Tying the DCFTA to the AA – a bad idea on reflection?

On numerous occasions over the past few years within this blog – too many to link to in fact – I have pondered the wisdom of the EU in tying the Association Agreement to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in relation to Ukraine.

Naturally I can see the realpolitik of tying political reform to the gains of trade.  Opening up the EU single market which is probably one of the most protectionist in the world to Ukraine was to come with a political price of symmetry not just by way of legislative reform to support the trade agreement, but equally if not more importantly, to move Ukraine firmly into the political orbit of the EU.

I have on several occasions questioned the pragmatism of making the two agreements inseparable  - for trade it a two-way street – and Ukrainian concessions in reaching this agreement opens up 46 million potential customers to an EU that is still mired in financial crisis, is forecast to have less annual growth than Ukraine this year, has record levels of unemployment (almost 12% across the Member States and well over 25% in some Member States) and thus whatever figures the EU hierarchy had forecast by way of internal EU improvements economically and socially when making the decision to tie the AA to th DCFTA have simply not been delivered – leaving a deeply unhappy society.

If it cannot generate growth internally within its own market, then simply it has to look externally – but in making the AA inseparable from the DCFTA and with Ukraine currently unlikely to fulfill the expectations of the EU by the proposed signing of the agreements in November – then the much needed market opportunities for both sides will not open up as fully as they could have.

Even if growth increased by a meager 0.1% – for both sides it is currently significant.

I have, however, on numerous occasions also predicted that in the event of failing to sign the agreements, at least parts – if not all – of the DCFTA will be quietly delivered anyway – making a complete mockery of tying the AA to the DCFTA in the first place – and the realpolitik behind doing so.

Quit obviously should that occur and the DCFTA be quietly implemented without the political AA, then the EU loses a significant political reform lever with Ukraine, notwithstanding a perceived failure with regards to “values” trumping “interests” amongst many onlookers.

That said, should the agreements not get signed the AA political lever loses much significants – for several years at least anyway.

The questions are therefore, will the EU take the opportunity – Ukraine fully compliant or not – to tie in its largest and most significant neighbour – and if not, how likely is it the DCFTA going to be implemented – in part, or in full – should there be no signatures at the November Vilnius Summit?

The calls for implementing the DCFTA regardless have been growing behind closed doors in Brussels for some time, and they are now becoming public calls – in this case from an evermore significant player within the EU machinery.  (One can expect a Polish candidate to become the next leader of either NATO or the EU – or possibly both.)

As I wrote only a few days ago – whether the agreements are signed in Vilnius or not, the EU will not – because it cannot – walk away from democracy promotion and consolidation in Ukraine anyway.  It also cannot turn a blind eye to its economic situation and its need for comprehensive market growth and access wherever it can be found – and there is an agreement concluded with Ukraine awaiting implementation that really cannot be ignored.

It is perhaps too soon to say whether tying one agreement to another was a poor policy decision.  That will become clear by the end of September when all major remaining EU orientated legislation is slated for a RADA vote – and is also the month predicted by several observers for the release of Tymoshenko – if it is to occur at all.

However, it would seem that regardless of signatures, the likelihood of the DCFTA – in part or in full, will occur – just as I have predicted it would.

Identity and ideology politics – Ukrainian Opposition

And so it has come to pass, as written a few days ago, that the “Grand Unification Congress” amongst the Ukrainian opposition has seen Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party assimilate Arseney Yatseniuk’s Front for Change Party and the Reform and Order Party of Serhiy Sobolev – Yatseniuk and Sobolev both unsurprisingly managing to find high ranking positions within Batkivshchyna – such is the necessary outcome of fractional power play with such individual ambition masked behind the party banners they fly – or rather flew with effect from today.

However the “United Opposition” remains fractional – and not without substantial internal friction – as 4 other parties that make up the United Opposition alliance were not assimilated.

That notwithstanding the obvious friction between the “United Opposition” parties, and those of Klitschko’s UDAR Party and Svoboda – which makes the congress meeting call by Yuri Lutsenko’s for Batkivshchyna to now take the lead amongst the opposition ranks about as likely as it was last week.

Yatseniuk now officially sits at the summit of Batkivshchyna – behind only Tymoshenko – and given his failure to instill discipline amongst its ranks for more than a year, to the point he cannot even get Batkivshchyna MPs to turn up to vote for Batkivshchyna bills in parliament, is that likely to change?

