstrations and immediate and large scale reaction to the government taking down EX.UA file sharing website simply dwarfed the reaction to her imprisonment.  On both occasions it should also be noted, the government ceded ground to the public.

One must start to question whether a “united democratic opposition” “Free Yulia” is a solid platform and singular policy to put before the Ukrainian voting public who prima facie don’t particularly seem to care.  This will surely reach only those who would vote for the opposition anyway.

It seems the Ukrainian opposition have learned absolutely nothing from their opposition neighbours in Belarus.

Since the brutal and repulsive crackdown on Belorussian opposition supporters  in 2010, the only issue the Belorussian opposition have pursued is a policy of continual highlighting of  “political prisoners”, completely failing to take advantage of serious chances to promote alternative policies to the Belorussian regime when open goals such as economics, giving away the Belorussian gas companies to Gazprom asking Russia to fund the Belorussian army etc have presented themselves.

I fear the Ukrainian opposition will do exactly the same thing.  They will simply miss all the alternative policy open goals and continue to talk, pretty much to themselves and the bureaucrats in the EU,  about Yulia Tymoshenko, despite the prima facie apathetic attitude of the Ukrainian public over the issue (both at the time and ever since) that raised hardly any protests at all.

It seems to me that if the opposition want to engage in policies that all Ukrainian people care about, they need to at the very least starting talking about alternative policies to those the current government have over defence, the economy,  agriculture, energy, health and on-going reforms etc.  You know, all those things that affect all Ukrainians every day of every week of every month of every year.  What that “governance stuff” is all about.

I am starting to have a very serious concern that the Ukrainian opposition will follow the Belorussian opposition and begin to be caught in a vortex where they are simply talking issues that fall way down the every day priority list of most Ukrainians.

There needs to be, and very quickly, a conversation with the Ukrainian public about their lives and ways to improve them, rather than a running commentary on Yulia Tymoshenko.

I still have serious concerns that any “third option” gains in the last elections will suffer after the October 2012 elections, namely those that follow in 2016/17, if they run on a “united ticket”.  Particularly more so if the opposition win a parliamentary majority and it turns into a political farce similar to the last time they were all in coalition together.  Lest we forget they failed to agree on anything, sacrificed position and principle for lowest common denominator compromise in a bid to hold the coalition together come what may, and displayed that power rather than principle and political ideology meant more to them than the platform voters put them into office on.

To be tarred with a failure brush a second time would be a disaster due to being in a coalition that flatters to deceive once again.

Surely somebody in the “united democratic opposition” must realise that a dual policy of the enemy of my enemy is my friend and “Free Yulia” are not the policies that Ukrainian voters are overly interested in.  They are interested in alternative opposition policies that will affect their daily lives, hopefully for the better.

I have grave doubts about both the “single ticket” and “Free Yulia” policies as the only foundation of the united opposition movement.  There simply needs to be more – much more!  It seems they are in a parallel political universe talking only to themselves and are determined to  fail to engage in a very necessary conversation with the Ukrainian public over things which really do matter each and every day to them.

If all real policy talk that effects peoples daily lives is left to the PoR, then they won’t even need to fix the elections, they will win anyway.

One can only hope that opposition sort themselves out fairly quickly and start talking about things affect the daily lives of those I live amongst.  Maybe even more so as US Courts are gathering amongst the storm clouds for Yulia Tymoshenko without any help from the Ukrainian government.

Will the opposition unite and remain united in Ukraine?

It is probably best to open this post by quoting the opening paragraph from A Tale of Two Cities by the one and only Charles Dickens:

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”

It will be important to remember the stark contrasts of this passage as we take a superficial walk through the politics leading up to the next Ukrainian parliamentary elections in October 2012, for they too, as far as the opposition can manage, will be painted in such extremes.

Such is the diktat issued by Ms Tymoshsenko to those in opposition who will still listen to her.  “Remember that the key to the elimination of the regime lies in the unity of the opposition, down to a single party list, in the clear division of the political field into black and white, good and evil, into Ukraine and its occupants.”

Of course she has a point.  Members of her party would not have voted through the new election laws if they hadn’t included a 5% threshold forcing minor parties to join with larger ones to retain their seats in the RADA.  In doing so a handful of smaller opposition parties have no choice but to unite with some of the bigger ones who will pass this threshold.

Cynical for opposition “democratic forces”, as they label themselves, to vote through an arbitrary threshold that would remove democratic representation for those who voted for a candidate that received 4.9% of the vote or less possibly, but maybe effective in garnering those smaller parties who would otherwise meet the political history rubbish bin to rally around the Tymoshenko party flag that will certainly pass the 5% threshold.

However, there are other opposition parties who will also expect to pass the 5% threshold.  Klitchko’s party, Yatseniuk’s Front for Change,  the extreme far-right Svoboda party should all get over that line so there is still a need to unite the opposition.

One wonders if Ms Korolevska’s move from Ms Tymoshenko’s party to lead the Ukrainian Social Democrat Party was more planned than surprising.  A stalwart and loyal Tymoshenko ally, she is guaranteed to bring the USDP to the Tymoshenko heel.  Alternatively Ms Korolevska may simply be following the path of her old leader Ms Tymoshenko.  Lest we forget within 3 weeks of Lazarenko being arrested in the USA, the once loyal Ms Tymoshenko broke ranks and formed her current party.  In the same vein, once Ms Tymoshenko was jailed, Ms Korolevska leaves Ms Tymoshenko’s party for another.  History repeating?