I strongly suspect not when statements like this appear on Facebook from Front for Change Party members who today swapped their ID cards for Batkivshchyna Party cards:

“Скажу відверто, не думав, що партійне посвідчення матиме термін дії”

To save you the trouble of translating, Yaroslav Demchenkov, obviously a Front for Change Party member from its creation with card number 4 issued in 2009, states “Frankly I did not think the party had a valid ID”.

What does that say about Yatseniuk, his leadership, ideology or ideology development within a party then deliberately formed by Yatseniuk to avoid being tarred with the Batkivshchyna Party brush – The very party of which he is now technically Second in Command – and de facto in command whilst Tymoshenko sits in jail?

You also have to ask questions about Demchenkov’s motivation not only to join and remain in a political party he felt had no political identity for 5 years until assimilation, but what his political ideology and motivation actually is if he feels relief at re-branding to Batkivshchyna – a party with a single identity that is nothing more than a vehicle for Yulia Tymoshenko.  It has been ideology-less politically, with party stance and policy contingent on Tymoshenko and how she felt on any particular day when she got out of bed – rather than identifiable left of centre, centre, or right of centre politics.

Will Batkivshchyna change for the better as a result of this “Grand Unification”? – No.

Will a miracle happen and Yatseniuk now become a leader capable of leading? – Of course not!

Glib references to democracy simply don’t cut it whether they be from Tymoshenko or Yatseniuk – (or Yanukovych) – as none have a politically identifiable anchored ideological position on the left to right spectrum.  Glib references to opportunism and populism would fit all three given their view of zero sum, winner takes all politics – which is hardly the inclusive and tolerant stance required for democracy.

Without the ideological anchors, how can anyone know in what areas a more inclusive and tolerant stance would be adopted by any parliamentary majority?  Ideology matters as it sets the parameters of just how far any party is prepared to drift from its position to reach compromise in a functioning democratic parliament in order to reach an inclusive consensus.

Tigipko has been sent into the bowels of Party Regions with a brief to create a party ideology – a thankless task amongst such a feckless party membership – but at least somebody within Party Regions has decided that some form of identifiable ideology matters and sent Tigipko to ferret about and find one – albeit such a search is undoubtedly a way to get Tigipko off the Party Regions top table where he made some people uncomfortable.

To be fair to both Svoboda and the Communist Party – whether they actually hold true to their ideology or not – it is at least identifiable.  Far right and far left respectively.

But how, in 5 years, did Front for Change fail to form a political identity as stated by Demchenkov?

The answer is found in the same dark, dank and septic corner where the missing ideology of Batkivshchyna can be found.

Both parties are not about democracy or ideology – both were created as political vehicles for their leaders in pursuit of the personalisation of power – and nothing more.  The only ideology required for that is the winner takes all, zero sum kind.

Strip away the veneer and rhetoric from the “Grand Unification Congress” and the shape and prospects of democracy in Ukraine has not changed – the outlook remains grim regardless of who is in power.

EU and Moldova complete AA and DCFTA negotiations

It appears that Moldova and the EU have managed to complete negotiations for an Association Agreement and DCFTA similar to that of Ukraine.

One wonders whether the initialing of this document will take place at the EaP Vilnius Summit simply so the EU can come away claiming to have had some form of success in November should Ukrainian-EU documents fail to be signed thus preventing them going forth into years of ratification wilderness.

The question is, however, can any initialing wait given the permanently precarious nature of Moldavian governments?  Is it simply better for the EU to get these negotiations officially sealed with a rapidly convened top level meeting – and concern itself with salvaging something else media worthy from the Vilnius summit?

Nevertheless, good news that the negotiations are now complete as it puts a little more indirect pressure on Ukraine.  It simply wouldn’t do to be the second rather than first EaP nation to formally sign such agreements – particularly to a nation that is the receiving end of a great many Ukrainian jokes.  National pride and egos simply wouldn’t suffer it!

Human Trafficking training – Ukraine

I find myself heartened somewhat by a Ukrainian government policy!

As chair of OSCE, yesterday Ukraine called for a joined-up, comprehensive strategy and legislative foundation to combat the totally abhorrent issue of human trafficking.

As somebody who has a great interest in human trafficking – particularly from/to/through Odessa – I cannot in anyway pooh-pooh such a call.  The EU strategy is fine, but not all OSCE members are EU members and it is an issue that affects the entire continent (like every other continent).  Personally I would be quite happy to see the issue subject to the International Criminal Court (ICC) – but perhaps that bar is set too high given it only deals with the most grievous offences against humanity on a truly massive scale perpetrated by a very select and well known few.

However, whilst I do applaud the quite necessary Ukrainian call for a comprehensive OSCE strategy at an institutional, international – thus by default national – and legislative level,  enforcing and adhering to any such strategy through such mechanisms is but part of the necessary package in such a fight.

Prevention and victim support are also two very necessary accompanying working parts of any such mechanism, deserving of equal attention, financing and awareness campaigns.  In fact, an effective policy would work by prioritising prevention, then protection/victims support and lastly concern itself with prosecution.

Thus, I was further encouraged by the Ukrainian declaration that Ukraine will, forthwith, begin to train border control staff in spotting potential victims – and in many cases they are not difficult to spot.

However, the state institutions and authorities whilst the first line of detection are not and cannot be the be-all and end-all.  For a start, one of the obvious indicators of trafficking is the victim is indeed the fear of the authorities and state institutions.  There are other obvious signs at points of entry and egress – but this is not a training site for the Ukrainian authorities – so there is no need to detail them all.

Just as importantly for a Ukrainian internal strategy is an awareness campaign amongst landlords, hotel staff, medical staff, police, housing authorities, pub, club and bar owners, NGOs and civil society that deal with domestic violence, prostitution, truancy  etc – as well as the general public (similar to the AIDS/STD campaign regularly on Ukrainian television) with a well publicised hot-line to report suspected incidents – or indeed for victims themselves to call if possible – and this is writing in broad brush-strokes without going into the nuts and bolts.

As you can tell I can go on and on with regards to creating and implementing an effective human trafficking strategy and awareness campaign – and I feel as though I am starting to go on and on – so I will stop.

Anyway, something positive from the government of Ukraine both on an international and domestic level for a change!

 

Momentum in the release of Tymoshenko?

I have written several times about the possible release of Tymoshenko – and more specifically the timing and implications of doing so over the past few months, speculating that thee summer RADA recess would be a realistic time if it were to happen at all prior to the Vilnius summit.

It seems that others are also are speculating now, at a slightly later date in September – based upon comments from within the EU and Ukraine recently.

It is not secret that the electoral law and prosecutors code are on the RADA timetable for September for amendment in line with the EU normative, all current cases against Tymoshnko officially are “stopped” (if not closed), leaving the issue of Tymoshenko’s incarceration as a stumbling block for signatures to be exchanged in Vilnius as planned.

In short, the statements quoted in the article to form this theory add up to the old idea of releasing Tymoshenko on the grounds of ill health and sending her to Germany for treatment.  All the statements do give some plausibility to this political maneuvering.

However – for this to occur, it still needs the goodwill of Tymoshenko to agree.  Needless to say there are no statements from Tymoshenko that infer her agreement or otherwise.  That said it is doubtful that Tymoshenko would jeopardise the signing of the documents in Vilnius when she so ardently supports it – whether she is released or not.

Perhaps the bigger question, should she enter voluntary exile to facilitate these political maneuvers is just how long she would remain in Germany for treatment?  If released at the end of September, one would presume she would remain in Germany until after the signing of the AA in November if for no other reason than to add credibility to the seriousness of her illness in the eyes of the public and global audience.

It maybe she will be sent for treatment and not released officially, thus claiming asylum in Germany whilst there, but I do not think she would go for such a deal and neither would the EU – despite the rhetoric relating to the aspirations of 46 million Ukrainians being sacrificed at the alter of the Tymoshenko case, not to mention facilitating the rebuilding of the USSR under another name, as some within the EU frame the issue, should signatures not occur in November.

The next question, should this all play out as the linked article believes, is what will happen to the United Opposition upon her return?  So polarising and so destructive a force is she, that it seems unlikely they would remain “united” for very long should she try to reenter opposition politics as a major decision making figure – and her ego would not allow any other type of entry.

Anyway – an interesting article that is at least plausible when built around the recent statements made.