Anyway, even with the 5% threshold forcing some parties to rally to the Tymoshenko flag, there are 4 or 5 opposition parties that will pass this threshold without having to give allegiance to Tymoshenko, thus possibly splitting the opposition vote and increasing the chances of PoR (and allies) retaining a parliamentary majority.

Recently the “democratic opposition” announced they had signed a unity agreement under which to fight the next election, agreeing to field a single candidate from amongst themselves to run against the ruling majority candidates for each seat.  All very good and tactically sound on the face of it until you realise that not all opposition parties actually signed up.  Hrytsenko’s party didn’t for example, and whilst a small party, he is particularly effective on the never ending Ukrainian televised political debate shows.  Oliynyk’s party is another that will not sign up.

There are other issues as well.  The unity agreement states those selected for nomination on the united opposition single list meet certain requirements “the basic requirements for candidates – decency, adherence to one’s principles, professionalism, public authority and perfect reputation.”

Errm – Exactly!  Under such criteria, it is unlikely many candidates meet that criteria as any Ukraine politics watcher will know.  It is further made more difficult by another of Ms Tymoshenko’s diktats,  “Do not allow the nomination and election of random people not tested by time and struggle, as well as entrepreneurs who plan to use politics to strengthen their business. I insist that the candidates for deputy in majority districts from Batkivschyna be publicly and seriously discussed.”

Which is it to be?  Those with a “perfect reputation”, which immediately discounts any long (self) serving RADA member leaving only new blood, or those RADA members “tested by time” as Ms Tymoshenko puts it, but will not stand up to any serious scrutiny as far as a “perfect reputation” is concerned that is called for in the opposition agreement?  Quite simply the united opposition would do well to field a handful of candidates that met both criteria.

Next, would those liberally minded voters of Yatseniuk’s Front for Change be willing to vote for a “united opposition” that  includes the self-proclaimed ultra-fascist Svoboda party?

Would Yatseniuk’s supporters vote for a united opposition ticket, which according to Ms Tymoshenko’s diktat  “Do not let new kleptomaniacs deprive the country of its strategic facilities ahead of the parliamentary elections – land, the gas transport system, hydropower, Energoatom , Ukrzaliznytsia, museum valuables and so on.”  Yatseniuk made his millions by privatising Ukrainian State assets and is on record as siding with the EBRD, EIB, IMF as being in favour of privatising the State assets Ms Tymoshenko wants to retain as State assets.

The list of political and policy divisions between this eclectic group go on and on.

Let us work on the assumption this schizophrenic, multiple-personality disordered, united opposition entity actually wins a majority at the next election.  Well, we have been here before with Ms Tymoshenko’s last government made up of numerous coalition partners with very different political views across the political spectrum and it was a disaster.  She held power by a majority of 1 and consistently needed to concede values, principles and positions to hold it together.

Which direction does any united opposition take if it gets into power?  Is there a shift to the far right Svoboda position or  will Ukraine become far more liberal as per the Front for Change position?  Will it simply become a reactionary populist government as it was last time under Ms Tymoshenko drifting in the breeze of public opinion without a rudder or course of its own?

How long will such a government stand before it is either dissolved by the President (which happened many times under ex-President Yushenko) or simply voted out of office again a few years down the line having once again proved to be completely ineffective as far as the Ukrainian population is concerned.  Due to the deep divisions between political coalition partners will anything to get done?

Something else to be seriously considered is the public demand for a “third choice”.  If we look back at the last Presidential elections, Yatseniuk (and his Front for Change) and Tigipko (and his Strong Ukraine), between them took 20% of the vote in the first round, only 5% less than Ms Tymoshenko.

Surely that must tell the established camps of Yanukovych and Tymoshenko that in 2010, one in five Ukrainians wanted a third choice that did not include either of them.  That number has surely grown rather than diminished over the past two years, as would seem to be born out by opinion polls that have seen the PoR ratings positively plummet but Tymoshenko’s rating fail to go up anywhere near that same number.

Where is the third choice now?  For those of you familiar with the thoughts of Messrs Huntington or Lipset, I concur with their line of political science evaluation.  To employ their thinking to Ukraine, it is now too open and too educated to put up with much more than another 5 or 10 years of the likes of Tymoshenko or Yanukovych.

It may therefore be a massive mistake for any third choice to remain in this coalition of the united opposition (or a coalition with those in power).   Messrs Yatseniuk and Tigipko (or possibly even Ms Korolevska) please take note!

Will this strategy of a united opposition actually work?  Will it hold together when the candidate nomination process begins or will they fragment and fall out with each other?  If they win, how will they even begin to work together on agreed policy when they come from such vastly different places on the political spectrum?  How will the Ukrainian voters actually vote when a vote for their man/woman may also put in power those they find truly abhorrent?  If the enemy of your enemy also turns out to be your enemy on a united opposition ticket, will they vote at all?

In short, will a united opposition ticket based upon the theory, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, actually sell to the Ukrainian voting public once that ideal is put under the electoral microscope?

It will be very interested to watch all this unfold over the next few months.