So whether I am right having stated the beginning of September – or not at all – or others are right in stating her release will occur by the end of September is a matter of splitting hairs.  It seems we agree that September is the month to watch for any finale in relation to Tymoshenko prior to Vilnius.

Identifying who are the true democrats – Democracy Ukraine

Having just spent the afternoon in a very nice restaurant in Odessa with a  Ukrainian politician – and witnessed the march past of a very vocal and lively anti-government protest by local Krygs against the government of Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek – the conversation turned to democracy and how best to support it within from without.

The question asked of me I presume, as somebody from without now living permanently within – rather than any urge of this politician to support from without any democratic notions within Kyrgyzstan.

Now there are truly numerous ways to support democracy within a nation from without, be it expertise or financial aid (or both) to the State apparatus, to civil society or to political parties themselves, or through development agencies with projects on the ground, the use of regional architecture such as the EU or OSCE – the list goes on and on to be honest.

However, blindly throwing money, time and expertise at supporting democracy has a very real risk of wasting these resources.  There is of course, a risk that such resources will be misused by the corrupt and insincere if these efforts are channeled through government that only purports to have the political will to carry out reforms.  There is a risk of looking to “western-orientated” NGOs for reasons of language or location within a nation rather than finding more “authentic and genuine” civil society actors in the provinces speaking only provincial language.  There is the risk that with money and expertise to farm out, the donor will approach the recipient rather than the other way around leading to a legitimacy crisis on the ground in some cases.

All very serious issues when thinking about democratic assistance to democratic agents in foreign lands – particularly when elections (whatever their genuine democratic worth in any particular nation) are on the horizon.

How close to any election can any external democratic assistance be given to the democratic parties before it is seen by both incumbent government and large parts of society as intervention rather than democratic assistance?  There is an obvious and extremely fine line between assisting democracy and democratic parties and being seen as intervening and “picking a winner” from without.

This is assuming that those without can actually identify any genuine democratic actors to support – rather than those who are opportunistic and thus semi-loyal to the idea of democracy, or those that are simply not democratic whatsoever other than having the word “democratic” attached to themselves or party when officially registering the party name.

It can hardly be claimed that Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushenko, Tymoshenko or Yanukovych are (or were) truly and genuinely democrats.  They may like the idea – but only so long as it serves their purpose at the time.

Kravchuk had democracy dumped in his lap when the USSR imploded.

Kuchma used dominant party politics during his term which failed to be continued as expected only due to the 2004/5 mass mobilisation of the Ukrainian public.

Yushenko continually interfered with the rule of law and most infamously with the constitutional courts to the point where the Council of Europe wrote to him in 2007 pointedly highlighting such an erroneous path – which he subsequently ignored.

Tymoshenko was and is known as an autocrat amongst most of her party and throughout the Ukrainian based foreign diplomatic community – which is hardly surprising when empirically and historically no political party or political faction that has born the name of any specific individual has ever produced anything other than an autocrat when they got into power.  What else could “Block Yulia Tymoshenko” have been other than a vehicle for the personalisation of power for Yulia Tymoshenko?

Yanukovych is seemingly attempting to return to the dominant party politics of the Kuchma era whilst brazenly reinforcing patron-client relationships on an almost daily basis.  Thus far it appears nobody within the Party of Regions is intent on reigning him in and eventually it may reach a stage where he becomes stronger than his party – no different to the inability of Batkivshchyna or Block Yulia Tymoshenko to control her.

This ably assisted, unfortunately, by a “United Opposition” that is neither “united” nor genuinely democratic across its tri-party make-up.  It is no surprise that the European Parliament has made repeated calls for the United Opposition to jettison Svoboda from its line-up, as extreme nationalist politics is by nature exclusive rather than inclusive and thus is not going to result in a full-blooded, liberal and inclusive democracy.

Who were and are the genuine democrats to support amongst these people?

Now there will be – and there are – those within both the current opposition and current majority that are genuinely up for the democratic leap despite the probable losses to themselves personally in doing so.  But, is it wise to support any specific actor, as that again can be seen as foreign intervention and “picking a winner” which may do more harm than good for that individual’s chances on polling day.

Are any of these truly democratic actors capable of garnering mass public support, or in supporting them would it be a case of futility by way of supporting a lost cause?  Even if there is such an actor, is the continued personalisation of politics what Ukraine needs?

So what to support?  The answer has to be the principles and processes of democracy in isolation from individual actors – especially and particularly so when elections sit just over the horizon.  The question then, is how to effectively and consistently support the principles and processes of democracy whilst insuring maximum impact in a somewhat hostile/insincere environment – especially and particularly during election time?

That question and the answers will have to await another sunny afternoon in another nice Odessa restaurant with the same company – and I fear it is my turn to pay next time!

(And yes, of course it does actually help when it comes to the legitimacy of any foreign donor purporting to support the principles and processes of democracy to have their own house in order and walk their own talk – before I get the usual, inevitable, expected – and yes warranted – comments about the EU and Member States.)

President of Ukraine meets with FBI Director – Why?

Regular readers will by now be aware of my highlighting occurrences that to me appear either unusual or failing to get the media attention they deserve.

Yesterday, President Yanukovych met with FBI Director Robert Mueller in Kyiv – which strikes me as odd.

What is the Director of the FBI doing in Ukraine?

Why is the President of Ukraine meeting with an American domestic security official?  No offence meant to Mr Mueller, but he is nothing more than an American civil servant, albeit one in charge of probably the most powerful domestic American state institutions.

I would have raised an eyebrow had President Yanukovych met with the Director of the CIA, but at least the CIA is charged with external, rather than internal US security affairs – Even so, director of the CIA or FBI makes little difference – both are still nothing more than a high level civil servant and not a politician or national leader of equal standing on the world stage.

In short, peer to peer meetings I can understand, although some would still question why the Director of the FBI is in Ukraine rather than somebody further down the FBI food chain – but meeting with the President begs the questions “Why?”  both for Mr Mueller’s presence here, meeting the President, and that it is made public rather than kept private.

Yes, yes, I know, Boston bombings, OSCE presidency, war on terror etc., – but that is boiler room staff work, signed off by security agency hierarchy – not FBI Directors and national presidents.

Are we to expect some sort of announcement in the days, weeks and months ahead that is the result of this meeting?

Wanted – Proposals to support Ukrainian regional development policy – Who knew?

Sometimes it is possible to simply drown in the amount of information on the Internet.  Indeed, sorting the wheat from the chaff can be very time consuming – to the point that by the time such information has been separated, it has become irrelevant due to the continued as the torrent of information.

It is why I generally stay away from headline news relating to Ukraine.  There is enough slipshod reporting of headline events here that it generally serves no purpose to add to such a cacophony.  Such a policy leads me to look at issues that maybe should get greater coverage than they get for one reason or another – and I am often left asking “who knew?” when what I do find can only be written about reactively rather than proactively.

Today is no exception when it comes to finding important issues buried under the weight of irrelevant media coverage.

I find myself at this appeal having read something from the KfW (German Investment Bank) relating to Euro 17.1 million it has spent in rural Ukraine, that led me to the above link.

It is a call for proposals and conceptual notes relating to the development of rural Ukraine funded by Euro 31 million of EU money.  Proposals and conceptual notes to be submitted by 1st July 2013 – not very far away at all.

But I am left asking myself once again – “Who knew?”

I have found nothing on any Ukrainian news websites or major government website.  Nothing on the Odessa, Lviv, Nikoliev or Yalta city websites either (a straw pole granted).

As far as I can tell, the only people “who knew” are those within investment banking, governments, the EU departments associated with the project, and 2954 people on Facebook who “liked” it – of which I am now one.

Surely some of the better proposals and concepts will come from the rural communities themselves that such development programmes seek to assist?  If not the best concepts, then certainly for the sake of inclusiveness, accountability, transparency and local goodwill, any self-generated concepts are worthy of examination even if ultimately dismissed in favour of better concepts proposed by others – but that local society input cannot happen if rural communities don’t know about the appeal for such proposals.

Why is there no EU drive to better advertise such programmes in the local press of the regions in Ukraine?  Why no central or local government highlighting?  To reach the people of Ukraine, it is surely better to engage them directly – or at least instigate the option of direct dialogue over issues that have a direct and relevant impact on their lives by actively reaching out via traditional media.

How much do 28 regional “box ads” in the local newspapers cost the EU when attempting not only to reach out directly to the Ukrainian public who do not all have access to the Internet, but also get their ideas and input relating to how best to develop their communities?

Hmmmm